Commit Graph
4537 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Michael Suchacz 25af21b5d5 feat!: remove has_ai_task and the task build reasons (#29085)
Drops the `has_ai_task` column from `template_versions` and
`workspace_builds` (with its index and view projections) and removes the
three task build reasons (`task_auto_pause`, `task_manual_pause`,
`task_resume`) from the `build_reason` enum. Existing rows are remapped
before the enum swap: automatic pauses become `autostop`, manual pauses
and resumes become `initiator`, and
`workspace_build_orchestrations.child_reason` follows the same mapping.
The query filters, provisionerdserver flag writes, and audit ignore
entries for the column go with it.

**Migration cost:** recreating `build_reason` rewrites
`workspace_builds`. `TestMigration000593TaskBuildReasonRewriteTiming`
seeds 1,000 workspaces, 100,000 builds (30,000 with task reasons) and
5,000 orchestrations and asserts the migration stays under a two-minute
bound; locally it takes about 0.7 to 1.0 s. The test is skipped under
`-short`.

**Breaking change:** the down migration re-adds `has_ai_task` as `false`
and restores the enum values; remapped reasons keep their new values.

**Review changes:** the migration test now asserts only the row remaps
(schema and enum introspection removed per review); renumbered from
000592 to 000593.

**Stack context:** Coder Tasks removal stack (CODAGT-642): #28743
frontend → #28788 CLI → #28789 API → #28790 provisioner → #29084
notifications → **#29085 build reasons** → #29086 tables → #28750
permissions. The last four PRs replace the single data-drop migration
that used to live in #28750; each carries one concern and its own
migration number.

> Created by Xum (AI agent) on behalf of @ibetitsmike.
2026-09-11 10:47:43 +02:00
Michael Suchacz f809776229 feat!: remove the task notification templates (#29084)
Removes the six Coder Tasks notification templates (their preferences
and inbox history go with them via cascade) and the
`preference_task_notification_alert_dismissed` user setting with its two
queries. The `task` value of `ai_seat_usage_reason` stays: seats
consumed through tasks remain consumed, and remapping their reason would
misstate billing history.

**Breaking change:** migration 000592 deletes data. The down migration
restores the template definitions, not the deleted preferences or
notification history.

**Review changes:** dropped the `ai_seat_state` remap and enum swap and
the migration unit test (both per review); moved the migration from
000591 to 000592 because main took 000591.

**Stack context:** Coder Tasks removal stack (CODAGT-642): #28743
frontend → #28788 CLI → #28789 API → #28790 provisioner → **#29084
notifications** → #29085 build reasons → #29086 tables → #28750
permissions. The last four PRs replace the single data-drop migration
that used to live in #28750; each carries one concern and its own
migration number.

> Created by Xum (AI agent) on behalf of @ibetitsmike.
2026-09-11 08:05:53 +00:00
Michael Suchacz 9cd38b5373 feat!: remove the Tasks API from coderd and codersdk (#28789)
Removes the Tasks API and task orchestration from coderd and codersdk:
the `/api/v2/tasks` handlers, task middleware and search filters, task
name generation, autobuild pause/resume logic, task notification
enqueues, telemetry, and the codersdk task types. Regenerates apidoc,
the API reference docs, and `typesGenerated.ts`.

**Breaking change:** the Tasks API is removed; requests to
`/api/v2/tasks` fail. Tasks was deprecated in v2.34.

**Stack context:** Coder Tasks removal stack (CODAGT-642): #28743
frontend → #28788 CLI → #28789 API → #28790 provisioner → #29084
notifications → #29085 build reasons → #29086 tables → #28750
permissions. The last four PRs replace the single data-drop migration
that used to live in #28750; each carries one concern and its own
migration number.

**Why:** with the UI (#28743) and CLI (#28788) gone, this deletes the
server surface. Database tables, RBAC, and notification templates stay
until the top of the stack so every layer builds and migrates
independently.

**What to scrutinize:**
- The `enable-ai-tasks` option is removed outright (review feedback):
configs still carrying `enableAITasks` fail to parse until the key is
deleted.
- provisionerdserver now writes `HasAITask: false` on template/build
flags; the column and these lines are dropped in #29085.
- `codersdk.ResourceTypeTask` stays so audit logs recorded before the
removal keep rendering.

**Validation:** `go build ./...`, `go vet ./...`, `go test
./codersdk/...`, site biome and tsc, CLI goldens regenerated, pre-commit
hooks.

**Size:** +242/-10,792 over 76 files; additions are regenerated
docs/goldens and test fixture updates.

> Created by Xum (AI agent) on behalf of @ibetitsmike.
2026-09-11 01:48:56 +00:00
Bobby Ho 42fcd332c6 fix: remove CORS from the OAuth2 authorization endpoint (#29143)
fix(oauth2): exclude authorization endpoint from permissive CORS

- Apply standard CORS to `/oauth2/authorize`, with or without a trailing slash, as required by OAuth 2.1 §3.1.
- Normalize repeated slashes before selecting the policy to prevent exclusion bypasses, including in wsproxy.
- Preserve permissive CORS for other OAuth2 endpoints, discovery documents, and MCP. Same-origin consent behavior is unchanged.
- Add middleware and router regression tests and update provider security docs.
2026-09-10 10:49:28 -07:00
david-fraley fef0763820 feat: report template builder build failure reasons in telemetry (#28586) 2026-09-10 08:21:29 -04:00
Ehab Younes 0aae890d03 feat: return per-app session counts from workspace agent stats queries (#29134)
- Make all six raw session-count queries return a session_counts JSONB
object keyed by app name instead of fixed per-family columns. Fold the
results into existing family fields in Go using the shared SDK registry,
including unrecognized names under unknown.
- Remove the registry parameters and associated dbauthz validation from
these queries, which no longer perform family attribution in SQL.
Preserve existing deployment stats, Prometheus, and telemetry outputs.
- Select session maps directly in the two latest-row queries instead of
decomposing and reaggregating a single row. Keep byte, connection, and
latency aggregates independent of per-app expansion.
- Add regressions for latest eligible rows, empty session maps, distinct
same-family app names, labels, and unchanged traffic aggregates.
2026-09-10 14:07:03 +02:00
Ehab Younes da45488208 feat: attribute session counts by app family (#28337)
- Centralize app-to-family attribution in the SDK registry so recognized
app aliases contribute to their family's session counts and usage
minutes without duplicating name lists across SQL queries.
- Pass the registry into agent stats queries, insights, and usage rollups.
- Validate its structure in dbauthz so missing or renamed families fail
explicitly instead of silently producing zero counts.
- Decompose session maps once per row for per-agent sums while retaining
the key-presence checks used by insights. Update reporting consumers
and add coverage for alias attribution and registry validation.
2026-09-10 13:54:11 +02:00
Susana Ferreira 3ed8548e78 fix: unblock AI price book refresh for gpt-6-astra and qwen3.8-max (#29170)
The weekly `aigateway-prices-refresh` job
[failed](https://github.com/coder/coder/actions/runs/34458761592)
because two upstream-guard assertions in the generator tripped:
models.dev now lists OpenAI's `gpt-6-astra` (so its `overrides.jq`
injection must be dropped), and the curated OpenRouter
`qwen/qwen3.8-max` identifier was renamed upstream to
`qwen/qwen3.8-max-0902`.

This removes the `gpt-6-astra` injection, repoints the qwen curation
entry to `qwen/qwen3.8-max-0902` (with a `displayName` override to keep
the clean "Qwen3.8 Max" label in the UI), and regenerates `prices.json`
and `knownModelsGenerated.json`.

Note: because the artifacts regenerate from live models.dev, this diff
also carries unrelated upstream drift, the same content the scheduled
refresh PR would produce.

> [!NOTE]
> Generated with Coder Agents on behalf of @ssncferreira.
2026-09-10 11:31:23 +01:00
Ethan d8e3f4fcf7 feat: evict the oldest attachments at the chat file cap (#29063)
Closes CODAGT-933

Long agent sessions were hitting the 50 attachment cap, after which
every upload, screenshot and `attach_file` call was rejected, so people
were abandoning otherwise healthy chats.

Rather than raise the cap (which just moves the cliff and multiplies the
worst-case per-chat `bytea` storage), a chat now keeps its 50 most
recent attachments. `LinkChatFilesAfterLock` deletes the oldest
`chat_files` rows in the same statement and the cascade drops their
links. Files in the incoming batch are never evicted, so the only
remaining rejection is a single message with more than 50 files.

Nothing in the product ever linked one file to two chats, so rather than
guard the eviction against it, this adds `UNIQUE (file_id)` on
`chat_file_links`, with the migration dropping any existing duplicates
in favour of the oldest chat.

Evicted attachments render as the existing "Attachment expired" tile. A
`pinned` flag is the obvious follow-up if someone needs to keep a
specific file around.
2026-09-10 13:40:16 +10:00
Bobby Ho 1818844069 fix: ignore unrecognized parameters at the token endpoint (#29139)
fix(oauth2): ignore unrecognized token request parameters

Align `/oauth2/tokens` with OAuth 2.1 §3.2 and `/oauth2/authorize` by ignoring unknown parameters and logging only their names at debug level, never values. Continue rejecting duplicate known parameters, with tests covering all nine and shared unknown-parameter inputs across both endpoints. Misspelled optional parameters are now ignored rather than returning 400. Changes are limited to `coderd/oauth2provider`, with no new endpoints or schema changes.

Closes https://linear.app/codercom/issue/PLAT-577
2026-09-09 11:42:57 -07:00
Bobby Ho 716a3fdbfd fix: match OAuth2 redirect_uri against every registered redirect URI (#29014)
- Fix OAuth2 redirect validation to accept any registered URI, resolving Cursor’s rejection when using its second callback (fixes #28910; stacked on #29013).

- Deduplicate primary and alternate callbacks, validate every registered entry, preserve primary-callback defaults and existing code-to-token redirect checks, and stop exposing registered URLs in errors.

- Add regression tests and update documentation; defer admin removal of registered URIs (PLAT-619) and requiring redirect_uri when multiple URIs are registered (PLAT-620) to follow-ups.
2026-09-09 11:25:17 -07:00
Bobby Ho 9f27e2b17c feat: let an OAuth2 refresh narrow the granted scope (#28751)
fix: honor scope narrowing on OAuth2 token refresh

Allow `POST /oauth2/tokens` to mint an access token with the requested
scope when covered by the consented grant. Narrowing affects only the
new access token; the stored grant and rotated refresh token scope remain
unchanged. Omitting `scope` uses the full grant.

Validate scope names against the catalog, then compare permission
coverage rather than set membership so `coder:all` grants can narrow.
Reject unknown or uncovered scopes with `400 invalid_scope` without
minting tokens or consuming the refresh token. Refresh still does not
re-check the app's current allowlist.

- Sanitize and cap token endpoint `error_description`, sharing the
  authorize path's length limit.
- Rename the scope-coverage log field `allowlist` to `ceiling` and add
  `phase=refresh`.
- Update provider docs for scoped refreshes, `invalid_scope`, composite
  scope caveats, and OAuth 2.1 draft -16.

Part 1 of 3 for PLAT-481, the final phase of PLAT-470.
2026-09-09 11:08:34 -07:00
Cian Johnston 74d1eef834 feat: support non-Anthropic models on Bedrock Mantle (#28404)
Migrates bedrock-typed provider construction to the standalone Bedrock
provider introduced by #28420, then removes the legacy Bedrock behavior
from the Anthropic provider. Existing provider and integration tests are
updated to use the new type; legacy environment configuration preserves
the `anthropic` route name while reporting provider type `bedrock`.

Adds chatd model-ID inference for Bedrock providers: `anthropic.*`
models keep the Anthropic Messages client, while other models use the
OpenAI Responses client. BYOK header format follows the inferred wire
shape.

A credential-gated live integration test discovers the Mantle catalog
from `/v1/models` and probes every model through the bridge. The
`openai.gpt-oss-*`, `google.gemma-4-*`, and `xai.grok-*` families are
documented as currently unsupported because Mantle serves them only on
routes the prefix-based rules cannot reach.

Depends on #28420.

## Smoke tests

Validated against a local `develop.sh` server on August 22, 2026:

- Coder Agents passed with Anthropic over InvokeModel, and Anthropic,
OpenAI, and Mistral models over Mantle.
- Claude Code passed the InvokeModel and Mantle Anthropic flows.
- Crush passed all four flows, including Mantle OpenAI and third-party
Chat Completions.

Models tested: `us.anthropic.claude-sonnet-4-6`,
`anthropic.claude-sonnet-5`, `openai.gpt-5.6-luna`, and
`mistral.ministral-3-14b-instruct`.

> Generated by Coder Agents
2026-09-09 18:28:57 +01:00
Sas Swart d5e2ca74cd chore: rename recorderTranslation to DRPCRecorder (#29133)
The old name, `recorderTranslation`, did not clarify from what calls
were being translated, nor to what they were being translated. The new
name, `DRPCRecorder`, immediately explains that calls are being recorded
over DRPC.

This was a readability hurdle while trying to investigate touch points
for AIGOV-358.

This is the first step towards implementing either a /dev/null-esque
recorder or a logging recorder as per the requirements in AIGOV-358.
2026-09-09 16:55:45 +02:00
Susana Ferreira 45fb985ce6 fix(coderd/database): exclude system users from AI budgets (#28698)
## Description

Group AI budget totals counted system users, including the prebuilds
user, even though they are excluded from the displayed member count.

The budget queries now exclude system users when calculating group
totals and over-budget user counts.

## Changes

- Exclude system users from group AI budget totals.
- Exclude system users from over-budget user counts.
- Add database regression coverage.

Closes https://linear.app/codercom/issue/AIGOV-595

> [!NOTE]
> Generated by Coder Agents on behalf of @ssncferreira.
2026-09-09 09:29:57 +01:00
Paweł Banaszewski 8472a6884f chore!: remove env-based AI provider configuration (#29053)
> AI tools were used to create this PR

Removes deprecated AI provider configuration through environment
variables, CLI flags, and YAML.
Deletion includes indexed providers and legacy OpenAI, Anthropic, and
Bedrock options under both AI Gateway and AI Bridge branding, eg.
`CODER_AI_GATEWAY_PROVIDER_<N>_*` or `CODER_AI_GATEWAY_ANTHROPIC_KEY`.
Removes the associated startup-seeding code.
Updates tests and documentation.

**Breaking change:** Remove [obsolete AI provider CLI flags and YAML
keys](https://coder.com/docs/ai-coder/ai-gateway/providers#database-management-of-providers)
before upgrading, otherwise Coder will fail to start with an `unknown
flag` or `unknown option` error. Provider environment variables are
ignored and no longer seed the database. Existing database-stored
provider configuration is preserved.
2026-09-09 10:16:24 +02:00
Bobby Ho 0ad8eebbf7 fix: allow any port on loopback OAuth2 redirect URIs (#29013)
Fix: Allow variable ports for registered HTTP loopback redirect URIs (127.0.0.1, [::1], and localhost), enabling native apps to use dynamically assigned ports. Apply this registration-matching exception at both authorization and token endpoints while preserving the presented port.

Safeguards: Keep all other URI components and non-loopback matching unchanged, and retain exact code-to-token redirect URI matching, including the port.

Implementation and verification: Add shared matching logic, automated tests, and updated documentation. All 29 manual scenarios passed, although browser click-through to a listener on an OS-chosen port was not tested.
2026-09-08 17:40:10 -07:00
Bobby Ho 96ee8d171a fix: make OAuth2 code redemption single-use under concurrency (#28744)
TL;DR

Third PR in the PLAT-480 stack, on top of #28740. Fixes a race where the same authorization code could be redeemed twice concurrently.

The redeeming delete now returns the deleted row. If another request already redeemed the code, the delete returns sql.ErrNoRows and redemption fails with invalid_grant.

Each redemption runs in its own transaction, so concurrent requests serialize on the code row and only one succeeds.

The test now races two concurrent redemptions to verify single-use behavior.

No scope logic, new endpoints, or schema changes.

Depends on #28740.

Stack: #28237, #28740, this PR.
2026-09-08 16:42:34 -07:00
Hugo Dutka 150c680a4b fix: return MCP server tool execution errors as tool results (#29051)
Coder's MCP server currently sends most tool execution failures as
top-level JSON-RPC errors. The underlying error text is transmitted like
this:

```json
{
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "id": 1,
  "error": {
    "code": -32603,
    "message": "workspace name cannot be empty"
  }
}
```


Not all clients handle it well, and some may return a generic "MCP tool
request failed." to the model instead of passing the details as tool
output.

This PR starts returning execution failures as tool results with
`isError: true` and descriptive content like this:

```json
{
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "id": 1,
  "result": {
    "isError": true,
    "content": [
      {
        "type": "text",
        "text": "workspace name cannot be empty"
      }
    ]
  }
}
```

This should make the MCP server work better across a broader range of
MCP clients.
2026-09-08 17:28:46 +00:00
Steven Masley d544f394d4 fix(coderd): keep parameter values when the render is incomplete (#29108)
Closes #29099 ([ENG-3324](https://linear.app/codercom/issue/ENG-3324)).
Follow-up to #29102, which stopped the loss propagating through stop
builds but left start builds truncating.

## What this does

A render carrying a `module_not_loaded` diagnostic could not see the
whole template, so a parameter's absence from it is not evidence the
template stopped declaring that parameter. Keep the unmatched values
instead of deleting them.

## Why preserve rather than fail

provisionerd resolves modules itself, so only coderd's render is
degraded. Keeping the value produces a correct apply and the workspace
keeps building. Failing the build would turn silent data loss into an
inability to start every workspace on an affected template version.

A complete render is still authoritative and still narrows the set, so
unrelated warnings and legitimate parameter removals behave exactly as
before.

## Tests

- `TestResolveParameters/IncompleteRender`: complete render drops,
`module_not_loaded` preserves previous and build values, unrelated
warning drops.
- `TestDynamicParametersModuleCachePurged` now continues into the start
build. On `main` it fails with `start build must not drop the module
parameter`.

<details>
<summary>Notes for the reviewer</summary>

### Detection

`preview` tags the warning with `types.DiagnosticCode(diag,
types.DiagnosticModuleNotLoaded)`, so the check is
`previewtypes.ExtractDiagnosticExtra(diag).Code ==
previewtypes.DiagnosticModuleNotLoaded` over the second render's
diagnostics. Adding future completeness codes is a one-line change in
`incompleteRender`.

### Departure from the issue's sketch

The issue proposed also gating on `v.Source != sourceDefault`, to keep
discarding values that only ever came from a default. That check cannot
fire: `sourceDefault` is only assigned to parameters present in the
render output, so an unmatched value is never default-sourced. A default
stored by an earlier build arrives as `sourcePrevious` and is
indistinguishable from user input at this layer. The condition is
omitted rather than left in as dead code.

### Not covered

Nothing surfaces the degraded render to the operator. `wsbuilder` has no
logger, and `render.go` still discards preview's diagnostics (`Logger:
slog.New(slog.DiscardHandler)`). That is the follow-up work listed in
the issue.

</details>

---

🤖 Authored by Coder Agents on behalf of @Emyrk.
2026-09-08 17:20:53 +00:00
Steven Masley 36ea6eaf80 fix(coderd): do not narrow the parameter set on non-start builds (#29102)
Fixes part of #29099
([ENG-3324](https://linear.app/codercom/issue/ENG-3324)).

## What this does

Only a start build may narrow the stored set. A stop or delete build
does not change which parameters a workspace has.

## Why

A stop or delete build re-resolves the workspace parameters and deletes
every stored value the render did not return.

- When a template version's `cached_module_files` is NULL the renderer
cannot load modules, and the parameters are dropped. Any `restart` or
`coder update`, uses the broken version for `stop` and all parameters
are removed before the fixed `start`.
  - This can happen on any broken template version

## Scope

This does not fix a start build that resolves against a version with a
NULL module cache, which still truncates. That is the completeness-aware
discard loop described in the issue, and it lands separately.

## Tests

- `TestResolveParameters/UnmatchedValues` covers all three transitions
at the resolver level.
- `TestDynamicParametersModuleCachePurged` is an end-to-end regression
test: create a workspace with a module declared parameter, remove the
module cache, stop, and assert the value survives. It fails on `main`.

<details>
<summary>Implementation plan</summary>

### Problem

`dynamicparameters.ResolveParameters` ends with an unconditional discard
loop (`coderd/dynamicparameters/resolver.go`) that deletes every stored
value whose parameter is absent from the render output. With a NULL
module cache the render is incomplete, `preview` reports
`module_not_loaded` at warning severity, and the reduced parameter set
is treated as authoritative.

`wsbuilder.getParameters()` is transition-agnostic, so a stop build
persists that truncated set. `cli/update.go` stops first against the
workspace's current version, then starts against the active version, and
the start build reads the truncated set via `getLastBuildParameters()`.

### Coverage

| Case | Fixed here |
|---|---|
| `coder update`, old version purged, active version healthy | yes |
| Workspace sits on a purged version, autostop then autostart | no,
needs the discard loop fix |
| `require_active_version` where the active version is purged | no,
needs the discard loop fix |

### Changes

1. `resolver.go`: gate the discard loop on the build transition.
Ephemeral trimming, immutability, monotonicity, and default backfill are
unchanged.
2. `wsbuilder.go`: pass `b.trans`. Single non-test caller.

### Deliberate calls

- `delete` is treated like `stop`. Neither transition changes which
parameters a workspace has, and it keeps the condition to one
comparison.
- The transition is passed rather than a second boolean flag, so the
call site stays unambiguous next to `firstBuild`.

</details>

---

🤖 Authored by Coder Agents on behalf of @Emyrk.
2026-09-08 11:01:59 -05:00
Garrett Delfosse c12355d6e5 fix(coderd/x/chatd): carry unanswered user messages through compaction verbatim (#28645)
Fixes
[CODAGT-737](https://linear.app/codercom/issue/CODAGT-737/compaction-can-treat-the-last-user-message-as-an-assistant-message)

## Problem

Auto-compaction can trigger on a turn whose last history message is a
fresh, unanswered **user** message. Two things go wrong:

1. The summary instruction is appended as another user message.
Providers that merge consecutive same-role messages (verified against
fantasy's Anthropic conversion) fuse it with the user's message, and the
summarizer misattributes the user's instruction as assistant intent.
2. After compaction the original user row falls outside the prompt
window, so the instruction survives only through summary fidelity.

## Fix

Carry unanswered trailing user messages through compaction verbatim
instead of summarizing them. All logic lives in `chatd`; `chatloop` is
unchanged apart from prompt wording.

- **Prepare** (`generation_preparer.go`): `pendingUserSegmentStart`
locates the trailing user rows on the persisted rows, before
provider-switch sanitization (which can drop the assistant row
separating them from an already-answered message). Head and tail are
converted separately so the summarizer input excludes the tail exactly.
Falls back to summarizing everything when no usable segment exists.
- **Commit** (`buildCompactionMessages`): replays the tail after the
boundary trio as uncompressed, model-only user rows. The existing prompt
window query includes them; no SQL, UI, or turn-guard changes. Replay
rows carry no usage, so compaction cannot immediately re-fire.
- **Prompt** (`chatloop/compaction.go`): the summary prefix no longer
claims the assistant "was actively working", which is false in this
case. The summarizer prompt is unchanged.
- `ARCHITECTURE.md` compaction section updated.

## Testing

`go test ./coderd/x/chatd/...` green. New:
`TestBuildCompactionMessages_ReplaysPendingUserMessages`,
`TestPendingUserSegmentStart`,
`TestPendingUserSegmentConversionEquivalence`,
`TestPendingUserSegmentDerivedBeforeProviderSwitchSanitization`,
`TestDecisionGeneratesAfterCompactionWithReplayedPendingUser`.

<details>
<summary>Root-cause repro</summary>

Replaying the reported scenario through fantasy's Anthropic provider
against a capture server:

```
=== fantasy prompt (roles as chatd builds them) ===
[2] role=user      "You'll hit compaction now, we'll need to go through some fin..."
[3] role=user      "You are performing a context compaction. Summarize the conve..."

=== wire request to Anthropic ===
[2] role=user, 2 content block(s)
    block[0]: "You'll hit compaction now, we'll need to go through some final checks..."
    block[1]: "You are performing a context compaction. Summarize the conversation so..."
```

</details>

---

🤖 This PR was generated by Coder Agents on behalf of @f0ssel.
2026-09-08 09:31:42 -04:00
Jake Howell 257c6f1dca refactor: move shared AI model UI into modules/aiModels (#29040)
> 🤖 Refactoring with Cursor.

AI settings was importing model form fields, ModelSelector, and
ProviderIcon from AgentsPage. Those now live in
`site/src/modules/aiModels`.

No user-facing behavior change.

- Move ProviderIcon, ModelSelector, and the model admin form fields into
`modules/aiModels`
- Point AgentsPage and AI settings at the new paths
- Drop the leftover ChatModelAdminPanel ProviderIcon duplicate and the
knownModels barrel
- Update the known-models catalog generator paths
2026-09-08 14:34:51 +10:00
Ehab Younes 90c7533204 perf: store workspace agent session counts as JSONB (#28126)
Replace fixed session_count_* columns with a sparse session_counts
JSONB object so new session types require no schema changes.

Convert retained and unrolled-up activity, warning on backlogs spanning
more than 24 hours. Update batching, queries, and rollups while preserving
existing API shapes and compatibility with older agents.

Add migration, query, and batcher coverage.
2026-09-07 22:31:42 +02:00
Hugo Dutka fcaa14f456 fix: validate mcp input (#28702)
Addresses
[CODAGT-994](https://linear.app/codercom/issue/CODAGT-994/return-validation-errors-for-invalid-mcp-tool-arguments).

The MCP server currently does not validate tool call arguments against
the MCP JSON schema.

Additionally, when a client passes invalid arguments to a Coder MCP
server tool call, currently the server returns only:

```json
{
  "error": "MCP tool request failed."
}
```

In this PR we start validating arguments and returning an informative
validation error instead:

```json
{
  "error": "invalid arguments: ...",
  "expectedSchema": { ... }
}
```
2026-09-07 19:15:38 +02:00
Hugo Dutka dc1faecbf8 test: bind more server tests to loopback (#29042)
Follow up to https://github.com/coder/coder/pull/28980. The tests
modified in this PR have the same flake potential as the test fixed in
#28980.

Fixes
https://linear.app/codercom/issue/PLAT-583/flake-testserveryamlwritethenreadconfig
2026-09-07 15:24:33 +02:00
Michael Suchacz ac824cd235 chore(coderd): remove dead code from chatd (#29008)
Removes production code in `coderd/x/chatd` that nothing reaches, the
tests that only existed to exercise it, and option/config fields that
callers filled in but chatd never read. No runtime behaviour changes;
the only edits outside `coderd/x/chatd` drop the now-nonexistent fields
at their three call sites (`coderd/coderd.go`, `coderd/exp_chats.go`,
`coderd/coderdtest`).

Net: 42 files, +147 / -1065.

Verification method for every item: `golang.org/x/tools/cmd/deadcode`
(with and without `-test`) rooted at `cmd/coder`, `enterprise/cmd/coder`
and every package that imports chatd; a `go/packages` pass counting
`TypesInfo.Uses` per declared type, const, var, field and method across
the same roots, split into test and non-test use sites, plus a
read-vs-write split for struct fields; `rg` over the whole repo
including `site/src` for json tag names; then `go build ./...`, `go vet
./coderd/x/chatd/...`, `golangci-lint run ./coderd/x/chatd/... ./coderd/
./coderd/coderdtest/`, and `go test ./coderd/x/chatd/...` (all 20
packages) locally.

<details>
<summary>Evidence per deletion</summary>

| Removed | What it was | Why unused |
|---|---|---|
| `subagent.go` `resolveConfiguredModelOverride`, `parseModelOverride`,
`parsedModelOverride` (~135 lines) +
`TestResolveConfiguredModelOverride_*`, `TestParseModelOverride` |
raw-string model override resolver | Only callers were its two tests;
production resolves overrides through `resolveOrganizationModelOverride`
(`title_override.go`, `compaction_override.go`, `subagent.go`). |
| `chatd.go` `removeSkillIndexMessages`, `isSkillIndexMessage` +
`TestSkillIndexRefreshReplacesStaleAliases` | skill-index refresh
helpers | Zero production references; the test simulated a refresh path
no production code performs. |
| `chatd.go` `chatMessage`, `newChatMessage`, `withCreatedBy`,
`appendMessageFields`, `BuildSingleChatMessageInsertParams` (~90 lines)
| insert-params builder | Exported, but every caller was a `chatd_test`
file (6 sites). Replaced by a 25-line `singleChatMessageInsertParams`
helper in `chatd_helpers_test.go`. |
| `chatd.go` `Server.closeInflightAdmission` | one-line wrapper around
`inflightClosed.Store(true)` | Single call site (`Close`); inlined. |
| `chatd.go` `Server.workerID`, `instructionLookupTimeout`,
`pendingChatAcquireInterval`, `maxChatsPerAcquire`,
`chatHeartbeatInterval` | Server struct fields | Assigned in `New` and
never read anywhere (the values reach the worker through
`chatWorkerOptions`, not these fields). |
| `Config.InstructionLookupTimeout`, `homeInstructionLookupTimeout`,
`coderd.Options.ChatdInstructionLookupTimeout`,
`coderdtest.Options.ChatdInstructionLookupTimeout` | timeout plumbing |
The value only landed in the dead `Server.instructionLookupTimeout`; no
CLI flag sets it and nothing reads it. |
| `PromoteQueuedOptions.CreatedBy` | option field | Set by
`coderd/exp_chats.go` and three tests, never read in chatd (promotion
keeps the queued row's `created_by`). |
| `SubmitToolResultsOptions.DynamicTools` | option field | Set by
`coderd/exp_chats.go` (which re-read `chat.DynamicTools` just to pass
it) and three tests, never read in chatd. |
| `attachments.go` `buildAssistantPartsForPersist` (whole file) |
assistant part builder | Stale copy left by #26270; production uses
`buildAssistantParts` in `message_conversion.go`. Its six tests were
retargeted to the live function (now
`message_conversion_internal_test.go`) and a dead-copy assertion in
`subagent_internal_test.go` was dropped. |
| `chatloop.RunOptions` (94 lines) | old loop options struct | Only two
of 23 fields were ever populated, for one internal call to
`prepareMessagesForRequest`, which now takes `model, logger` directly
and no longer returns the ignored canonical slice.
`GenerateAssistantOptions` / `ExecuteLocalToolsOptions` are the live
types. |
| `chatloop.ErrDynamicToolCall`, `ErrStopAfterTool`, `PendingToolCall`,
`PersistedStep.PendingDynamicToolCalls` | dynamic-tool exit protocol |
Zero references outside their declarations (one stale comment in
`chatdebug/service.go` updated). |
| `chatloop.CompactionOptions.Persist`, `.OnError` | callbacks |
`Persist` had zero references; `OnError` was set only by two tests that
asserted it was never invoked. |
| `chatloop` `stepResult.shouldContinue` + its computation | flag |
Written once, never read. |
| `chatloop.StateWaiting` | metric label const | Zero references. |
| `generation.go` `generationOutcome.InsertedMessages`,
`runnerActionMessage` | outcome field | Built on every commit, never
read. |
| `chatstate` `ExecutionState.IsArchived`, `AllOwnershipStates`,
`OwnershipState`/`StateU`/`StateO`, `TransitionAcquire` | state-machine
leftovers | Zero references (the ownership consts became dead once
`AllOwnershipStates` went). |
| `chatstate` `ExecutionState.QueueNonEmpty` | predicate | Only
referenced by the test asserting its own table; the sibling `IsRunnable`
check in that test is kept. |
| `chatdebug.Attempt.RetryClassification`, `.RetryDelayMs` | json fields
| Never assigned anywhere, `omitempty`, and
`retry_classification`/`retry_delay_ms` do not appear in `site/src` or
`typesGenerated.ts`. |
| `chatdebug.RunContext.Kind`, `StepContext.HistoryTipMessageID`,
`RecorderOptions.Provider`/`.Model`, `stepHandle.opts`/`.usage`/`.err` |
context/handle fields | Written (from `chatd.go`,
`chatloop/compaction.go`, `modelcall.go`, `recorder.go`) and never read.
The DB run row keeps its own `kind` column. |
| `chatprovider.MergeProviderAPIKeys` +
`TestMergeProviderAPIKeys_PreservesProviderRegions` | key merge |
Superseded by `ResolveUserProviderKeys`, whose region test already
covers the same behaviour. |
| `chatprovider` `providerCreationError` | one-line `xerrors.Errorf`
wrapper | Single call site; inlined with identical message. |
| `chatretry.IsRetryable` | classifier wrapper | Zero references. |
| `computeruse.IsTool` + `TestComputerUseTool` | one-line forwarder to
`fantasyopenai.IsComputerUseTool` | No production caller; two test
assertions now call the fantasy function directly, and the dropped test
only asserted the library's own constructor. |
| `chatprompt.ToolResultToPart` | one-line forwarder to
`codersdk.ChatMessageToolResult` | Single call site; inlined. |
| `subagent_catalog.go` `formatSubagentDefinitions` | forwarder with
`nil` overrides | Single call site; inlined. |
| `worker.go` `chatWorker.chatWorkerID` | getter | Only tests called it;
they read `opts.WorkerID` directly now. |
| `chattest.AnthropicErrorResponse`, `OpenAIServerErrorResponse`,
`ChatMessageWithParts` (`messages.go` removed) | test fixtures | Zero
references. |
| `chattest` `AnthropicRequest.Options`, `OpenAIRequest.Options` |
`json:",inline"` map fields | `encoding/json` has no inline tag (the
TODO on each said so); never populated, never read. |

</details>

<details>
<summary>Considered and kept</summary>

- `chatstate.CreateChat` (test-only thin wrapper over `insertChat`,
production uses `CreateChatWithID`): documented package API with 25 test
call sites; not worth the churn.
- `chatprompt.MarshalContent` / `MarshalToolResult`: test-only, but they
deliberately produce legacy-format DB rows so the read path's legacy
handling stays covered.
- `chatstate.AllowedExecutionTransitionsFrom` / `AllowedInputStates` /
`AllowedExecutionTransitionOutputs`, `chatdebug.StepFromContext`,
`WithClock`, `WithStaleThreshold`, `WaitUntilIdleForTest`,
`PublishBuffer.BufferedChannels`, `chattool.NewWorkspaceMCPTool`: test
seams that tests actively use to reach otherwise unexported state.
- `AgentCapacityLimiter` interface (one production implementation):
tests inject fakes.
- `applyHookResultMessages` / `appendHookResultMessages`: a named pair
over one placement enum, both used.
- Nil-receiver guards on `*Metrics`, `*Result`, `*streamSyncPoller`,
`*runnerDebugTurn`: nil is a supported "disabled" value on those paths.
- Tests flagged by heuristics as assertion-light
(`TestNopMetrics_DoesNotPanic`, `TestStepHandleFinish_NilHandle`,
`TestRetry_OnRetryNilDoesNotPanic`, the `chatstate`
synthetic-cancellation tests that assert through helpers): they cover
real nil-safety or delegate assertions to helpers; kept.

</details>

<details>
<summary>Out-of-scope findings (not changed here)</summary>

- `chatdebug.Service.FinalizeStale` has had no production caller since
#26270 removed the background sweep loop; only its tests call it, and
comments in `chatd_debug.go` and `database/querier.go` still describe
the loop. Deleting it would erase the implementation a fix needs, so it
is left for a decision.
- `coderd_chatd_chats` (gauge) and
`coderd_chatd_stream_buffer_dropped_total` (counter) are registered and
documented in `docs/admin/integrations/prometheus.md` but never set or
incremented in production; `Metrics.RecordStreamBufferDropped` is
test-only. Removing them changes the exported metric set and the docs,
so they are left alone.

</details>

## Declined review findings

None yet.

> Xum (AI agent) opened this PR on behalf of @ibetitsmike.
2026-09-05 11:39:10 +02:00
Jeremy RuppelandAndrew Aquino 52142e6e94 fix(coderd/templatebuilder): strip prerequisite markers from delivered README (#28953)
## Problem

Template builder base READMEs delimit their prerequisites section with
HTML comment markers (`<!-- prerequisites:start -->` / `<!--
prerequisites:end -->`). `ExtractPrerequisites` uses these to populate
the builder's Prerequisites step, which works correctly.

However, `Compose` embeds the **full** base README verbatim into the
generated template's tarball. Because `react-markdown` renders raw HTML
comments as literal text, the markers were visible when the delivered
README is viewed via `MemoizedMarkdown`.

<img width="876" height="586" alt="Screenshot 2026-09-03 at 3 28 08 PM"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/70353ee2-1ff6-4e70-9b5d-7ac0521b945f"
/>

## Fix

Strip the prerequisite markers from the README before writing it into
the tarball (Option 2), keeping the change contained to the template
builder and leaving global markdown rendering untouched.

- `prerequisites.go`: new `StripPrerequisiteMarkers` removes each marker
line (plus an optional trailing blank line so no gap is left) while
preserving the content between them.
- `compose.go`: new `composedReadme` helper applies the strip in both
`Compose` return paths; returns `nil` for an empty README, preserving
the existing "omit README.md when empty" behavior.
- `ExtractPrerequisites` still reads the markers from the source
`BaseReadme`, so the builder's Prerequisites step is unaffected.

## Testing

- `TestStripPrerequisiteMarkers` covers both markers, no markers, single
markers, missing trailing blank line, and end-of-file cases.
- Extended the compose test to assert the delivered README contains no
marker text.
- `go test ./coderd/templatebuilder/`, `go vet`, and `golangci-lint run
./coderd/templatebuilder/...` all pass.

<details>
<summary>Approach considered</summary>

Two options were on the table:

1. Skip HTML comments in the shared `MemoizedMarkdown` component (fixes
any stray comment globally, but changes shared rendering behavior
app-wide).
2. Strip the markers from the README before inserting it into the
template zipball (targeted; markers have no purpose in the delivered
README since prerequisites are already extracted separately).

Option 2 was chosen for being contained and easily unit-tested.
</details>

---
_This PR was created by Coder Agents on behalf of @jeremyruppel._

---------

Co-authored-by: Andrew Aquino <dawneraq@gmail.com>
2026-09-04 19:14:10 +00:00
Danielle Maywood a6938e69db fix: re-resolve PR when stored URL's branch is stale (#28983) 2026-09-04 17:04:13 +01:00
Ethan 9f7d08a26d fix: default chat compaction threshold to 30% for large-context models (#28899) 2026-09-04 16:03:01 +02:00
Michael Suchacz 9cd66d3773 feat: add GPT-6 Astra to the known models catalog, price book, and chatd (#28955) 2026-09-04 11:19:29 +02:00
Ethan ced03dc30b fix(coderd/x/chatd): avoid closing poller hint channels (#28746)
Closes SEC-515

Prevent a `send on closed channel` panic when a chat stream unregisters
during polling.

The poller no longer owns or closes subscriber channels. This is safe
because delivery is guarded by the stream context, and unregister
removes the subscriber from future polls.
2026-09-04 08:55:15 +01:00
07f9018c61 feat: re-check the app allowlist at OAuth2 code redemption (#28740)
**TL;DR**

Second of the PLAT-480 stack. #28237 made the negotiated scope bound the
issued token; this PR makes a narrowing of an app's registered scopes
apply to codes that were already issued.

| PR | What it does |
|---|---|
| #28237 (merged) | Mints access tokens with the negotiated scope, so a
grant for one scope stops behaving as full access, and reports the
granted scope per RFC 6749 §5.1. |
| **#28740 (this)** | Re-checks the code's scope against the app's
registered scopes at redemption, closing the ten minute window in which
a narrowing was ignored. |
| #28744 | Makes code redemption single-use under concurrency. Carries
no scope logic and is independent of this PR. |

- #28237 has merged, so this targets main.
- No new endpoints and no schema change.

---

An authorization code is valid for ten minutes, and its scope is checked
against the app's registered scopes exactly once, when the code is
issued. A registration narrowed inside that window had the narrowing
ignored: the code still redeemed for a token carrying the wider scope.

- The token exchange re-checks the code's scope against the registration
as it stands at redemption and refuses with `invalid_grant`. RFC 6749
§5.2 reserves `invalid_scope` for the scope the client asked for, and
this one comes from the stored grant.
- The check is coverage rather than membership, and reuses the
comparison the authorize endpoint already runs. That comparison now goes
through a new `rbac.FirstScopeNotCovered`, which expands the allowlist
once rather than once per granted scope.
- Only the client can change its registered `scope`, through RFC 7592;
no administrator surface writes the column. The re-check reflects the
registration at redemption rather than constraining the client.
- Refresh keeps the scope originally granted. That is a product choice,
not an RFC requirement: a narrowing applies at the next authorization
rather than mid-session, so tightening an app's scopes does not break
integrations already running.
- Codes issued before migration 000569 carry `coder:all`. For an app
registered with a narrower `scope` those are refused at redemption until
they expire, at most ten minutes.

Stack: #28237 (merged), this PR, #28744.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Steven Masley <Emyrk@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-03 18:29:11 -07:00
George K 156c8b6e41 fix: prevent coderd crashes from unsupported Tailnet RPCs (#28429)
Workspace agents could call RefreshResumeToken and WorkspaceUpdates,
even though agent connections do not configure the providers those RPCs
require. The resulting nil dereference panicked a DRPC handler and
crashed coderd.

Limit the agent Tailnet surface to its supported RPCs, return
`Unimplemented` when optional providers are absent, and recover panics
in Coder-owned DRPC servers so they return an internal error instead of
crashing the process.

Refs: https://linear.app/codercom/issue/PLAT-464
2026-09-03 13:29:17 -07:00
68ca033d67 fix: deliver the rest of the invalid_request class to the client (#28736)
**TL;DR**

Fifth of the stack, split out of #28045. #28450 delivered the errors
raised *after* the callback is trusted and left the parameter failures
behind. This PR delivers those, and replaces the implicit ordering that
decided where an answer went with an explicit classification.

| PR | What it does |
|---|---|
| #28007 | Schema: `codes.scope` and `tokens.scope`, so a negotiated
scope has somewhere to live. |
| #28167 | `ScopesCover` compares an allowlist against a request by
permission coverage rather than by name. |
| #28178 | The authorize endpoint negotiates the scope against the app's
allowlist and persists it on the code. |
| #28179 | The consent page lists the negotiated permissions, and
`invalid_scope` reaches the client's callback. |
| #28450 | The same delivery for every other error raised once the
callback is trusted. |
| **#28736 (this)** | The parameter failures #28450 left behind, and the
classification that decides where each answer goes. |

- Stacked on #28450. Review that first.
- Nothing about what a token can do changes here. This is delivery, not
enforcement.

**Contract change**

A rejected parameter now arrives at the app's registered callback with
`error=invalid_request`, a description naming every failing field, and
the request's `state`. Both verbs.

| Verb | Was |
|---|---|
| GET | static "Invalid Query Parameters" page, 400 |
| POST | `WriteOAuth2Error`, 400 |

An integrator watching for either now reads the error from its own
callback instead.

**Two failures still answer on Coder**, because in neither case is the
callback trustworthy yet:

- A `redirect_uri` that does not parse, or does not exactly match the
registration. Redirecting to it would defeat the check that just
rejected it.
- A `client_id` sent more than once, or naming something other than the
app the callback was matched against. Coder cannot tell whose
registration it is about to redirect to.

An absent query `client_id` is **not** in that group. `httpmw` also
reads the POST form body and the §2.3.1 Basic credential, so an absent
query parameter still names a client and its failure is deliverable.

**Precedence change.** An app whose *registered* callback does not
parse, or uses a rejected scheme, now answers 500 even when the request
also carries parameter errors; that used to answer 400. Decided before
any parameter is read, so the others are never detected. Only reachable
for an app row that bypassed registration.
`DangerousCallbackSchemeOutranksParseFailure` pins it.

**Also in this PR**

- **Unrecognized parameters are ignored**, as §3.1 requires, rather than
rejected by `ErrorExcessParams`. An OIDC `nonce` or a vendor extension
no longer fails the request. Repeats of parameters the endpoint does
read are still rejected.
- **Every unsupported `response_type` gets one code.** Read as text
rather than through the SDK enum, so a value with no Go constant behind
it answers `unsupported_response_type` like `token` does, instead of
splitting on whether the SDK names it.
- **A malformed `resource` answers `invalid_target`** (RFC 8707 §2), but
only when nothing else failed. A client retrying on `invalid_target`
would otherwise resend a request still broken in a field it never heard
about.
- **`error_description` is bounded and readable.** Capped at 2048
characters and marked `(truncated)` before the log field or the
`Location` header is written. Entries read `field: reason` joined with
`; `, not the parser's debug shape, whose details contain commas and
cannot be split apart again.
- **A repeated `state` is charged to the client, not the callback.**
Reading `state` shares a function with the `redirect_uri` match, so it
used to fall into that carve-out and answer on Coder.

**Where in the OAuth Flow**

<details>
<summary>Diagram: the three-way dispatch, and what licenses a
redirect</summary>

```mermaid
flowchart TD
    NEW["newAuthorizeResponse<br/>parses the registered callback, checks its scheme,<br/>exact-matches any redirect_uri, reads state"]

    NEW -->|"registration unusable"| C500["500 on Coder<br/>server_error, value logged not echoed"]
    NEW --> PARSE["extractAuthorizeParams<br/>reads every parameter, collects all failures"]

    PARSE -->|"no failure"| OK["GET: consent page<br/>POST: authorization code"]
    PARSE -->|"failure"| KIND{"authorizeFailure.kind()"}

    KIND -->|"corrupt registration"| C500
    KIND -->|"redirect_uri or client_id at fault"| CODER["400 on Coder<br/>RFC 6749 4.1.2.1 carve-out"]
    KIND -->|"anything else"| CLIENT["302 to the callback<br/>invalid_request or invalid_target, with state"]
```

</details>

- Authorize endpoint only, both verbs. Token exchange, refresh, and
revocation are untouched, and `ErrorExcessParams` still guards the token
endpoint.
- `validatedCallbackURL` becomes `authorizeResponse`, built only by
`newAuthorizeResponse`, which runs the scheme check and the exact match
in that order. Holding one is what licenses a redirect, so the ordering
is structural rather than a convention each call site remembers.
- The scheme is checked on the *registered* URL, since `p.RedirectURL`
returns the client's URI on a mismatch and checking that would blame the
app for a request it never made.
- `state` moves onto the type, out of the parameter lists of
`withQuery`, `errorURL`, `codeURL`, and `redirectAuthorizeError`, so no
call site can emit a response the client cannot correlate.
- `extractAuthorizeParams` returns one `authorizeFailure` instead of two
trailing values, and both handlers dispatch on `kind()` rather than
re-deriving precedence from field checks.

**What it satisfies**

- RFC 6749 §4.1.2.1: a failure that is not a bad redirection URI or
client identifier is reported through the redirection URI. That is the
whole PR. Its two exceptions "MUST NOT" be redirected to, hence the
carve-outs.
- RFC 6749 §3.1: unrecognized parameters MUST be ignored, and no
parameter may appear more than once. Both now hold here.
- RFC 6749 Appendix A: `error_description` is confined to the permitted
set, on the decoded value.
- RFC 8707 §2: a `resource` that is not an absolute URI without a
fragment answers `invalid_target`.
- RFC 7636 §4.4.1: a malformed `code_challenge` is rejected at the
authorization request rather than deferred to token exchange, where the
error would point at the `code_verifier`.
- Not yet: CRF-26 (the `server_error` sites) and CRF-13 (fragment
delivery), both as in #28450.

**Docs and Swagger.** `docs/admin/integrations/oauth2-provider.md` gains
entries for the redirected parameter errors, `invalid_target`, and the
two failures that stay on Coder. Both authorize verbs document their 400
and 500 responses and stop advertising `response_type=token`, which
meant declaring the parameter as a `string`, since `Enums` appends to
what swaggo derives from the type.

---

Split out of #28045
([PLAT-479](https://linear.app/codercom/issue/PLAT-479)). Fifth of the
stack, stacked on #28450.
## Manual Tests

Verified by hand against a local dev deployment
(`v2.37.0-devel+1145d35a47`, dev Postgres), in addition to the automated
suite. The build string was checked first, because `develop.sh` builds
from whatever the tree held when it started and every result below would
otherwise be describing the wrong binary.

Two scenario groups need state the API cannot produce. The scope
allowlist is reachable only through dynamic client registration, which
was enabled for the run and disabled again at the end. A registered
callback that does not parse, or that uses a blocked scheme, is refused
at registration, so those rows were planted directly with `psql` on a
purpose-built client and restored afterwards.

**28 scenarios, all passing.** No correctness or security defect was
found in the
code this PR changes. Seven observations came out of the run: six are
consistency,
documentation or diagnosability points, and one is a small defect that
predates
this PR.

<details>
<summary><b>Scenario summary, all 28</b></summary>

| # | Scenario | Result |
|---|----------|--------|
| 1 | A well-formed request still succeeds on both verbs, and the
consent page renders | Pass |
| 2 | A rejected parameter now reaches the client's callback on `POST` |
Pass |
| 3 | The same on `GET`, and the consent page does not render first |
Pass |
| 4 | The description names every failing field, joined with `; ` | Pass
|
| 5 | A mismatched `redirect_uri` is answered on Coder with no
`Location` on either verb | Pass |
| 6 | An unparseable `redirect_uri` likewise, and the echoed value is
HTML escaped | Pass |
| 7 | A repeated `client_id` is answered on Coder although the callback
was valid | Pass |
| 8 | A single query `client_id` cannot disagree with the resolved app
over HTTP | Pass |
| 9 | A `client_id` supplied only in the `POST` form body is delivered,
not withheld | Pass |
| 10 | A `{UPPERCASE}` `client_id` is delivered, and also succeeds end
to end | Pass |
| 11 | A repeated `state` is delivered rather than charged to the
redirect carve-out | Pass |
| 12 | A registered callback with a blocked scheme answers 500 on both
verbs | Pass |
| 13 | An unparseable registered callback answers 500, indistinguishably
to the caller | Pass |
| 14 | Corrupt registration outranks a deliverable failure and both
carve-outs | Pass |
| 15 | The corrupt value is logged with the app ID and never appears in
a response | Pass |
| 16 | Restoring the row restores normal behaviour with no restart |
Pass |
| 17 | Every unsupported `response_type` gets one code; an empty one is
`invalid_request` | Pass |
| 18 | An unsupported `response_type` is not recast as a missing
`code_challenge` | Pass |
| 19 | Unrecognized parameters are ignored, including a case-variant
`REDIRECT_URI` | Pass |
| 20 | A misspelled `redirect_url` is ignored and cannot smuggle a
destination | Pass |
| 21 | Repeated known parameters are still rejected | Pass |
| 22 | `resource` answers `invalid_target` alone and `invalid_request`
in company | Pass |
| 23 | A fragment in `resource` is rejected | Pass, with one gap |
| 24 | A long description is capped at 2048 and marked `(truncated)`, on
both verbs | Pass |
| 25 | The description is sanitized to the RFC 6749 §4.1.2.1 character
set | Pass |
| 26 | The registered callback query is retained except the reserved
names | Pass |
| 27 | Scope rejections still reach the callback, and no consent page
renders | Pass |
| 28 | Declining consent carries `access_denied` and issues no code |
Pass |

</details>

<details>
<summary><b>Observations, all 7</b></summary>

| # | Observation | Severity |
|---|-------------|----------|
| 1 | `invalid_request` is returned in three description shapes: the
parser's `Invalid query params: field: reason; ...` aggregate, the PKCE
validator's single message, and `scopeFailureResponse`'s. A client
cannot parse all three with one rule. | Consistency, reviewer call |
| 2 | The phase 2 runbook for #28045 asserts the old `field: x detail:
y` message shape, which this PR replaces. That doc needs a one-line
update. | Docs follow-up |
| 3 | `clientIDInDoubt`'s `default` branch is unreachable over HTTP,
because `httpmw` derives `app.ID` from the same query value the parser
reads. Defensive rather than dead, but the comment does not say so. |
Comment clarity |
| 4 | A `POST` supplying `client_id` only in the form body always fails
with `client_id ... is required and cannot be empty`, naming a parameter
it did supply. `httpmw` reads the body, `RequiredNotEmpty` reads the
query. Pre-existing. | Misleading diagnostic |
| 5 | A misspelled parameter is invisible from every angle at default
verbosity. The client gets a 302 with a code, its redirect is silently
replaced by the registered one, and the `ignoring unrecognized
authorization parameters` line is `logger.Debug` so it is not emitted. |
Diagnosability |
| 6 | `resource` sent twice answers `invalid_target` rather than
`invalid_request`. RFC 8707 §2 frames `invalid_target` as being about
the resource value; a duplicated parameter is a malformed request under
RFC 6749 §3.1. | Low, error code choice |
| 7 | `resource=https://api.example.com/#` (trailing `#`, empty
fragment) is accepted and stored with the `#` intact, so the persisted
audience is not textually equal to the fragment-free form. `url.Parse`
maps empty and absent fragments both to `Fragment == ""`. Pre-existing,
in `tokens.go`. | Defect, low severity |

</details>

**One note for anyone re-running this.** Every request below depends on
`$CHALLENGE` from the most recent `new_pkce` call. Forgetting to call it
sends an empty `code_challenge`, which fails with the fixed "is required
and cannot be empty" message at 98 characters and looks exactly like a
cap or a validator failing to fire. That cost one wrong measurement
during this run before the numbers below were taken.

<details>
<summary><b>Shell helpers used throughout</b></summary>

```bash
export BASE_URL=http://localhost:3000
export AUTH_HEADER="Coder-Session-Token: $(cat ./.coderv2/session)"
export PGPASSWORD=$(cat ./.coderv2/postgres/password)
export PGPORT=$(cat ./.coderv2/postgres/port)

pg() { psql -h localhost -p "$PGPORT" -U coder -d coder -tAc "$1"; }
plant_callback() { pg "UPDATE oauth2_provider_apps SET callback_url = '$2' WHERE id = '$1';"; }
urlenc() { jq -rn --arg v "$1" '$v|@uri'; }

# 43 unreserved characters every time. Base64url of the raw 32 bytes.
new_pkce() {
  VERIFIER=$(openssl rand 32 | base64 | tr -d '\n=' | tr '+/' '-_')
  CHALLENGE=$(printf '%s' "$VERIFIER" | openssl dgst -sha256 -binary | base64 | tr -d "=" | tr '+/' '-_')
  STATE=$(openssl rand -hex 16)
}

authz_url() {
  local url="$BASE_URL/oauth2/authorize?client_id=$1&response_type=code"
  url="$url&redirect_uri=$(urlenc "$2")&state=$STATE"
  url="$url&code_challenge=$CHALLENGE&code_challenge_method=S256"
  printf '%s' "$url"
}

# The core assertion of the whole run: what answer, delivered where.
answer() { curl -s -o /dev/null -D - -X "$1" "$2" -H "$AUTH_HEADER" | grep -iE '^HTTP/|^location:'; }

show_callback() {
  python3 - "$1" <<'PY'
import sys, urllib.parse
q = urllib.parse.urlparse(sys.argv[1]).query
for k, v in urllib.parse.parse_qsl(q, keep_blank_values=True):
    print(f"{k} = {v}")
PY
}
```

Fixtures, all registered through DCR:

```text
plat479-plain    http://localhost:9876/callback
plat479-query    http://localhost:9876/callback?tenant=acme&error=stale
plat479-corrupt  http://localhost:9876/callback   (overwritten by psql in 12 to 16)
plat479-reserved http://localhost:9876/callback?tenant=acme&code=FAKECODE&error=stale&error_description=oldmsg&state=oldstate&keep=yes
plat479-ci       http://localhost:9876/callback   (scope allowlist coder:workspaces.access)
```

</details>

<details>
<summary><b>1. Baseline: a well-formed request still
succeeds</b></summary>

```bash
new_pkce; answer GET  "$(authz_url "$APP_ID" http://localhost:9876/callback)"
new_pkce; answer POST "$(authz_url "$APP_ID" http://localhost:9876/callback)"
```

```text
=== GET ===
HTTP/1.1 200 OK

=== POST ===
HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Location: http://localhost:9876/callback?code=coder_dzvaCPf9W1_...&state=e321bd5d5b594a1fae8a2d5da654b84a
```

`GET` carries no `Location` at all, so the consent page really rendered
rather than redirecting. The `state` echoed is the one sent. The code
persisted as `coder:all`, this app having no allowlist, with
`redirect_uri` recorded because the request supplied one.

Also driven through a real browser rather than curl, so the consent
form's `nosurf` token is the one submitted rather than the session-token
header alone. Clicking **Allow** delivered `code` and `state` to the
callback. Both request shapes agree on the success case.

Not to be misread: `oauth2_provider_app_codes` holds one row after both
POSTs, not two. `ProcessAuthorize` opens its transaction with
`DeleteOAuth2ProviderAppCodesByAppAndUserID`, so a row count is not a
count of successful authorizations. That predates this PR.

</details>

<details>
<summary><b>2 to 4. A rejected parameter now reaches the client's
callback</b></summary>

```bash
new_pkce
BAD="$BASE_URL/oauth2/authorize?client_id=$APP_ID&response_type=code"
BAD="$BAD&redirect_uri=$(urlenc http://localhost:9876/callback)&state=$STATE"
BAD="$BAD&code_challenge=short&code_challenge_method=S256"
answer POST "$BAD"
answer GET  "$BAD"
```

```text
HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Location: http://localhost:9876/callback?error=invalid_request&error_description=Invalid+query+params%3A+code_challenge%3A+must+be+43+to+128+characters+from+the+unreserved+character+set+%5BA-Za-z0-9-._~%5D&state=e89f4d98d4c8c347e5ae25175748b731
```

Identical on both verbs. Decoded:

```text
error = invalid_request
error_description = Invalid query params: code_challenge: must be 43 to 128 characters from the unreserved character set [A-Za-z0-9-._~]
state = e89f4d98d4c8c347e5ae25175748b731
```

The `GET` body confirms no page was rendered, against the baseline:

| Request | Body size | Occurrences of "Allow" |
|---|---|---|
| Malformed `code_challenge` | 263 bytes | 0 |
| Well formed (scenario 1) | 4928 bytes | 2 |

263 bytes is Go's redirect stub. There is no consent form in it, so
there is no Allow button to press for a request the server has already
refused.

Multiple failures are reported together (scenario 4):

```text
error_description = Invalid query params: code_challenge: must be 43 to 128 characters from the unreserved character set [A-Za-z0-9-._~]; resource: must be an absolute URI without fragment
```

The separator is `; `, and no entry uses the older `field: x detail: y`
shape. The code is `invalid_request` rather than `invalid_target` even
though `resource` is one of the two failures, which is the scenario 22
guard firing.

The same request also carried `code_challenge_method=plain`, which is
invalid and is *not* mentioned, because the method is validated after
`extractAuthorizeParams` returns and a parse failure short-circuits
first. Sent alone it is rejected as `code_challenge_method 'plain' is
not supported; use 'S256'`, with no `Invalid query params: ` prefix.
That difference is observation 1.

</details>

<details>
<summary><b>5 and 6. The redirect_uri carve-out keeps the answer
here</b></summary>

```bash
new_pkce
EVIL="$BASE_URL/oauth2/authorize?client_id=$APP_ID&response_type=code"
EVIL="$EVIL&redirect_uri=$(urlenc http://evil.example/steal)&state=$STATE"
EVIL="$EVIL&code_challenge=$CHALLENGE&code_challenge_method=S256"
answer POST "$EVIL"; answer GET "$EVIL"
```

```text
HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
```

**The absence in that output is the assertion**: no `Location` on either
verb, so nothing redirects to `evil.example`. Stronger, `evil.example`
appears zero times in either full response, headers and body together,
so the attacker-supplied host is not reflected into the page either.

```json
{"error":"invalid_request","error_description":"Invalid query params: redirect_uri: Query param \"redirect_uri\" must exactly match http://localhost:9876/callback"}
```

The `GET` page names the *registered* callback as the value the
parameter had to match, which is the app's own configuration and safe to
display.

An unparseable `redirect_uri` reaches the same outcome by a different
route, having never parsed at all:

```json
{"error":"invalid_request","error_description":"Invalid query params: redirect_uri: Query param \"redirect_uri\" must be a valid url: parse \"http://%zz\": invalid URL escape \"%zz\""}
```

That message echoes the caller's value, unlike the mismatch case, so the
`GET` path was probed with markup in it:

```text
input:  http://%zz"><img src=x onerror=BAD>
page:   ...must be a valid url: parse &#34;http://%zz\&#34;&gt;&lt;img src=x onerror=BAD&gt;&#34;...
literal `<img` in body: 0     entity encoded `&lt;img`: 1
```

Escaped correctly by the template layer. Recorded as a negative result
so a future change to the error page has something to regress against.

One note for the docs: this detail contains colons, so a client
splitting `field: reason` entries must split each on its **first** colon
only.

</details>

<details>
<summary><b>7 to 10. The client_id carve-out, and its
negatives</b></summary>

A repeated `client_id` in an otherwise perfect request:

```text
HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request   (both verbs, no Location)
{"error":"invalid_request","error_description":"Invalid query params: client_id: Query param \"client_id\" provided more than once, found 2 times. Only provide 1 instance of this query param."}
```

This is the one carve-out not implied by the response's shape. The
`redirect_uri` matched the registration, so `canRedirect()` was true and
there *was* somewhere to send the answer; it was withheld because
`extractAuthorizeParams` assigns `failure.redirect` only when
`clientIDInDoubt` is false.

**The `default` branch of that function is unreachable over HTTP**
(observation 3). `httpmw` resolves the app from
`r.URL.Query().Get("client_id")`, so `app.ID` and the parsed value
derive from the same string and cannot disagree. Three experiments:

```text
one query client_id, bad challenge          -> 302 delivered
two DIFFERENT client_id values              -> 400, caught by the repeated branch
query names app A, form body names app B    -> 302 to app A; the body is ignored
```

The negatives matter as much as the positives. An identifier absent from
the query but present in the `POST` form body is **delivered**,
correctly:

```text
HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Location: ...error=invalid_request&error_description=Invalid+query+params%3A+client_id%3A+...is+required+and+cannot+be+empty%3B+code_challenge%3A+...
```

That is observation 4: the description says `client_id` is required for
a request that supplied it. With everything else valid the same shape
still fails, while the identical request carrying `client_id` in the
query succeeds with a code. `RequiredNotEmpty` reads the query; `httpmw`
reads the body. Pre-existing, and arguably the parser is the layer in
the right, since RFC 6749 §4.1.1 puts authorization parameters in the
query string and §3.2.1 is the endpoint that uses a form body.

A braced upper-case UUID is delivered, and succeeds end to end:

```text
{UPPERCASE} client_id, bad challenge -> 302, description names ONLY code_challenge
{UPPERCASE} client_id, all valid     -> 302 with a real code
GET, all valid                       -> 200, consent page, heading resolves to the app's real name
```

`uuid.Parse` accepts that spelling and `httpmw` resolved through it, so
a string comparison here would withhold an answer the client is entitled
to, for no reason it could diagnose.

</details>

<details>
<summary><b>11. A repeated state is delivered, not
withheld</b></summary>

```text
HTTP/1.1 302 Found   (both verbs)
error = invalid_request
error_description = Invalid query params: state: Query param 'state' provided more than once, found 2 times. Only provide 1 instance of this query param.
```

Reading `state` happens inside `newAuthorizeResponse`, the same function
that runs the `redirect_uri` match. A count of errors across those two
lines would charge this to the redirect carve-out and answer 400. It
answered 302, so the field-specific test is doing the work.

The asymmetry with scenario 7 is deliberate: a repeated `client_id`
leaves the server unsure whose callback it holds, a repeated `state`
leaves the callback fully settled.

The response carries **no `state`**, since `parseSingle` collapsed the
repeat to the empty string and `withQuery` only sets it when non-empty.
Unavoidable rather than wrong: picking one of two values could satisfy a
CSRF check the client meant to be strict.

</details>

<details>
<summary><b>12 to 16. A corrupt registration outranks
everything</b></summary>

DCR refuses both planted values, which is why `psql` is needed and why
500 is the right answer: a stored one is not something a client did.

```json
{"error":"invalid_client_metadata","error_description":"invalid redirect_uris: redirect URI at index 0: redirect URI uses dangerous scheme javascript which is not allowed"}
{"error":"invalid_client_metadata","error_description":"invalid redirect_uris: redirect URI at index 0 is not a valid URL: parse \"http://%zz\": invalid URL escape \"%zz\""}
```

```bash
plant_callback "$APP_CORRUPT_ID" 'javascript:alert(1)'
new_pkce
CORRUPT="$BASE_URL/oauth2/authorize?client_id=$APP_CORRUPT_ID&response_type=code&state=$STATE"
CORRUPT="$CORRUPT&code_challenge=$CHALLENGE&code_challenge_method=S256"
answer POST "$CORRUPT"; answer GET "$CORRUPT"
```

```text
HTTP/1.1 500 Internal Server Error
{"error":"server_error","error_description":"The application's registered callback URL is not usable"}
GET: HTTP/1.1 500, page reads "500 - Invalid Callback URL", 3346 bytes, 0 Allow buttons
```

The unparseable callback is **indistinguishable to the caller**: same
description, and a `GET` page of exactly 3346 bytes, matching byte for
byte. Two different defects in stored state, one answer. Correct, since
neither is actionable by the client.

Note the request carried no `redirect_uri` of its own and still failed,
because the scheme is checked on the *registered* URL before the
client's value is consulted.

Precedence was tested against all three competitors, not one:

| Also wrong in the request | Would answer alone | Actually answered |
|---|---|---|
| `code_challenge=short` | 302 to the callback | **500** |
| `client_id` repeated | 400 kept here | **500** |
| `redirect_uri` mismatched | 400 kept here | **500** |

Reading the source, this is stronger than precedence.
`newAuthorizeResponse` runs at `authorize.go:250`, before any of
`client_id`, `code_challenge`, `scope` or `resource` is read, and the
early return discards whatever `p.Errors` already held. In rows two and
three those failures are never detected at all, so `kind()` ranking
`failureCorruptRegistration` first is belt and braces for a failure
constructed some other way.

**The value is logged and never echoed.** A distinctive marker was
planted and five requests fired:

```text
[erro] coderd: oauth2 app has an unusable registered callback URL
  request_id=01ca4796-c743-4923-a06b-afc1f3decc95
  app_id=12f9ca3b-7a2c-4c54-8ed7-723698c62bd1
  callback_url="javascript:alert(\"plat479-6d-marker\")"
  error= redirect URI uses dangerous scheme javascript which is not allowed:
         codersdk/oauth2_validation.go:116
```

Five requests, five lines, in request order. Occurrences of the marker
in the POST body, the rendered GET page, and the response headers: **0,
0, 0**.

The `request_id` joins that line to the request log entry whose
`response_body` field holds the vague message, so the server's own
record confirms what it sent for the same request rather than a replay.
The log is also where the two causes diverge, naming `validateScheme`
and its source line, which the response cannot do.

Restoring the row restores normal behaviour immediately, with no
restart:

```text
POST -> 302 with a code      GET -> 200 consent page
```

That is a control rather than housekeeping: it rules out the app having
been poisoned lastingly, and rules out a cached parse outliving the
`UPDATE`.

</details>

<details>
<summary><b>17 and 18. Every unsupported response_type gets one
code</b></summary>

| `response_type` sent | `error` | `error_description` |
|---|---|---|
| `token` | `unsupported_response_type` | Only response_type=code is
supported |
| `banana` | `unsupported_response_type` | Only response_type=code is
supported |
| `code token` | `unsupported_response_type` | Only response_type=code
is supported |
| `CODE` | `unsupported_response_type` | Only response_type=code is
supported |
| `code_extra` | `unsupported_response_type` | Only response_type=code
is supported |
| empty string | `invalid_request` | Invalid query params:
response_type: Query param 'response_type' is required and cannot be
empty |

`token` has a Go constant behind it and `banana` does not, so their
agreement is what reading the value as text bought. Three rows are more
interesting than `banana`: `code token` is a legal RFC 6749 §3.1.1
space-delimited list used by OIDC's hybrid flow, `CODE` confirms the
comparison is case sensitive, and `code_extra` confirms it is equality
rather than a prefix match.

The empty string is correctly the exception. A valueless parameter is
*missing*, not unsupported, and RFC 6749 §3.1 requires it be treated as
omitted.

**The error is in the query, not the fragment.** `response_type=token`
is the implicit grant's own value, so a fragment would be arguable, but
this deployment advertises `"response_types_supported":["code"]` alone,
and a fragment is never sent to the server, so it would be unreadable to
the client's backend.

PKCE is not recast, which the controls show:

| `response_type`, no `code_challenge` sent | `error` |
|---|---|
| `token` | `unsupported_response_type`, zero mentions of
`code_challenge` |
| `banana` | `unsupported_response_type`, zero mentions of
`code_challenge` |
| `code` | `invalid_request`, naming `code_challenge` |

Without the `if params.responseType == responseTypeCode` guard, a client
sending `token` would be told its `code_challenge` was missing, add one,
resend, and be told the same thing again.

</details>

<details>
<summary><b>19 to 21. Unrecognized parameters ignored, repeats still
rejected</b></summary>

Eight unknown parameters, each on an otherwise valid request, every one
issuing a code:

| Unknown parameter | Result |
|---|---|
| `nonce`, `prompt`, `login_hint`, `acr_values`, `max_age`, `ui_locales`
| code issued |
| `code_challenge_methods=S256` | code issued |
| `REDIRECT_URI=http://evil.example/steal` | code issued, **to the
registered callback** |

Five of those are OpenID Connect Core parameters, so an OIDC client
pointed here degrades to plain OAuth2 rather than failing. The ignored
parameters are **dropped, not forwarded**: the callback receives only
`code` and `state`.

The last two rows are the ones with teeth. Query parameter names are
case sensitive, so `REDIRECT_URI` must be ignored, and a misspelled
`redirect_url` likewise:

```text
case variant alongside a valid redirect_uri : Location host localhost:9876
case variant as the only redirect parameter : Location host localhost:9876
redirect_url typo, no valid redirect_uri    : Location host localhost:9876, code issued
evil.example occurrences in any Location    : 0
```

The consent page renders for the typo case too, and even its cancel link
targets the registered callback. A parser matching names
case-insensitively would have redirected to `evil.example` with a valid
code attached.

**Observation 5.** The `ignoring unrecognized authorization parameters`
line was never emitted. Three requests carrying a distinctive marker
produced no new server output at all, because the call is `logger.Debug`
(`authorize.go:307`) and the deployment runs with `verbose: null`. The
behaviour is correct and required by RFC 6749 §3.1, but at default
verbosity the misspelling is invisible from every angle: the client sees
a 302 with a code, its redirect is silently replaced, and nothing is
logged. The comment claiming the typo "surfaces here" is optimistic.

Repeats of known parameters are still rejected, which the replacement of
`ErrorExcessParams` had to leave alone:

| Repeated parameter | HTTP | `error` | Answered at |
|---|---|---|---|
| `code_challenge` | 302 | `invalid_request`, two entries one field |
client callback |
| `code_challenge_method` | 302 | `invalid_request` | client callback |
| `response_type` | 302 | `invalid_request` | client callback |
| `redirect_uri` | 400 | withheld | **Coder** |
| `scope` | 302 | `invalid_request` | client callback |
| `resource` | 302 | `invalid_target` | client callback |

`redirect_uri` being withheld confirms the carve-out keys on the field
name rather than the kind of mistake. `code_challenge` collects two
entries for one mistake, because `parseSingle` collapses the value to
empty and the PKCE block then reports it missing. The `resource` row is
observation 6.

</details>

<details>
<summary><b>22 and 23. resource, its own code, and the fragment
rule</b></summary>

Both sides of the rule, since a check enforced too broadly would reject
a valid URN:

| `resource` sent | `error` | Stored `resource_uri` |
|---|---|---|
| `not a uri` | `invalid_target` | not stored |
| `/api` relative | `invalid_target` | not stored |
| `https://api.example.com` | none, code issued | as sent |
| `https://api.example.com/v1?q=1` | none, code issued | as sent, query
is not a fragment |
| `urn:example:resource` | none, code issued | as sent |
| empty string | none, code issued | `NULL`, same as omitted |

`invalid_target` applies only when `resource` is the sole failure. Add
any second failure in any other field and the code becomes
`invalid_request` naming both, which is the retry-loop guard:

```text
resource + bad code_challenge -> invalid_request, both named
resource + repeated scope     -> invalid_request, both named
resource + repeated state     -> invalid_request, both named
resource alone (control)      -> invalid_target
```

Fragments are rejected in all three placements, with or without a path:

```text
https://api.example.com/#x         -> invalid_target
https://api.example.com#x          -> invalid_target
https://api.example.com/v1#frag    -> invalid_target
https://api.example.com/#          -> code issued, stored as https://api.example.com/#
```

**The last row is observation 7, and it predates this PR.** Go cannot
represent the distinction:

```text
https://a.example.com/    Fragment=""  String()="https://a.example.com/"
https://a.example.com/#   Fragment=""  String()="https://a.example.com/"
https://a.example.com/#x  Fragment="x" String()="https://a.example.com/#x"
```

`url.Parse` collapses "no fragment" and "empty fragment", so `if
u.Fragment != ""` in `validateResourceParameter`
(`coderd/oauth2provider/tokens.go:591`) cannot see a trailing `#`. RFC
3986 §3.5 permits a zero-length fragment, which RFC 8707 §2's "MUST NOT
include a fragment component" reads as forbidding. Validation parses the
value but persistence stores the raw string, so the `#` reaches
`resource_uri` and the stored audience is not textually equal to the
fragment-free form. A client appending a harmless-looking `#` would get
a token bound to an audience nothing matches.

The authorize-side call to `validateResourceParameter` is context in
this diff rather than an added line; this PR added the `invalid_target`
code for the failure.

</details>

<details>
<summary><b>24 and 25. The description cap and character
set</b></summary>

The obvious probe does not exercise the cap: a 4000-character
`code_challenge` produces a 116-character description, because that
message is fixed text and never quotes the offending value. The
descriptions that echo caller input come from a validator's own error.

| Request | `error` | Description length | Truncated | `Location` length
|
|---|---|---|---|---|
| `code_challenge_method` = 4000 chars | `invalid_request` | 2060 |
**yes** | 2176 |
| `scope` = 4000 chars | `invalid_scope` | 2060 | **yes** | 2174 |
| `code_challenge_method` = 2000 chars | `invalid_request` | 2035 | no |
2147 |
| `code_challenge` = 4000 chars | `invalid_request` | 116 | no | 234 |

2060 is exactly `maxErrorDescription` plus `" (truncated)"`. Row three
is the boundary control, so the cap fires on length rather than on the
presence of echoed input. Measured from the `Location` header rather
than a log line, since the stated reason for the cap is that the header
must survive intermediary proxies; the longest observed was 2176 bytes.

Both verbs agree, the cap living in the shared `redirectAuthorizeError`:

```text
GET, long method : desc_len=2060 truncated=True
GET, long scope  : desc_len=2060 truncated=True
```

The character set is enforced independently, later, in `errorURL`:

```text
input:       pl"ain\back<newline>tab<tab>end~unicode
description: unsupported code_challenge_method: pl'ainback tab end~ nicode
chars outside the RFC 6749 §4.1.2.1 set: []
```

`"` becomes `'`, `\` is dropped so it cannot escape the rewritten quote,
and anything below 0x20 or above 0x7E becomes a space. Checked
programmatically rather than by eye. The RFC sets no length limit, so
the 2048 cap is policy; the character set is conformance.

</details>

<details>
<summary><b>26. The registered callback query, retained except reserved
names</b></summary>

`plat479-reserved` registers a callback carrying all four reserved names
plus two ordinary ones, and DCR stores it unchanged:

```text
http://localhost:9876/callback?tenant=acme&code=FAKECODE&error=stale&error_description=oldmsg&state=oldstate&keep=yes
```

Success response, no `redirect_uri` sent:

```text
code  = coder_WXwBpvYR5u_...
keep  = yes
state = 516abeea9976119eb33ddc10f0ca04ed
tenant = acme
```

Failure response, same app:

```text
error = invalid_request
error_description = Invalid query params: code_challenge: must be 43 to 128 characters...
keep  = yes
state = 3a17bdd75dfcf740bda36124cd161fb7
tenant = acme
```

Stale registered values in either response: `FAKECODE` 0, `stale` 0,
`oldmsg` 0, `oldstate` 0.

Without the deletion step a registered `error=stale` would ride out on
the **success** response, and a client reading `error` before `code`,
the conventional order, would discard a valid authorization code.
`FAKECODE` is the mirror image on a failure response.

The cancel link obeys the same rule, being built by the same `withQuery`
path:

```text
http://localhost:9876/callback?error=access_denied&error_description=The+resource+owner...&keep=yes&state=e15b5f0f...&tenant=acme
```

RFC 6749 §3.1.2 requires the registered query be retained when adding
parameters, which is the `tenant` and `keep` half. It does not say what
to do when the registered query collides with the response parameters
§4.1.2 adds, so dropping the registered copies is the resolution that
keeps the client's read unambiguous.

</details>

<details>
<summary><b>27 and 28. Scope rejections, and declining
consent</b></summary>

`plat479-ci` carries the allowlist `coder:workspaces.access`.

```text
scope=template:update (outside)  -> error = invalid_scope
                                    'template:update': scope requests permissions beyond this app's allowed scopes
GET, same request                -> 302, 225 bytes, 0 Allow buttons, no consent page
scope=workspace:ssh (covered)    -> code issued, persisted scope workspace:ssh
GET, same request                -> 200, 5182 bytes, consent page naming the scope
```

`workspace:ssh` is granted although the allowlist names the composite
rather than that scope, which is the coverage-not-spelling rule from
#28045. This run only checks that the changes here left it delivering
the same answers.

The consent page for a narrow scope reads differently from the
unrestricted one: "to access your **admin** account with these
permissions?", the scope as `<li role="listitem">workspace:ssh`, and the
caution "These are technical permission names. Grant them only to an
application you trust."

The scope description shape differs from the parser's, coming from
`scopeFailureResponse` rather than the field join, which is the third
producer behind observation 1.

Declining consent, clicked in a real browser:

```text
error             = access_denied
error_description = The resource owner or authorization server denied the request
state             = a8bd538b365b61f54586892c73968b80
```

The page carries exactly one `href` and it is the cancel link. The
`state` matches, there is no `code`, and the code count for the app is
unchanged, the link being a plain `GET` to the client's callback that
never reaches `ProcessAuthorize`. The description is RFC 6749 §4.1.2.1's
own definition of `access_denied`, word for word.

That shared construction is what makes the `#nosec G203` annotation on
`CancelURI` sound: the URL is injected as a trusted `htmltemplate.URL`,
safe only because `newAuthorizeResponse` validated the registered scheme
before the response object could exist. Scenario 12 is the other half,
an app with a rejected scheme never reaching this page at all.

</details>

<details>
<summary><b>Where the consent page renders, across every GET
case</b></summary>

Only `GET` can render anything, and body size identifies which of four
renderers ran, so this is the table to check when a status code alone
looks right.

| Case | Status | Body bytes | Allow buttons | Rendered |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| well formed | 200 | 4928 | 1 | **consent page** |
| bad `code_challenge` | 302 | 263 | 0 | redirect stub |
| two bad fields | 302 | 319 | 0 | redirect stub |
| mismatched `redirect_uri` | 400 | 3814 | 0 | 400 error page |
| unparseable `redirect_uri` | 400 | 3846 | 0 | 400 error page |
| repeated `client_id` | 400 | 3846 | 0 | 400 error page |
| `client_id` in form body only | 400 | 77 | 0 | `httpmw` JSON, unstyled
|
| `{UPPERCASE}` `client_id` | 200 | 4940 | 1 | **consent page** |
| repeated `state` | 302 | 239 | 0 | redirect stub |
| corrupt callback, blocked scheme | 500 | 3346 | 0 | 500 error page |
| corrupt callback, unparseable | 500 | 3346 | 0 | 500 error page |
| `response_type=token` | 302 | 187 | 0 | redirect stub |
| `banana` / `code token` / `CODE` | 302 | 187 | 0 | redirect stub |
| empty `response_type` | 302 | 243 | 0 | redirect stub |
| `token`, no PKCE | 302 | 187 | 0 | redirect stub |
| `code`, no PKCE | 302 | 245 | 0 | redirect stub |
| unknown params, valid request | 200 | 4932 | 1 | **consent page** |
| `redirect_url` typo, valid request | 200 | 4932 | 1 | **consent page**
|
| `resource` malformed | 302 | 214 | 0 | redirect stub |
| `resource` valid absolute URI | 200 | 4932 | 1 | **consent page** |
| `resource=.../#` empty fragment | 200 | 4932 | 1 | **consent page**,
observation 7 |
| reserved params in registered callback | 200 | 4973 | 1 | **consent
page** |
| `scope` outside allowlist | 302 | 225 | 0 | redirect stub |
| `scope` covered by allowlist | 200 | 5182 | 1 | **consent page** |

The invariant: the page renders if and only if `extractAuthorizeParams`
returned no failure, so no input asks the owner to approve a request the
server has already refused. The `evil.example` rows are worth reading
carefully rather than alarming: RFC 6749 §3.1 requires a case variant
and a typo to be ignored, so from the server's view nothing was wrong
with either request, and both cancel links target the registered
callback.

About 4930 bytes is the consent page, about 3800 the 400 page, 3346 the
500 page, 77 the unstyled `httpmw` JSON, and low hundreds is Go's
redirect stub, whose length tracks the `Location` it embeds. Every
`unsupported_response_type` answer is exactly 187 bytes because they
share one description. Small variations within a renderer are expected:
the consent page moves 4928 to 4940 with a fresh CSRF token and the app
name.

As a regression signal, body size is more sensitive than the status
line. A change that rendered a page alongside a redirect would still
report 302, but the stub would come back at thousands of bytes rather
than hundreds.

</details>

<details>
<summary><b>Cleanup</b></summary>

```bash
for id in $(pg "SELECT id FROM oauth2_provider_apps WHERE name LIKE 'plat479%';"); do
  curl -s -X DELETE "$BASE_URL/api/v2/oauth2-provider/apps/$id" -H "$AUTH_HEADER" \
    -o /dev/null -w "$id -> %{http_code}\n"
done
pg "SELECT count(*) FROM oauth2_provider_apps WHERE name LIKE 'plat479%';"
./scripts/coder-dev.sh oauth2-provider dcr disable
```

All planted callback rows were restored before deletion, so no fixture
was left holding a value DCR would refuse.

</details>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Steven Masley <Emyrk@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-03 10:54:34 -07:00
cdrciandgithub-actions[bot] b938495bf5 chore: refresh AI model price book (#28939)
## Price book changes

7 models added, 0 models removed, 15 models changed.

<details>
<summary>Added</summary>

- openrouter/meta/muse-spark-1.3
- openrouter/meta/muse-spark-1.3-contributor
- vercel/alibaba/qwen3.8-max-0902
- vercel/google/gemini-3.8-flash
- vercel/meta/muse-spark-1.3
- vercel/meta/muse-spark-1.3-contributor
- vercel/zai/glm-5.3-promo-50
</details>

<details>
<summary>Changed</summary>

- azure/gpt-5.6-sol
- openrouter/deepseek/deepseek-v4-flash
- openrouter/deepseek/deepseek-v4-flash-vision-exp
- openrouter/deepseek/deepseek-v4-pro
- openrouter/deepseek/deepseek-v4-pro-0813
- openrouter/meta-llama/llama-3.3-70b-instruct
- openrouter/meta/muse-glimmer-30b
- openrouter/nvidia/nemotron-3-nano-30b-a3b
- openrouter/nvidia/nemotron-3-ultra-550b-a55b
- openrouter/qwen/qwen3.5-397b-a17b
- openrouter/qwen/qwen3.8-2.4t-a95b
- openrouter/tencent/hy3
- openrouter/z-ai/glm-4.6
- openrouter/z-ai/glm-5.3
- openrouter/~z-ai/glm-latest
</details>

## Review notes

Regenerated by `make gen/aibridge-prices` from the live
[models.dev](https://models.dev) catalog. Both artifacts come from one
snapshot, so they ship together:

- `coderd/aibridge/prices/data/prices.json`
-
`site/src/pages/AgentsPage/components/ChatModelAdminPanel/knownModels/knownModelsGenerated.json`

These are customer-visible cost numbers taken from upstream data, so
this PR is never merged automatically. The summary above lists what
moved; check the diff for exact figures before approving.

Opened automatically by the [aigateway-prices-refresh
workflow](https://github.com/coder/coder/actions/runs/33736992948).

Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <41898282+github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-03 13:41:16 +02:00
Jon Ayers 56255e5121 fix: accept connection reset as auth rejection in nats auth tests (#28918)
Flaked on Windows because the server can close the rejected route
connection before nats.go reads the `-ERR 'Authorization Violation'`
2026-09-02 16:35:18 -05:00
Jon Ayers 99554ed65c fix: fix flaky TestExecutorAutostartSkipsWhenNoProvisionersAvailable (#28917) 2026-09-02 16:15:11 -05:00
dylanhuff-at-coder 524745da5d feat: filter blocked user secret file targets (#28519)
When `DisableUserSecretFilePath` is set, coderd strips file targets
while building the agent manifest: env-only secrets are unchanged,
dual-target secrets keep the env var with an empty file path, and
file-only secrets are omitted so their plaintext never crosses DRPC.
Stored paths stay in the database and reappear on the next manifest
fetch once the option is cleared. Agents converge on reconnect; no
protobuf, provisioner, or agent-side changes are needed, and files
already written to workspace disks are left alone.

Also exposes the positive capability as the
`user-secret-file-path-enabled` embedded metadata tag, which the next PR
in the stack consumes in the dashboard. Builds on #28518. Refs #27488.

Reviewed and updated by Coder Agents on behalf of @dylanhuff-at-coder.
2026-09-02 14:06:46 -07:00
e035967ef1 feat: mint access tokens with the negotiated scope (#28237)
**TL;DR**

First of PLAT-480, continuing the merged PLAT-479 stack. #28178 decided
what the scope is and #28179 reported it; this PR is the one that makes
it bind. Until now the scope negotiated at `/oauth2/authorize` was
recorded on the grant but never reached the token: every OAuth2 access
key was minted with `coder:all`, so a client that asked for
`coder:workspaces.access` still got full API access.

| PR | What it does |
|---|---|
| #28167 | `ScopesCover` compares an allowlist against a request by
permission coverage rather than by name. Merged. |
| #28178 | The authorize endpoint checks the request against the scope
catalog, grants it only if the app's filtered allowlist covers it, and
persists the result on the code. Merged. |
| #28179 | The consent page lists the negotiated permissions, and
`invalid_scope` reaches the client's own callback per RFC 6749 §4.1.2.1.
Merged. |
| **#28237 (this)** | The exchange mints the API key with the stored
scope, and the token response states what was granted. |
| #28740 | Re-checks the app allowlist at redemption, for a code whose
app was narrowed after the code was issued. |
| #28751 | Lets a refresh narrow the granted scope, which is the `scope`
request parameter this PR still ignores. |

- #28179 has merged, so this diff is against main and reviews on its
own.
- **This is the first PR in the stack where a token's authority actually
changes.** Everything before it recorded and reported. That is the blast
radius worth reviewing: a grant that negotiated a narrow scope now gets
a key that is genuinely narrower, and anything that was quietly relying
on `coder:all` will start seeing 403.
- Grants that predate the scope columns carry what migration 000569
backfilled, `coder:all`, so they refresh unrestricted and reach what
they reached before. Pinned by `BackfilledScopeRefreshesUnrestricted`,
seeded the way the migration leaves a row rather than exchanged.
- The actor that writes the key stays `rbac.ScopeAll`. Narrowing it to
the granted scope would deny `api_key:create` and fail the exchange. The
bound lives on `api_keys.scopes`, which dbauthz reads on every request,
not on the actor doing the insert.

**Where in the flow**

<details>
<summary>Diagram: where the stored scope turns into a bound on the
token</summary>

```mermaid
flowchart TD
    AZ["GET or POST /oauth2/authorize<br/>negotiates the scope and persists it on the code<br/>PR 28178, merged"]
    AZ --> TK["POST /oauth2/tokens"]

    TK --> GT{"grant_type"}
    GT -->|authorization_code| S1["scope read from codes.scope"]
    GT -->|refresh_token| S2["scope read from tokens.scope<br/>req.Scope is parsed and ignored, PR 28751"]

    S1 --> CV["scopeStringToAPIKeyScopes, this PR<br/>every name must be in the api_key_scope enum<br/>an empty list is an error, not coder:all"]
    S2 --> CV

    CV -->|"unknown name, or empty"| ERR["400 invalid_grant, this PR<br/>error_description names the offending value"]
    CV -->|mintable| GEN["apikey.Generate with Scopes, this PR<br/>was: no Scopes, so every key defaulted to coder:all"]

    GEN --> KEY["api_keys.scopes<br/>read by dbauthz on every later request:<br/>this is where the grant becomes a bound"]
    GEN --> ROW["the new tokens row carries the same scope,<br/>so the next refresh reads back the same grant"]

    KEY --> RESP["200 with scope in the token response, this PR<br/>RFC 6749 5.1, OAuth 2.1 1.4.1"]
    ROW --> RESP
```

</details>

- Token endpoint only, both grants. Authorize is untouched apart from
two comments that said the scope was not yet enforced.
- `scopeStringToAPIKeyScopes` turns the stored scope string into
`database.APIKeyScopes` for `apikey.Generate`. Names are checked there
rather than inside `apikey.Generate`, whose error would surface as a 500
rather than an OAuth2 error.
- An empty list is an error, not an unrestricted key. `apikey.Generate`
defaults an empty scope list to `coder:all`, so an empty stored scope
would silently widen the grant instead of failing it. The same reasoning
is why the `expandRBACScope` comment in `modelmethods.go` was stale:
that function already errored on an empty list while its comment still
promised `rbac.ScopeAll`.
- A stored scope outside the `api_key_scope` enum answers 400
`invalid_grant` rather than 500, with the offending name in
`error_description`. Not `invalid_scope`: RFC 6749 §5.2 and OAuth 2.1
§3.2.4 both scope that code to what the client requested, and this value
is server state the client cannot change by asking differently. The
grant is what is unusable, and re-authorizing is the only way out.
- Refresh copies the presented token's scope onto both the new API key
and the rotated refresh row. `req.Scope` is parsed but ignored; #28751
is where it starts being honoured.
- The swagger annotation moves from `oauth2.Token` to
`codersdk.OAuth2TokenResponse`, because `oauth2.Token` has no `scope`
field to document.
- `EveryCatalogNameMintable` pins the catalog against the
`api_key_scope` enum. The two are maintained separately, and a name
negotiable at authorization but unmintable at exchange would leave a
client holding a code it can never redeem.

**What it satisfies**

Checked against both RFC 6749 and the OAuth 2.1 draft
(draft-ietf-oauth-v2-1-15). The 2.1 draft moves the scope-reporting rule
from RFC 6749 §5.1 into §1.4.1 and grades it in §3.2.3, but the
requirement is the same one.

- RFC 6749 §5.1, OAuth 2.1 §1.4.1 — "If the issued access token scope is
different from the one requested by the client, the authorization server
MUST include the `scope` response parameter in the token response".
OAuth 2.1 §3.2.3 grades `scope` as "RECOMMENDED, if identical to the
scope requested by the client; otherwise, REQUIRED". Both grants set it
unconditionally, which covers both grades. Without it, a client whose
request was narrowed against the app's allowlist, or defaulted because
it requested nothing, first learns its bounds from an unexplained 403.
Pinned by `IssuedTokenBoundsTheAPI`, which requests no scope and asserts
the response names what it got.
- OAuth 2.1 §1.4.1 — "The authorization server MAY fully or partially
ignore the scope requested by the client, based on the authorization
server policy or the resource owner's instructions." This is what
licenses ignoring `scope` on a refresh, and the licence is conditional
on reporting the actual grant. Before this PR the exchange both ignored
the request and said nothing, which is the half that was not defensible.
- OAuth 2.1 §4.3.1, RFC 6749 §6 — the refresh `scope` parameter is
OPTIONAL and "if omitted is treated as equal to the scope originally
granted by the resource owner". Exactly what `refreshTokenGrant` does
with `dbToken.Scope`.
- OAuth 2.1 §4.3.3 — "If a new refresh token is issued, the refresh
token scope MUST be identical to that of the refresh token included by
the client in the request." Rotation copies `dbToken.Scope` onto the new
refresh row.
- OAuth 2.1 §3.2.3 — "If refresh tokens are issued, those refresh tokens
MUST be bound to the scope and resource servers as consented by the
resource owner. This is to prevent privilege escalation by the
legitimate client". The refresh row has carried the negotiated scope
since #28178; this PR is what makes the access token minted from it
carry the same bound. Pinned by `RefreshDoesNotWidenTheScope`.
- OAuth 2.1 §1.4.1 — a client that omits `scope` must be met with "a
pre-defined default value or fail the request indicating an invalid
scope", and the server "SHOULD document its scope requirements and
default value". #28178 chose the default; `scopes_supported` and the
integration guide document it. Unchanged here, but it is why
`IssuedTokenBoundsTheAPI` can request nothing and still receive a
bounded token.
- Not yet: OAuth 2.1 §4.3.1 also says "The requested scope MUST NOT
include any scope not originally granted by the resource owner." A
refresh naming a narrower scope is ignored rather than honoured, and one
naming a wider scope is ignored rather than rejected with
`invalid_scope` (§3.2.4, "exceeds the scope granted by the resource
owner"). Neither case widens a token, so there is no escalation, and
§1.4.1's MAY plus the `scope` response parameter keep the client
correctly informed in the meantime. #28751 is where narrowing lands.
Documented under Limitations until then.

---

First of three, [PLAT-480](https://linear.app/codercom/issue/PLAT-480).
Depends on #28179, which has merged, so this reviews against main.

#28178 decided the scope and #28179 reported it. This PR is the one that
makes a token feel it.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Steven Masley <Emyrk@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-02 13:14:44 -07:00
54e21f29a1 fix: deliver four more authorize errors to the client (#28450)
**TL;DR**

Fourth of the stack, split out of #28045. #28179 sent `invalid_scope` to
the client's own callback; this PR sends the rest of the errors raised
after the callback has been verified, behind one URL builder they all
now share.

| PR | What it does |
|---|---|
| #28007 | Schema: `codes.scope` and `tokens.scope`, so a negotiated
scope has somewhere to live. |
| #28167 | `ScopesCover` compares an allowlist against a request by
permission coverage rather than by name. |
| #28178 | The authorize endpoint negotiates the scope against the app's
allowlist and persists it on the code. |
| #28179 | The consent page lists the negotiated permissions, and
`invalid_scope` reaches the client's callback per RFC 6749 §4.1.2.1. |
| **#28450 (this)** | The same delivery for every other error raised
once the callback is trusted. |

- #28179 has merged, so this diff is against main and reviews on its
own.
- Nothing about what a token can do changes here. This is delivery, not
enforcement.

**Contract change**

Four failures now arrive at the app's registered callback instead of
terminating on Coder, so an integrator with error handling on its
callback starts seeing codes it never received.

| Verb | Condition | Error code | Was |
|------|-----------|------------|-----|
| GET | `response_type != code` | `unsupported_response_type` | static
"Unsupported Response Type" page, 400 |
| POST | `response_type != code` | `unsupported_response_type` |
`WriteOAuth2Error`, 400 |
| POST | `code_challenge_method=plain` | `invalid_request` |
`WriteOAuth2Error`, 400 |
| GET | `code_challenge_method=plain` | `invalid_request` | consent
page, 200, refused after Allow |

The GET static error page loses its only caller. The last row is what
review found: the method was checked on POST only, so the user approved
a request that could never succeed.

**Where in the OAuth Flow**

<details>
<summary>Diagram: where these errors are raised, and what licenses the
redirect</summary>

```mermaid
flowchart TD
    EX["GET or POST /oauth2/authorize<br/>extractAuthorizeParams exact-matches redirect_uri<br/>against the app's registered callback"]

    EX -->|"no match, rejected scheme, unparsable,<br/>other param failures"| CODER["Answers on Coder<br/>RFC 6749 3.1.2.4: MUST NOT redirect"]
    EX -->|"matched: a validatedCallbackURL,<br/>which is what licenses a redirect"| RT{"response_type == code?"}

    RT -->|no| E1["unsupported_response_type (this PR)"]
    RT -->|yes| PK{"code_challenge_method S256 or omitted?"}
    PK -->|no| E2["invalid_request (this PR, and newly checked on GET)"]
    PK -->|yes| SC{"scope negotiable?"}
    SC -->|no| E3["invalid_scope (previous PR)"]
    SC -->|yes| OK["GET: consent page, cancel link is access_denied<br/>POST: authorization code"]

    E1 --> OUT
    E2 --> OUT
    E3 --> OUT
    OK --> OUT["One builder produces every URL the flow emits:<br/>error redirect, cancel link, success code"]
```

</details>

- Authorize endpoint only, both verbs. The token exchange, refresh, and
revocation are untouched.
- Every redirect is licensed by a `validatedCallbackURL`, a type
produced only where `extractAuthorizeParams` exact-matches the URI
against the app's registration. A guard, not a proof: no other package
can fabricate one, this one still can.
- One builder now produces every response URL, including the consent
page's cancel link, which rolled its own and edited the shared URL in
place rather than copying it.
- Each rejection logs. The error leaves in a `Location` header, which
`loggermw` does not record, so a failed authorization used to look
exactly like a successful one.

**Three smaller behavior changes**

- A callback registered with `code`, `error`, `error_description`, or
`state` in its own query no longer receives that value back. A
registered `error=` rode out on the success redirect, where a client
that reads `error` first discards a valid code. The rest of the
registered query is kept, as §3.1.2 requires.
- `error_description` is confined to the NQSCHAR set Appendix A permits.
Descriptions name the offending value with `%q`, so every
`invalid_scope` Coder emits today carries excluded characters. Quotes
now render as apostrophes.
- An unparsable `redirect_uri` returns 400 instead of 500. It reached a
nil dereference in `httpapi.RedirectURL`, which `POST /oauth2/tokens`
also uses, and that endpoint takes no API key.

**What it satisfies**

- RFC 6749 §4.1.2.1 — on a failure that is not a bad redirection URI,
the server informs the client through the redirection URI. That is the
whole PR.
- RFC 6749 §3.1.2.4 and §4.1.2.1 — a missing, invalid, or mismatching
redirection URI "MUST NOT" be redirected to. A mismatched URI, and a
registered URI with a rejected scheme, still answer on Coder. Pinned by
`MismatchedRedirectURINotRedirected` and
`DangerousCallbackSchemeNotRedirected`.
- RFC 6749 Appendix A — `error_description` is NQSCHAR, and the rule is
on the decoded value, so percent-encoding on the wire does not satisfy
it.
- RFC 6749 §4.1.2 and §3.1.2 — the four reserved response parameters are
dropped from the registered query; everything else in it is retained.
- Not yet: the remaining parameter failures do have a trusted callback
in hand, but the parser reports one verdict for every field at once, so
the caller cannot say which field failed. A follow-up classifies them.
The two `server_error` sites also stay put: sending an internal fault
outbound with a Coder-written description wants its own review.

**Docs and Swagger.** `docs/admin/integrations/oauth2-provider.md` gains
a Common Issues entry per newly redirected code, and the implicit-grant
limitation now says where the error arrives. Both authorize verbs
document the 302, the GET side for the first time.

---

Split out of #28045
([PLAT-479](https://linear.app/codercom/issue/PLAT-479)). Fourth of the
stack. #28179 has merged, so this reviews against main.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Steven Masley <Emyrk@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-02 12:43:32 -07:00
Andrew Aquino 3aeb7f85d9 feat: correlate coder CLI workspace sessions with client_session_id (#28313)
## Summary

Implements DEVEX-664: the coder CLI commands that open a workspace
connection now generate a client session ID and attach it to their
requests, logs, and existing network telemetry, per the connection-log
RFC.

Commands opt in explicitly with a `client_session_id` annotation. The
opted-in set is `coder ssh`, `coder start`, `coder stop`, and `coder
update`. Long-running daemon commands (`coder server`, `agent`,
`provisionerd`, and so on) deliberately stay out, so they never carry a
meaningless session ID in their logs, request baggage, or telemetry.

- **Generate / resolve**: a 16-byte lowercase-hex session ID is
generated per opted-in invocation. When `CODER_TRACE_SESSION_ID` is set
(so Toolbox and the VS Code plugin can correlate the CLI they spawn),
that value is used verbatim; a warning is logged if it is not the
canonical 32-char lowercase hex form, since coderd/agent middleware drop
non-canonical values.
- **Requests**: the ID is attached to every request as
`client_session_id` W3C baggage via a transport wrapper, independent of
whether tracing is enabled. The already-merged coderd tracing middleware
(#27671) reads it.
- **Coordinate websocket**: the ID is also set explicitly as baggage on
the tailnet coordinate handshake in `workspacesdk.DialAgent`, so
coderd's `/api/v2/workspaceagents/{id}/coordinate` endpoint logs it (it
does not rely on the CLI transport for that dial).
- **Logs**: the ID is added to the command's log context.
- **Existing telemetry**: the ID is added to tailnet `TelemetryEvent`
(`client_session_id`, new field 20; proto minor version bumped) and
plumbed from the CLI through `workspacesdk.DialAgent`.

Scope is the coder CLI client only (RFC glossary + requirement 5), and
within the CLI only the opted-in workspace-connecting commands above.
This PR is independent of #28039 (the agent middleware that consumes the
baggage); it depends only on `tracing.SessionIDBaggageKey`, which is
already on `main` via #27671.

## Out of scope

RFC requirements 7-16 (connection-state change logging,
`connection_logs` columns, log buffering, routing/disconnect-reason
logs, coordination-protocol plumbing, `agentssh`/`reconnectingpty`
command logging, support-bundle log capture) and requirements 4.2/4.3
(VS Code telemetry, Prometheus stats) are separate tickets. IDE plugins,
Toolbox, and the daemon commands are also out of scope.

## Testing

- `go test ./coderd/tracing/... ./cli/... ./tailnet/...
./codersdk/workspacesdk/...` (unit tests for the generator, the
env/generate resolver, per-command opt-in, the baggage transport
wrapper, the coordinate-dial baggage helper, and the telemetry field).
- `go build ./...`, `go vet`, and `golangci-lint` pass on the touched
packages.
- `make tailnet/proto/tailnet.pb.go` regenerated the proto; the proto
minor version was bumped and `postStartup` now connects at the current
agent API version so `TestWorkspaceAgent_Startup/OK` tracks it.

> Note: the pre-commit `enterprise/cli/.gen-golden` step could not run
in this environment (no Postgres: `open postgres connection: EOF`).
`cli/testdata/.gen-golden` passed; this change adds no serpent flags, so
there is no CLI help/golden drift.

<details>
<summary>Implementation plan</summary>

### Scope mapping (RFC -> DEVEX-664)

In scope (the CLI workspace-connecting subset of RFC phase 2):
- Req 1: generate a 16-byte session ID as 32-char lowercase hex.
- Req 2: add the session ID to every log the command makes for the
session.
- Req 3: attach the session ID to every API request via
`client_session_id` baggage, including the coordinate websocket
handshake. (The query-param fallback is browser-only; not applicable to
the CLI.)
- Req 4.1: attach the session ID to CLI network telemetry.
- Req 5 / 5.3: support `CODER_TRACE_SESSION_ID`; when set, use it
instead of generating.

### Resolved decisions

- Scope: opt-in per command via a `client_session_id` annotation;
opted-in set is `coder ssh`, `coder start`, `coder stop`, `coder
update`. Daemon commands are excluded.
- `CODER_TRACE_SESSION_ID`: when set, use the value verbatim; warn if it
is not canonical 32-char lowercase hex. When unset, generate a fresh ID.
- Existing telemetry = CLI network telemetry (tailnet `TelemetryEvent`);
requires a new proto field + plumbing and a proto minor version bump.
- Coordinate endpoint: set the session ID as baggage on the coordinate
handshake explicitly in `DialAgent` (header, not query param) so it is
logged server-side without relying on the CLI transport.
- Shared helper: add `tracing.NewSessionID()` and export the validator
as `tracing.ValidSessionID` for a single source of truth.

### Implementation

1. `coderd/tracing`: add `NewSessionID()` (16 random bytes,
hex-encoded); export `ValidSessionID`.
2. `cli`: resolve the ID from `CODER_TRACE_SESSION_ID` or generate;
attach `client_session_id` baggage to every request via
`wrapTransportWithSessionIDHeader`, gated on the
`annotationClientSessionID` opt-in; add it to the command log context.
3. `tailnet` + `codersdk/workspacesdk`: add `client_session_id` to
`TelemetryEvent`, an `Options.ClientSessionID`/`Conn.clientSessionID`
set in `newTelemetryEvent`, a `DialAgentOptions.ClientSessionID` plumbed
from the opted-in commands, and the coordinate-handshake baggage in
`DialAgent`.

</details>

---

_This PR was created by Coder Agents on behalf of @aqandrew._
2026-09-02 19:31:01 +00:00
Michael Suchacz a8f7591627 chore: add Gemini 3.8 Flash to the known models catalog and price book (#28909) 2026-09-02 18:35:51 +00:00
Jeremy RuppelandCoder Agents 8b8c80614d feat: expose template builder agents and per-module agent (#28905)
Part of [DEVEX-556](https://linear.app/codercom/issue/DEVEX-556). Builds
on the base agent metadata added in #28794.

## Summary

Surfaces the backend multi-agent support through the SDK and HTTP API:
the bases endpoint returns each base's agents, and
compose/create-template accept a per-module `agent_name`.

## What changed

- `codersdk/templatebuilder.go`: added `TemplateBuilderBaseAgent`,
`TemplateBuilderBase.Agents`, and
`TemplateBuilderComposeModule.AgentName` (`agent_name,omitempty`).
- `coderd/templatebuilder_handler.go`: added `baseAgentsToSDK`; the
bases endpoint returns agents, and the compose and create-template
endpoints forward `AgentName`.
- `make gen` regenerated `site/src/api/typesGenerated.ts`,
`coderd/apidoc/docs.go`, `coderd/apidoc/swagger.json`,
`docs/reference/api/schemas.md`, and
`docs/reference/api/templatebuilder.md`.
- `wizardState.test.ts`: added `agents: []` to the base fixture now that
the field is required on the generated type.

## Scope

SDK/API plumbing only. `ComposeModule.AgentName` now has a producer (the
handlers) but no caller sets it yet — the wizard UI (follow-up) is what
will populate it. No DB change, so `enterprise/audit/table.go` is
unaffected.

## Testing

- Bases endpoint asserts each base returns agents with exactly one
default (and the `dev`/`main` names).
- Per-module `agent_name` round-trip and unknown-agent (400) compose
tests.
- `make gen` (idempotent), `make fmt` (no changes), `golangci-lint
./coderd/... ./codersdk/...`, the Go template-builder tests, frontend
`tsc` + `biome check`, and docs markdownlint all pass.

<details>
<summary>Design note</summary>

`display_name` is intentionally returned as `""` for now: every base is
single-agent, so no base authors a per-agent label. The field exists for
multi-agent bases where the wizard radio needs a human-readable name;
consumers fall back to the agent `name` when it is empty.

</details>

---
🤖 Generated by Coder Agents on behalf of @jeremyruppel.

Co-authored-by: Coder Agents <agents@coder.com>
2026-09-02 12:51:33 -04:00
dylanhuff-at-coder 4875ae218a feat: enforce user secret file policy (#28518)
Adds the deployment option `--user-secrets-disable-file-path` /
`CODER_USER_SECRETS_DISABLE_FILE_PATH` / `userSecretsDisableFilePath`
(default `false`). When it is set, the create and batch-create
user-secret endpoints reject requests with a non-empty file path, and
PATCH validates the post-update state under a `SELECT ... FOR UPDATE`
row lock, rejecting a new or changed file path as well as enabled states
that would have no effective delivery target. Legacy stored paths are
preserved, so users can still edit, disable, clear the path, or migrate
the secret to env delivery.

This is PR 1 of a 4-PR stack; follow-ups cover manifest filtering, the
dashboard, and CLI/docs.

Refs #27488

Reviewed and updated by Coder Agents on behalf of @dylanhuff-at-coder.
2026-09-02 09:21:36 -07:00
Michael Suchacz 6db09ed9a6 fix: sync pinned chat MCP context resources on agent push (#28796) 2026-09-02 13:38:14 +02:00
Bartek Gatz 55340de360 feat: add deployment setting to disable the Codernauts game (#27662)
Adds a `codernauts_enabled` runtime setting (default: enabled) that
controls whether the Codernauts game link appears in the user dropdown
menu. A toggle at the bottom of the Deployment > Appearance page
controls it, and the value persists in `site_configs`, so it survives
restarts and upgrades without any CLI flags or environment variables.

The setting works on all licenses: `GET /api/v2/appearance` reports it
from both the enterprise and the default (AGPL) appearance fetchers, and
`PUT /api/v2/appearance` persists it gated only by the deployment-config
RBAC permission, not by an entitlement. On the Appearance page the
toggle renders outside the Premium paywall introduced in #27948; the
other appearance fields keep their existing licensing behavior.

Note: a pure AGPL-only build of coderd does not register the
`/api/v2/appearance` routes at all, so the toggle cannot be saved there.
The standard `coder server` binary is unaffected regardless of license
state.

<details>
<summary>Implementation notes</summary>

- `coderd/database/queries/siteconfig.sql`: new `GetCodernautsEnabled` /
`UpsertCodernautsEnabled` queries backed by a `codernauts_enabled` key
in `site_configs`; defaults to `true` when unset (no migration needed).
- `coderd/database/dbauthz`: read has no authz checks (matching other
appearance reads); write requires `ResourceDeploymentConfig` update.
Coverage added to `dbauthz_test.go`.
- `codersdk`: `codernauts_enabled` added to `AppearanceConfig` and
`UpdateAppearanceConfig`.
- `coderd/appearance`: the default fetcher takes a `database.Store` and
reads the setting from the database so unlicensed deployments serve it
too.
- `enterprise/coderd/appearance.go`: fetches the value in `Fetch` and
persists it in `putAppearance`.
- Frontend: "Codernauts game" toggle section on Deployment > Appearance
saving immediately via the existing appearance mutation;
`codernauts_enabled` threaded from `useDashboard().appearance` through
Navbar to `UserDropdownContent`, which renders the menu item only when
enabled. Storybook stories with `play` functions cover toggling
(entitled and not) and the dropdown hiding the link when disabled.

</details>

---

🤖 This PR was generated by Coder Agents on behalf of @bartekgatzcoder.
2026-09-02 11:29:35 +02:00
Michael Suchacz 560ef00c15 chore: add Claude Fable 5.1 and other new models to the known models catalog (#28887)
Add the models that landed on models.dev since the August curation pass
to the Agents-page known models list, so they appear as suggestions when
an admin adds a chat model in `/agents` settings.

| Model | Providers |
|---|---|
| Claude Fable 5.1 | anthropic, azure, bedrock (plus `global.` alias),
openrouter, vercel |
| Claude Opus 5 | anthropic (already curated on the other providers) |
| Gemini 3.7 Flash | google |
| GLM 5.3 | openrouter, vercel |

Fable 5.1 and Opus 5 use `reasoningEffort: high` like their curated
siblings, and new entries sort ahead of the models they supersede.
`knownModelsGenerated.json` and
`coderd/aibridge/prices/data/prices.json` are both regenerated with
`make gen/aibridge-prices` from the same models.dev snapshot; the
`prices.json` changes are upstream drift since the last weekly refresh.

Left out pending a decision: azure now lists `claude-mythos-5` upstream
but it is not curated for azure here, and `copilot` has no curation
entries at all.

> Xum opened this PR on behalf of @ibetitsmike.
2026-09-02 09:50:57 +02:00
McKayla はな fb0bdd3feb chore: remove tasks frontend (#28743) 2026-09-01 17:49:42 +00:00
Samuel Volin 117c0f7b11 feat: distinct NewUser and Product trial sources (#28882)
*
[DEVEX-847/distinct-newuser-and-product-trial-sources](https://linear.app/codercom/issue/DEVEX-847/distinct-newuser-and-product-trial-sources)
* for premium trial signups with a new user account creation, passes the
`NewUser` trial source.
* for premium trial signups from the /deployment/premium account page,
passes the `Product` trial source
2026-09-01 11:15:02 -06:00