The tests from #32063 and #32062 are two to three times the size of the
code they cover, and a lot of them can't fail for a reason we'd care
about. This PR removes those, with no production changes.
In `coderd/schedule/cron`, two tests rebuilt the schedule rule a second
time to compare against, which was also the only use of
`export_test.go`, so that goes too. Most of the rest, in both packages,
are table rows that take the same branch as a row that stays. I also
dropped a copy of the webhook scheme list and a repeated-request test
that belongs at the route.
What's left is a row per reject branch, the RFC cases, the regression
test for the `Next` hang and the constant-time scan. I replayed each fix
commit from the two PRs against the smaller suite, and the pre-fix code
still fails a test for every one, other than a fix to the wording of a
zone error.
One row that stays is changed: the bearer wrong-scheme case used
`Basic`, which was only rejected because of where its space lands, so
nothing covered the scheme word. It's now `Digest`.
#32162 overlaps with this in `cron`. With the shim's users gone it no
longer needs to touch that package, so it's now stacked on top of this
PR.
## Why
An automation webhook must prove that a request comes from the holder of
the automation's secret before Coder parses the JSON body. The approved
RFC ([Automations for Coder
Agents](https://app.notion.com/p/3ded579be59281e39950e686df02fa3d),
Webhooks section) puts that check behind one `WebhookVerifier` interface
with three schemes. This PR adds those verifiers as a pure Go package.
The webhook route that calls them comes in a later PR.
Part of CODAGT-1135.
## What changed
New leaf package `coderd/x/chatd/chatwebhook`:
- `WebhookVerifier`, with the three methods exactly as the RFC writes
them, and three verifiers: `bearer` (constant-time token compare, one or
more spaces after `Bearer` as in RFC 6750 section 2.1), `github`
(HMAC-SHA256 of the raw body in `X-Hub-Signature-256`) and
`standard_webhooks` (HMAC-SHA256 of `webhook-id.webhook-timestamp.body`,
`v1,` entries in `webhook-signature`, five-minute timestamp window,
`whsec_` secret).
- `Scheme` with the three RFC enum strings, and `NewVerifier(Scheme)`.
The package does not import `coderd/database`.
- Every `Verify` failure wraps `ErrRejected`, so the route can answer
`401`. Every `Verify` and `ValidateSecret` error is built from a fixed
string: it never holds the secret, the received token or a signature.
The package does not log. Only the `NewVerifier` error names the unknown
scheme.
- `GenerateSecret` reads 32 bytes from `crypto/rand` for `bearer` and
`github`. For `standard_webhooks` it returns `ok=false`, and
`ValidateSecret` checks the pasted `whsec_` secret.
## Scope
- No database, no HTTP route, no wiring, no new Go module. Nothing
imports the package yet, so `main` behaves as before with the
`chat-automations` experiment off.
- The map from the database enum to a verifier, and its "every enum
value has a verifier" test, belong to the route PR. It can call
`NewVerifier(chatwebhook.Scheme(automation.WebhookAuth))`. A
`NewVerifier` error is a server error, not a `401`.
- No deduplication by `webhook-id`, as in the RFC. The same valid
request verifies every time.
## Tradeoffs
- A pasted `whsec_` secret has no length bound. The spec describes
sender secrets of 24 to 64 bytes, but it does not tell a receiver to
reject others. A bound would lock out a sender that deviates, and it
protects only the owner from the sender's own key.
- The bearer verifier accepts one or more spaces between `Bearer` and
the token, as RFC 6750 section 2.1 and the API key middleware do. It
rejects a tab and an empty token. It also rejects trailing whitespace
after the token when it receives it, but an HTTP request cannot deliver
that: `net/http` strips trailing whitespace from the header value before
the verifier runs, so such a request is accepted with the right token.
- The signed Standard Webhooks content uses the `webhook-timestamp` text
as received. The reference Go library signs the reformatted number
instead. The two differ only for a timestamp with leading zeros, which a
conforming sender does not send.
- A `webhook-id` that contains `.` is rejected. The spec asks senders to
avoid it, because it makes `id.timestamp.body` ambiguous. A repeated
`Authorization`, `X-Hub-Signature-256`, `webhook-id` or
`webhook-timestamp` line is rejected for the same reason. Several
`webhook-signature` lines are read as one list.
- `TestSecretComparisonsAreConstantTime` reads the package source and
fails on `==`, `bytes.Equal` and similar on secrets. A correct
early-exit compare gives the same answers as a constant-time one, so a
request-level test cannot tell them apart. The scan is a guard against
the likely mistake, not a proof.
## Verification
- Test vectors come from the [GitHub
docs](https://docs.github.com/en/webhooks/using-webhooks/validating-webhook-deliveries)
and from `TestWebhookSign` in the [Standard Webhooks Go
library](https://github.com/standard-webhooks/standard-webhooks/blob/main/libraries/go/webhook_test.go).
The tests cite the URL beside each vector.
- Live lane: none. No route, CLI or UI reaches this code yet, so there
is no surface to exercise.
---
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