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Commits
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99e3bf91a7 |
fix(coderd/database/migrations): resolve duplicate version (#32329)
Main cannot initialize database migrations because #32309 reused version 000643, already taken by the skill display-name migration from #31747. Renumber the later chat-project migration and its fixture to 000644, preserving the earlier migration number. All three renames leave SQL contents unchanged. |
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1f1aa6ae3c |
feat: add chat project template schema and queries (#32309)
Adds the database layer for attaching workspace templates to chat projects: the schema, the queries, their authorization, and the audit type. Nothing calls the new queries yet, and the existing create and update handlers pass the new parameters unset. The API, the limit's enforcement, and the agent tools follow in the PRs above. - Attachments live in a `chat_project_templates` table (`project_id`, `template_id`, `created_by`, `created_at`), deleted with the project or the template. `chat_projects` gains `limit_templates` (default `false`), `default_template_id`, `default_template_version_preset_id`, and `default_parameters jsonb`. A project stores a default preset or default parameter values, not both. - `InsertChatProjectTemplates` needs project `update` and `use` on every template. It skips templates that are already attached, and templates outside the project's organization, so an attachment never crosses organizations. `DeleteChatProjectTemplate` needs project `update` and template `read`, and clears the project's default when it detaches the default template. Both checks are in dbauthz. - `GetChatProjectTemplatesByProjectIDs` is authorized through the project, and leaves out deleted, deprecated, and agent-disabled templates. It does not check the caller's access to each template, so callers do that before they expose one. - `UpdateChatProjectByID` changes the template settings only when the request sets them, so an update that omits them cannot write back a stale snapshot. - `AuditableChatProjectTemplates` is the audit form of a project's attached templates, logged as a write to the project. The new `chat_projects` columns are tracked in the project's own audit diff, with the default parameter values masked because they may hold credentials. **NOTE**: the migration adds one table and four columns and changes no existing rows. Existing projects keep unlimited template access. Stack (merge top to bottom): - #32309 👈 - #30754 - #32310 - #30755 - #30756 - #30898 |
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d1f308d9f3 |
feat: let organization members turn off organization skills in chats (#31134)
## Stack Organization skills load into every member's Coder Agents chats in their organization, with no way for a member to opt out. This stack adds a per-organization setting that lets members turn them off for their own chats, bottom to top: 1. **#31134** data model, API, and chatd (this PR) 2. #31135 admin and member controls in the dashboard, the `/` menu, and docs ## What changes Organizations get `members_can_disable_skills`, off by default. Users who can update organization skills change it with `PUT /api/experimental/organizations/{organization}/skill-settings`, which writes an organization audit entry. Anyone who can read the organization can `GET` it. While the setting is on, each member saves their own choices with `PATCH /api/experimental/organizations/{organization}/members/{user}/skill-preferences`: `all_skills_disabled` (a master switch that also covers skills created later) and `skills`, a sparse map from skill ID to on or off. `GET` returns the setting, the master switch, and `disabled_skill_ids`. The routes follow the personal-settings rules: without `read_personal` or `update_personal` on that user the caller gets 404, a PATCH while the setting is off gets 403, and a key that is not an organization skill that member can read gets a 400 that names the key. The check runs as the member, not the caller, so an owner or user admin editing someone else's choices is held to that member's skills. Turning the setting off keeps the choices but ignores them. Migration 000636 adds the column and two tables keyed by organization membership. Both cascade when the membership goes away, and the per-skill table also cascades when the skill is deleted, so a recreated skill loads by default. chatd reads the preferences as the chat owner when it builds the skill index and when it loads a body for `read_skill` or for a structured skill invocation (#30861). A skill the member turned off is left out of the index, and both loads report it as not found, including later in a running chat. If the preferences cannot be read, turn preparation fails, as it already does when the skill metadata cannot be read. Older migration tests created organizations with `dbgen.Organization` and `GetDefaultOrganization`, which now select the new column before it exists, so they insert organizations with raw SQL instead. ## Review focus - Authorization in `coderd/organizationskillpreferences.go` and the five new dbauthz methods (`read_personal` and `update_personal` on the user, `organization_skill` update for the setting). - `GetOrganizationSkillMemberPreferencesRow.Excludes` is the one rule chatd applies; #31135 mirrors it in `activeOrganizationSkills`. ## Testing - Go tests cover the queries and cascades, dbauthz, both routes (including the audit diff and each 400 case), and chatd (index, `read_skill`, skill invocations, master switch, a change during a chat). Each new test fails with its code path removed. - Remote dogfood UAT (10 scenarios, real model) passed on the pre-split branch head `186c28d81ab`, which has the same code except the fix below. It found one issue: two spellings of one skill ID with opposite values stored a random result. The PATCH now rejects every aliased key with a 400. A second run on the stack's top head at the time, `718dd6d1bd1`, passed: every aliased form returns 400 and stores nothing, and chats leave out a skill the member turned off, including in `read_skill`. - Polish and the test audit stayed inside the implementation diff. No new dependencies. - Rebased on main as one commit. The migration is now 000636, after main's 000634 and 000635. Every organization skill load passes the chat owner, including main's skill invocation path, so `/skill` invocations honor the opt-out too. The model's skill index leaves out a skill that is not model-invocable or that the member turned off. Apart from that, the diff is unchanged. > Xum, an AI agent, opened this PR for @ibetitsmike and wrote this description. |
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d14631df1a |
feat(coderd/database): add organization AI model config table (#30717)
Adds `ai_model_configs`: an organization's AI Governance configuration for one model on one configured provider. Token prices are its first settings. Migration `000630` is additive and needs no backfill. - Rows are soft deleted with a `deleted` flag. A surrogate `id` is the primary key, and a partial unique index allows one live row per `(organization_id, provider_id, model)`. Cascades on delete of the organization or provider. The organization is a column, as in other organization-scoped tables. - A check constraint rejects an empty model. - Pricing per provider ID is what lets `openai-compat` gateways be priced, and lets providers of the same type have different prices. - Site-wide prices per provider type stay in the existing `ai_model_prices` table, unchanged. Recording which price was used on each token usage record is deferred until its design settles. **Used later:** #30718 adds the queries that read and write the table, and #30719 looks prices up from it. The rest of the diff is generated. --- *This PR was generated by Coder Agents on behalf of @SasSwart.* |
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7aef110ca2 |
feat: add workspace secrets table, queries, and RBAC (#30248)
Adds the database table, queries, and permissions for workspace secrets: secrets set on a workspace build and delivered to the agent, never to Terraform. Each secret belongs to one workspace build. A new build copies the previous build's secrets, then the old copies lose their values but stay as history. |
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b67587c875 |
feat: add the organization skills data model (#30609)
## Stack Part of [CODAGT-1341](https://linear.app/codercom/issue/CODAGT-1341/support-organization-level-skills-in-coder-agents). This stack adds organization skills to Coder Agents: admins publish a skill once per organization, share it with groups or members, and chats in that organization load it next to personal and workspace skills. It replaces the 21-PR draft stack #30584 to #30604 with five PRs, bottom to top: 1. **#30609** data model: one migration, queries, RBAC and dbauthz (this PR) 2. #30610 organization skill API routes and the scope-neutral SDK 3. #30611 sharing ACL routes 4. #30612 settings UI: shared skills table, admin page, member section 5. #30613 chats: chatd loading, `/` menu, docs ## What changes This PR adds the data model and authorization for organization skills. Personal skills keep working unchanged: `git diff origin/main -- codersdk site` shows only generated RBAC and API key scope additions (`apikey_scopes_gen.go`, `rbacresources_gen.go`, `rbacresourcesGenerated.ts`, the RBAC and scope unions in `typesGenerated.ts`) and `codersdk.ResourceTypeOrganizationSkill` with its friendly string. No personal route, SDK type or site component changes, and `coderd/userskills_test.go` changes only by mechanical constant renames. **One migration, `000621_skills`** (please review it closely): - renames `user_skills` to `skills` with its constraints, index and triggers, and recreates the cap function and `delete_deleted_user_resources`, whose PL/pgSQL bodies name the table; - adds `organization_id` and `project_id` (`ON DELETE CASCADE`), `enabled` (default true), and `group_acl` / `user_acl` (`jsonb`, default `{}`), with CHECKs for exactly one owner, ACLs that are JSON objects, and ACLs that stay empty unless an organization owns the row, plus partial unique name indexes per owner kind; - replaces the cap trigger with `enforce_skills_per_owner_limit()`: 100 rows per owner, disabled rows included, locking the owner row `FOR NO KEY UPDATE` so unrelated foreign key checks are not blocked; - adds a `BEFORE DELETE` trigger on `organization_members` that removes a departing member from `user_acl` on that organization's skills, so rejoining doesn't restore a direct grant; - adds the `organization_skill` `resource_type` and `api_key_scope` enum values last; nothing in the migration uses them. The down migration undoes the three old migrations in reverse order: it drops organization and project rows and restores `user_skills`, its names, the cap function and `user_id NOT NULL`. Authorization: a new RBAC resource `organization_skill` (create, read, update, delete, share). Owner and org admin get it; site and org auditors get read; members read only through the skill's ACL, which applies only to members of its organization. `Skill.RBACObject()` returns the organization object with both ACLs; project rows stay denied to everyone. New sqlc queries cover organization insert, get, list (SQL-filtered through `GetAuthorizedOrganizationSkillMetadata` and a `regosql` converter), update and delete, with dbauthz wrappers and the audit table entries. No routes yet. ## Commits The first commit reproduces the reviewed code from the old stack; each later commit is a labeled trim or fix. - `baa3150e3b7` feat: add the organization skills data model. Reproduction: every non-site file this commit changes equals the reviewed old `authz` head `1e16b3004c4`, except that the old stack's migrations 000615, 000616 and 000617 are merged into one migration (then `000615_skills`, now `000621_skills`) with one fixture (`testdata/fixtures/000621_skills.up.sql`) and one migration test (now `testMigration000621Skills`). At that commit, `dump.sql` was byte-identical to the old head's. - `1b84e83463a` test(coderd/database): keep only the SQL paths of the org skill matrix. `TestOrganizationSkillAuthorization` becomes `TestOrganizationSkillQueries` instead of being deleted, because coverage showed it is this PR's only run of the `GetAuthorizedOrganizationSkillMetadata` row scan (80% to 65% without it) and of the organization update and delete queries (100% to 0%). Swapping `group_acl` and `user_acl` in the converter makes `GrantedMember` fail. The removed cases are decided by `TestRolePermissions`, `TestSkillRBACObjectOrganizationACL` and the dbauthz method suite. - `e2931b412e9` test(coderd/database): fold the skill cap cases into existing coverage. The user case is covered by `TestUserSkillLimit` and `TestUserSkillLimitConcurrentCreates`; the organization case folds into `ConcurrentOrganizationInsertsHonorCap`, which now also checks that disabled rows count and another organization is unaffected (mutation checked); the project case stays. - `be62aea9021` test(coderd/rbac): drop `TestOrganizationSkillReadScope`, covered by `TestExternalScopeNames` and the generated scope file. - `0c275ba37de` merges main at `454a2fcc697`, which took 000615 to 000618: it renumbers the migration to 000619 and resolves `dump.sql`, `check_constraint.go` and the generated API docs. `8f2b4b87ee2` merges main at `ad85646164e`, which took 000619: it renumbers the migration to 000620. - `5248d56b64f` merges main at `e7b76872098`, which took 000620 (`000620_audit_chat_project_instructions_resource_type`): it renumbers the migration, fixture and migration test to `000621_skills` (step `Migration000621Skills`, version 621), and resolves `enterprise/audit/table.go` (keeping main's `AuditableChatProjectInstructions` entries and the `Skill` entry), `dump.sql` and `models.go` (the `resource_type` enum gets `chat_project_instructions`, then `organization_skill`) and the regenerated `schemas.md`. The up and down SQL are unchanged by every renumbering. ## Size Production +549/-67, tests +728/-33, generated +881/-314; total +2158/-414. This is above the 500-line reviewer-friendly limit on purpose: Mike asked for 4 to 5 PRs instead of the 21 small ones this stack replaces. ## Replaces #30584 (rename `user_skills` to `skills`), #30585 (skill owners), #30586 (organization skill authorization). ## Validation - Migration test: up keeps the existing personal row and its ID; down restores the `user_skills` names, cap function and `NOT NULL`, and drops organization rows; soft-deleting a user removes their skills after up, after down, and after re-up. - `go test` passed on `be62aea9021`, before the main merges, for `coderd` (skill tests), `coderd/database`, `dbauthz`, `migrations`, `gentest`, `coderd/rbac/...`, `coderd/x/chatd`, `coderd/x/skills`, `enterprise/audit` and `enterprise/coderd`; `make lint/check-scopes` passed; the four personal skills Vitest files pass unchanged. - On `5248d56b64f`: build, vet, `TestMigrate`, `TestMigrationChain`, the `migrations`, `database`, `dbauthz`, `gentest`, `rbac` and `enterprise/audit` packages pass; `make gen` run twice is clean, and `make pre-commit` passes. - Remote UAT round 7 through Coder Agents passed on the whole stack; see #30613's Validation for scope and findings. > Xum opened this PR on behalf of @ibetitsmike. |
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ad85646164 |
feat(coderd): add chat project instructions storage and prompt injection (#30367)
Adds storage for project-level instructions in Coder Agents chat projects and injects them into every chat in the project. This is the first of four stacked PRs that replace #30349. A new `chat_project_instructions` table (migration 000613) holds at most one row per project, scoped to the project's organization. It records `updated_by` and cascades on project delete. The dbauthz wrappers authorize against the parent project: read access to get the instructions, update access to upsert or delete them. No new RBAC resource is added; project RBAC comes in a later PR. chatd loads the instructions on every turn, so edits reach existing chats on their next turn. They are added to the system prompt as a `<project-instructions>` block after the memory guidance and before personal instructions, so a user's personal instructions still win a conflict. Subagent chats carry no `project_id`, so they use their root chat's project. A load error other than no rows is logged, and the turn continues without instructions. **What to scrutinize:** the prompt ordering in `buildSystemPrompt`, and the choice to inject per turn rather than snapshot at chat creation. Per-turn injection costs one prompt-cache miss after each edit; the org instructions in #30272 use a creation-time snapshot instead. **Generated** (`make gen` from the migration and `queries/chatprojectinstructions.sql`): `dump.sql`, `models.go`, `querier.go`, `queries.sql.go`, `dbmetrics/querymetrics.go`, `dbmock/dbmock.go`, and the `*_constraint.go` files. `coderd/x/chatd/ARCHITECTURE.md` gets two TODOs for the PR author to replace with the real description, per AGENTS.md. **Validation:** `make gen` leaves no diff. `go test ./coderd/database/dbauthz -run TestMethodTestSuite/TestChats`, `go test ./coderd/x/chatd -run 'SystemPrompt|ProjectInstructions|Memory'`, and `go test ./coderd/database/migrations/...` pass. --- Stack (merge top to bottom). #30377 through #29583 are f0ssel's split of the original #29583, and this stack sits on #29583: - #30377 data layer and project dialog (f0ssel) - #30378 new-chat form locked to a project (f0ssel) - #30379 project page route (f0ssel) - #29583 sidebar folders (f0ssel), the base of this stack - #30291 composer frame - #30292 project chat list caches - #30293 project page header - #30294 project chats list - #30367 instructions storage and prompt injection 👈 - #30368 instructions API - #30369 instructions editor dialog - #30370 instructions Details panel --------- Co-authored-by: Garrett Delfosse <delfossegarrett@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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dae7967bd1 |
feat: persist script resource addresses and dependencies (#30625)
feat(coderd): persist workspace agent script dependencies Persist Terraform resource addresses and script dependencies supplied by the provisioner (#30451, #30491), and expose them through the SDK and REST API. - Add migration 000618 with `resource_address` and `dependencies` columns, empty defaults, and a JSON-array constraint. API responses always include the address and omit empty dependency lists. - Preserve `success` and `completion` requirements, including scripts on devcontainer subagents. Legacy scripts and older provisioners remain compatible through empty defaults. - Reject empty prerequisite addresses and unsupported requirements, rolling back the entire job. Invalid stored dependencies return HTTP 500 rather than silently dropping ordering. - Add persistence, validation, rollback, devcontainer, API, and migration coverage; regenerate API docs and TypeScript types. Unordered templates retain their existing execution behavior. Dependency lists remain empty until #30556. Agent manifest wiring and the agent API version bump are deferred to a follow-up. Refs PLAT-548. |
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7993c73c87 |
feat: add organization-scoped Coder Agents instructions (#30272)
Adds organization-scoped Coder Agents instructions. Organization admins
set them in **Admin settings** > **AI** > **Coder Agents** >
**Organization settings**, or with `GET`/`PUT
/api/v2/organizations/{organization}/chats/config/system-prompt`.
Implements [CODAGT-984](https://linear.app/codercom/issue/CODAGT-984).
The instructions add to the deployment system prompt and never replace
it. When a chat is created, chatd stores the organization prompt as its
own system row right after the deployment row, only for chats in that
organization. Subagents resolve their parent organization's current
prompt when they spawn, and existing chats keep their stored rows.
Access reuses the organization `chat_model_config` permission: owners
and organization admins edit, auditors read, members get 404 on read and
403 on write. Writes reuse the deployment prompt's sanitization, size
limit (128 KiB by default), and audit behavior, with a new
`chat_organization_system_prompt` audit resource type. Migration
`000613` (the next number after `000612` on `main`) adds the
`chat_organization_system_prompts` table.
## Testing
- Go: enterprise authorization (including an update-only custom role),
validation, and audit tests; chatd row order and subagent tests.
- Frontend: Vitest interaction tests and stories for the card (loading,
load error, refetch error over the cached value, save error, read-only).
- Remote dogfood UAT, [evidence
chat](https://dogfood.cdr.dev/agents/b595a709-0709-44e6-9535-96a922974d61):
round 1 **PASS** on `b027cb5ca67` (permission matrix, validation, UI,
row order, cross-organization isolation, audit, subagents, regression).
Round 2 **PASS** on `618bff67c75` (loading and load-error states,
refetch error over the cached value with unsaved edits kept, update-only
custom role saves over the API, row order, the documented size limit,
rapid organization switching, double-click save).
- CI: rebased onto `main` (`98332c739b0`) as `3850fbaa922`; other commit
SHAs in this description are from before the rebase. Every check passed
on `3850fbaa922`, with `test-go-pg` green on the first attempt. After
the review fixes in item 7, `main` was merged in as `006c4951749` to
resolve new conflicts in generated files and renumber the migration to
`000613`. Every check passes on `006c4951749`. Before the rebase, every
check passed on `b4e76543df2`. `test-go-pg (ubuntu-latest)` passed on
its fourth attempt; the first three failed only the `cli` package
goroutine leak check, with every test passing. Two of those leaked a
coderd instance, which also happens intermittently on `main`:
`TestServer/Logging` cancels `coder server` during startup, and an early
return in `cli/server.go` skips closing coderd. That fix is in #30280.
The first attempt leaked an idle HTTP connection instead (not
investigated).
## Screenshots
From remote UAT on a test deployment (test data only).
| Organization admin saves instructions (`b027cb5ca67`) | Auditor sees
read-only instructions, no save actions (`b027cb5ca67`) |
|---|---|
| 
| 
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| **Loading state while the first fetch is pending (`618bff67c75`)** |
**Refetch error shown above the field; the unsaved edit is kept and Save
stays enabled (`618bff67c75`)** |
| 
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## Review record
1. Codex,
[review](https://github.com/coder/coder/pull/30272#pullrequestreview-5387245297)
on `c42b5f9e05c`: 6 findings. Fixed the missing loading state, refetch
failures hiding cached instructions, and two docs style issues
(`58eab5603a4`, `cc73b714630`). Two were first declined in error, then
corrected: the read-only test now checks that typing leaves the value
unchanged (`cc73b714630`), and update-only custom roles no longer get a
500 on save (`618bff67c75`).
2. Independent security review by a clean-context agent,
[comment](https://github.com/coder/coder/pull/30272#issuecomment-5943505041)
on `c42b5f9e05c`: no P0 to P2 findings. A stale P3 comment was fixed in
`34c17aadb7f`; returning `err.Error()` in 500 details was kept to match
the deployment prompt handlers.
3. Codex,
[review](https://github.com/coder/coder/pull/30272#pullrequestreview-5387323380)
on `58eab5603a4`: 2 findings (refetch errors not surfaced, docs line
breaks), both fixed in `cc73b714630`.
4. Codex, blockers only,
[review](https://github.com/coder/coder/pull/30272#pullrequestreview-5387462070)
on `618bff67c75`: 1 P2 (a failed refresh right after a successful save
shows the previous value). Not a blocker, deferred.
5. Final fresh advisory by a clean-context agent,
[comment](https://github.com/coder/coder/pull/30272#issuecomment-5944285083)
on `618bff67c75`: **READY**, no blockers and nothing to cut. It
independently checked authorization, audit, the migration, chatd row
insertion and subagent inheritance, the tests, and soft-deleted
organization handling, and agreed with every deferral. No code changes
followed: the snapshot behavior it suggested documenting is already
documented, and its docs wording note joins the deferred docs item.
6. Codex,
[comment](https://github.com/coder/coder/pull/30272#issuecomment-5952100918)
on `b4e76543df2` (the docs-only follow-up below): no major issues. Mike
asked for a passing Codex review loop after item 5, so this review goes
past the planned stop at the final advisory. No code changes followed.
7. ethanndickson,
[review](https://github.com/coder/coder/pull/30272#pullrequestreview-5409332502)
on `3850fbaa922`: approved with 4 comments. Fixed 3: the audit target is
now empty (`91e77d3fa8c`), the docs no longer re-explain audit logs
(`a0fb6891af5`), and the organization instructions stories went from 9
to 5 (`e836097f93f`). Not fixed: the organization prompt read fails open
on a database error, like the deployment prompt, and ethanndickson is
changing both after merge
([thread](https://github.com/coder/coder/pull/30272#discussion_r4180191267)).
UAT did not rerun for these changes.
Not counted as reviews: the pre-PR frontend self-review, simplify pass,
and test audit (`de8377e94e1`), and a second test audit of
`de8377e94e1..cc73b714630` (pass with nits; the update-only test case
was added after it).
Docs-only follow-up after the advisory, requested by Mike: `b4e76543df2`
adds audit log guidance for prompt changes to the platform controls page
and an update-only custom role note to the organizations page. Codex
reviewed it (item 6). No UAT covers it, and the code is unchanged since
`618bff67c75`. The deferred claim that the Instructions page path is
outdated was wrong, so it's dropped. Item 7 removed the audit log
guidance again; the custom role note stays.
## Soft-deleted organizations
UAT found that a soft-deleted organization's prompt stays readable and
writable by UUID. This is inherited behavior, not new exposure:
`ExtractOrganizationParam` resolves UUIDs without a deleted filter, so
the sibling organization chat routes (MCP servers, model overrides,
models) behave the same. The same `chat_model_config` RBAC still
applies, nobody gains access to another organization, and writes are
audited.
## Deferred (owner: Mike)
- A failed refresh right after a successful save shows the previous
value with an error alert, so a further edit from that view starts from
the old text (Codex round 4, UAT round 2). Trigger: reports of stale
values after saving on unreliable networks.
- Update-only custom roles can save over the API, but the card stays
hidden without read access. Trigger: a customer uses such a role.
- Soft-deleted organization access by UUID, above. Trigger: the platform
starts rejecting deleted organizations in `ExtractOrganizationParam` or
purging their configuration.
- A contrived "code word" instruction was refused as possible prompt
injection; neutral instructions work. Trigger: reports of ignored
organization instructions.
- UX polish: there is no retry action after a failed first load, the
save toast can cover Cancel, there is no unsaved-changes guard, the
oversize error omits the limit, and whitespace-only text clears the
prompt without notice. Trigger: the next settings UX pass.
- Docs: the 413 response and organization name paths are undocumented.
Trigger: the next Coder Agents docs pass.
- Test audit nits: a redundant `waitFor` and an optional read-only plus
refetch story. Trigger: the next change to these tests.
> Xum, an AI coding agent, implemented, tested, and opened this PR on
behalf of @ibetitsmike.
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a08ba6a70c |
feat: add shared project memory API for chats in a project (#29301)
- Experiment, stacked on #29242. UI is in #29583. - Adds **project memory**: `chat_project_memories` rows with a name (lowercase slug, unique per project), a one-line description (150 characters) and a body (8KB). Up to 200 per project, shared by every root chat in the project. Chats outside a project and subagents have no memory. - Memories are immutable: they are created and deleted, never edited. Agent tools are `read_memory`, `save_memory`, `delete_memory` and `consolidate_memory`. Saving an existing name fails and points the agent at `consolidate_memory` to replace it. - **Consolidation is agent-driven, in the turn**, modeled on how Claude Code compacts its memory index when warned it is near its limit. From 160 memories (80%), save results ask the agent to get under 140 (70%) with `consolidate_memory`, choosing what to merge and drop. That tool deletes and saves memories in one transaction under the per-project advisory lock, and rolls back entirely if a delete is missing, a name is taken, or the result exceeds 200. There is no background extraction or consolidation. - **The memory index reaches the model as model-only conversation messages**, not in a tool description or the system prompt. At turn start the chat gets a full `<project-memory-index>` snapshot when its prompt has none (first turn, or after compaction), otherwise a `<project-memory-index-update>` listing only what changed. Tool definitions and the system prompt carry no memory state, so memory writes never invalidate the provider's cached prompt prefix. Writes by other chats, or by this chat mid-turn, reach the model at its next turn. - REST API (create, list, get, delete) under `/api/experimental/organizations/{organization}/chats/projects/{project}/memories`. Memory permissions follow projects onto the `agents-access` role. - **Every memory change is audited** as `ChatProjectMemory` create or delete. REST changes are attributed to the caller. Tool changes (`save_memory`, `delete_memory`, `consolidate_memory`) are attributed to the chat owner, carry the `chat_id`, and record one entry per memory after the change commits, so a rolled-back consolidation records nothing. ### Examples **What the model sees.** The system prompt gets a fixed guidance block with no memory state: ```text <memory> Memory is durable context shared by every chat in the project "platform". Save facts that will matter in future chats: … The memory index is in the conversation: a <project-memory-index> message lists every saved memory, and <project-memory-index-update> messages at the start of later turns list what changed. Changes made during a turn, including your own, appear in the next turn's update. … Memories cannot be edited: replace one that no longer holds with consolidate_memory, or delete it. </memory> ``` On the first turn, after the user's message, the chat gets a model-only row with the full index (hidden in the UI): ```text <project-memory-index> - deploy-day: Deploys happen on Tuesdays - release-owner: Alice owns releases; ping her before tagging </project-memory-index> ``` On a later turn where memories changed, it gets only the difference: ```text <project-memory-index-update> Added or changed: - deploy-day: Deploys happen on Wednesdays (changed 2026-09-30) - staging-url: Staging lives at staging.example.com Removed: - old-ci-notes </project-memory-index-update> ``` Resulting request layout, with the provider's cached prefix unchanged by memory writes: ```text [tools: fixed] [system: fixed <memory> guidance] [turn 1 user] [index snapshot] [assistant/tools …] [turn 2 user] [index update] [assistant …] ``` **Tool calls and results** (produced by the tools in this PR): ```text save_memory {"name":"staging-url","description":"Staging lives at staging.example.com","body":"Staging is https://staging.example.com; deploys from main."} → {"count":3,"saved":"staging-url"} save_memory {"name":"deploy-day", …} // name already exists → error: a memory named "deploy-day" already exists; read it, then replace it with consolidate_memory by deleting "deploy-day" and saving the new version in one call consolidate_memory {"delete":["deploy-day"],"save":[{"name":"deploy-day","description":"Deploys happen on Wednesdays (changed 2026-09-30)","body":"The team deploys every Wednesday since 2026-09-30."}]} → {"count":3,"deleted":["deploy-day"],"saved":["deploy-day"]} read_memory {"name":"deploy-day"} → {"name":"deploy-day","description":"…","body":"…","created_at":"2026-09-30T15:04:05Z","created_by":"alice"} ``` Near and at the cap: ```text save_memory … → {"count":160,"saved":"one-more","warning":"memory is 160/200, approaching the limit. Consolidate it to under 140 memories now with consolidate_memory: merge overlapping memories into one, and drop stale, wrong, or superseded ones."} save_memory … → error: memory is full (200/200); use consolidate_memory to merge overlapping memories and drop stale ones, and include this memory in its save list ``` **REST memory object** (`GET .../chats/projects/{project}/memories`): ```json { "id": "59500000-0000-4000-8000-000000000001", "project_id": "7c0e4a3e-5b1f-4f7d-9a51-2f3c8f6d2b10", "organization_id": "bb640d07-ca8a-4869-b6bc-ae61ebb2fda1", "name": "deploy-day", "description": "Deploys happen on Wednesdays (changed 2026-09-30)", "body": "The team deploys every Wednesday since 2026-09-30.", "created_by": "0ed9befc-4911-4ccf-a8e2-559bf72daa94", "created_by_username": "alice", "created_at": "2026-09-30T15:04:05Z" } ``` Create takes `{"name", "description", "body"}` and answers 409 on a duplicate name or at the cap. <details> <summary>Screenshots (predate the immutable-memory rework; tool output shape has since changed)</summary>    </details> --- Generated with Coder Agents on behalf of @f0ssel. --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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f55aa6c50d |
feat: add chat automations schema, RBAC resource, and audit entries (#30085)
Adds the storage and authorization pieces for Automations for Coder Agents. No route, SDK request type, or chatd code uses them yet, so nothing is exposed. This is the bottom PR of the Automations stack (RFC step 1). Later PRs add the chatd acceptance seam, management routes, webhooks, and schedules on top of these names and constraints. **Schema** (migrations 000609, 000610) - `chat_automations` table with enums `chat_automation_kind`, `chat_automation_target_mode`, `chat_automation_webhook_use`, and `chat_automation_when_busy`. It includes `created_by_chat_id`, the webhook secret hash and version, the single-use `webhook_consumed_at` marker, the schedule cursor and revision, and `queue_generation`. Named CHECKs enforce the target and kind shapes from the RFC. A composite foreign key keeps `new_chat_model_config_id` in the automation's organization, the same pattern the model override tables use. A trigger (`chat_automations_chat_organization`) keeps `target_chat_id` and `created_by_chat_id` in that organization too. A composite foreign key cannot do that while keeping `ON DELETE SET NULL` on PostgreSQL 13. The trigger validates a reference only on insert or when it changes, so chat deletion can still clear both references. Indexes cover the owner and both chat references for cascades and `SET NULL`. - Provenance columns with partial indexes and no foreign key to `chat_automations`: `automation_id`, `input_id`, `queue_generation` on `chat_queued_messages` (all set or all null), `automation_id` and `input_id` on `chat_messages`, and `chats.automation_id`. `chats_expanded` is recreated to include `automation_id`. - `chat_automation` values for `api_key_scope` and `resource_type`. The down migration is a no-op because enum values cannot be dropped. **Authorization** - New organization-scoped RBAC resource `chat_automation` (create, read, update, delete). The `agents-access` role grants it for the member's own automations. It is excluded from the member role's user-level permissions, so a member without `agents-access` gets nothing. Site owners and organization admins get it through their existing all-permissions lists. The owner-only update, enable, and run rule from the RFC belongs to the management service in a later PR. - The generated scopes stay out of `externalLowLevel`, so API keys gain no user-requestable scopes. - `dbauthz` wrappers for the three queries this PR adds: `InsertChatAutomation`, `GetChatAutomationByID`, and `DeleteChatAutomationByID`. `InsertChatAutomation` also requires update on the target chat, read on the creating chat, and read on the new-chat model config (its user and group ACL). There is also a `dbgen.ChatAutomation` helper. **Audit** - `enterprise/audit/table.go` entries for `ChatAutomation`, with `webhook_secret_hash` and `prompt` marked `ActionSecret`. The prompt is treated as chat content, like chat titles. The schedule cursor, revision, and queue generation are ignored as internal bookkeeping. `Chat.automation_id` is tracked. **Required checks from the ticket** - Migrations apply and roll back: `TestMigrate` and `TestMigrateUpWithFixtures` (new fixture for 000609). Dogfood UAT also applied the migrations on a dev instance, rolled them back, re-applied them, and compared schema dumps. After rollback, the only differences from main were the enum values that cannot be dropped and develop.sh's own `_develop` schema. After re-applying, the only difference from this branch's `dump.sql` was the `_develop` schema. - Secret hash marked secret: `Test_chatAutomationSecretFieldsRedacted` checks the table entries and that an audit diff contains neither the raw hash, its base64 form, nor the prompt text. Also covered: `TestRolePermissions` cases for own, other owner, other organization, and a member without `agents-access`. `TestChatAutomationShapeConstraints` covers the named CHECKs, the cross-organization foreign key and trigger, a cross-organization retarget, and deleting referenced chats. Under `site/`, only generated files changed (`typesGenerated.ts`, `rbacresourcesGenerated.ts`). Closes CODAGT-1207 Part of CODAGT-1135 --- _Generated with [`xum`](https://github.com/coder/xum) • Model: `anthropic:claude-opus-5-5` • Thinking: `high`_ --------- Signed-off-by: Thomas Kosiewski <tk@coder.com> |
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a328bee007 |
fix(coderd/database): fix duplicate chat projects migration and stale chat title query (#30257)
Fixes two semantic conflicts on main from merging #29242 (chat projects): - **Duplicate migration 000606.** #29242 and #29081 both added `000606`, so golang-migrate refuses to load the migrations (`duplicate migration file: 000606_chat_projects.down.sql`), breaking coderd startup and database tests. `000606_chat_projects` (up, down, fixture) is renamed to `000607`. Main has never been able to migrate with the duplicate, so no deployment has recorded version 606 as chat projects. - **Stale generated code.** #30254 added `UpdateChatTitleByIDIfTitle` with an explicit chat column list that lacks the `project_id` column #29242 added. On regeneration sqlc emits a separate row type instead of `database.Chat`, and dbauthz fails to compile (the `gen` check). The column is added and `queries.sql.go` regenerated. `make gen` is clean, `go build ./...` passes, and the migration, dbauthz method suite, and chatd title tests pass. --- Generated with Coder Agents on behalf of @f0ssel. |
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7cd1b2040b |
feat: add chat projects API (#29242)
- Experiment, behind `chat-projects` (off by default). First of three stacked PRs: #29301 (memory), #29583 (UI). This PR is API only; the screenshots below are from the UI in #29583. - CRUD under `/api/experimental/organizations/{organization}/chats/projects/{project}`. `GET /api/experimental/chats/projects` lists the caller's projects across all organizations. - `project_id` on chat create and as a chat list filter. A chat joins a project only at creation; there is no move. - Projects are identified by ID. Names are display labels (64 characters, description 1024) with no uniqueness constraint. An optional `icon` URL (usually an emoji image under `/emojis`) is capped at 256 characters and audited. - A user can own at most 100 projects across all organizations; creating another answers 409. Creates count and insert under a per-owner advisory lock so concurrent requests cannot overshoot. - Projects are private to their `owner_id`. Members may only create their own, and a chat can only be bound to a project its owner owns. An unreadable or foreign project on chat create answers 404 so IDs cannot be probed; a project from another organization answers 400. - Permissions ride on the `agents-access` role next to chats (after #30004), so whoever can use Coder Agents can use projects. Owners and org admins reach every project. ### Examples Create a project in an organization: ```http POST /api/experimental/organizations/{organization}/chats/projects {"name": "Platform", "description": "Infra and deploy work", "icon": "/emojis/1f680.png"} ``` ```json { "id": "7c0e4a3e-5b1f-4f7d-9a51-2f3c8f6d2b10", "organization_id": "bb640d07-ca8a-4869-b6bc-ae61ebb2fda1", "owner_id": "0ed9befc-4911-4ccf-a8e2-559bf72daa94", "name": "Platform", "description": "Infra and deploy work", "icon": "/emojis/1f680.png", "created_at": "2026-09-30T15:04:05Z", "updated_at": "2026-09-30T15:04:05Z" } ``` List the caller's projects across organizations with `GET /api/experimental/chats/projects` (an array of the object above). Update with `PATCH .../chats/projects/{project}` and any of `name`, `description`, `icon`; delete with `DELETE`, which detaches its chats. Create a chat in the project, and list only its chats: ```http POST /api/v2/chats {"organization_id": "bb640d07-…", "project_id": "7c0e4a3e-…", "content": [{"type": "text", "text": "Plan the deploy"}]} GET /api/v2/chats?project_id=7c0e4a3e-… ``` At the limit: ```json 409 {"message": "You can have at most 100 chat projects. Delete a project to create another."} ``` <details> <summary>Screenshots (UI from #29583)</summary>      </details> --- Generated with Coder Agents on behalf of @f0ssel. --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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acebdf5b60 |
feat: add chat_mcp_servers table with encrypted headers (#29517)
This is the second PR in the stack that adds experimental support for attaching MCP servers to a chat; https://github.com/coder/coder/pull/29466 is the first. This one is just the persistence layer, nothing reads from the table yet. It adds a `chat_mcp_servers` table, unique on `(chat_id, slug)` and cascading on chat deletion. Each row stores the server URL, a JSON object of request headers, per-server tool allow and deny lists, and three flags that later PRs in the stack use to decide when the server gets connected: `allow_in_plan_mode` (mirroring the existing column on `mcp_server_configs`), `allow_in_subagents`, and `forward_coder_headers`. All three default to `false`. Headers are the sensitive part, so they're encrypted at rest via `dbcrypt` in the same way `external_auth_links` are: `headers_key_id` records which key was used, and `NULL` means plaintext. Empty or `{}` headers are stored as `{}` with no key, so servers that don't need auth never produce ciphertext. The `dbcrypt` wrappers cover the chat-scoped reads and writes, plus `GetChatMCPServersByChatOwnerID` and `UpdateEncryptedChatMCPServerHeaders`, which follow the per-user shape that `Rotate` and `Decrypt` in `cliutil.go` use. I haven't wired those two into `coder server dbcrypt rotate` and `decrypt` in this PR. For authz, reading a chat's servers requires read on the chat, and upserting or deleting them requires update on the chat. The two owner-scoped queries above are system-only. Part of CODAGT-1131 |
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b9e3de8403 |
fix: make redirect_uris the source of truth for OAuth2 redirect URIs (#29440)
Fix OAuth2 callback edits retaining stale redirect URIs - Make `redirect_uris` the sole source of truth, with the first entry as primary and `callback_url` retained as a synchronized, deprecated copy. - Backfill existing apps and unify all writers. Callback-only admin updates now replace the previous primary while preserving alternate URIs. - Share redirect URI validation, reject fragments, and add limits of 32 URIs and 2048 bytes per URI. - Add regression coverage for migration, callback edits, validation, and rejection of removed URIs during authorization and token exchange. One data migration; no schema or request/response shape changes. Admin API and UI list editing follow separately. Rollout: Drain old replicas before upgrading; callback edits handled by old code are not reflected on new replicas. Refs PLAT-619. |
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817fc77612 |
feat: store session usage per app and family in template usage stats (#29109)
Store per-app session minutes in a child table instead of fixed family-minute columns, so adding an IDE no longer needs a rollup schema change. API, Prometheus, and telemetry output are unchanged. - Add `template_usage_stats_session_apps`, keyed by start time, template, user, and app name, replacing the `ssh_mins`, `sftp_mins`, `reconnecting_pty_mins`, `vscode_mins`, and `jetbrains_mins` columns. - Group app names into families at read time through the `codersdk` registry, so the registry never reaches SQL and attribution covers all history rather than only the buckets the rollup still revisits. - Group `GetTemplateInsightsByTemplate` by app name so that Prometheus and the API report a family identically. - Drop the `@app_families` query parameter and its dbauthz validation. - Report a family total as the sum of its apps rather than the distinct minutes any of them was active. Numbers are unchanged today, because every agent reports one canonical name per family. - Keep the child table window index-usable and count minutes with `COUNT(DISTINCT)` in the grouping, so a dashboard-sized range uses an index scan and a large deployment does not spill the sort to disk. Part of #27410 |
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90c7533204 |
perf: store workspace agent session counts as JSONB (#28126)
Replace fixed session_count_* columns with a sparse session_counts JSONB object so new session types require no schema changes. Convert retained and unrolled-up activity, warning on backlogs spanning more than 24 hours. Update batching, queries, and rollups while preserving existing API shapes and compatibility with older agents. Add migration, query, and batcher coverage. |
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0ef331fcd0 |
feat!: scope chat model override settings to organizations (#28442)
Moves chat model override settings from deployment scope to organization scope, following the org-scoping of chat model configs in #28440. Depends on #28440 (based on `ethan/chat-models-availability-consolidation`). Remote dogfood UAT passed on this change, including multi-organization scenarios on a licensed deployment with real models. ## Problem Chat model configs are now owned by organizations, but the override settings that reference them stayed deployment-wide: admin subagent/title/compaction overrides in `site_configs`, personal overrides in `user_configs`, and the advisor model embedded in the advisor runtime JSON. A single deployment-level override can only point at one organization's model config, so overrides effectively worked for the default organization only, and title generation had to soften its hard-failure contract to tolerate unusable overrides. ## Fix Admin overrides (general, explore, title generation, compaction, advisor) and personal overrides (root, general, explore) become organization-scoped rows in two new typed tables, `chat_organization_model_overrides` and `chat_user_model_overrides`. Composite foreign keys on `(organization_id, model_config_id)` make cross-organization model references unrepresentable. The migration deletes the legacy serialized `site_configs`/`user_configs` override keys instead of migrating them; admins and users re-select models in the new organization-scoped settings. New endpoints live under `/api/experimental/organizations/{organization}/chats/model-overrides` (admin defaults) and `/api/experimental/organizations/{organization}/members/{user}/chats/model-overrides` (personal overrides); the legacy deployment-level routes are removed. chatd resolves overrides via the chat's organization, restoring the hard-failure contract for configured-but-unusable title generation overrides. The deployment-level `AllowUsers` switch and advisor runtime limits stay deployment-scoped. The Coder Agents settings UI gains a per-organization "Defaults & overrides" page under AI Settings > Models, and the personal overrides page gains an organization selector for users in multiple organizations. Advisor telemetry now reports per-organization override rows. **BREAKING CHANGE**: Existing deployment-level overrides are dropped, not migrated. Every organization starts with no overrides after upgrade, and model selections must be re-applied in the new settings. The legacy deployment-level override endpoints are removed. Closes https://linear.app/coder/issue/CODAGT-872 > [!NOTE] > Xum (AI agent) authored this PR on behalf of @ibetitsmike. <!-- xum-attribution: model=claude-opus-4-6 thinking=high --> --------- Co-authored-by: Ethan Dickson <ethan@coder.com> |
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f32592ec6b |
feat!: scope chat model configs to organizations (#27955)
## Summary Scope chat model configurations and runtime model resolution to organizations. Each model configuration now belongs to exactly one organization, each organization can have its own default model, and Chatd only uses models that belong to the chat's organization. Depends on #27968. ## Problem Chat model configurations are currently deployment-wide even though chats belong to organizations. A default model, explicitly selected model, or configured model override can therefore reference the same model configuration from every organization. This prevents model catalogs and defaults from being isolated by organization and allows a chat to retain or select a model that its organization does not own. Existing model configurations also have no organization ownership or organization-scoped ACL data, and the database enforces a single live default across the entire deployment. ## Fix Add required organization ownership and ACL storage to chat model configurations. The migration assigns every existing configuration to the default organization, seeds organization-wide read access, and replaces the deployment-wide default constraint with a per-organization constraint. Scope Chatd lookup, admission, fallback, and queue-promotion behavior to the chat's organization: - New chats use the usable default model from their organization. - Explicit model selections from another organization are rejected. - Deployment or personal overrides that point to a foreign model are not used for the chat. - Historical cross-organization model references remain unchanged in the database, but runtime generation falls back to a usable local default. - Queue promotion resolves unavailable, disabled, missing, or foreign stored models to the usable local default and fails when no usable local default exists. The existing model configuration management and availability routes remain compatibility routes for the default organization in this layer. A later layer in the stack adds organization-scoped management routes and updates clients to use them. ## Breaking change This changes chat model behavior from deployment-wide to organization-scoped. Existing configurations are migrated only to the default organization; they are not copied into every organization. As a result: - A non-default organization no longer inherits the deployment's existing default model. - Creating a chat in an organization without a usable local default fails with `400: No default chat model config is configured.` - Explicitly selecting a configuration owned by another organization fails with `400: Model config does not belong to the specified organization.` - Existing chats whose stored model belongs to another organization can generate only if a usable local default is available; otherwise generation fails. Deployments using Agents in non-default organizations must configure a usable default chat model separately for each organization after the organization-scoped management layers in this stack are available. _This pull request description was generated by Coder Agents._ |
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7ca7c30f40 |
feat: add group and user ACLs to MCP server configs (#27944)
Adds group and user ACLs to org-scoped MCP server configs so
organizations can restrict specific MCP servers to subsets of members,
mirroring the template ACL pattern.
## Summary
- Migration adds `group_acl`/`user_acl` JSONB columns (nested `{"<id>":
{"permissions": [...]}}` shape) and seeds every existing config with its
organization's Everyone group read entry (the Everyone group ID equals
the org ID), so member access is unchanged by default. Creation seeds
the same entry.
- The blanket org-member read grant from the base PR is replaced by ACL
evaluation: Rego requires org membership for every ACL grant, and
`GetAuthorizedMCPServerConfigs` compiles ACL-aware SQL filters.
- New `ActionShare` (org admins) gates `GET|PATCH
/api/experimental/organizations/{organization}/mcp-servers/{mcpserverconfig}/acl`
(nested under the organization like the rest of the config surface).
PATCH validates principals against the config's organization, merges
sparse updates under a row lock, stamps `updated_by`/`updated_at`, and
is audited as a Write with `Old` captured before authorization. A config
deleted concurrently between the middleware fetch and the locked
re-fetch is concealed as 404, matching the update and delete handlers.
ACL columns are tracked in the audit table.
- ACL management is available in all editions (no enterprise
entitlement), documented in the MCP servers page. Revoking an ACL does
not retro-strip already-selected configs from existing chats; new
selection is blocked at chat create.
- Force On respects the ACL: the forced set is loaded as the chat owner,
so a `force_on` server whose ACL denies the owner never attaches at
create, send, or generation time.
- No rolling-upgrade machinery: upgrades run in scheduled maintenance
downtime, so the migration only backfills existing rows; the API sets
the Everyone read grant explicitly on every insert.
Stacked on #27943. Part of the MCP org-separation stack.
Closes https://linear.app/codercom/issue/CODAGT-712
UAT: verified on a dogfood instance with two members and a custom group:
Everyone-seed default visibility, group grant with Everyone removal
(non-member loses list/fetch/selection), foreign-principal rejection,
non-admin share denial (audited 403 / concealed 404), user_acl restore,
and audited ACL diffs.
> Mux (AI agent) authored this PR on Mike's behalf.
<!-- mux-attribution: model=claude-fable-5 thinking=high -->
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443e3b9b80 |
feat!: org-scope MCP server configs with RBAC (#27942)
Moves `mcp_server_configs` from deployment scope to organization scope
so each organization fully controls the MCP servers its members can use
with Coder Agents.
## Summary
- Migration: adds `organization_id` (NOT NULL, FK) and keeps existing
rows as the default organization's originals with credentials intact.
Other organizations start with no MCP servers and configure their own;
nothing is copied across organizations. Chats outside the default
organization keep any now-cross-organization `mcp_server_ids` entries;
the runtime already ignores IDs that do not resolve in the chat's
organization, so no data rewrite is needed. Slug uniqueness becomes
`(organization_id, slug)`.
- RBAC: new org-scoped `ResourceMCPServerConfig` with regosql converter
and `GetAuthorizedMCPServerConfigs`; org admins get in-org CRUD, org
members get read (replaced by ACL evaluation in the follow-up ACL PR in
this stack).
- API: all config routes nest under the organization, matching
templates: `POST|GET
/api/experimental/organizations/{organization}/mcp-servers` and
`GET|PATCH|DELETE .../mcp-servers/{mcpserverconfig}` (plus
`oauth2/connect`), resolved by a read-only param middleware that
conceals read-denied and cross-organization access as 404. Two routes
stay on the frozen `/api/experimental/mcp/servers/{mcpServer}` block:
the OAuth2 callback (the redirect URI baked into existing AS-side client
registrations) and `oauth2/disconnect`, which must remain reachable by
users removed from the organization so they can still revoke their token
grant.
- Chat runtime: selection validation and generation resolve configs
strictly by IDs, enabled state, and the chat's organization in SQL;
requested duplicates are normalized; invalid or cross-org IDs are
rejected with the precise ID list. IDs already persisted on a chat are
exempt from message-time rejection so disabling a selected server never
blocks sends; generation skips servers that are no longer usable.
- Frontend: API layer and admin settings pages target the new endpoints.
The admin page manages the default organization's servers; the org
picker is tracked separately (CODAGT-714).
- Security hardening from review: OAuth user grants are additionally
bound to `oauth2_revocation_url` (changing it invalidates grants, and a
racing OAuth callback gets 409 instead of recreating a grant).
Stack-wide SSRF protection for MCP config-directed traffic was split
into its own PR at the top of this stack (#28242) to keep this diff
reviewable; this PR keeps main's existing discovery IP-range guard.
OAuth2 auto-discovery now completes before the config row is inserted: a
failed discovery persists nothing, and there is no provisional row that
concurrent updates could race against.
Two follow-up PRs in this stack were split out to keep this diff
reviewable: #28064 completes the swagger annotations for the moved
routes (main already ships these experimental MCP handlers unannotated),
and #28065 carries hardening fixes and regression pins on top of the
cutover.
- Force On enforcement (landed on main mid-review) is org-scoped: the
forced set is read per chat organization
(`GetForcedMCPServerConfigsByOrganization`), so another organization's
`force_on` server never attaches to a chat.
## Breaking changes (experimental API)
The MCP server config endpoints move from the deployment-scoped
`/api/experimental/mcp/servers` block to organization-nested paths:
`POST|GET /api/experimental/organizations/{organization}/mcp-servers`
and `GET|PATCH|DELETE
/api/experimental/organizations/{organization}/mcp-servers/{mcpserverconfig}`
(plus `oauth2/connect`). The old paths are removed, so API consumers
must supply an organization. Two routes intentionally stay on the frozen
`/api/experimental/mcp/servers/{mcpServer}` block: the OAuth2 callback
(its redirect URI is baked into existing AS-side client registrations)
and `oauth2/disconnect` (must remain reachable by users removed from the
organization). These endpoints are under `/api/experimental`, so no
deprecation window is provided.
## Rolling upgrades
During a rolling deploy, an old replica creating an MCP config can fail
the new `NOT NULL organization_id` constraint until it is upgraded
(reads are unaffected: old binaries' generated queries select their own
column lists). This matches the repo's existing precedent for additive
NOT NULL migrations (000562) and affects only the admin config-create
path in the upgrade window.
Upgrades are expected to run in scheduled maintenance downtime with the
database locked during migration, so the migration ships no
rolling-upgrade compatibility machinery. The down migration deletes
organization-created configs (their chat references are cleaned by the
000510 delete trigger) and restores deployment-wide slug uniqueness.
Part of the MCP org-separation stack (CODAGT-711 -> CODAGT-717 audit ->
CODAGT-712 ACLs -> CODAGT-806 token RBAC).
Closes https://linear.app/codercom/issue/CODAGT-711
UAT: validated end to end on a two-org dogfood deployment, including a
real pre-migration to post-migration upgrade, cross-org isolation
(404s), same-slug-two-orgs, chat selection gating, and a live MCP tool
call through the org-scoped generation path. The migration was later
revised to keep existing rows in the default organization only (no
per-organization copies); that revision is covered by the migration test
suite.
> Mux (AI agent) authored this PR on Mike's behalf.
<!-- mux-attribution: model=claude-fable-5 thinking=high -->
---------
Co-authored-by: Mathias Fredriksson <mafredri@gmail.com>
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54d5eb7ec2 |
feat: add hourly hb_agent_runtime_v1 usage events for Coder Agent runtime (#27312)
closes CODAGT-839 closes CODAGT-843 closes CODAGT-773 ## Summary Adds a new heartbeat usage event type, `hb_agent_runtime_v1`, measuring the total agent-loop runtime of Coder Agents (chats) per UTC hour, plus a reconciler that generates one event per hour with self-healing backfill over a trailing 7-day window. Events flow to Tallyman through the existing publisher unchanged. This measures the new Coder Agents (the `chats` tables), not the deprecated Tasks counted by `dc_managed_agents_v1`. Independent of #27508, which fixes the dead ai-seats cron registration. Both PRs carry the identical `usage_event` create permission hunk for the usage-publisher subject (this feature's generator and the ai-seats cron each need it for heartbeat inserts), so they can land in either order and the overlap merges cleanly. > [!WARNING] > **Do not include this in a release until Tallyman accepts `hb_agent_runtime_v1`.** The publisher marks permanently rejected events as done-forever, and the generator then sees those buckets as complete locally, so their usage would be silently and permanently lost. ## Details Each event's payload is `{"runtime_ms": N}`: the sum of `chat_messages.runtime_ms` for messages created in the hour bucket `[H, H+1)`, across all chats (sub-agents, API-created, archived, and soft-deleted messages included). Events use deterministic IDs (`hb_agent_runtime_v1:<bucket start>`) with `created_at` set to the bucket start, so concurrent replicas race safely via `ON CONFLICT (id) DO NOTHING` without locking, and daily rollups attribute backfilled hours to the correct day. Idle hours produce zero-valued events. A bucket becomes eligible 5 minutes after it closes; hours missing for longer than the 7-day window are forfeited, which can only undercount. Note that this makes `usage_events.created_at` explicitly the *event occurrence time* rather than the row insertion time; the two only diverge for backfilled events. It already behaved as the occurrence timestamp (it drives the daily rollup day and is shipped to Tallyman/Metronome as the event timestamp), and the migration now documents this with a `COMMENT ON COLUMN`, which also surfaces as a Go doc comment on `UsageEvent.CreatedAt`. The new `usage.Generator` runs unconditionally in enterprise builds; the `publish_usage_data` license flag continues to gate egress only, so air-gapped deployments still fill their local ledger. The `aggregate_usage_event()` trigger sums `runtime_ms` per day into `usage_events_daily` (unlike `hb_ai_seats_v1`, which takes the daily max). `InsertHeartbeatUsageEvent` now takes an explicit `createdAt` so generators can backfill historical buckets; the cron passes `clock.Now()` to preserve its existing behavior. ## Tallyman follow-up <details> <summary>Prompt for the Tallyman-repo agent</summary> > **Task**: Add support for the new Coder usage event type `hb_agent_runtime_v1` so Tallyman accepts, validates, and forwards it to Metronome. > > **Background**: coder/coder PR (this PR) adds hourly heartbeat events measuring Coder Agent runtime. Events arrive via the existing `/api/v1/events/ingest` endpoint with: `event_type: "hb_agent_runtime_v1"`, `event_data: {"runtime_ms": <int64 >= 0>}`, deterministic `id` of the form `hb_agent_runtime_v1:2026-07-15_14:00:00` (UTC hour bucket start), and `created_at` set to the bucket start (may be up to ~8 days in the past due to backfill; within Metronome's 34-day dedup window). Zero-value events are normal (idle hours). > > **Work**: > 1. Update Tallyman's vendored/imported `coderd/usage/usagetypes` (or equivalent) to the coder/coder commit that adds `UsageEventTypeHBAgentRuntimeV1` and `HBAgentRuntime`. > 2. Ensure ingestion validation accepts the type (`Valid()` switches) and rejects negative `runtime_ms`. > 3. Ensure Metronome forwarding maps the event with transaction ID derived from the event `id` as for existing types, passing `runtime_ms` through as the property for a SUM-aggregated billable metric ("Coder Agent Hours" = `SUM(runtime_ms) / 3,600,000`). > 4. Do NOT permanently reject unknown-but-well-formed future `hb_*` types if avoidable; at minimum confirm current behavior for unknown types (temporary vs permanent rejection) and report it. > 5. Tests: ingest accept/validate, dedup by ID, Metronome payload mapping. > > **Constraint**: this must be deployed to tallyman-prod **before** any coder/coder release containing the event generator; coderd treats permanent rejections as terminal per event. </details> |
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d66e4d794f | feat: add configurable reasoning effort to Coder agents (#26974) | ||
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6af0f4d698 |
feat: add workspace restart functionality to API (#25757)
This models restart as durable orchestration of existing stop and start workspace builds instead of adding a new restart transition. Keeping restart as two existing transitions preserves the current build/provisioner model. The child start build is created only after the parent stop build succeeds, rather than being inserted immediately in a pending state. That keeps `workspace_builds` aligned with actual provisioner-ready work and avoids introducing a second pending-build lifecycle that the provisioner and build acquisition paths would need to understand. Refs: https://linear.app/codercom/issue/PLAT-143 |
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fcdd029d74 |
feat: add ai_user_daily_spend table and queries (#26562)
## Description Adds the spend tracking table and queries needed by [AIGOV-427](https://linear.app/codercom/issue/AIGOV-427/add-post-response-spend-accumulation) (post-response accumulation) and [AIGOV-428](https://linear.app/codercom/issue/AIGOV-428/add-pre-request-budget-enforcement) (pre-request enforcement). ## Changes - Add `ai_user_daily_spend` table to aggregate per-user, per-effective-group AI spend by UTC day. - Add `UpsertUserAIDailySpend` and `GetUserAISpendSince` queries. Closes https://linear.app/codercom/issue/AIGOV-426/add-daily-spend-table-and-queries > [!NOTE] > Initially generated by Claude Opus 4.7, modified and reviewed by @ssncferreira |
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047c47495b |
refactor: drop chat_model_configs provider column (#26877)
The provider type already lives authoritatively in ai_providers.type, reachable on every active row through ai_provider_id, which the chat_model_configs_ai_provider_required_when_active CHECK makes mandatory. The stored provider string was a denormalized copy the system kept in sync with a startup backfill and no longer needs. Every surface now derives provider type from the linked ai_providers row. Telemetry is the one exception: it keeps emitting provider, now sourced from ai_providers.type via a JOIN, so the BigQuery column and the Nexus dashboards that read it are unaffected. The experimental HTTP/SDK response drops provider and makes ai_provider_id required, since those endpoints return only active configs; consumers resolve provider type from ai_provider_id and the AI providers listing. This ships in a single release with no compatibility window: production reads the table via SELECT *, so a pre-drop binary fails config reads the moment the column is gone. Operators must scale to zero before upgrading, and there is no rollback. Closes CODAGT-599 |
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53a6459ecd |
feat(coderd/database): add chat_context_resources table (#26430)
Adds chat_context_resources: a per-chat pinned copy of the agent context resources a chat is hydrated against. The agent-side table (workspace_agent_context_resources) is last-writer-wins with no history, so a chat copies its resources at hydration/refresh to keep a stable view while the agent drifts. Schema foundation only (no queries/dbauthz/prepareGeneration/SDK yet). chat_id FK ON DELETE CASCADE for cleanup parity; no agent FK so the pin survives agent replacement; PK (chat_id, source); reuses the 000522 enum types. |
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b439b06ee6 |
feat: persist agent-pushed workspace context snapshots in coderd (#26145)
Replaces the v2.10 `PushContextState` stub with a real coderd write path. Phase 1 of the chat-side persistence story; nothing reads these rows yet. Follows [#25983](https://github.com/coder/coder/pull/25983) and unblocks [CODAGT-569](https://linear.app/codercom/issue/CODAGT-569/enable-agent-api-v210-pushcontextstate-bump-currentminor-wire-coderd). ## What ships ### Schema (`000517_workspace_agent_context.{up,down}.sql`) Two new tables plus `api_key_scope` enum extensions: - `workspace_agent_context_snapshots` (PK `workspace_agent_id` to `workspace_agents(id) ON DELETE CASCADE`): one row per agent, overwritten per push. Holds `version`, `schema_version`, `aggregate_hash`, `snapshot_error`, `received_at`. - `workspace_agent_context_resources` (PK `(workspace_agent_id, source)`): per-resource state. `body_kind` and `status` are `TEXT` + `CHECK` so adding new wire kinds (the RFC's reserved PLUGIN/HOOK/SUBAGENT/COMMAND) is a one-line CHECK update plus a Go switch case. ### SQLC queries (`coderd/database/queries/workspaceagentcontext.sql`) - `UpsertWorkspaceAgentContextSnapshot` - `UpsertWorkspaceAgentContextResource` - `DeleteStaleWorkspaceAgentContextResources` (delete-where-source-not-in) - `GetLatestWorkspaceAgentContextSnapshot` - `ListWorkspaceAgentContextResources` ### Handler (`coderd/agentapi/context.go`) `ContextAPI` is a new sub-API. `PushContextState`: 1. Rejects `schema_version > 1` with a non-`Unimplemented` error so a forward-incompatible agent fails loudly during rollout instead of slipping into the permanent fallback path the `Unimplemented` translation reserves for old coderd deployments. 2. Validates resources: no empty/duplicate sources, every variant maps to a known body kind, every status maps to a known enum value, the `Body` oneof is set (even when status is non-OK, mirroring the wire guarantee so coderd can attribute failures to a known kind). 3. Inside `Database.InTx`, reads the existing snapshot. If the push is not `initial` and `version` is not strictly greater, returns `accepted = false` and leaves stored state untouched. Otherwise upserts the snapshot row, upserts each resource, then runs the stale-source prune so the snapshot and resource rows always agree. 4. Returns `accepted = true` on success. Resource bodies are stored as `protojson(body oneof variant)` in `body JSONB` with `body_kind` as the discriminator. Adding a new field to an existing variant is zero work since `protojson` tolerates new fields; adding a new variant is a CHECK + switch case. ### RBAC + dbauthz - New `ResourceWorkspaceAgentContext` (Create/Read/Update/Delete). - New `SubjectTypeAgentContext` plus `subjectAgentContext` system role and `dbauthz.AsAgentContext` helper. The push handler elevates to this subject; the agent's own role does not get direct write access to the table. - New `workspace_agent_context:*` API key scopes registered in the enum migration; internal-only (not added to `externalLowLevel`). ### Audit These rows are agent-pushed state, not user-authored. They are intentionally not added to `AuditActionMap` and not enumerated in `enterprise/audit/table.go`, matching `boundary_logs`, `workspace_agent_memory_resource_monitor`, etc. `enterprise/audit` tests pass unchanged. ## Tests - `coderd/agentapi/context_test.go`: 12 subtests covering accepts/rejects (schema version, empty/duplicate source, unknown status, missing body), version semantics (stale dropped, same-version replay dropped, `initial=true` overwrites lower version), variant coverage, non-OK status persistence, and the empty-active-set prune case. - `coderd/database/dbauthz/dbauthz_test.go`: 5 `MethodTestSuite` cases covering the new queries. - `coderd/rbac/roles_test.go`: `WorkspaceAgentContext` permission row asserting no human role currently has access. - `coderd/database/migrations/testdata/fixtures/000517_workspace_agent_context.up.sql`: one snapshot + one resource per known body kind plus a non-OK status, so the migration test suite never lands with these tables empty. ## Out of scope (later phases) - Chat hydration (`chats.context_aggregate_hash`, `last_injected_context`). - Dirty-bit fan-out and `PUT /chats/{id}/context`. - Agent-side `POST /api/v0/context/resync` barrier and the `coder exp chat context` CLI. - `codersdk` chat-context wire types and the dashboard Sources drawer. - Removal of the chatd per-turn pull fallback. ## Compat property This is a pure write path. If anything here returns errors the agent's `RunPush` loop backs off, no chat behavior changes, and the workspace keeps behaving exactly like it did before v2.10. <details> <summary>Implementation plan and decision log</summary> Key design calls: 1. **Concurrency**: Accept iff `req.Initial || req.Version > existing.Version`. The strict RFC reading ("version comparison is authoritative") locks restarted agents out because their per-process counter resets to 1; honoring `initial=true` reflects the real reboot reality while still rejecting steady-state replays/out-of-order pushes. 2. **Body encoding**: `protojson` over the oneof variant body proto, stored in JSONB with `body_kind` discriminator. Structured at the API/Go layer, schema-tolerant at the storage layer, and Phase 2 readers round-trip back via `protojson.Unmarshal`. 3. **Schema version rejection**: returns a normal error, not `Unimplemented`. The agent's `RunPush` loop only short-circuits on `Unimplemented`; that escape hatch is reserved for old coderd deployments. A forward-incompatible agent should retry-and-back-off, not flip the connection into permanent fallback. 4. **Validation strictness**: empty sources, duplicate sources, `STATUS_UNSPECIFIED`, and missing `Body` oneof variants are rejected before any write so a misbehaving agent cannot poison the snapshot table. Phase 2 readers can trust every row maps to a known proto variant. </details> _This PR was authored by Coder Agents on Kyle Carberry's behalf._ |
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4debd23cbb |
fix: chatd refactor (#26270)
Implements the chatd stabilization RFC. Combines: - https://github.com/coder/coder/pull/25908 - https://github.com/coder/coder/pull/25923 - https://github.com/coder/coder/pull/26109 - https://github.com/coder/coder/pull/26110 - https://github.com/coder/coder/pull/26111 - https://github.com/coder/coder/pull/26112 |
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f22d4e2cbb |
feat: add ai_gateway_keys table and related RBAC (#25563)
Adds table to store keys that AI Gateway standalone replicas will use to authenticate into Coderd. Also adds RBAC and audit boilerplate. |
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1a91d31793 |
feat: add user AI budget override endpoints (#25439)
Implements https://linear.app/codercom/issue/AIGOV-285 Follow the structure established in https://github.com/coder/coder/pull/25203 ## Summary Adds the `user_ai_budget_overrides` table and CRUD API at `/api/v2/users/{user}/ai/budget`. An override sets a custom per-user spend cap that supersedes group-budget resolution, attributing spend to a specific group. ## Schema ```sql CREATE TABLE user_ai_budget_overrides ( user_id UUID PRIMARY KEY REFERENCES users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE, group_id UUID NOT NULL REFERENCES groups(id) ON DELETE CASCADE, spend_limit_micros BIGINT NOT NULL CHECK (spend_limit_micros >= 0), created_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW(), updated_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW() ); ``` ## Membership lifecycle The membership invariant — a user must be a member of the attributed group, including when that group is "Everyone" — would naturally be expressed as a composite FK on `(user_id, group_id) → group_members_expanded(user_id, group_id)`. PostgreSQL doesn't allow foreign keys to reference views, so enforcement is split across two mechanisms: - **Write-time check.** A CHECK constraint on the table (`user_ai_budget_overrides_must_be_group_member`) calls a `STABLE` function `is_group_member(user_id, group_id)` that queries `group_members_expanded`. The view surfaces both regular group memberships and the implicit "Everyone" group memberships from `organization_members`. Any INSERT or UPDATE that violates the predicate is rejected with a Postgres `check_violation`, which the handler maps to a 400. `is_group_member` is defined as a general predicate, reusable by any future table that needs the same check. - **Cascade on removal.** Two `BEFORE DELETE` triggers handle membership loss: - `trigger_delete_user_ai_budget_overrides_on_group_member_delete` on `group_members` — covers regular group removals (admin action, OIDC sync). - `trigger_delete_user_ai_budget_overrides_on_org_member_delete` on `organization_members` — covers the "Everyone" group, whose membership lives in `organization_members`. The single-column FKs on `users(id)` and `groups(id)` remain to cascade on user or group deletion (those paths don't pass through `group_members`). ## Authorization The dbauthz layer gates each operation against the `User` and (for writes) `Group` resources: | Operation | User resource | Group resource | |-----------|----------------|----------------| | `GET` | `ActionRead` | — | | `PUT` | `ActionUpdate` | `ActionUpdate` | | `DELETE` | `ActionUpdate` | `ActionUpdate` | For `DELETE`, the dbauthz layer fetches the existing override first to learn the attributed `group_id`, then runs both checks. ### Role matrix | Role | GET | PUT | DELETE | |--------------|-----|-----|--------| | Owner | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | | UserAdmin | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | | OrgAdmin | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ | | OrgUserAdmin | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ | Internal discussion: https://codercom.slack.com/archives/C096PFVBZKN/p1779392747885359 ## Audit logs Audit logs will be addressed in a follow-up PR. |
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a586b7e5e0 |
feat: add boundary_log rbac resource (#24810)
RFC: [Bridge ↔ Boundaries Correlation RFC](https://www.notion.so/coderhq/Gateway-and-Firewall-Correlation-RFC-31ad579be592803aa8b3d48348ccdde9) Register a dedicated `boundary_log` RBAC resource type with `create`, `read`, and `delete` actions, replacing the placeholder `rbac.ResourceAuditLog` and `rbac.ResourceSystem` references previously used in the dbauthz layer. Create is granted at user-level so workspace agents can only write logs owned by their workspace owner, preventing cross-workspace log fabrication. Delete is restricted to `DBPurge` only; no human role (including owner) can delete boundary logs. | Subject | Create (own) | Create (other) | Read (all) | Delete | |---|---|---|---|---| | Workspace agent | yes | no | no | no | | Owner (site admin) | yes (via member) | no | yes | no | | Auditor | no | no | yes | no | | DBPurge | no | no | no | yes | ### Changes - **RBAC policy & resource definition**: add `boundary_log` to `policy.go` and generate `ResourceBoundaryLog` object, scope constants, and codersdk/TypeScript types. - **dbauthz authorization**: replace all `ResourceAuditLog`/`ResourceSystem` placeholders with `ResourceBoundaryLog`. `InsertBoundaryLog` and `InsertBoundarySession` derive the workspace owner from the agent and authorize with `.WithOwner()` for user-scoped create. - **Role assignments:** - **Owner (site):** read only. Excluded from `allPermsExcept` wildcard; create is inherited from member at user-level. - **Member (user-level):** create. User-scoped so agents can only write logs they own. - **Auditor (site):** read. - `boundary_log` is excluded from org-admin, org-member, and org-service-account `allPermsExcept` calls for consistency with `ResourceBoundaryUsage`. - **System subjects:** - **DB Purge** (`SubjectTypeDBPurge`): delete. The only subject that can remove boundary logs. - **Workspace agent scope**: `ResourceBoundaryLog` with wildcard ID in the agent scope allow-list (necessary for creation since no pre-existing ID exists). User-level role scoping prevents deployment-wide access. - **DB migration** (`000510_boundary_log_scopes`): add `boundary_log:*`, `boundary_log:create`, `boundary_log:delete`, `boundary_log:read` enum values to `api_key_scope`. - **Test coverage**: `BoundaryLogCreate` (user-scoped, only matching owner succeeds), `BoundaryLogDelete` (all human roles denied), `BoundaryLogRead` (owner + auditor). dbauthz mock tests set up workspace agent lookups for owner derivation. - **Generated docs**: update OpenAPI specs, API reference docs, and frontend type definitions. --------- Co-authored-by: Muhammad Danish <mdanishkhdev@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Coder Agents <coder-agents-review[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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3bf5f80277 |
feat(coderd/database): add boundary_sessions and boundary_logs tables (#25441)
RFC: [Bridge ↔ Boundaries Correlation RFC](https://www.notion.so/coderhq/Gateway-and-Firewall-Correlation-RFC-31ad579be592803aa8b3d48348ccdde9) Add up/down migrations and matching sqlc queries for persisting Boundary audit events, as specified in the Bridge/Boundaries Correlation RFC. **Tables:** - `boundary_sessions`: session metadata with `workspace_agent_id` FK, `confined_process_name`, and timestamps (`started_at`, `updated_at`). ID is externally supplied by the Boundary process (no DB-side default). Created lazily when the first log for a session arrives. - `boundary_logs`: individual audit events with `session_id` FK, `sequence_number` (INT, primary ordering key), protocol/method/detail fields, and `matched_rule` (nullable; non-NULL implies allowed). **Indexes (per RFC):** - `(session_id, sequence_number)` for the ordering query path - `(captured_at)` for the retention purge path **Queries:** - `InsertBoundarySession` / `GetBoundarySessionByID` - `InsertBoundaryLog` / `GetBoundaryLogByID` - `ListBoundaryLogsBySessionID` with nullable `seq_after`/`seq_before` exclusive bounds for fetching events between two known interception sequence numbers - `DeleteOldBoundaryLogs` with row limit to avoid long-running transactions **Also includes:** dbgen helpers (`BoundarySession`, `BoundaryLog`), dbauthz implementations (reads gated on `ResourceAuditLog`, deletes on `ResourceSystem`), and all generated wrappers (dbmock, dbmetrics). No callers yet. A follow-up PR will add the dedicated `boundary_log` RBAC resource type. > Generated by Coder Agents |
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40878eeba4 | feat: add AI provider schema expansion (#25412) | ||
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dd3223451b | feat: add AI providers HTTP CRUD handlers (#24894) | ||
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5a8d0016a5 |
feat: add personal skill storage, API, and SDK (#25363)
> Mux updated this PR on behalf of Mike. ## Stack Context This PR is the storage, permissions, API, and SDK layer for experimental personal skills. #25362 has landed on `main`, so this branch is restacked directly on `main`. Stack order: 1. #25363 storage, permissions, API, and SDK 2. #25365 API test coverage 3. #25366 chattool and chatd integration 4. #25066 settings UI and docs 5. #25386 personal skills slash menu ## What? Adds the `user_skills` database table, generated queries, RBAC resources and scopes, audit resource handling, experimental user-scoped CRUD endpoints, SDK types, and generated API/site types. Follow-up review and restack fixes: - Enforce a bounded personal skill description in parser and database constraints. - Return `403 Forbidden` for unauthorized create and update attempts. - Return explicit conflict responses when soft-deleted users are targeted. - Keep user admins out of personal skills, while site owners can read and delete but not create or update. - Document trigger-raised constraint names and keep schema constants covered by tests. - Reuse `UserSkillMetadata` in the full `UserSkill` SDK response type. - Generate user skill IDs in Go instead of relying on a database default. - Rebase on latest `main` and renumber the user skills migration to `000502_user_skills`. ## Why? Personal skills need durable user-owned storage with owner authorization, limited site-owner moderation, and a hidden API surface before chatd can consume them. ## Validation - `make gen` - `go test ./coderd/database -run '^TestUserSkillSchemaConstants$' -count=1` - `go test ./coderd/database/dbauthz -run '^TestMethodTestSuite/TestUserSkills$' -count=1` - `go test ./coderd -run '^TestPatchUserSkill$' -count=1` - `go test ./codersdk ./coderd/database/db2sdk` - `make lint` - pre-commit hook on `97fd58108d` |
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238968cfa0 |
feat: add per-group AI budget table and endpoints (#25203)
Closes https://linear.app/codercom/issue/AIGOV-284/add-group-budgets-table-and-crud-api ## Summary Adds the `group_ai_budgets` table and the following endpoints: - `GET /api/v2/groups/{group}/ai/budget` - `PUT /api/v2/groups/{group}/ai/budget` - `DELETE /api/v2/groups/{group}/ai/budget` Each group may have at most one budget row. If no row exists, no budget is enforced. ### Feature gate Added `RequireFeatureMW(FeatureAIBridge)` on the `/ai/budget` sub-route. ## RBAC Authorization reuses `rbac.ResourceGroup` with the existing `.InOrganization(...).WithID(...)` scoping model. The `dbauthz` wrappers load the parent `groups` row and authorize against it. No new resource type is introduced. As a result, anyone with `group:update` permissions (Owner, OrgAdmin, or UserAdmin within the organization) can manage AI budgets for that group. ## Read access for group members `database.Group.RBACObject()` grants `policy.ActionRead` to all members of the group through the group ACL: ```go func (g Group) RBACObject() rbac.Object { return rbac.ResourceGroup.WithID(g.ID). InOrg(g.OrganizationID). // Group members can read the group. WithGroupACL(map[string][]policy.Action{ g.ID.String(): { policy.ActionRead, }, }) } ``` Because the `GET` endpoint authorizes against the same loaded `Group` object, any group member can call: ```text GET /api/v2/groups/{group}/ai/budget ``` `PUT` and `DELETE` remain admin-only. The group ACL grants only `ActionRead`, so write operations continue to require role-based `group:update` permissions. ## Alternative considered A dedicated `rbac.ResourceGroupAiBudget` resource would allow budget management to be separated from general group administration. We decided not to add that complexity for now. |
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841b777ccd | feat: add ai_providers table, queries, dbauthz, audit, RBAC (#24892) | ||
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b0b07536fc | feat: add opt-in Coder identity headers for MCP servers (#25153) | ||
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4124d1137d |
feat: add ai_model_prices table (#24932)
# Summary Implements https://linear.app/codercom/issue/AIGOV-282/add-ai-model-price-table-and-seed-generator This PR lays the groundwork for AI Bridge cost controls (per the AI Governance RFC). It adds the foundation needed for future cost tracking: a place to store per-model token prices, a way to keep those prices in sync with upstream pricing data, and a startup mechanism that ensures every deployment has prices loaded before AI Bridge starts processing requests. The price data comes from [models.dev](https://models.dev/), a community-maintained catalogue of AI provider pricing. A generator script fetches the latest prices, filters to Anthropic and OpenAI for now, and produces a seed file checked into the repository. On every server startup the seed is applied to the database, so new releases automatically pick up any price corrections that landed since the previous one. Existing rows are overwritten with the latest prices; rows for models no longer in the seed are left untouched. # Batching the AI model price seed: three approaches Context: at server startup we seed the `ai_model_prices` table from an embedded JSON price book (~70 rows today, will grow as we add providers, potentially 4000+). Each row is: ```text (provider, model, input_price, output_price, cache_read_price, cache_write_price) ``` Any of the four price columns can be: - `NULL` → “price unknown for this dimension” - explicit `0` → “free” The batch must be an UPSERT so re-running is idempotent and existing rows pick up new prices. We considered three implementations. --- ## Approach 1 — Per-row UPSERT in a Go loop ```go for _, row := range rows { if err := db.UpsertAIModelPrice(ctx, database.UpsertAIModelPriceParams{ Provider: row.Provider, Model: row.Model, InputPrice: nullInt64(row.InputPrice), // ... }); err != nil { return err } } ``` ### Pros - Trivial. - NULL handling falls out naturally from `sql.NullInt64`. ### Cons - `N` round-trips per seed. - With ~70 rows that means ~70 statement executions on every startup, even inside a transaction. - Doesn't scale gracefully as the price book grows, potentially 4000+. --- ## Approach 2 — `UNNEST` with parallel arrays Pass each column as a separate Go slice. Postgres unnests them in parallel into a virtual table, then `INSERT ... SELECT`. ```sql INSERT INTO ai_model_prices ( provider, model, input_price, output_price, cache_read_price, cache_write_price ) SELECT UNNEST(@providers::text[]), UNNEST(@models::text[]), NULLIF(UNNEST(@input_prices::bigint[]), -1), NULLIF(UNNEST(@output_prices::bigint[]), -1), NULLIF(UNNEST(@cache_read_prices::bigint[]), -1), NULLIF(UNNEST(@cache_write_prices::bigint[]), -1) ON CONFLICT (provider, model) DO UPDATE SET input_price = EXCLUDED.input_price, output_price = EXCLUDED.output_price, cache_read_price = EXCLUDED.cache_read_price, cache_write_price = EXCLUDED.cache_write_price, updated_at = NOW(); ``` Go side: flatten rows into six parallel slices. Use a sentinel (`-1`) for “missing”, since `lib/pq` can't encode `NULL` into a `bigint[]` element. ```go providers := make([]string, len(rows)) models := make([]string, len(rows)) inputs := make([]int64, len(rows)) outputs := make([]int64, len(rows)) cacheR := make([]int64, len(rows)) cacheW := make([]int64, len(rows)) for i, r := range rows { providers[i] = r.Provider models[i] = r.Model inputs[i] = -1 if r.InputPrice != nil { inputs[i] = *r.InputPrice } outputs[i] = -1 if r.OutputPrice != nil { outputs[i] = *r.OutputPrice } cacheR[i] = -1 if r.CacheReadPrice != nil { cacheR[i] = *r.CacheReadPrice } cacheW[i] = -1 if r.CacheWritePrice != nil { cacheW[i] = *r.CacheWritePrice } } return db.UpsertAIModelPrices(ctx, database.UpsertAIModelPricesParams{ Providers: providers, Models: models, InputPrices: inputs, OutputPrices: outputs, CacheReadPrices: cacheR, CacheWritePrices: cacheW, }) ``` ### Pros - Single round-trip. ### Cons - The generated `sqlc` params become plain `[]int64`, which can't represent `NULL`. --- ## Approach 3 — `jsonb_array_elements` over a single `@seed::jsonb` (chosen) Pass the raw seed JSON as one parameter; let Postgres expand and parse it. ```sql INSERT INTO ai_model_prices ( provider, model, input_price, output_price, cache_read_price, cache_write_price ) SELECT elem->>'provider', elem->>'model', (elem->>'input_price')::bigint, (elem->>'output_price')::bigint, (elem->>'cache_read_price')::bigint, (elem->>'cache_write_price')::bigint FROM jsonb_array_elements(@seed::jsonb) AS elem ON CONFLICT (provider, model) DO UPDATE SET input_price = EXCLUDED.input_price, output_price = EXCLUDED.output_price, cache_read_price = EXCLUDED.cache_read_price, cache_write_price = EXCLUDED.cache_write_price, updated_at = NOW(); ``` Go side reduces to: ```go return db.UpsertAIModelPrices(ctx, seedJSON) ``` ### Pros - Single round-trip. - NULLs fall out naturally: - `(elem->>'cache_write_price')::bigint` becomes `NULL` - no sentinels - The seed is already JSON: - Existing precedent: - `jsonb_array_elements` is already used elsewhere in the codebase ### Cons - Less type-safe at the SQL boundary than `UNNEST` - Slightly less standard than `UNNEST` - Readers need familiarity with: - `jsonb_array_elements` - `->>` extraction syntax - Postgres pays JSON parse cost - negligible at our scale --- --- # Decision We picked Approach 3. It collapses the round-trips like `UNNEST` does, but without: - nullable-array workarounds - sentinel values |
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1b2a1af097 |
feat: report user secrets adoption summary in telemetry (#24854)
Add a deployment-wide user secrets summary to the telemetry snapshot so we can track adoption of user secrets The summary reports: - A breakdown of secrets by which injection fields are populated: EnvNameOnly, FilePathOnly, Both, Neither - The distribution of secrets per user (max, p25, p50, p75, p90) All metrics are scoped to active non-system users. Soft-deleted users are excluded. The percentile distribution is computed across the entire active non-system user base, including users with zero secrets, so the percentiles reflect deployment-wide adoption. Assisted by Coder Agents. |
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4751416b29 |
fix!: persist structured chat errors (#24919)
**Breaking change for changelog:**
> `codersdk.Chat.last_error` now returns a structured `ChatError` object
(`{message, kind, provider, retryable, status_code, detail}`) instead of
a plain string. The chats API is experimental
(`/api/experimental/chats`), so this ships without a deprecation cycle;
consumers reading `chat.last_error` as a string must update to read
`chat.last_error.message`. SDK/generated TypeScript terminal error
payloads now use the single `ChatError` type; the live stream error
payload type is renamed from `ChatStreamError` to `ChatError`.
Persisted chat errors now carry the same provider-specific detail (kind,
provider, retryable, HTTP status, optional detail) as the live stream,
so refreshing a failed chat rehydrates with the full structured error
instead of a one-line headline.
Existing rows are migrated in place: legacy text errors are wrapped into
`{message, kind: "generic"}` so already-errored chats still render, and
rows with `last_error IS NULL` stay NULL. Internally, persisted fallback
decoding now reuses the existing `chaterror.KindGeneric` constant, with
no JSON value change.
Closes CODAGT-239
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cb67e71835 |
fix(coderd/database): renumber duplicate MCP migration (#24552)
## Summary - rename the `allow_in_plan_mode` migration pair from `000472` to `000473` - rename the matching fixture file and update its comment - remove the duplicate migration version that broke containerized database startup ## Testing - `go test ./coderd/database/migrations -run '^TestMigrate$' -count=1 -timeout 15m` - validated `iofs.New` for `coderd/database/migrations` and `coderd/database/migrations/testdata/fixtures` Closes coder/internal#1483 > Mux opened this PR on Mike's behalf. |
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9d0469fc4c |
feat: allow approved external MCP tools in root plan mode (#24509)
## Summary
Allow root plan-mode chats to use MCP tools from external servers that
an admin has explicitly approved for plan mode. Workspace MCP and
plan-mode subagents remain blocked.
## Problem
`chatd.go` excluded every MCP tool when `isPlanModeTurn` was true, so
planning had no access to tools like docs search, ticketing, etc.
Lifting that guard wholesale was unsafe: `mcp_server_configs` already
has centralized admin governance, but workspace-local MCP (discovered
from agent `.mcp.json`) does not, and subagents use a narrower trust
boundary.
## Fix
Add an admin-controlled per-server `allow_in_plan_mode` flag (default
`false`) and gate plan-mode MCP access on it.
### Backend / schema
- New migration `000472_mcp_server_allow_in_plan_mode.{up,down}.sql` and
matching fixture update.
- `mcpserverconfigs.sql` + generated code: persist and read the new
column.
- `codersdk/mcp.go`: thread the field through `MCPServerConfig`,
`Create*`, and `Update*` request types.
- `coderd/mcp.go`: validate, persist, and return the flag in
get/list/create/update handlers.
### chatd
- `coderd/x/chatd/chatd.go`: pre-filter selected external MCP configs by
`AllowInPlanMode` before calling `mcpclient.ConnectAll` on plan-mode
root turns. Workspace MCP discovery is skipped entirely on plan-mode
turns.
- Single helper decides whether a tool is available in plan mode, used
both at construction and for active-tool filtering (defense in depth).
Plan-mode subagents, dynamic tools, provider-native tools, computer-use,
and workspace MCP stay unchanged.
- `coderd/x/chatd/prompt.go`: update the root plan-mode overlay text to
match the new boundary.
### UI
- `MCPServerAdminPanel.tsx`: add an explicit toggle ("Allow all tools
from this MCP server in root plan mode") next to the existing governance
controls.
- Regenerated `site/src/api/typesGenerated.ts`.
### Docs
- `docs/ai-coder/agents/architecture.md`: replace the blanket "MCP is
unavailable in plan mode" note with the new root-only, external-only,
admin-approved policy. Explicitly call out that workspace MCP and
plan-mode subagents are still excluded.
### Tests
- Plan-mode visibility (approved vs non-approved external server).
- Plan-mode invocation of an approved external MCP tool.
- End-to-end plan-mode workflow that uses an approved MCP tool and then
reaches `propose_plan`.
- Regressions: workspace MCP still excluded in plan mode; plan-mode
subagents still on the restricted tool boundary; existing tool
allow/deny list filtering still applies.
## Policy precedence
`allow_in_plan_mode` is an **additional** requirement on top of existing
`enabled`, availability, chat-selected / forced server IDs, and tool
allow/deny lists. It approves **all tools on that server** for root plan
mode; a per-tool plan allowlist is deliberately deferred.
## Follow-ups (explicitly out of scope)
- Whether plan-mode subagents should inherit approved external MCP
tools.
- Workspace-local MCP safety model (agent-side `.mcp.json` schema vs. a
coderd-managed workspace MCP config).
## Validation
- `go vet ./coderd/x/chatd/...`
- `go test ./coderd/x/chatd -run 'TestPlan.*|TestMCP.*' -count=1`
- `go test ./coderd/x/chatd -count=1 -timeout 5m` (full chatd suite)
- `make fmt` (no diff)
> Mux opened this PR on Mike's behalf.
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6ab30123bf | feat: add chat debug log tables, queries, and SDK types (#23913) | ||
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d5a1792f07 |
feat: track chat file associations with chat_file_links on chats (#23537)
Needed by #23833 Adds a `chat_file_links` association table to track which files are associated with each chat. - `AppendChatFileIDs` query links a file to a chat with deduplication - `GetChatFileMetadataByIDs` query returns lightweight file metadata by IDs - Tool-created files (e.g. `propose_plan`) are linked to the chat after insert - User-uploaded files are linked to the chat when the referencing message is sent - Single-chat GET endpoint hydrates `files: ChatFileMetadata[]` on the response > 🤖 Created by Coder Agents and massaged into shape by a human. |
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7d0a0c6495 | feat: provider key policies and user provider settings (#23751) | ||
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d8ff67fb68 |
feat: add MCP server configuration backend for chats (#23227)
## Summary
Adds the database schema, API endpoints, SDK types, and encryption
wrappers for admin-managed MCP (Model Context Protocol) server
configurations that chatd can consume. This is the backend foundation
for allowing external MCP tools (Sentry, Linear, GitHub, etc.) to be
used during AI chat sessions.
## Database
Two new tables:
- **`mcp_server_configs`**: Admin-managed server definitions with URL,
transport (Streamable HTTP / SSE), auth config (none / OAuth2 / API key
/ custom headers), tool allow/deny lists, and an availability policy
(`force_on` / `default_on` / `default_off`). Includes CHECK constraints
on transport, auth_type, and availability values.
- **`mcp_server_user_tokens`**: Per-user OAuth2 tokens for servers
requiring individual authentication. Cascades on user/config deletion.
New column on `chats` table:
- **`mcp_server_ids UUID[]`**: Per-chat MCP server selection, following
the same pattern as `model_config_id` — passed at chat creation,
changeable per-message with nil-means-no-change semantics.
## API Endpoints
All routes are under `/api/experimental/mcp/servers/` and gated behind
the `agents` experiment.
**Admin endpoints** (`ResourceDeploymentConfig` auth):
- `POST /` — Create MCP server config
- `PATCH /{id}` — Update MCP server config (full-replace)
- `DELETE /{id}` — Delete MCP server config
**Authenticated endpoints** (all users, enabled servers only for
non-admins):
- `GET /` — List configs (admins see all, members see enabled-only with
admin fields redacted)
- `GET /{id}` — Get config by ID (with `auth_connected` populated
per-user)
**OAuth2 per-user auth flow:**
- `GET /{id}/oauth2/connect` — Initiate OAuth2 flow (state cookie CSRF
protection)
- `GET /{id}/oauth2/callback` — Handle OAuth2 callback, store tokens
- `DELETE /{id}/oauth2/disconnect` — Remove stored OAuth2 tokens
## Security
- **Secrets never returned**: `OAuth2ClientSecret`, `APIKeyValue`, and
`CustomHeaders` are never in API responses — only boolean indicators
(`has_oauth2_secret`, `has_api_key`, `has_custom_headers`).
- **Field redaction for non-admins**: `convertMCPServerConfigRedacted`
strips `OAuth2ClientID`, auth URLs, scopes, and `APIKeyHeader` from
non-admin responses.
- **dbcrypt encryption at rest**: All 5 secret fields use `dbcrypt_keys`
encryption with full encrypt-on-write / decrypt-on-read wrappers (11
dbcrypt method overrides + 2 helpers), following the same pattern as
`chat_providers.api_key`.
- **OAuth2 CSRF protection**: State parameter stored in `HttpOnly`
cookie with `HTTPCookies.Apply()` for correct `Secure`/`SameSite` behind
TLS-terminating proxies.
- **dbauthz authorization**: All 18 querier methods have authorization
wrappers. Read operations use `ActionRead`, write operations use
`ActionUpdate` on `ResourceDeploymentConfig`.
## Governance Model
| Control | Implementation |
|---------|---------------|
| **Global kill switch** | `enabled` defaults to `false` |
| **Availability policy** | `force_on` (always injected), `default_on`
(pre-selected), `default_off` (opt-in) |
| **Per-chat selection** | `mcp_server_ids` on `CreateChatRequest` /
`CreateChatMessageRequest` |
| **Auth gate** | OAuth2 servers require per-user auth before tools are
injected |
| **Tool-level allow/deny** | Arrays on `mcp_server_configs` for
granular tool filtering |
| **Secrets encrypted at rest** | Uses `dbcrypt_keys` (same pattern as
`chat_providers.api_key`) |
## Tests
8 test functions covering:
- Full CRUD lifecycle (create, list, update, delete)
- Non-admin visibility filtering (enabled-only, field redaction)
- `auth_connected` population for OAuth2 vs non-OAuth2 servers
- Availability policy validation (valid values + invalid rejection)
- Unique slug enforcement (409 Conflict)
- OAuth2 disconnect idempotency
- Chat creation with `mcp_server_ids` persistence
## Known Limitations (Deferred)
These are documented and intentional for an experimental feature:
- **Audit logging** not yet wired — will add when feature stabilizes
- **Cross-field validation** (e.g., OAuth2 fields required when
`auth_type=oauth2`) — admin-only endpoint, will add when stabilizing
- **`force_on` auto-injection** — query exists but not yet wired into
chatd tool injection (follow-up)
- **Additional test coverage** — 403 auth tests, GET-by-ID tests,
callback CSRF tests planned for follow-up
## What's NOT in this PR
- Frontend UI (admin panel + chat picker)
- Actual MCP client connections (`chatd/chatmcp/` manager)
- Tool injection into `chatloop/`
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84de391f26 |
chore: add tallyman events for ai seat tracking (#22689)
AI seat tracking inserted as heartbeat into usage table. |
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91ec0f1484 |
feat: add service_accounts workspace sharing mode (#23093)
Introduce a three-way workspace sharing setting (none, everyone, service_accounts) replacing the boolean workspace_sharing_disabled. In service_accounts mode, only service account-owned workspaces can be shared while regular members' share permissions are removed. Adds a new organization-service-account system role with per-org permissions reconciled alongside the existing organization-member system role. Related to: https://linear.app/codercom/issue/PLAT-28/feat-service-accounts-sharing-mode-and-rbac-role --------- Co-authored-by: Steven Masley <Emyrk@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Kayla はな <mckayla@hey.com> |