import copy import ipaddress import os import secrets import socket from dataclasses import dataclass from typing import Any from urllib.parse import urlsplit from core.utils import hash_password, is_password_hashed, verify_password JWT_SECRET_MIN_LENGTH = 32 INTERNAL_CONFIG_KEYS = {"jwt_secret"} LEGACY_DEFAULT_ADMIN_TOKEN = "FileCodeBox" + "2023" @dataclass class SecurityConfigResult: config: dict[str, Any] changed: bool = False password_hashed: bool = False jwt_secret_rotated: bool = False setup_required: bool = False def generate_jwt_secret() -> str: return secrets.token_urlsafe(48) def is_valid_jwt_secret(secret: Any) -> bool: return isinstance(secret, str) and len(secret) >= JWT_SECRET_MIN_LENGTH def is_config_initialized(config: dict[str, Any]) -> bool: """Cheap initialization probe — runs on EVERY request via the middleware. Must never run a slow hash: a scrypt-stored token cannot be the legacy default (which only ever existed as plaintext or sha256), so those tokens are initialized without any verification. Only plaintext/sha256 tokens go through the legacy-default comparison, which is microseconds. """ admin_token = str(config.get("admin_token") or "") if not admin_token: return False if is_password_hashed(admin_token) and admin_token.startswith("scrypt$"): return True return not verify_password(LEGACY_DEFAULT_ADMIN_TOKEN, admin_token) def prepare_security_config(config: dict[str, Any]) -> SecurityConfigResult: next_config = copy.deepcopy(config) result = SecurityConfigResult(config=next_config) admin_token = str(next_config.get("admin_token") or "") if not admin_token: result.setup_required = True elif verify_password(LEGACY_DEFAULT_ADMIN_TOKEN, admin_token): next_config["admin_token"] = "" result.setup_required = True result.changed = True elif not is_password_hashed(admin_token): next_config["admin_token"] = hash_password(admin_token) result.password_hashed = True result.changed = True jwt_secret = next_config.get("jwt_secret") if not is_valid_jwt_secret(jwt_secret): next_config["jwt_secret"] = generate_jwt_secret() result.jwt_secret_rotated = True result.changed = True return result # 出站端点白名单/黑名单(SSRF 防护)。 # 这些配置项会被服务器直接当作上游地址访问:被劫持的管理员会话可以把实例 # 变成内网代理跳板,或把数据发往任意地址。校验只在写入入口(update_config), # 已存值不受影响;APP_ENV 非 production(本地开发,如 minio/webdav)时放行。 OUTBOUND_ENDPOINT_CONFIG_KEYS = ("s3_endpoint_url", "s3_hostname", "webdav_url") _ENDPOINT_SCHEME_WHITELIST = {"http", "https"} _ENDPOINT_HOST_DENY_SUFFIXES = ( ".local", ".internal", ".lan", ".home.arpa", ".corp", ".localhost", ) def _endpoint_ip_is_denied(ip_str: str) -> bool: try: ip = ipaddress.ip_address(ip_str) except ValueError: return False return ( ip.is_private or ip.is_loopback or ip.is_link_local or ip.is_reserved or ip.is_multicast or ip.is_unspecified ) def _endpoint_host_is_denied(host: str) -> bool: host = host.strip("[]").lower() if host in {"localhost"} or host.endswith(_ENDPOINT_HOST_DENY_SUFFIXES): return True # 字面 IP 直接判;非字面形态(速记 "127.1"、十进制 2130706433、十六进制、 # *.localhost、nip.io 类 DNS 映射)交给解析后逐 IP 复判——静态字符串 # 黑名单对它们全部失效,这是探测中实测确认的绕过面。 if _endpoint_ip_is_denied(host): return True try: infos = socket.getaddrinfo(host, None) except (socket.gaierror, UnicodeError, OSError): return False for info in infos: # getaddrinfo 的 sockaddr 首元素在 IPv4/IPv6 下均为 str(int 仅出现在 # AF_UNIX 等异形族)——显式 str() 让类型检查器与运行时一致。 if _endpoint_ip_is_denied(str(info[4][0])): return True return False def validate_outbound_endpoint(value: Any) -> str: """校验完整 URL 形态的出站端点(s3_endpoint_url / webdav_url)。""" endpoint = str(value or "").strip() if not endpoint: return "" if os.environ.get("APP_ENV", "development") != "production": return endpoint parts = urlsplit(endpoint) if parts.scheme.lower() not in _ENDPOINT_SCHEME_WHITELIST: raise ValueError(f"端点协议必须是 http(s):{endpoint}") host = parts.hostname or "" if not host: raise ValueError(f"端点缺少主机名:{endpoint}") if _endpoint_host_is_denied(host): raise ValueError(f"端点不允许指向内网/保留地址:{endpoint}") return endpoint def validate_outbound_hostname(value: Any) -> str: """校验裸主机名形态的出站端点(s3_hostname,存储层拼接 https://{hostname})。""" hostname = str(value or "").strip() if not hostname: return "" if os.environ.get("APP_ENV", "development") != "production": return hostname if "://" in hostname or "/" in hostname or "@" in hostname: raise ValueError(f"s3_hostname 应为裸主机名,不含协议、路径或 userinfo:{hostname}") # 取主机部分:[v6] 形态取括号内;host:port 取冒号前;裸 IPv6(多个冒号)整体 if "[" in hostname: host = hostname.split("[", 1)[1].split("]", 1)[0] rest = hostname.split("]", 1)[1] if "]" in hostname else "" if rest and not rest.startswith(":"): raise ValueError(f"s3_hostname 的 IPv6 括号后只允许端口:{hostname}") elif hostname.count(":") == 1: host = hostname.split(":")[0] else: host = hostname if not host or _endpoint_host_is_denied(host): raise ValueError(f"端点不允许指向内网/保留地址:{hostname}") return hostname