From cebac32145f948bfca7c44c663a0bcdcd9c56830 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: zhou-kkk <104576154+zhou-kkk@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Sat, 29 Aug 2026 12:13:39 +0800 Subject: [PATCH] fix: sanitize chunk upload file_name to prevent path traversal --- apps/base/utils.py | 1 + core/storage.py | 2 ++ tests/test_security_hardening.py | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 37 insertions(+) diff --git a/apps/base/utils.py b/apps/base/utils.py index a453c89..2f1dba7 100644 --- a/apps/base/utils.py +++ b/apps/base/utils.py @@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ async def get_chunk_file_path_name( ) -> Tuple[str, str, str, str, str]: today = await get_now() storage_path = settings.storage_path.strip("/") + file_name = await sanitize_filename(unquote(file_name or "")) base_path = f"share/data/{today.strftime('%Y/%m/%d')}/{upload_id}" path = f"{storage_path}/{base_path}" if storage_path else base_path prefix, suffix = os.path.splitext(file_name) diff --git a/core/storage.py b/core/storage.py index 016163c..16630dd 100644 --- a/core/storage.py +++ b/core/storage.py @@ -116,6 +116,8 @@ class SystemFileStorage(FileStorageInterface): """将相对路径解析到数据根目录内,阻止路径穿越。""" root = self.root_path.resolve() raw = str(relative_path or "").replace("\\", "/").lstrip("/") + if any(part == ".." for part in raw.split("/")): + raise ValueError("非法文件路径") candidate = (root / raw).resolve() try: candidate.relative_to(root) diff --git a/tests/test_security_hardening.py b/tests/test_security_hardening.py index fc01b8c..2d7ee82 100644 --- a/tests/test_security_hardening.py +++ b/tests/test_security_hardening.py @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ from fastapi import HTTPException from apps.admin import dependencies as admin_dependencies from apps.admin.dependencies import create_token, verify_token from apps.admin.services import LocalFileClass +from apps.base.utils import get_chunk_file_path_name from core.settings import data_root, settings from core.storage import SystemFileStorage from core.utils import hash_password, verify_password @@ -71,11 +72,44 @@ class SystemStoragePathTests(unittest.TestCase): with self.assertRaises(ValueError): self.storage._resolve_safe_path("../etc/passwd") + def test_resolve_safe_path_blocks_internal_dotdot(self): + with self.assertRaises(ValueError): + self.storage._resolve_safe_path("share/data/2026/08/29/x/../../../../../../filecodebox.db") + + def test_resolve_safe_path_blocks_windows_dotdot(self): + with self.assertRaises(ValueError): + self.storage._resolve_safe_path("share\\data\\..\\..\\filecodebox.db") + def test_resolve_safe_path_allows_nested(self): target = self.storage._resolve_safe_path("share/data/a/b.txt") self.assertTrue(str(target).startswith(str(Path(self._tmpdir.name).resolve()))) +class ChunkFileNameSanitizeTests(unittest.TestCase): + def test_chunk_file_path_name_strips_traversal(self): + path, _, _, filename, save_path = asyncio.run( + get_chunk_file_path_name("../../../../../../filecodebox.db", "a" * 32) + ) + self.assertNotIn("..", save_path) + self.assertEqual(filename, "filecodebox.db") + self.assertEqual(save_path, f"{path}/filecodebox.db") + self.assertIn("a" * 32, path) + + def test_chunk_file_path_name_strips_windows_traversal(self): + _, _, _, filename, save_path = asyncio.run( + get_chunk_file_path_name("..\\..\\..\\..\\..\\..\\evil.bin", "b" * 32) + ) + self.assertNotIn("..", save_path) + self.assertEqual(filename, "evil.bin") + + def test_chunk_file_path_name_keeps_normal_name(self): + _, _, _, filename, save_path = asyncio.run( + get_chunk_file_path_name("safe.txt", "c" * 32) + ) + self.assertEqual(filename, "safe.txt") + self.assertTrue(save_path.endswith("/safe.txt")) + + class AdminJwtUrlSafeTests(unittest.TestCase): def setUp(self): settings.jwt_secret = "j" * 48