9 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Garrett Delfosse 6ebefb8325 feat: add chat project sharing API (#30439)
API for chat project sharing (experiment `chat-projects`). Builds on
#30479 (merged).

Owners share a project with users, groups, or the whole organization
(the Everyone group, ID = organization ID). Chats in a shared project
stay private.

| Role    | Project and instructions | Memories   | ACL  | Delete |
|---------|--------------------------|------------|------|--------|
| `use`   | read                     | read/write | read | no     |
| `admin` | read/write               | read/write | edit | no     |

Only the owner, and administrators whose role grants delete, can delete
a project.

- **API:** `GET`/`PATCH .../chats/projects/{project}/acl`, same shapes
as `/chats/{chat}/acl`, plus SDK methods. Project responses include the
caller's `permissions` (`update`, `delete`, `share`); the UI hides edit
and delete accordingly.
- **Listing:** `GET /chats/projects` returns owned and shared projects.
Removes `GetChatProjectsByOwnerID`.
- **Chat access:** creating a chat in a project, and loading its memory
and instructions on each turn, requires the chat owner to own the
project or have an ACL grant (`chatd.ChatProjectUsableBy`). Role grants
don't count. If the grant is removed, existing chats lose memory and
instructions on their next turn.
- **Validation:** users and groups must be in the project's
organization; keys must be canonical UUIDs; callers can't change their
own role; the owner can't be added. Migration `000624` drops a user's
grants when they leave the organization, so rejoining doesn't restore
access.
- **Instructions:** readers who can't edit get 403 instead of 404, and
the UI hides editing.
- **Agent prompt:** memories are visible to and editable by sharees, so
the agent is told not to save secrets or personal details.

Known gap: project deletion still detaches chats, and a sharee's open
sidebar keeps showing them until reload. #30683 replaces this.

Not included: share notifications, `/acl/available`, sharing UI.

<details>
<summary>Decision log</summary>

- `use` grants memory read/write over HTTP, because agents in a sharee's
chats can already write memories. Making the agent read-only for sharees
was the alternative (@f0ssel chose sharees changing memories through
use).
- An administrator with `share` can grant themselves access and then use
the project. Accepted to keep access control simple (@f0ssel).
</details>

> Generated by Coder Agents.
2026-10-19 11:32:26 +00:00
Garrett Delfosse 2b9fad8bba feat: add chat project sharing database layer (#30479)
Database and authorization layer for chat project sharing (experiment
`chat-projects`), part 1 of 2. #30439 adds the API on top of it. Nothing
here changes behavior: projects start with empty ACLs, no endpoint
writes them yet, and deleting a project still detaches its chats.
Project deletion is in #30683.

- **Schema:** migration `000621` adds `user_acl` and `group_acl` jsonb
columns to `chat_projects`, typed as `ChatACL` like chats, with GIN
indexes. It also adds the `chat_project:share` API key scope.
- **Queries:**
- `GetChatProjectsOwnedOrSharedWithUserID`: owned projects plus projects
with an ACL entry for the user directly, through a group, or through the
Everyone group (whose ID is the organization ID). Entries count only for
members of the project's organization. Keys match regardless of actions,
so dbauthz filters the rows.
- `IsChatProjectAccessibleByUserID`: whether a user owns a project or
holds a `read` or `*` grant on it, for code running under a system
subject. With sharing disabled, dbauthz answers owner-only.
- `GetChatProjectByIDForUpdate`: lets the ACL update read, modify, and
write in one transaction.
  - `UpdateChatProjectACLByID`.
- **RBAC:**
- New `share` action on `chat_project`. dbauthz requires it to update
the ACL.
- `ChatProject.RBACObject` attaches the project ACL. Memory objects get
a derived ACL: project `read` grants memory read, and `read` with
`update` grants memory create and delete. Wildcard grants count. Read
sharees change memories through their chats' agents, which #30439 gates.
Project instructions authorize through the same object, so a `read`
grant reads them and an `update` grant edits them.
- `--disable-chat-sharing` also covers projects: ACLs are ignored, the
ACL update is rejected, and roles deny `chat_project:share`. The help
text and chat sharing docs say so.
- **Audit:** `user_acl` and `group_acl` changes are tracked.
- **Tests:**
- Querier tests run the access queries both raw and through dbauthz
(owner, direct user, group, Everyone, wildcard grants, a member of
another org, grants without read).
- RBAC object and memory ACL tests, with an authorizer check, in both
sharing modes.
- dbauthz cases including the disabled guards, and the
`chat_project:share` negation in the roles test.

The generated TypeScript changes only add the new scope value.

> Generated by Coder Agents.
2026-10-14 10:42:00 -04:00
Michael Suchacz b67587c875 feat: add the organization skills data model (#30609)
## Stack

Part of
[CODAGT-1341](https://linear.app/codercom/issue/CODAGT-1341/support-organization-level-skills-in-coder-agents).
This stack adds organization skills to Coder Agents: admins publish a
skill once per organization, share it with groups or members, and chats
in that organization load it next to personal and workspace skills. It
replaces the 21-PR draft stack #30584 to #30604 with five PRs, bottom to
top:

1. **#30609** data model: one migration, queries, RBAC and dbauthz (this
PR)
2. #30610 organization skill API routes and the scope-neutral SDK
3. #30611 sharing ACL routes
4. #30612 settings UI: shared skills table, admin page, member section
5. #30613 chats: chatd loading, `/` menu, docs

## What changes

This PR adds the data model and authorization for organization skills.
Personal skills keep working unchanged: `git diff origin/main --
codersdk site` shows only generated RBAC and API key scope additions
(`apikey_scopes_gen.go`, `rbacresources_gen.go`,
`rbacresourcesGenerated.ts`, the RBAC and scope unions in
`typesGenerated.ts`) and `codersdk.ResourceTypeOrganizationSkill` with
its friendly string. No personal route, SDK type or site component
changes, and `coderd/userskills_test.go` changes only by mechanical
constant renames.

**One migration, `000621_skills`** (please review it closely):

- renames `user_skills` to `skills` with its constraints, index and
triggers, and recreates the cap function and
`delete_deleted_user_resources`, whose PL/pgSQL bodies name the table;
- adds `organization_id` and `project_id` (`ON DELETE CASCADE`),
`enabled` (default true), and `group_acl` / `user_acl` (`jsonb`, default
`{}`), with CHECKs for exactly one owner, ACLs that are JSON objects,
and ACLs that stay empty unless an organization owns the row, plus
partial unique name indexes per owner kind;
- replaces the cap trigger with `enforce_skills_per_owner_limit()`: 100
rows per owner, disabled rows included, locking the owner row `FOR NO
KEY UPDATE` so unrelated foreign key checks are not blocked;
- adds a `BEFORE DELETE` trigger on `organization_members` that removes
a departing member from `user_acl` on that organization's skills, so
rejoining doesn't restore a direct grant;
- adds the `organization_skill` `resource_type` and `api_key_scope` enum
values last; nothing in the migration uses them.

The down migration undoes the three old migrations in reverse order: it
drops organization and project rows and restores `user_skills`, its
names, the cap function and `user_id NOT NULL`.

Authorization: a new RBAC resource `organization_skill` (create, read,
update, delete, share). Owner and org admin get it; site and org
auditors get read; members read only through the skill's ACL, which
applies only to members of its organization. `Skill.RBACObject()`
returns the organization object with both ACLs; project rows stay denied
to everyone. New sqlc queries cover organization insert, get, list
(SQL-filtered through `GetAuthorizedOrganizationSkillMetadata` and a
`regosql` converter), update and delete, with dbauthz wrappers and the
audit table entries. No routes yet.

## Commits

The first commit reproduces the reviewed code from the old stack; each
later commit is a labeled trim or fix.

- `baa3150e3b7` feat: add the organization skills data model.
Reproduction: every non-site file this commit changes equals the
reviewed old `authz` head `1e16b3004c4`, except that the old stack's
migrations 000615, 000616 and 000617 are merged into one migration (then
`000615_skills`, now `000621_skills`) with one fixture
(`testdata/fixtures/000621_skills.up.sql`) and one migration test (now
`testMigration000621Skills`). At that commit, `dump.sql` was
byte-identical to the old head's.
- `1b84e83463a` test(coderd/database): keep only the SQL paths of the
org skill matrix. `TestOrganizationSkillAuthorization` becomes
`TestOrganizationSkillQueries` instead of being deleted, because
coverage showed it is this PR's only run of the
`GetAuthorizedOrganizationSkillMetadata` row scan (80% to 65% without
it) and of the organization update and delete queries (100% to 0%).
Swapping `group_acl` and `user_acl` in the converter makes
`GrantedMember` fail. The removed cases are decided by
`TestRolePermissions`, `TestSkillRBACObjectOrganizationACL` and the
dbauthz method suite.
- `e2931b412e9` test(coderd/database): fold the skill cap cases into
existing coverage. The user case is covered by `TestUserSkillLimit` and
`TestUserSkillLimitConcurrentCreates`; the organization case folds into
`ConcurrentOrganizationInsertsHonorCap`, which now also checks that
disabled rows count and another organization is unaffected (mutation
checked); the project case stays.
- `be62aea9021` test(coderd/rbac): drop
`TestOrganizationSkillReadScope`, covered by `TestExternalScopeNames`
and the generated scope file.
- `0c275ba37de` merges main at `454a2fcc697`, which took 000615 to
000618: it renumbers the migration to 000619 and resolves `dump.sql`,
`check_constraint.go` and the generated API docs. `8f2b4b87ee2` merges
main at `ad85646164e`, which took 000619: it renumbers the migration to
000620.
- `5248d56b64f` merges main at `e7b76872098`, which took 000620
(`000620_audit_chat_project_instructions_resource_type`): it renumbers
the migration, fixture and migration test to `000621_skills` (step
`Migration000621Skills`, version 621), and resolves
`enterprise/audit/table.go` (keeping main's
`AuditableChatProjectInstructions` entries and the `Skill` entry),
`dump.sql` and `models.go` (the `resource_type` enum gets
`chat_project_instructions`, then `organization_skill`) and the
regenerated `schemas.md`. The up and down SQL are unchanged by every
renumbering.

## Size

Production +549/-67, tests +728/-33, generated +881/-314; total
+2158/-414. This is above the 500-line reviewer-friendly limit on
purpose: Mike asked for 4 to 5 PRs instead of the 21 small ones this
stack replaces.

## Replaces

#30584 (rename `user_skills` to `skills`), #30585 (skill owners), #30586
(organization skill authorization).

## Validation

- Migration test: up keeps the existing personal row and its ID; down
restores the `user_skills` names, cap function and `NOT NULL`, and drops
organization rows; soft-deleting a user removes their skills after up,
after down, and after re-up.
- `go test` passed on `be62aea9021`, before the main merges, for
`coderd` (skill tests), `coderd/database`, `dbauthz`, `migrations`,
`gentest`, `coderd/rbac/...`, `coderd/x/chatd`, `coderd/x/skills`,
`enterprise/audit` and `enterprise/coderd`; `make lint/check-scopes`
passed; the four personal skills Vitest files pass unchanged.
- On `5248d56b64f`: build, vet, `TestMigrate`, `TestMigrationChain`, the
`migrations`, `database`, `dbauthz`, `gentest`, `rbac` and
`enterprise/audit` packages pass; `make gen` run twice is clean, and
`make pre-commit` passes.
- Remote UAT round 7 through Coder Agents passed on the whole stack; see
#30613's Validation for scope and findings.

> Xum opened this PR on behalf of @ibetitsmike.
2026-10-13 15:51:31 +00:00
Bobby Ho 663f41ffa9 feat: derive OAuth2 client type from token_endpoint_auth_method (#28043)
Adds an OAuth2 client type (public vs confidential, RFC 7591 §2) derived
from the requested auth method instead of hardcoded confidential. The
type is stored and guarded here, but no endpoint enforces on it yet;
public behavior at the token endpoint follows in the next PR in the
stack.

- Client type is derived once and reused by both registration and
redirect URI validation, so they can't disagree
- IsPublic() fails closed: an unrecognized or missing value reads as
confidential
- RFC 7592 update (PUT) now rejects moving a client between public and
confidential (400) instead of silently flipping it when the auth method
is omitted
- Discovery still doesn't advertise "none"; follows once the token
endpoint honors it

### Behavior by client shape

`client_type` is derived from `token_endpoint_auth_method` at POST and
pinned at PUT. RFC 7592 GET/PUT authenticate with the registration
access token, not the client secret, so neither endpoint reads a secret.

| Registered with | Stored `client_type` / method | GET reports | PUT
that flips the method |

|------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------------------------|
| omitted, or `client_secret_basic` | `confidential` /
`client_secret_basic` | `client_secret_basic` | `none` → 400
`invalid_client_metadata` |
| `none` (new) | `public` / `none` | `none` | `client_secret_*` → 400
`invalid_client_metadata` |
| `none` (before this PR) | `confidential` / `none` | `none` | either →
200, type stays `confidential` |

- PUT still replaces every other RFC 7591 field. `client_type` is the
only pinned one; the method may move within a type
(`client_secret_basic` ↔ `client_secret_post`).
- Row 3 is the only shape where the two columns disagree. The guard
fires only on a method change that crosses the type line, so those
clients keep managing themselves instead of being locked out of their
own configuration endpoint.
- The token endpoint does not consult `client_type` yet, so every client
still authenticates with a secret and registration still issues one.

Split out of #27873, second in the stack (on top of #28041).
Refs
https://linear.app/codercom/issue/ENG-3029/oauth2-support-public-client
2026-08-18 21:12:44 -07:00
Danielle Maywood 170a6e1fe9 feat: add chat sharing foundation (#25041) 2026-05-18 22:32:05 +01:00
George K 4379230a27 feat: add deployment-wide option to disable workspace sharing (#21172)
Adds `--disable-workspace-sharing` option.

Workspace sharing is disabled by not including user and group ACLs in
the workspace RBAC object, which prevents ACL-based authz.

Closes https://github.com/coder/internal/issues/1072

The commit also adds saving of workspace user/group ACLs in the test DB
data generator.
2025-12-09 08:13:09 -08:00
Thomas Kosiewski ed90ecf00e feat: add allow_list to resource-scoped API tokens (#19964)
# Add API key allow_list for resource-scoped tokens

This PR adds support for API key allow lists, enabling tokens to be scoped to specific resources. The implementation:

1. Adds a new `allow_list` field to the `CreateTokenRequest` struct, allowing clients to specify resource-specific scopes when creating API tokens
2. Implements `APIAllowListTarget` type to represent resource targets in the format `<type>:<id>` with support for wildcards
3. Adds validation and normalization logic for allow lists to handle wildcards and deduplication
4. Integrates with RBAC by creating an `APIKeyEffectiveScope` that merges API key scopes with allow list restrictions
5. Updates API documentation and TypeScript types to reflect the new functionality

This feature enables creating tokens that are limited to specific resources (like workspaces or templates) by ID, making it possible to create more granular API tokens with limited access.
2025-10-09 14:53:08 +02:00
Thomas Kosiewski d0db9ec88f feat: add multi-scope support to API keys (#19917)
# Canonicalize API Key Scopes

This PR introduces canonical API key scopes with a `coder:` namespace prefix to avoid collisions with low-level resource:action names. It:

1. Renames special API key scopes in the database:
   - `all` → `coder:all`
   - `application_connect` → `coder:application_connect`

2. Adds support for a new `scopes` field in the API key creation request, allowing multiple scopes to be specified while maintaining backward compatibility with the singular `scope` field.

3. Updates the API documentation to reflect these changes, including the new endpoint for listing public API key scopes.

4. Ensures backward compatibility by mapping between legacy and canonical scope names in relevant code paths.
2025-09-26 11:56:34 +02:00
Thomas Kosiewski fb0ce389a6 feat: implement API key scopes database migration (#19861)
Added database migration for API key scopes.

Fixes #19845
2025-09-22 19:26:51 +02:00