#514 began validating `background` as an http(s) URL against the *merged*
config, so a value stored by an older release (a relative path, or one
containing a space/parenthesis — all legal before) made every subsequent
settings save return 400, including saves that never touched `background`.
Existing deployments could not change any setting at all.
Validate only values that actually change: an untouched legacy value is
kept as-is (it is still html-escaped on render), while any edit must pass
validation. Regression tests cover both directions and fail without this
change.
Also treat OverflowError from hashlib.scrypt as a non-matching hash so a
hand-crafted n/r/p cannot disturb the login path on runtimes that raise it.
settings/activities/view-presets are whole-blob KeyValue rows; concurrent
admin operations could silently drop each other's writes (last-writer-wins).
Single-worker deployment assumption documented; lock is process-local.
- storage contract drops UploadFile in favor of BinaryIO (+content_type param),
completing the framework decoupling of the storage layer
- LocalFileClass.read() leaked an open fd and its handle was passed where
save_file expected UploadFile — /admin/local/share 500ed on every call;
now reads bytes via with-block and shares correctly (regression tests added)
- OneDrive save_file additionally had save_path called as a function — fixed
Close the remaining security gaps: validate upload content against
file signatures, rate-limit admin login failures with configurable
thresholds, and run the container as uid 1000 instead of root.
Upgrade aiohttp and related packages, harden local file and storage path checks, tighten password/JWT comparisons, and default Docker forwarded IP trust to empty.