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* fix: constant-time comparison for download tokens (security item 5) Replace the set-membership key check in /share/download with hmac.compare_digest over the two valid window tokens; add negative-path tests (wrong key 403, both windows accepted, foreign-code token 403). * fix: single source for attachment headers + guard tests (security item 2) All six Content-Disposition construction sites across the five storage backends now go through build_attachment_headers; the header is what neutralizes stored XSS on the same-origin download path. Guard tests assert every get_file_response uses the builder and no hand-built disposition reappears. * fix: reject internal-network endpoints for storage config (security item 7) s3_endpoint_url/s3_hostname/webdav_url are fetched server-side; with APP_ENV=production the write entry now enforces http(s) schemes and a loopback/private/link-local/metadata host blacklist. Development env stays open for local minio/webdav. Already-stored values are never re-validated, so existing deployments are unaffected. * fix: JSON 404 for handler-raised 404s; negative-path test batch Starlette status-code handlers take precedence over the HTTPException class handler, so registering the theme index as the 404 handler turned every HTTPException(404) app-wide into a 200 HTML page (found by the new negative-path tests). The new not_found_handler serves the theme page only to browsers (Accept: text/html) and JSON 404 to API clients. Negative-path batch: download count exhaustion, missing chunk session 404s, expired presign session deletion, admin update_file uniqueness/ existence. * fix: run container as non-root app user with compat volume chown (security item 3) Entrypoint starts as root only to fix the data-dir ownership (skipped when nothing needs changing or when the deployer sets an explicit user), then drops to uid 10001 via gosu. Verified in-container: uvicorn runs as app (uid 10001), setup and share round-trip work against a root-owned volume. * fix: compare download tokens as bytes (non-ASCII key caused 500) * test: lock changed-only semantics for endpoint config saves Integration regression for the background lesson: a stored internal endpoint must not block unrelated settings saves in production mode; changing to an internal endpoint (URL or bare-hostname form) is 400. * fix: resolve-based SSRF check — deny IP shorthands, hex/decimal IPs, DNS maps Probe found the static blacklist bypassed by glibc shorthands (127.1, 10.1), decimal (2130706433) and hex IP forms, *.localhost, and loopback-mapping DNS services. Both validators now resolve the host and re-check every resolved address; hostname tier extracts the host part correctly for [v6]/host:port/bare-v6 forms. 44 tests. * test: pin 404 handler dual-branch behavior (browser theme page vs API JSON) * fix: write back normalized endpoint values; hostname dev-gate test * test: header-injection negative paths for attachment disposition * fix: S3 merge buffers parts to >=5MiB; missing object 404 upfront - S3 multipart rejects parts <5MiB (EntityTooSmall) except the last; chunk size is client-controlled (commonly 2-4MB) so multi-chunk merges always failed with 500. Merge now buffers chunks into >=5MiB parts (memory bound: 5MB + one chunk). - get_file_response: a 404 head_object now raises StorageError(404) upfront instead of signing a doomed presigned URL and failing mid-stream (aligns with local backend semantics from the M2 behavior unification). * test: S3 backend coverage via in-process moto server (13 cases) mock_aws cannot intercept aioboto3's aiohttp stack, so tests run against a real in-process ThreadedMotoServer endpoint. Covers roundtrips, missing object 404, merge failure modes (missing chunk / hash mismatch -> abort, no leftover object), cleanup scoping, presign shapes, proxy dispatch. Also adds moto[s3,server] to the dev group and CI. * fix: WebDAV missing object 404 upfront; connection errors map to 503 HEAD 404 was silently swallowed (signed a 200 bad stream that failed mid-download, same family as the S3 bug), and HEAD connection errors were also swallowed so the 503 mapping never fired. Both now surface properly; the aiohttp session is reclaimed on pre-stream exception paths. * test: WebDAV backend coverage via in-process WebDAV server (9 cases) Real HTTP (HEAD/GET/PUT/DELETE/MKCOL/PROPFIND) against a minimal aiohttp WebDAV server over a temp dir: roundtrips, missing object 404, connection error 503, delete with empty-parent cleanup, merge failure modes, chunk cleanup scoping. * fix: OneDrive missing object maps to 404 upfront; OpenDAL behavior pinned OneDrive get_file_response translated graph itemNotFound into the outer 503 catch-all; now raises StorageError(404) like local/S3/WebDAV. OpenDAL already mapped missing objects to 404 via its outer catch — pinned with fake-operator tests (SDK not in runtime deps, instances built via __new__). Also tightens the S3 presign URL assertion. * test: admin write-path coverage (batch/single delete, batch update, policy actions) 13 negative-path cases for the previously untested data-modifying admin endpoints: mixed-id aggregation with duplicates and missing records, empty-list rejections, clear_expired_at permanence semantics, policy action boundaries (zero limit 400, unknown action 400, missing 404), and the DoesNotExist->404 mapping pinned for single delete. * test: admin read-path and view-preset CRUD coverage (22 cases) Detail/metadata/preview/admin-download/activities/local-lists+delete/ verify: missing-record 404s, note/tag truncation limits, preview max_chars truncation, activity filtering and the 80-event clamp, local path traversal rejection. Presets: update-vs-create by id, name truncation, filter normalization clamps, 24-preset cap, delete-missing 404. * refactor: move auth primitives to apps/base/auth, kill base->admin dep JWT create/verify, bearer extraction and the share-upload gate move to apps.base.auth (consumed by both surfaces); admin.dependencies keeps admin session gating and service providers, re-exporting the primitives for import-path compatibility. base.views no longer imports from apps.admin — the last cross-app reverse dependency is gone. * refactor: split admin services god-module (ConfigService/LocalFile out) apps/admin/services.py (1697 lines) becomes FileService (~1200 lines) + a compatibility facade re-exporting ConfigService, LocalFileService, LocalFileClass and keyvalue_write_lock from their new homes (config_service.py holds the D5 KeyValue lock; one-way imports, no cycle). test_admin_security patch targets follow ConfigService to its new module. Behavior unchanged; 247 tests green. * fix: size-less uploads no longer crash (upstream seek bug) validate_file_size's size-None branch called UploadFile.seek(0, 2), which raises TypeError (UploadFile.seek takes one arg); the underlying SpooledTemporaryFile.seek is sync, so awaiting it also fails. Use the underlying file object with sync seek(0, SEEK_END). Surface discovered by the mypy pilot run; regression test covers the size-None branch. * chore: bump direct deps (patch/minor) fastapi 0.139.2->0.141.1, pydantic 2.12.5->2.13.5, uvicorn 0.51.0->0.53.0, aiohttp 3.14.2->3.14.3; lockfile regenerated. tortoise-orm 0.x->1.x major deliberately deferred pending API-change review. * ci: gradual mypy adoption via baseline ratchet scripts/mypy_ratchet.py compares mypy output against scripts/mypy-baseline.txt (line numbers stripped for edit stability): new type errors fail CI, fixes are folded back via --regenerate. Baseline starts at 30 known errors; the seek bug found in the pilot was fixed before baselining. mypy joins the dev group and CI. * fix: migrate WebDAV auth off aiohttp.BasicAuth (deprecated in 4.0) Dependency-upgrade probe on aiohttp 3.14.3 surfaced the BasicAuth deprecation; switch to aiohttp.encode_basic_auth() headers so the aiohttp 4.0 upgrade does not break the WebDAV backend. * chore: drop dead code (WebDAV _instance stub, unused LocalFileClass.write) * test: file-validation negative paths (13 cases) Magic-bytes spoofing (text-as-png, exe-as-pdf, mp4/webp box detection), whitelist rule semantics (star/image-wildcard/content mismatch), chunk-0 header validation parity, and end-to-end UploadFile rejection. * test: migration runner coverage (5 cases) Full chain executes 001-007 in filename order and registers; rerun is idempotent; pre-registered entries are skipped (DDL not re-executed); the resulting schema matches deployment; a failing migration propagates and is not registered. Uses a fresh :memory: DB without generate_schemas so the migrations themselves build the schema (the real deployment path). * refactor: split core/storage.py into a package (per-backend modules) core/storage.py (1400+ lines, six backends) becomes core/storage/ with _base.py (data contracts, interface, shared header builder), and local/s3/onedrive/opendal/webdav modules. The package __init__ re-exports the full historical public surface; test patch targets move to the precise backend modules (core.storage.local.data_root etc.) and the attachment guard scans the package. Import-only change; 264 tests green. Storage-layer DI deferred: current tests construct instances against patched settings, so the added surface isn't justified yet. * refactor: TypedDict for IPRateLimit records The rate-limit ledger mixed int and datetime under a loose Union typing, producing 5 mypy noise errors. A TypedDict gives precise per-key types; setdefault replaces the get-then-assign pattern. One mypy baseline error family resolved; 264 tests green. * chore: tighten mypy baseline after IPRateLimit TypedDict * refactor: resolve all 26 baseline mypy errors; precise test assertions Per-error treatment (no bulk script): honest annotations for StoredDownload (Path/bytes/Callable), KeyValue.value (Any for JSONField), dict[str, Any] for form/config dicts; signature split in create_token; str() normalization in config int(); platform/type-ignore only where the checker cannot follow (msvcrt, FastAPI Request injection). Baseline file and ratchet compare now redundant at zero errors but kept as the guard against regressions. Tests: assertions tightened to status_code == 403 with HTTPException raises; _create_share explicit parameters replace **extra passthrough; seek-fix pointer-reset assertion persisted.
185 lines
7.1 KiB
Python
185 lines
7.1 KiB
Python
import hashlib
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from core.logger import logger
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import shutil
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from typing import BinaryIO, Optional
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import aiofiles
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import asyncio
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from pathlib import Path
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from core.errors import StorageError
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from core.settings import data_root
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from core.utils import get_file_url, sanitize_filename
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from core.storage._base import (
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FileStorageInterface,
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StoredDownload,
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StoredFile,
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build_attachment_headers,
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)
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class SystemFileStorage(FileStorageInterface):
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def __init__(self):
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self.chunk_size = 256 * 1024
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self.root_path = data_root
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def _resolve_safe_path(self, relative_path: str) -> Path:
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"""将相对路径解析到数据根目录内,阻止路径穿越。"""
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root = self.root_path.resolve()
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raw = str(relative_path or "").replace("\\", "/").lstrip("/")
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if any(part == ".." for part in raw.split("/")):
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raise ValueError("非法文件路径")
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candidate = (root / raw).resolve()
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try:
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candidate.relative_to(root)
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except ValueError as exc:
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raise ValueError("非法文件路径") from exc
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return candidate
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def _save(self, file, save_path):
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with open(save_path, "wb") as f:
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chunk = file.read(self.chunk_size)
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while chunk:
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f.write(chunk)
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chunk = file.read(self.chunk_size)
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async def save_file(
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self, stream: BinaryIO, save_path: str, content_type: Optional[str] = None
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):
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path_obj = Path(str(save_path).replace("\\", "/"))
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directory = str(path_obj.parent).replace("\\", "/").lstrip("/")
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# 提取原始文件名并进行清理
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filename = await sanitize_filename(path_obj.name)
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# 构建安全的完整保存路径
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safe_save_path = self._resolve_safe_path(f"{directory}/{filename}" if directory not in {"", "."} else filename)
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# 确保目录存在
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if not safe_save_path.parent.exists():
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safe_save_path.parent.mkdir(parents=True)
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await asyncio.to_thread(self._save, stream, safe_save_path)
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async def delete_file(self, file_code: StoredFile):
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save_path = self._resolve_safe_path(file_code.get_file_path())
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if save_path.exists():
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save_path.unlink()
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async def get_file_url(self, file_code: StoredFile):
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return await get_file_url(file_code.code)
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async def get_file_response(self, file_code: StoredFile):
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file_path = self._resolve_safe_path(file_code.get_file_path())
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if not file_path.exists():
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raise StorageError(status_code=404, detail="文件已过期删除")
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filename = f"{file_code.prefix}{file_code.suffix}"
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try:
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headers = build_attachment_headers(filename, file_path.stat().st_size)
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except OSError:
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# 文件大小不可得时省略 Content-Length
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headers = build_attachment_headers(filename)
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return StoredDownload(
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filename=filename,
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headers=headers,
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path=file_path,
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)
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async def save_chunk(self, upload_id: str, chunk_index: int, chunk_data: bytes, chunk_hash: str, save_path: str):
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"""
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保存分片文件到本地文件系统
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:param upload_id: 上传会话ID
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:param chunk_index: 分片索引
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:param chunk_data: 分片数据
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:param chunk_hash: 分片哈希值
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:param save_path: 文件保存路径
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"""
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# 先校验目标文件路径合法,再将分片落到同级 chunks 目录。
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self._resolve_safe_path(save_path)
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chunk_path = self._resolve_safe_path(
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str(Path(save_path).parent / "chunks" / upload_id / f"{chunk_index}.part")
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)
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if not chunk_path.parent.exists():
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chunk_path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
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# 使用临时文件写入,确保原子性
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temp_path = chunk_path.with_suffix('.tmp')
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try:
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async with aiofiles.open(temp_path, "wb") as f:
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await f.write(chunk_data)
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# 原子重命名
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temp_path.rename(chunk_path)
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except Exception as e:
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if temp_path.exists():
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temp_path.unlink()
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raise e
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async def merge_chunks(self, upload_id: str, total_chunks: int, chunk_size: int, save_path: str, chunk_records: dict) -> tuple[str, str]:
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"""
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合并本地文件系统的分片文件并返回文件路径和完整哈希值
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:param upload_id: 上传会话ID
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:param chunk_info: 分片信息
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:param save_path: 文件保存路径
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:return: (文件路径, 文件哈希值)
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"""
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output_path = self._resolve_safe_path(save_path)
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output_path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
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chunk_base_dir = self._resolve_safe_path(
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str(Path(save_path).parent / "chunks" / upload_id)
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)
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file_sha256 = hashlib.sha256()
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# 使用临时文件写入,确保原子性
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temp_output = output_path.with_suffix('.merging')
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try:
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async with aiofiles.open(temp_output, "wb") as out_file:
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for i in range(total_chunks):
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# 获取分片记录
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chunk_record = self._get_chunk_record(chunk_records, i)
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chunk_path = chunk_base_dir / f"{i}.part"
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if not chunk_path.exists():
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raise ValueError(f"分片{i}文件不存在")
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async with aiofiles.open(chunk_path, "rb") as in_file:
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chunk_data = await in_file.read()
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self._verify_and_hash_chunk(i, chunk_record, chunk_data, file_sha256)
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await out_file.write(chunk_data)
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# 原子重命名
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temp_output.rename(output_path)
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except Exception as e:
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if temp_output.exists():
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temp_output.unlink()
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raise e
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return str(output_path), file_sha256.hexdigest()
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async def clean_chunks(self, upload_id: str, save_path: str):
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"""
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清理本地文件系统的临时分片文件
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:param upload_id: 上传会话ID
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:param save_path: 文件保存路径
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"""
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chunk_dir = self._resolve_safe_path(
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str(Path(save_path).parent / "chunks" / upload_id)
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)
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if chunk_dir.exists():
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try:
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shutil.rmtree(chunk_dir)
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except Exception as e:
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logger.warning(f"清理本地分片目录失败: {e}")
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# 清理父级 chunks 目录(如果为空)
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chunks_parent = chunk_dir.parent
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if chunks_parent.exists() and not any(chunks_parent.iterdir()):
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try:
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chunks_parent.rmdir()
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except Exception as e:
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logger.warning(f"清理 chunks 父目录失败: {e}")
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async def file_exists(self, save_path: str) -> bool:
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"""
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检查文件是否存在于本地文件系统
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:param save_path: 文件路径
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:return: 文件是否存在
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"""
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try:
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file_path = self._resolve_safe_path(save_path)
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except ValueError:
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return False
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return file_path.exists()
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