mirror of
https://github.com/vastsa/FileCodeBox.git
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* fix: constant-time comparison for download tokens (security item 5) Replace the set-membership key check in /share/download with hmac.compare_digest over the two valid window tokens; add negative-path tests (wrong key 403, both windows accepted, foreign-code token 403). * fix: single source for attachment headers + guard tests (security item 2) All six Content-Disposition construction sites across the five storage backends now go through build_attachment_headers; the header is what neutralizes stored XSS on the same-origin download path. Guard tests assert every get_file_response uses the builder and no hand-built disposition reappears. * fix: reject internal-network endpoints for storage config (security item 7) s3_endpoint_url/s3_hostname/webdav_url are fetched server-side; with APP_ENV=production the write entry now enforces http(s) schemes and a loopback/private/link-local/metadata host blacklist. Development env stays open for local minio/webdav. Already-stored values are never re-validated, so existing deployments are unaffected. * fix: JSON 404 for handler-raised 404s; negative-path test batch Starlette status-code handlers take precedence over the HTTPException class handler, so registering the theme index as the 404 handler turned every HTTPException(404) app-wide into a 200 HTML page (found by the new negative-path tests). The new not_found_handler serves the theme page only to browsers (Accept: text/html) and JSON 404 to API clients. Negative-path batch: download count exhaustion, missing chunk session 404s, expired presign session deletion, admin update_file uniqueness/ existence. * fix: run container as non-root app user with compat volume chown (security item 3) Entrypoint starts as root only to fix the data-dir ownership (skipped when nothing needs changing or when the deployer sets an explicit user), then drops to uid 10001 via gosu. Verified in-container: uvicorn runs as app (uid 10001), setup and share round-trip work against a root-owned volume. * fix: compare download tokens as bytes (non-ASCII key caused 500) * test: lock changed-only semantics for endpoint config saves Integration regression for the background lesson: a stored internal endpoint must not block unrelated settings saves in production mode; changing to an internal endpoint (URL or bare-hostname form) is 400. * fix: resolve-based SSRF check — deny IP shorthands, hex/decimal IPs, DNS maps Probe found the static blacklist bypassed by glibc shorthands (127.1, 10.1), decimal (2130706433) and hex IP forms, *.localhost, and loopback-mapping DNS services. Both validators now resolve the host and re-check every resolved address; hostname tier extracts the host part correctly for [v6]/host:port/bare-v6 forms. 44 tests. * test: pin 404 handler dual-branch behavior (browser theme page vs API JSON) * fix: write back normalized endpoint values; hostname dev-gate test * test: header-injection negative paths for attachment disposition * fix: S3 merge buffers parts to >=5MiB; missing object 404 upfront - S3 multipart rejects parts <5MiB (EntityTooSmall) except the last; chunk size is client-controlled (commonly 2-4MB) so multi-chunk merges always failed with 500. Merge now buffers chunks into >=5MiB parts (memory bound: 5MB + one chunk). - get_file_response: a 404 head_object now raises StorageError(404) upfront instead of signing a doomed presigned URL and failing mid-stream (aligns with local backend semantics from the M2 behavior unification). * test: S3 backend coverage via in-process moto server (13 cases) mock_aws cannot intercept aioboto3's aiohttp stack, so tests run against a real in-process ThreadedMotoServer endpoint. Covers roundtrips, missing object 404, merge failure modes (missing chunk / hash mismatch -> abort, no leftover object), cleanup scoping, presign shapes, proxy dispatch. Also adds moto[s3,server] to the dev group and CI. * fix: WebDAV missing object 404 upfront; connection errors map to 503 HEAD 404 was silently swallowed (signed a 200 bad stream that failed mid-download, same family as the S3 bug), and HEAD connection errors were also swallowed so the 503 mapping never fired. Both now surface properly; the aiohttp session is reclaimed on pre-stream exception paths. * test: WebDAV backend coverage via in-process WebDAV server (9 cases) Real HTTP (HEAD/GET/PUT/DELETE/MKCOL/PROPFIND) against a minimal aiohttp WebDAV server over a temp dir: roundtrips, missing object 404, connection error 503, delete with empty-parent cleanup, merge failure modes, chunk cleanup scoping. * fix: OneDrive missing object maps to 404 upfront; OpenDAL behavior pinned OneDrive get_file_response translated graph itemNotFound into the outer 503 catch-all; now raises StorageError(404) like local/S3/WebDAV. OpenDAL already mapped missing objects to 404 via its outer catch — pinned with fake-operator tests (SDK not in runtime deps, instances built via __new__). Also tightens the S3 presign URL assertion. * test: admin write-path coverage (batch/single delete, batch update, policy actions) 13 negative-path cases for the previously untested data-modifying admin endpoints: mixed-id aggregation with duplicates and missing records, empty-list rejections, clear_expired_at permanence semantics, policy action boundaries (zero limit 400, unknown action 400, missing 404), and the DoesNotExist->404 mapping pinned for single delete. * test: admin read-path and view-preset CRUD coverage (22 cases) Detail/metadata/preview/admin-download/activities/local-lists+delete/ verify: missing-record 404s, note/tag truncation limits, preview max_chars truncation, activity filtering and the 80-event clamp, local path traversal rejection. Presets: update-vs-create by id, name truncation, filter normalization clamps, 24-preset cap, delete-missing 404. * refactor: move auth primitives to apps/base/auth, kill base->admin dep JWT create/verify, bearer extraction and the share-upload gate move to apps.base.auth (consumed by both surfaces); admin.dependencies keeps admin session gating and service providers, re-exporting the primitives for import-path compatibility. base.views no longer imports from apps.admin — the last cross-app reverse dependency is gone. * refactor: split admin services god-module (ConfigService/LocalFile out) apps/admin/services.py (1697 lines) becomes FileService (~1200 lines) + a compatibility facade re-exporting ConfigService, LocalFileService, LocalFileClass and keyvalue_write_lock from their new homes (config_service.py holds the D5 KeyValue lock; one-way imports, no cycle). test_admin_security patch targets follow ConfigService to its new module. Behavior unchanged; 247 tests green. * fix: size-less uploads no longer crash (upstream seek bug) validate_file_size's size-None branch called UploadFile.seek(0, 2), which raises TypeError (UploadFile.seek takes one arg); the underlying SpooledTemporaryFile.seek is sync, so awaiting it also fails. Use the underlying file object with sync seek(0, SEEK_END). Surface discovered by the mypy pilot run; regression test covers the size-None branch. * chore: bump direct deps (patch/minor) fastapi 0.139.2->0.141.1, pydantic 2.12.5->2.13.5, uvicorn 0.51.0->0.53.0, aiohttp 3.14.2->3.14.3; lockfile regenerated. tortoise-orm 0.x->1.x major deliberately deferred pending API-change review. * ci: gradual mypy adoption via baseline ratchet scripts/mypy_ratchet.py compares mypy output against scripts/mypy-baseline.txt (line numbers stripped for edit stability): new type errors fail CI, fixes are folded back via --regenerate. Baseline starts at 30 known errors; the seek bug found in the pilot was fixed before baselining. mypy joins the dev group and CI. * fix: migrate WebDAV auth off aiohttp.BasicAuth (deprecated in 4.0) Dependency-upgrade probe on aiohttp 3.14.3 surfaced the BasicAuth deprecation; switch to aiohttp.encode_basic_auth() headers so the aiohttp 4.0 upgrade does not break the WebDAV backend. * chore: drop dead code (WebDAV _instance stub, unused LocalFileClass.write) * test: file-validation negative paths (13 cases) Magic-bytes spoofing (text-as-png, exe-as-pdf, mp4/webp box detection), whitelist rule semantics (star/image-wildcard/content mismatch), chunk-0 header validation parity, and end-to-end UploadFile rejection. * test: migration runner coverage (5 cases) Full chain executes 001-007 in filename order and registers; rerun is idempotent; pre-registered entries are skipped (DDL not re-executed); the resulting schema matches deployment; a failing migration propagates and is not registered. Uses a fresh :memory: DB without generate_schemas so the migrations themselves build the schema (the real deployment path). * refactor: split core/storage.py into a package (per-backend modules) core/storage.py (1400+ lines, six backends) becomes core/storage/ with _base.py (data contracts, interface, shared header builder), and local/s3/onedrive/opendal/webdav modules. The package __init__ re-exports the full historical public surface; test patch targets move to the precise backend modules (core.storage.local.data_root etc.) and the attachment guard scans the package. Import-only change; 264 tests green. Storage-layer DI deferred: current tests construct instances against patched settings, so the added surface isn't justified yet. * refactor: TypedDict for IPRateLimit records The rate-limit ledger mixed int and datetime under a loose Union typing, producing 5 mypy noise errors. A TypedDict gives precise per-key types; setdefault replaces the get-then-assign pattern. One mypy baseline error family resolved; 264 tests green. * chore: tighten mypy baseline after IPRateLimit TypedDict * refactor: resolve all 26 baseline mypy errors; precise test assertions Per-error treatment (no bulk script): honest annotations for StoredDownload (Path/bytes/Callable), KeyValue.value (Any for JSONField), dict[str, Any] for form/config dicts; signature split in create_token; str() normalization in config int(); platform/type-ignore only where the checker cannot follow (msvcrt, FastAPI Request injection). Baseline file and ratchet compare now redundant at zero errors but kept as the guard against regressions. Tests: assertions tightened to status_code == 403 with HTTPException raises; _create_share explicit parameters replace **extra passthrough; seek-fix pointer-reset assertion persisted.
173 lines
6.0 KiB
Python
173 lines
6.0 KiB
Python
import copy
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import ipaddress
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import os
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import secrets
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import socket
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from dataclasses import dataclass
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from typing import Any
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from urllib.parse import urlsplit
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from core.utils import hash_password, is_password_hashed, verify_password
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JWT_SECRET_MIN_LENGTH = 32
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INTERNAL_CONFIG_KEYS = {"jwt_secret"}
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LEGACY_DEFAULT_ADMIN_TOKEN = "FileCodeBox" + "2023"
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@dataclass
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class SecurityConfigResult:
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config: dict[str, Any]
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changed: bool = False
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password_hashed: bool = False
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jwt_secret_rotated: bool = False
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setup_required: bool = False
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def generate_jwt_secret() -> str:
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return secrets.token_urlsafe(48)
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def is_valid_jwt_secret(secret: Any) -> bool:
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return isinstance(secret, str) and len(secret) >= JWT_SECRET_MIN_LENGTH
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def is_config_initialized(config: dict[str, Any]) -> bool:
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"""Cheap initialization probe — runs on EVERY request via the middleware.
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Must never run a slow hash: a scrypt-stored token cannot be the legacy
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default (which only ever existed as plaintext or sha256), so those tokens
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are initialized without any verification. Only plaintext/sha256 tokens go
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through the legacy-default comparison, which is microseconds.
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"""
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admin_token = str(config.get("admin_token") or "")
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if not admin_token:
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return False
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if is_password_hashed(admin_token) and admin_token.startswith("scrypt$"):
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return True
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return not verify_password(LEGACY_DEFAULT_ADMIN_TOKEN, admin_token)
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def prepare_security_config(config: dict[str, Any]) -> SecurityConfigResult:
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next_config = copy.deepcopy(config)
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result = SecurityConfigResult(config=next_config)
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admin_token = str(next_config.get("admin_token") or "")
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if not admin_token:
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result.setup_required = True
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elif verify_password(LEGACY_DEFAULT_ADMIN_TOKEN, admin_token):
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next_config["admin_token"] = ""
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result.setup_required = True
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result.changed = True
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elif not is_password_hashed(admin_token):
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next_config["admin_token"] = hash_password(admin_token)
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result.password_hashed = True
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result.changed = True
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jwt_secret = next_config.get("jwt_secret")
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if not is_valid_jwt_secret(jwt_secret):
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next_config["jwt_secret"] = generate_jwt_secret()
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result.jwt_secret_rotated = True
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result.changed = True
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return result
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# 出站端点白名单/黑名单(SSRF 防护)。
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# 这些配置项会被服务器直接当作上游地址访问:被劫持的管理员会话可以把实例
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# 变成内网代理跳板,或把数据发往任意地址。校验只在写入入口(update_config),
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# 已存值不受影响;APP_ENV 非 production(本地开发,如 minio/webdav)时放行。
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OUTBOUND_ENDPOINT_CONFIG_KEYS = ("s3_endpoint_url", "s3_hostname", "webdav_url")
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_ENDPOINT_SCHEME_WHITELIST = {"http", "https"}
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_ENDPOINT_HOST_DENY_SUFFIXES = (
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".local",
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".internal",
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".lan",
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".home.arpa",
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".corp",
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".localhost",
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)
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def _endpoint_ip_is_denied(ip_str: str) -> bool:
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try:
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ip = ipaddress.ip_address(ip_str)
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except ValueError:
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return False
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return (
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ip.is_private
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or ip.is_loopback
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or ip.is_link_local
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or ip.is_reserved
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or ip.is_multicast
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or ip.is_unspecified
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)
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def _endpoint_host_is_denied(host: str) -> bool:
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host = host.strip("[]").lower()
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if host in {"localhost"} or host.endswith(_ENDPOINT_HOST_DENY_SUFFIXES):
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return True
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# 字面 IP 直接判;非字面形态(速记 "127.1"、十进制 2130706433、十六进制、
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# *.localhost、nip.io 类 DNS 映射)交给解析后逐 IP 复判——静态字符串
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# 黑名单对它们全部失效,这是探测中实测确认的绕过面。
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if _endpoint_ip_is_denied(host):
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return True
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try:
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infos = socket.getaddrinfo(host, None)
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except (socket.gaierror, UnicodeError, OSError):
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return False
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for info in infos:
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# getaddrinfo 的 sockaddr 首元素在 IPv4/IPv6 下均为 str(int 仅出现在
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# AF_UNIX 等异形族)——显式 str() 让类型检查器与运行时一致。
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if _endpoint_ip_is_denied(str(info[4][0])):
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return True
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return False
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def validate_outbound_endpoint(value: Any) -> str:
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"""校验完整 URL 形态的出站端点(s3_endpoint_url / webdav_url)。"""
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endpoint = str(value or "").strip()
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if not endpoint:
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return ""
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if os.environ.get("APP_ENV", "development") != "production":
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return endpoint
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parts = urlsplit(endpoint)
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if parts.scheme.lower() not in _ENDPOINT_SCHEME_WHITELIST:
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raise ValueError(f"端点协议必须是 http(s):{endpoint}")
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host = parts.hostname or ""
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if not host:
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raise ValueError(f"端点缺少主机名:{endpoint}")
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if _endpoint_host_is_denied(host):
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raise ValueError(f"端点不允许指向内网/保留地址:{endpoint}")
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return endpoint
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def validate_outbound_hostname(value: Any) -> str:
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"""校验裸主机名形态的出站端点(s3_hostname,存储层拼接 https://{hostname})。"""
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hostname = str(value or "").strip()
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if not hostname:
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return ""
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if os.environ.get("APP_ENV", "development") != "production":
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return hostname
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if "://" in hostname or "/" in hostname:
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raise ValueError(f"s3_hostname 应为裸主机名,不含协议或路径:{hostname}")
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# 取主机部分:[v6] 形态取括号内;host:port 取冒号前;裸 IPv6(多个冒号)整体
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if "[" in hostname:
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host = hostname.split("[", 1)[1].split("]", 1)[0]
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rest = hostname.split("]", 1)[1] if "]" in hostname else ""
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if rest and not rest.startswith(":"):
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raise ValueError(f"s3_hostname 的 IPv6 括号后只允许端口:{hostname}")
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elif hostname.count(":") == 1:
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host = hostname.split(":")[0]
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else:
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host = hostname
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if not host or _endpoint_host_is_denied(host):
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raise ValueError(f"端点不允许指向内网/保留地址:{hostname}")
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return hostname
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