* fix: constant-time comparison for download tokens (security item 5)
Replace the set-membership key check in /share/download with
hmac.compare_digest over the two valid window tokens; add negative-path
tests (wrong key 403, both windows accepted, foreign-code token 403).
* fix: single source for attachment headers + guard tests (security item 2)
All six Content-Disposition construction sites across the five storage
backends now go through build_attachment_headers; the header is what
neutralizes stored XSS on the same-origin download path. Guard tests
assert every get_file_response uses the builder and no hand-built
disposition reappears.
* fix: reject internal-network endpoints for storage config (security item 7)
s3_endpoint_url/s3_hostname/webdav_url are fetched server-side; with
APP_ENV=production the write entry now enforces http(s) schemes and a
loopback/private/link-local/metadata host blacklist. Development env
stays open for local minio/webdav. Already-stored values are never
re-validated, so existing deployments are unaffected.
* fix: JSON 404 for handler-raised 404s; negative-path test batch
Starlette status-code handlers take precedence over the HTTPException
class handler, so registering the theme index as the 404 handler turned
every HTTPException(404) app-wide into a 200 HTML page (found by the new
negative-path tests). The new not_found_handler serves the theme page
only to browsers (Accept: text/html) and JSON 404 to API clients.
Negative-path batch: download count exhaustion, missing chunk session
404s, expired presign session deletion, admin update_file uniqueness/
existence.
* fix: run container as non-root app user with compat volume chown (security item 3)
Entrypoint starts as root only to fix the data-dir ownership (skipped
when nothing needs changing or when the deployer sets an explicit user),
then drops to uid 10001 via gosu. Verified in-container: uvicorn runs as
app (uid 10001), setup and share round-trip work against a root-owned
volume.
* fix: compare download tokens as bytes (non-ASCII key caused 500)
* test: lock changed-only semantics for endpoint config saves
Integration regression for the background lesson: a stored internal
endpoint must not block unrelated settings saves in production mode;
changing to an internal endpoint (URL or bare-hostname form) is 400.
* fix: resolve-based SSRF check — deny IP shorthands, hex/decimal IPs, DNS maps
Probe found the static blacklist bypassed by glibc shorthands (127.1,
10.1), decimal (2130706433) and hex IP forms, *.localhost, and
loopback-mapping DNS services. Both validators now resolve the host and
re-check every resolved address; hostname tier extracts the host part
correctly for [v6]/host:port/bare-v6 forms. 44 tests.
* test: pin 404 handler dual-branch behavior (browser theme page vs API JSON)
* fix: write back normalized endpoint values; hostname dev-gate test
* test: header-injection negative paths for attachment disposition
* fix: S3 merge buffers parts to >=5MiB; missing object 404 upfront
- S3 multipart rejects parts <5MiB (EntityTooSmall) except the last; chunk
size is client-controlled (commonly 2-4MB) so multi-chunk merges always
failed with 500. Merge now buffers chunks into >=5MiB parts (memory
bound: 5MB + one chunk).
- get_file_response: a 404 head_object now raises StorageError(404)
upfront instead of signing a doomed presigned URL and failing mid-stream
(aligns with local backend semantics from the M2 behavior unification).
* test: S3 backend coverage via in-process moto server (13 cases)
mock_aws cannot intercept aioboto3's aiohttp stack, so tests run against
a real in-process ThreadedMotoServer endpoint. Covers roundtrips, missing
object 404, merge failure modes (missing chunk / hash mismatch -> abort,
no leftover object), cleanup scoping, presign shapes, proxy dispatch.
Also adds moto[s3,server] to the dev group and CI.
* fix: WebDAV missing object 404 upfront; connection errors map to 503
HEAD 404 was silently swallowed (signed a 200 bad stream that failed
mid-download, same family as the S3 bug), and HEAD connection errors were
also swallowed so the 503 mapping never fired. Both now surface properly;
the aiohttp session is reclaimed on pre-stream exception paths.
* test: WebDAV backend coverage via in-process WebDAV server (9 cases)
Real HTTP (HEAD/GET/PUT/DELETE/MKCOL/PROPFIND) against a minimal aiohttp
WebDAV server over a temp dir: roundtrips, missing object 404, connection
error 503, delete with empty-parent cleanup, merge failure modes, chunk
cleanup scoping.
* fix: OneDrive missing object maps to 404 upfront; OpenDAL behavior pinned
OneDrive get_file_response translated graph itemNotFound into the outer
503 catch-all; now raises StorageError(404) like local/S3/WebDAV.
OpenDAL already mapped missing objects to 404 via its outer catch —
pinned with fake-operator tests (SDK not in runtime deps, instances built
via __new__). Also tightens the S3 presign URL assertion.
* test: admin write-path coverage (batch/single delete, batch update, policy actions)
13 negative-path cases for the previously untested data-modifying admin
endpoints: mixed-id aggregation with duplicates and missing records,
empty-list rejections, clear_expired_at permanence semantics, policy
action boundaries (zero limit 400, unknown action 400, missing 404),
and the DoesNotExist->404 mapping pinned for single delete.
* test: admin read-path and view-preset CRUD coverage (22 cases)
Detail/metadata/preview/admin-download/activities/local-lists+delete/
verify: missing-record 404s, note/tag truncation limits, preview max_chars
truncation, activity filtering and the 80-event clamp, local path
traversal rejection. Presets: update-vs-create by id, name truncation,
filter normalization clamps, 24-preset cap, delete-missing 404.
* refactor: move auth primitives to apps/base/auth, kill base->admin dep
JWT create/verify, bearer extraction and the share-upload gate move to
apps.base.auth (consumed by both surfaces); admin.dependencies keeps
admin session gating and service providers, re-exporting the primitives
for import-path compatibility. base.views no longer imports from
apps.admin — the last cross-app reverse dependency is gone.
* refactor: split admin services god-module (ConfigService/LocalFile out)
apps/admin/services.py (1697 lines) becomes FileService (~1200 lines) +
a compatibility facade re-exporting ConfigService, LocalFileService,
LocalFileClass and keyvalue_write_lock from their new homes
(config_service.py holds the D5 KeyValue lock; one-way imports, no
cycle). test_admin_security patch targets follow ConfigService to its
new module. Behavior unchanged; 247 tests green.
* fix: size-less uploads no longer crash (upstream seek bug)
validate_file_size's size-None branch called UploadFile.seek(0, 2),
which raises TypeError (UploadFile.seek takes one arg); the underlying
SpooledTemporaryFile.seek is sync, so awaiting it also fails. Use the
underlying file object with sync seek(0, SEEK_END). Surface discovered
by the mypy pilot run; regression test covers the size-None branch.
* chore: bump direct deps (patch/minor)
fastapi 0.139.2->0.141.1, pydantic 2.12.5->2.13.5, uvicorn 0.51.0->0.53.0,
aiohttp 3.14.2->3.14.3; lockfile regenerated. tortoise-orm 0.x->1.x major
deliberately deferred pending API-change review.
* ci: gradual mypy adoption via baseline ratchet
scripts/mypy_ratchet.py compares mypy output against
scripts/mypy-baseline.txt (line numbers stripped for edit stability):
new type errors fail CI, fixes are folded back via --regenerate.
Baseline starts at 30 known errors; the seek bug found in the pilot was
fixed before baselining. mypy joins the dev group and CI.
* fix: migrate WebDAV auth off aiohttp.BasicAuth (deprecated in 4.0)
Dependency-upgrade probe on aiohttp 3.14.3 surfaced the BasicAuth
deprecation; switch to aiohttp.encode_basic_auth() headers so the
aiohttp 4.0 upgrade does not break the WebDAV backend.
* chore: drop dead code (WebDAV _instance stub, unused LocalFileClass.write)
* test: file-validation negative paths (13 cases)
Magic-bytes spoofing (text-as-png, exe-as-pdf, mp4/webp box detection),
whitelist rule semantics (star/image-wildcard/content mismatch), chunk-0
header validation parity, and end-to-end UploadFile rejection.
* test: migration runner coverage (5 cases)
Full chain executes 001-007 in filename order and registers; rerun is
idempotent; pre-registered entries are skipped (DDL not re-executed);
the resulting schema matches deployment; a failing migration propagates
and is not registered. Uses a fresh :memory: DB without
generate_schemas so the migrations themselves build the schema (the
real deployment path).
* refactor: split core/storage.py into a package (per-backend modules)
core/storage.py (1400+ lines, six backends) becomes core/storage/ with
_base.py (data contracts, interface, shared header builder), and
local/s3/onedrive/opendal/webdav modules. The package __init__
re-exports the full historical public surface; test patch targets move
to the precise backend modules (core.storage.local.data_root etc.) and
the attachment guard scans the package. Import-only change; 264 tests
green. Storage-layer DI deferred: current tests construct instances
against patched settings, so the added surface isn't justified yet.
* refactor: TypedDict for IPRateLimit records
The rate-limit ledger mixed int and datetime under a loose Union typing,
producing 5 mypy noise errors. A TypedDict gives precise per-key types;
setdefault replaces the get-then-assign pattern. One mypy baseline error
family resolved; 264 tests green.
* chore: tighten mypy baseline after IPRateLimit TypedDict
* refactor: resolve all 26 baseline mypy errors; precise test assertions
Per-error treatment (no bulk script): honest annotations for
StoredDownload (Path/bytes/Callable), KeyValue.value (Any for JSONField),
dict[str, Any] for form/config dicts; signature split in create_token;
str() normalization in config int(); platform/type-ignore only where the
checker cannot follow (msvcrt, FastAPI Request injection). Baseline file
and ratchet compare now redundant at zero errors but kept as the guard
against regressions.
Tests: assertions tightened to status_code == 403 with HTTPException
raises; _create_share explicit parameters replace **extra passthrough;
seek-fix pointer-reset assertion persisted.
Admin can browse NAS files under data/local including subfolders and share
them in place. Shares use file_path=local-ref, skip storage quota, and never
delete the original file on expire.
#514 began validating `background` as an http(s) URL against the *merged*
config, so a value stored by an older release (a relative path, or one
containing a space/parenthesis — all legal before) made every subsequent
settings save return 400, including saves that never touched `background`.
Existing deployments could not change any setting at all.
Validate only values that actually change: an untouched legacy value is
kept as-is (it is still html-escaped on render), while any edit must pass
validation. Regression tests cover both directions and fail without this
change.
Also treat OverflowError from hashlib.scrypt as a non-matching hash so a
hand-crafted n/r/p cannot disturb the login path on runtimes that raise it.
settings/activities/view-presets are whole-blob KeyValue rows; concurrent
admin operations could silently drop each other's writes (last-writer-wins).
Single-worker deployment assumption documented; lock is process-local.
- quota.get_storage_usage (runs on every upload) now aggregates via Sum
instead of loading every row
- dashboard simple counters (total/size/expired/active/text/chunked/used,
yesterday/today, top suffixes, recent 8) moved to SQL; the per-row health
rules engine keeps its single pass (documented)
- storage contract drops UploadFile in favor of BinaryIO (+content_type param),
completing the framework decoupling of the storage layer
- LocalFileClass.read() leaked an open fd and its handle was passed where
save_file expected UploadFile — /admin/local/share 500ed on every call;
now reads bytes via with-block and shares correctly (regression tests added)
- OneDrive save_file additionally had save_path called as a function — fixed
- new hashes use scrypt (n=2^14, r=8, p=1); sha256 and plaintext formats
keep verifying unchanged, so existing deployments are unaffected
- on successful login a legacy-stored admin password is rehashed to scrypt
in the settings KeyValue row
- add password_needs_rehash() and extend scheme detection; stdlib only, no
new dependency
- add pyproject.toml with pytest config and dev dependency group (PEP 735)
- add ruff (core correctness rules) + pre-commit hook
- fix stored XSS: html.escape site config before index template injection,
with regression tests
- log previously swallowed cleanup exceptions in upload rollback paths
- consolidate three duplicate path generators into build_file_path
(also aligns chunk/presign date dirs to get_now() instead of local time)
- drop redundant ip_limit sync in load_config (refresh_settings covers all limiters)
- remove dead code (calculate_file_hash, commented-out block), two orphan
guide docs, and stale .gitignore entries
- add dependabot for pip, docker, and github-actions
- bump starlette 1.3.1 -> 1.6.0 (no breaking API changes; verified with the
full test suite plus an ASGI smoke test incl. Range downloads)
- skip theme asset tests when themes/ is not built locally
Close the remaining security gaps: validate upload content against
file signatures, rate-limit admin login failures with configurable
thresholds, and run the container as uid 1000 instead of root.
Upgrade aiohttp and related packages, harden local file and storage path checks, tighten password/JWT comparisons, and default Docker forwarded IP trust to empty.