Commit Graph
1736 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Michael Suchacz 25af21b5d5 feat!: remove has_ai_task and the task build reasons (#29085)
Drops the `has_ai_task` column from `template_versions` and
`workspace_builds` (with its index and view projections) and removes the
three task build reasons (`task_auto_pause`, `task_manual_pause`,
`task_resume`) from the `build_reason` enum. Existing rows are remapped
before the enum swap: automatic pauses become `autostop`, manual pauses
and resumes become `initiator`, and
`workspace_build_orchestrations.child_reason` follows the same mapping.
The query filters, provisionerdserver flag writes, and audit ignore
entries for the column go with it.

**Migration cost:** recreating `build_reason` rewrites
`workspace_builds`. `TestMigration000593TaskBuildReasonRewriteTiming`
seeds 1,000 workspaces, 100,000 builds (30,000 with task reasons) and
5,000 orchestrations and asserts the migration stays under a two-minute
bound; locally it takes about 0.7 to 1.0 s. The test is skipped under
`-short`.

**Breaking change:** the down migration re-adds `has_ai_task` as `false`
and restores the enum values; remapped reasons keep their new values.

**Review changes:** the migration test now asserts only the row remaps
(schema and enum introspection removed per review); renumbered from
000592 to 000593.

**Stack context:** Coder Tasks removal stack (CODAGT-642): #28743
frontend → #28788 CLI → #28789 API → #28790 provisioner → #29084
notifications → **#29085 build reasons** → #29086 tables → #28750
permissions. The last four PRs replace the single data-drop migration
that used to live in #28750; each carries one concern and its own
migration number.

> Created by Xum (AI agent) on behalf of @ibetitsmike.
2026-09-11 10:47:43 +02:00
Michael Suchacz f809776229 feat!: remove the task notification templates (#29084)
Removes the six Coder Tasks notification templates (their preferences
and inbox history go with them via cascade) and the
`preference_task_notification_alert_dismissed` user setting with its two
queries. The `task` value of `ai_seat_usage_reason` stays: seats
consumed through tasks remain consumed, and remapping their reason would
misstate billing history.

**Breaking change:** migration 000592 deletes data. The down migration
restores the template definitions, not the deleted preferences or
notification history.

**Review changes:** dropped the `ai_seat_state` remap and enum swap and
the migration unit test (both per review); moved the migration from
000591 to 000592 because main took 000591.

**Stack context:** Coder Tasks removal stack (CODAGT-642): #28743
frontend → #28788 CLI → #28789 API → #28790 provisioner → **#29084
notifications** → #29085 build reasons → #29086 tables → #28750
permissions. The last four PRs replace the single data-drop migration
that used to live in #28750; each carries one concern and its own
migration number.

> Created by Xum (AI agent) on behalf of @ibetitsmike.
2026-09-11 08:05:53 +00:00
Ehab Younes 0aae890d03 feat: return per-app session counts from workspace agent stats queries (#29134)
- Make all six raw session-count queries return a session_counts JSONB
object keyed by app name instead of fixed per-family columns. Fold the
results into existing family fields in Go using the shared SDK registry,
including unrecognized names under unknown.
- Remove the registry parameters and associated dbauthz validation from
these queries, which no longer perform family attribution in SQL.
Preserve existing deployment stats, Prometheus, and telemetry outputs.
- Select session maps directly in the two latest-row queries instead of
decomposing and reaggregating a single row. Keep byte, connection, and
latency aggregates independent of per-app expansion.
- Add regressions for latest eligible rows, empty session maps, distinct
same-family app names, labels, and unchanged traffic aggregates.
2026-09-10 14:07:03 +02:00
Ehab Younes da45488208 feat: attribute session counts by app family (#28337)
- Centralize app-to-family attribution in the SDK registry so recognized
app aliases contribute to their family's session counts and usage
minutes without duplicating name lists across SQL queries.
- Pass the registry into agent stats queries, insights, and usage rollups.
- Validate its structure in dbauthz so missing or renamed families fail
explicitly instead of silently producing zero counts.
- Decompose session maps once per row for per-agent sums while retaining
the key-presence checks used by insights. Update reporting consumers
and add coverage for alias attribution and registry validation.
2026-09-10 13:54:11 +02:00
Ethan d8e3f4fcf7 feat: evict the oldest attachments at the chat file cap (#29063)
Closes CODAGT-933

Long agent sessions were hitting the 50 attachment cap, after which
every upload, screenshot and `attach_file` call was rejected, so people
were abandoning otherwise healthy chats.

Rather than raise the cap (which just moves the cliff and multiplies the
worst-case per-chat `bytea` storage), a chat now keeps its 50 most
recent attachments. `LinkChatFilesAfterLock` deletes the oldest
`chat_files` rows in the same statement and the cascade drops their
links. Files in the incoming batch are never evicted, so the only
remaining rejection is a single message with more than 50 files.

Nothing in the product ever linked one file to two chats, so rather than
guard the eviction against it, this adds `UNIQUE (file_id)` on
`chat_file_links`, with the migration dropping any existing duplicates
in favour of the oldest chat.

Evicted attachments render as the existing "Attachment expired" tile. A
`pinned` flag is the obvious follow-up if someone needs to keep a
specific file around.
2026-09-10 13:40:16 +10:00
Susana Ferreira 45fb985ce6 fix(coderd/database): exclude system users from AI budgets (#28698)
## Description

Group AI budget totals counted system users, including the prebuilds
user, even though they are excluded from the displayed member count.

The budget queries now exclude system users when calculating group
totals and over-budget user counts.

## Changes

- Exclude system users from group AI budget totals.
- Exclude system users from over-budget user counts.
- Add database regression coverage.

Closes https://linear.app/codercom/issue/AIGOV-595

> [!NOTE]
> Generated by Coder Agents on behalf of @ssncferreira.
2026-09-09 09:29:57 +01:00
Paweł Banaszewski 8472a6884f chore!: remove env-based AI provider configuration (#29053)
> AI tools were used to create this PR

Removes deprecated AI provider configuration through environment
variables, CLI flags, and YAML.
Deletion includes indexed providers and legacy OpenAI, Anthropic, and
Bedrock options under both AI Gateway and AI Bridge branding, eg.
`CODER_AI_GATEWAY_PROVIDER_<N>_*` or `CODER_AI_GATEWAY_ANTHROPIC_KEY`.
Removes the associated startup-seeding code.
Updates tests and documentation.

**Breaking change:** Remove [obsolete AI provider CLI flags and YAML
keys](https://coder.com/docs/ai-coder/ai-gateway/providers#database-management-of-providers)
before upgrading, otherwise Coder will fail to start with an `unknown
flag` or `unknown option` error. Provider environment variables are
ignored and no longer seed the database. Existing database-stored
provider configuration is preserved.
2026-09-09 10:16:24 +02:00
Bobby Ho 96ee8d171a fix: make OAuth2 code redemption single-use under concurrency (#28744)
TL;DR

Third PR in the PLAT-480 stack, on top of #28740. Fixes a race where the same authorization code could be redeemed twice concurrently.

The redeeming delete now returns the deleted row. If another request already redeemed the code, the delete returns sql.ErrNoRows and redemption fails with invalid_grant.

Each redemption runs in its own transaction, so concurrent requests serialize on the code row and only one succeeds.

The test now races two concurrent redemptions to verify single-use behavior.

No scope logic, new endpoints, or schema changes.

Depends on #28740.

Stack: #28237, #28740, this PR.
2026-09-08 16:42:34 -07:00
Ehab Younes 90c7533204 perf: store workspace agent session counts as JSONB (#28126)
Replace fixed session_count_* columns with a sparse session_counts
JSONB object so new session types require no schema changes.

Convert retained and unrolled-up activity, warning on backlogs spanning
more than 24 hours. Update batching, queries, and rollups while preserving
existing API shapes and compatibility with older agents.

Add migration, query, and batcher coverage.
2026-09-07 22:31:42 +02:00
Danielle Maywood a6938e69db fix: re-resolve PR when stored URL's branch is stale (#28983) 2026-09-04 17:04:13 +01:00
e035967ef1 feat: mint access tokens with the negotiated scope (#28237)
**TL;DR**

First of PLAT-480, continuing the merged PLAT-479 stack. #28178 decided
what the scope is and #28179 reported it; this PR is the one that makes
it bind. Until now the scope negotiated at `/oauth2/authorize` was
recorded on the grant but never reached the token: every OAuth2 access
key was minted with `coder:all`, so a client that asked for
`coder:workspaces.access` still got full API access.

| PR | What it does |
|---|---|
| #28167 | `ScopesCover` compares an allowlist against a request by
permission coverage rather than by name. Merged. |
| #28178 | The authorize endpoint checks the request against the scope
catalog, grants it only if the app's filtered allowlist covers it, and
persists the result on the code. Merged. |
| #28179 | The consent page lists the negotiated permissions, and
`invalid_scope` reaches the client's own callback per RFC 6749 §4.1.2.1.
Merged. |
| **#28237 (this)** | The exchange mints the API key with the stored
scope, and the token response states what was granted. |
| #28740 | Re-checks the app allowlist at redemption, for a code whose
app was narrowed after the code was issued. |
| #28751 | Lets a refresh narrow the granted scope, which is the `scope`
request parameter this PR still ignores. |

- #28179 has merged, so this diff is against main and reviews on its
own.
- **This is the first PR in the stack where a token's authority actually
changes.** Everything before it recorded and reported. That is the blast
radius worth reviewing: a grant that negotiated a narrow scope now gets
a key that is genuinely narrower, and anything that was quietly relying
on `coder:all` will start seeing 403.
- Grants that predate the scope columns carry what migration 000569
backfilled, `coder:all`, so they refresh unrestricted and reach what
they reached before. Pinned by `BackfilledScopeRefreshesUnrestricted`,
seeded the way the migration leaves a row rather than exchanged.
- The actor that writes the key stays `rbac.ScopeAll`. Narrowing it to
the granted scope would deny `api_key:create` and fail the exchange. The
bound lives on `api_keys.scopes`, which dbauthz reads on every request,
not on the actor doing the insert.

**Where in the flow**

<details>
<summary>Diagram: where the stored scope turns into a bound on the
token</summary>

```mermaid
flowchart TD
    AZ["GET or POST /oauth2/authorize<br/>negotiates the scope and persists it on the code<br/>PR 28178, merged"]
    AZ --> TK["POST /oauth2/tokens"]

    TK --> GT{"grant_type"}
    GT -->|authorization_code| S1["scope read from codes.scope"]
    GT -->|refresh_token| S2["scope read from tokens.scope<br/>req.Scope is parsed and ignored, PR 28751"]

    S1 --> CV["scopeStringToAPIKeyScopes, this PR<br/>every name must be in the api_key_scope enum<br/>an empty list is an error, not coder:all"]
    S2 --> CV

    CV -->|"unknown name, or empty"| ERR["400 invalid_grant, this PR<br/>error_description names the offending value"]
    CV -->|mintable| GEN["apikey.Generate with Scopes, this PR<br/>was: no Scopes, so every key defaulted to coder:all"]

    GEN --> KEY["api_keys.scopes<br/>read by dbauthz on every later request:<br/>this is where the grant becomes a bound"]
    GEN --> ROW["the new tokens row carries the same scope,<br/>so the next refresh reads back the same grant"]

    KEY --> RESP["200 with scope in the token response, this PR<br/>RFC 6749 5.1, OAuth 2.1 1.4.1"]
    ROW --> RESP
```

</details>

- Token endpoint only, both grants. Authorize is untouched apart from
two comments that said the scope was not yet enforced.
- `scopeStringToAPIKeyScopes` turns the stored scope string into
`database.APIKeyScopes` for `apikey.Generate`. Names are checked there
rather than inside `apikey.Generate`, whose error would surface as a 500
rather than an OAuth2 error.
- An empty list is an error, not an unrestricted key. `apikey.Generate`
defaults an empty scope list to `coder:all`, so an empty stored scope
would silently widen the grant instead of failing it. The same reasoning
is why the `expandRBACScope` comment in `modelmethods.go` was stale:
that function already errored on an empty list while its comment still
promised `rbac.ScopeAll`.
- A stored scope outside the `api_key_scope` enum answers 400
`invalid_grant` rather than 500, with the offending name in
`error_description`. Not `invalid_scope`: RFC 6749 §5.2 and OAuth 2.1
§3.2.4 both scope that code to what the client requested, and this value
is server state the client cannot change by asking differently. The
grant is what is unusable, and re-authorizing is the only way out.
- Refresh copies the presented token's scope onto both the new API key
and the rotated refresh row. `req.Scope` is parsed but ignored; #28751
is where it starts being honoured.
- The swagger annotation moves from `oauth2.Token` to
`codersdk.OAuth2TokenResponse`, because `oauth2.Token` has no `scope`
field to document.
- `EveryCatalogNameMintable` pins the catalog against the
`api_key_scope` enum. The two are maintained separately, and a name
negotiable at authorization but unmintable at exchange would leave a
client holding a code it can never redeem.

**What it satisfies**

Checked against both RFC 6749 and the OAuth 2.1 draft
(draft-ietf-oauth-v2-1-15). The 2.1 draft moves the scope-reporting rule
from RFC 6749 §5.1 into §1.4.1 and grades it in §3.2.3, but the
requirement is the same one.

- RFC 6749 §5.1, OAuth 2.1 §1.4.1 — "If the issued access token scope is
different from the one requested by the client, the authorization server
MUST include the `scope` response parameter in the token response".
OAuth 2.1 §3.2.3 grades `scope` as "RECOMMENDED, if identical to the
scope requested by the client; otherwise, REQUIRED". Both grants set it
unconditionally, which covers both grades. Without it, a client whose
request was narrowed against the app's allowlist, or defaulted because
it requested nothing, first learns its bounds from an unexplained 403.
Pinned by `IssuedTokenBoundsTheAPI`, which requests no scope and asserts
the response names what it got.
- OAuth 2.1 §1.4.1 — "The authorization server MAY fully or partially
ignore the scope requested by the client, based on the authorization
server policy or the resource owner's instructions." This is what
licenses ignoring `scope` on a refresh, and the licence is conditional
on reporting the actual grant. Before this PR the exchange both ignored
the request and said nothing, which is the half that was not defensible.
- OAuth 2.1 §4.3.1, RFC 6749 §6 — the refresh `scope` parameter is
OPTIONAL and "if omitted is treated as equal to the scope originally
granted by the resource owner". Exactly what `refreshTokenGrant` does
with `dbToken.Scope`.
- OAuth 2.1 §4.3.3 — "If a new refresh token is issued, the refresh
token scope MUST be identical to that of the refresh token included by
the client in the request." Rotation copies `dbToken.Scope` onto the new
refresh row.
- OAuth 2.1 §3.2.3 — "If refresh tokens are issued, those refresh tokens
MUST be bound to the scope and resource servers as consented by the
resource owner. This is to prevent privilege escalation by the
legitimate client". The refresh row has carried the negotiated scope
since #28178; this PR is what makes the access token minted from it
carry the same bound. Pinned by `RefreshDoesNotWidenTheScope`.
- OAuth 2.1 §1.4.1 — a client that omits `scope` must be met with "a
pre-defined default value or fail the request indicating an invalid
scope", and the server "SHOULD document its scope requirements and
default value". #28178 chose the default; `scopes_supported` and the
integration guide document it. Unchanged here, but it is why
`IssuedTokenBoundsTheAPI` can request nothing and still receive a
bounded token.
- Not yet: OAuth 2.1 §4.3.1 also says "The requested scope MUST NOT
include any scope not originally granted by the resource owner." A
refresh naming a narrower scope is ignored rather than honoured, and one
naming a wider scope is ignored rather than rejected with
`invalid_scope` (§3.2.4, "exceeds the scope granted by the resource
owner"). Neither case widens a token, so there is no escalation, and
§1.4.1's MAY plus the `scope` response parameter keep the client
correctly informed in the meantime. #28751 is where narrowing lands.
Documented under Limitations until then.

---

First of three, [PLAT-480](https://linear.app/codercom/issue/PLAT-480).
Depends on #28179, which has merged, so this reviews against main.

#28178 decided the scope and #28179 reported it. This PR is the one that
makes a token feel it.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Steven Masley <Emyrk@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-02 13:14:44 -07:00
dylanhuff-at-coder 4875ae218a feat: enforce user secret file policy (#28518)
Adds the deployment option `--user-secrets-disable-file-path` /
`CODER_USER_SECRETS_DISABLE_FILE_PATH` / `userSecretsDisableFilePath`
(default `false`). When it is set, the create and batch-create
user-secret endpoints reject requests with a non-empty file path, and
PATCH validates the post-update state under a `SELECT ... FOR UPDATE`
row lock, rejecting a new or changed file path as well as enabled states
that would have no effective delivery target. Legacy stored paths are
preserved, so users can still edit, disable, clear the path, or migrate
the secret to env delivery.

This is PR 1 of a 4-PR stack; follow-ups cover manifest filtering, the
dashboard, and CLI/docs.

Refs #27488

Reviewed and updated by Coder Agents on behalf of @dylanhuff-at-coder.
2026-09-02 09:21:36 -07:00
Michael Suchacz 6db09ed9a6 fix: sync pinned chat MCP context resources on agent push (#28796) 2026-09-02 13:38:14 +02:00
Bartek Gatz 55340de360 feat: add deployment setting to disable the Codernauts game (#27662)
Adds a `codernauts_enabled` runtime setting (default: enabled) that
controls whether the Codernauts game link appears in the user dropdown
menu. A toggle at the bottom of the Deployment > Appearance page
controls it, and the value persists in `site_configs`, so it survives
restarts and upgrades without any CLI flags or environment variables.

The setting works on all licenses: `GET /api/v2/appearance` reports it
from both the enterprise and the default (AGPL) appearance fetchers, and
`PUT /api/v2/appearance` persists it gated only by the deployment-config
RBAC permission, not by an entitlement. On the Appearance page the
toggle renders outside the Premium paywall introduced in #27948; the
other appearance fields keep their existing licensing behavior.

Note: a pure AGPL-only build of coderd does not register the
`/api/v2/appearance` routes at all, so the toggle cannot be saved there.
The standard `coder server` binary is unaffected regardless of license
state.

<details>
<summary>Implementation notes</summary>

- `coderd/database/queries/siteconfig.sql`: new `GetCodernautsEnabled` /
`UpsertCodernautsEnabled` queries backed by a `codernauts_enabled` key
in `site_configs`; defaults to `true` when unset (no migration needed).
- `coderd/database/dbauthz`: read has no authz checks (matching other
appearance reads); write requires `ResourceDeploymentConfig` update.
Coverage added to `dbauthz_test.go`.
- `codersdk`: `codernauts_enabled` added to `AppearanceConfig` and
`UpdateAppearanceConfig`.
- `coderd/appearance`: the default fetcher takes a `database.Store` and
reads the setting from the database so unlicensed deployments serve it
too.
- `enterprise/coderd/appearance.go`: fetches the value in `Fetch` and
persists it in `putAppearance`.
- Frontend: "Codernauts game" toggle section on Deployment > Appearance
saving immediately via the existing appearance mutation;
`codernauts_enabled` threaded from `useDashboard().appearance` through
Navbar to `UserDropdownContent`, which renders the menu item only when
enabled. Storybook stories with `play` functions cover toggling
(entitled and not) and the dropdown hiding the link when disabled.

</details>

---

🤖 This PR was generated by Coder Agents on behalf of @bartekgatzcoder.
2026-09-02 11:29:35 +02:00
Steven Masley dc1a54cd37 chore: purge identified terraform modules via dbpurge (#28802) 2026-08-31 19:24:27 -05:00
Steven Masley dd1aa88914 chore: migration to delete identified modules (#28798)
Modules downloaded during the window will be removed. Remediation is to
re-import the template.
2026-08-31 18:50:12 -05:00
Jaayden HalkoandMathias Fredriksson 8bf271c503 feat: add Prometheus metrics for the usage publisher (#28368)
The Tallyman usage publisher (`enterprise/coderd/usage/publisher.go`)
had no metrics; failures were only visible in logs and the
`usage_events.failure_message` column.

This adds five metrics under `coderd_usage_events_*`:

| Metric | Type | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
| `publish_results_total{result, event_type}` | counter | Per-event
outcomes from real Tallyman responses (`accepted`,
`rejected_temporarily`, `rejected_permanently`; events missing from the
response count as temporary) |
| `publish_send_errors_total` | counter | Ingest requests that failed
entirely (HTTP error, non-200, decode error), one per request |
| `pending` | gauge | Unpublished events still inside the 30-day
publishing window |
| `pending_oldest_age_seconds` | gauge | Age of the oldest pending event
(0 when none) |
| `expired` | gauge | Unpublished events older than 30 days that will
never be published |

Send errors and per-event results never double-count: when a request
fails, the publisher fakes an all-temporarily-rejected response for the
DB update, but only `publish_send_errors_total` increments, so
`publish_results_total` reflects only real Tallyman verdicts.

The gauges are backed by a new read-only `GetUsageEventsStats` query
(authorized as `ActionRead` on `ResourceUsageEvent`) and refreshed from
the publish loop after each attempt, so they update roughly every 17
minutes.

Metrics are created with `promauto.With(reg)` where the registerer
defaults to nil, so existing callers and tests need no changes;
`enterprise/cli/server.go` wires in the deployment's
`PrometheusRegistry` via the new `PublisherWithPrometheusRegisterer`
option.

Closes
https://linear.app/codercom/issue/CODAGT-833/e3-prometheus-metrics-for-the-usage-publisher

---------

Co-authored-by: Mathias Fredriksson <mafredri@gmail.com>
2026-08-28 15:44:31 +07:00
Yevhenii Shcherbina 0bc2858b6e feat: report unpriced AI models to owners (#28419)
Closes
[AIGOV-568](https://linear.app/codercom/issue/AIGOV-568/notify-admins-about-unpriced-ai-models).

AI Bridge records token usage for a model with no price at a NULL cost,
so its spend is neither reported nor enforced against any budget. Until
now that only reached admins through an info log and a Prometheus
metric.

Owners now receive a weekly report listing models used without a price
in the past week. The report links to documentation explaining how Coder
calculates spend from the default price book and how owners can
configure missing prices with `coder exp ai-model-prices`.

## Screenshots

<img width="726" height="531" alt="image"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/168ae378-60cb-4c96-8f60-36c6edc0b268"
/>
<img width="470" height="417" alt="image"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/7dc71a1e-0c57-44f1-86f7-df800603c865"
/>



## Design

**Derived, not tracked.** The unpriced set is computed at report time
from interceptions that recorded token usage, joined against the current
`ai_model_prices` table. Requests that produced no token usage are
excluded.

**No new loop or table.** `reportUnpricedAIModels` is a sibling of
`reportFailedWorkspaceBuilds` in the existing report generator, reusing
its ticker and `notification_report_generator_logs`. Each report runs in
its own transaction under a separate advisory lock, so failures and lock
contention do not couple otherwise independent reports. The weekly
frequency is enforced by the persisted timestamp rather than by the
ticker, which restarts with the process and runs on a different phase in
each replica.

## Behaviour

| Situation | Outcome |
|---|---|
| Model used without a price | Listed in the next weekly report |
| Price set | Disappears from the next report |
| Still unpriced and still in use | Reported again each week |
| Model stops being used | Drops out of the report |
| Nothing unpriced | No notification; window still advances |
| More than 100 unpriced models | Top 100 by usage, with the total
reported alongside |
| openai-compat models | Excluded, they cannot be priced |
| Many replicas | Exactly one report per week |
| First ever run | Reports models used in the preceding week immediately
|

## Design choices

1. **openai-compat** is excluded because it cannot be priced and would
produce permanent, unactionable notifications.
2. **Token volume** orders the list but is not shown. The 100-model cap
therefore prioritizes models responsible for the most unpriced usage.
3. **Placement** remains in the generic report generator rather than
`aibridgedserver`. This keeps one periodic-report lifecycle at the cost
of coupling the notifications package to an AI cost-control query.
4. **No license gate.** The reporter runs even when AI Gateway is
disabled. With no recorded token usage the query is empty and no
notification is sent.

---

Created by Coder Agents on behalf of @evgeniy-scherbina.
2026-08-27 21:04:13 +00:00
McKayla はな 2a8e390f0c refactor: replace most usage of ptr.Ref with new (#28282) 2026-08-26 11:57:56 -06:00
Susana Ferreira 276d0a8586 fix: expose effective member AI budgets (#28410)
## Description

The group members page could not distinguish an unlimited Everyone
fallback from a configured budget on the Everyone group when viewing
another group, so it incorrectly displayed `Unlimited` and `Everyone
(not allocated)` despite the configured Everyone budget.

The member spend response now includes `effective_budget` as the
canonical budget that currently applies to the user. The existing
`group_budget` field remains for backward compatibility and is
deprecated in favor of `effective_budget`.

## Changes

- Add `effective_budget` to group member AI spend responses.
- Deprecate `group_budget` in favor of `effective_budget`.
- Display budgeted Everyone as the governing group instead of
`Unlimited` and `Everyone (not allocated)`.
- Add database, API, conversion, and Storybook coverage.

Closes https://linear.app/codercom/issue/AIGOV-588

> [!NOTE]
> Generated by Coder Agents on behalf of @ssncferreira.
2026-08-26 16:17:07 +01:00
Michael Suchacz 45f2eb48cc refactor(coderd): restore agents-access cleanup migration (#28587)
## Summary

- restore the `agents-access` data cleanup migration as `000587`
(renumbered from `000585`; main advanced past that number)
- revert the temporary RBAC tolerance for retired role names now that
the migration strips stale grants
- make the migration test discover its predecessor dynamically, since
this branch does not carry main's `000585`/`000586`

## Stack context

Stacked on #28186, which retires the `agents-access` role but
intentionally ships without a migration so it can be backported across
diverged migration numbers. This layer completes the retirement on main:
it cleans up stale role grants in `users.rbac_roles`,
`organization_members.roles`, and
`organizations.default_org_member_roles`, then reverts the interim
leniency (role expansion dropping legacy names, assignment validation
ignoring them) that existed only to keep the migration-less base safe.
`rbac.ReservedRoleName` still reserves the retired name so custom roles
cannot shadow it on rollback. Do not backport this PR alongside the base
PR.

## Rollback note

The down migration restores effective access broadly because it cannot
reconstruct which users previously held the removed role.

## Validation

- `go build ./coderd/... ./enterprise/...`
- full `coderd/database/migrations`, `coderd/rbac/...`, and
`coderd/database/dbauthz` suites
- targeted members tests in `coderd`
- repository pre-commit checks (`lint/go`, `lint/ts`, etc.)

> Mux created this pull request on Mike's behalf.
2026-08-26 15:29:26 +02:00
Michael Suchacz 845790e652 feat: enable Coder Agents for organization members (#28186)
## Summary

- make Coder Agents available to organization members without a separate
built-in role
- remove the obsolete role from backend and frontend role surfaces
- update authorization, UI, documentation, and regression coverage

## Database note

This PR intentionally ships no migration so it backports cleanly across
diverged migration numbers. Stale `agents-access` grants may remain in
user role arrays and org default member roles; the retired name is
treated as a grant of nothing (role expansion drops it, assignment
validation ignores it, and the name stays reserved). A follow-up PR will
add the data cleanup migration.

## Validation

- `make gen`
- `make lint`
- repository pre-commit checks
- targeted RBAC, migration, chat API, enterprise, site, Storybook, and
race tests
- `git diff --check`

## Rollback note

Rolling back the deployment restores the previous behavior directly: no
data changed, and older binaries still resolve any lingering
`agents-access` grants.

> Mux created this pull request on Mike's behalf.
2026-08-26 13:33:13 +02:00
McKayla はな 29995c9ef8 feat: add a per-template workspace rename setting (#27558) 2026-08-25 11:05:42 -06:00
Garrett Delfosse 7fc9a6e449 fix: revert update on chat messages table (#28552)
Reverts commit a2459f8dda from #28319
("fix(coderd/database): stamp existing vectors simple and match config
explicitly").

Note: #28319 was squash-merged, so this reverts only that commit's diff,
not the entire PR.

This directly edits a migration on main due to issues with the
previously merged migration taking too long on large tables.
2026-08-25 10:14:41 -04:00
Garrett Delfosse 378ac91b49 fix: stem chat search terms with the english text search config (#28319)
Chat message search used the `simple` text search config, which folds
case but does no stemming, so `refactor` did not match messages
containing `refactoring`. Message bodies now index and query with the
`english` config, which stems both sides. Titles, PR titles, and all
other filters are unchanged.

Migration `000585` adds a `chat_messages.search_tsv_config` enum column
recording which config produced each stored vector and stamps existing
vectors `'simple'` (a column-only update; vectors and indexes are
untouched, since rewriting `search_tsv` would block message writes on
large tables). The dbpurge sweep gains a bounded
`ReindexStaleChatMessagesSearchTsv` pass that rewrites stale vectors
newest first and stops for the process lifetime once drained. Until a
row is rewritten, `GetChats` matches it with the config that produced
it, so pre-migration exact-form searches keep working during the drain.
Vectors written by old binaries mid rolling upgrade cannot stamp the
config, stay pending, and self-heal on the next upgraded sweep.
Steady-state DB load is unchanged.

The down migration resets `english` vectors to `NULL` so the parent
version's existing sweep rewrites them with `simple`.

Closes
[CODAGT-867](https://linear.app/codercom/issue/CODAGT-867/backend-search-improvements-to-handle-partial-matches)

<details>
<summary>Decision log</summary>

- **`english` stemming over prefix matching.** On a 300k-row corpus a
stemmed lookup is a single GIN entry-tree probe, while `term:*` prefix
matching unions posting lists of every lexeme sharing the prefix (up to
a full scan for short prefixes), is asymmetric, and loses the
`websearch_to_tsquery` phrase/OR/negation UX. `pg_trgm` rejected as a
heavier index with different semantics.
- **Scope to message bodies only** (review). Titles and PR titles keep
their `simple` FTS expressions and indexes, identical to main.
- **Config-versioned queue over migration-time reset** (review). An
unqualified `UPDATE ... SET search_tsv = NULL` rewrites every indexed
row in the migration transaction, and an old replica could backfill
reset rows with `simple` vectors that permanently leave the `search_tsv
IS NULL` queue. The config column makes staleness explicit and both
problems disappear.
- **Enum over `text`** (review) for the config column.
- **Trade-offs.** English stopwords are dropped from message search
(stopword-only queries match no messages); stemming is English-specific;
titles do not stem; prefix matching remains out of scope.

</details>

---

🤖 This PR was generated by Coder Agents on behalf of @f0ssel.
2026-08-25 09:08:52 -04:00
Jaayden Halko b428c8feb6 feat(coderd): bill completed local tool batches in agent runtime (#28360)
**Stack**: #28359 → **#28360 (this PR)** → #28361 → #28362

## Summary

Completed local tool batches now count toward Coder Agent runtime
(`chat_messages.runtime_ms`, the source of truth for
`hb_agent_runtime_v1`), excluding sub-agent orchestration tools to avoid
double counting, and without multiplying runtime for parallel tool
calls.

Second of a four-PR stack splitting #28211. Stacked on #28359. Refs
CODAGT-928
(https://linear.app/codercom/issue/CODAGT-928/track-local-tool-execution-for-agent-runtime).

## Problem

Agent runtime previously measured only model invocation wall clock
(stream open to fully consumed). Time spent executing local tools
between steps, including file operations, terminal commands, workspace
provisioning, and MCP tools, was deliberately excluded, which
undercounts the product definition of "actively processing a task".

Naive inclusion has two hazards: a batch of parallel tool calls would
bill N windows for one wall-clock wait, and `wait_agent` would re-bill
child agents that already bill their own model and tool time.

## Fix

Each completed local tool batch bills one window: the union of the
billed tools' execution intervals, persisted as `runtime_ms` on a
dedicated usage record appended after the batch's tool-result rows. The
record is a tool-role message with `visibility='model'`, so it never
reaches the API, SSE, or clients, and prompt replay drops it because its
single internal `tool-batch-usage` part converts to no provider content.
Its content carries an audit payload (`billed_ms`, `billed_calls`) so
the billed window is inspectable after the fact; real tool-result rows
never carry batch-level runtime. Concurrent calls all start at batch
start, so 5 parallel 10s reads bill 10s, not 50s; serial calls
(`SerialToolCalls`) count only from their own launch, so unbilled waits
before them do not count.

Sub-agent orchestration tools (`spawn_agent`, `wait_agent`,
`message_agent`, `interrupt_agent`, `list_agents`,
`list_subagent_models`, plus the deprecated `close_agent` alias) never
extend the window: every chat, including children, applies the same
rules to its own runtime, so a parent's `wait_agent` window would double
count. A lone `wait_agent` bills 0 and appends no usage record;
`execute` 10s in parallel with `wait_agent` 60s bills 10s. A test pins
the unbilled set to the registered sub-agent tool catalog so they cannot
drift.

`GetTotalChatMessageRuntimeMsInRange` already sums `runtime_ms`
role-agnostically, so the usage record is picked up with no schema,
query, or cron changes.

Client-executed dynamic tools, external agents, parked/idle time, and
retry backoff remain unbilled. Interrupted batches still bill only the
model window; the rest of the stack adds partial-window billing via the
same usage record.

`ExecuteLocalToolsOptions` also gains an optional `ToolBillingRecorder`
(`RecordStart`/`RecordComplete`) observing per-occurrence dispatch-order
execution stamps. This PR wires no recorder; the next PR in the stack
connects it to the message part buffer for interrupt billing.

**NOTE**: Reported agent runtime (`hb_agent_runtime_v1`) increases from
deploy forward. There is no backfill and no feature flag.
2026-08-25 16:40:41 +07:00
Spike Curtis 6a58d50f1d feat(coderd): add queue-position-free provisioner job query (#28367)
Follow-up to #28302 ([GRU-82](https://linear.app/codercom/issue/GRU-82), [RFC](https://app.notion.com/p/coderhq/Lite-Workspace-API-Requests-3aad579be5928060b5e7cc65c539717f)). That PR added related-data selection but noted that selecting `latest_build.job` still ran the expensive `GetProvisionerJobsByIDsWithQueuePosition` query, which computes queue position and size with window functions over pending jobs and provisioner daemons and is consistently the top resource consumer in scale tests.

This PR adds a cheaper `GetProvisionerJobsByIDs` query that fetches jobs by ID without the queue-position computation, and selects between the two based on whether `latest_build.job.queue_position` is requested. When the queue position is not selected, `QueuePosition` and `QueueSize` are left zero and the rest of the response is unchanged.

Both paths go through a single `provisionerJobsByIDs` API method that takes the `jobRelated` selection, switches on it, and reshapes the cheaper query's rows into `GetProvisionerJobsByIDsWithQueuePositionRow` so downstream conversion is uniform.

The new query has the same dbauthz properties as the queue-position variant (system-level pass-through pending the proper provisioner-job RBAC check tracked in #16160), with a matching authorization test.

No behavior change for existing callers: they select `queue_position` (via `allLatestBuildRelated`), so they continue to use the queue-position query.


---

*Generated by Coder Agents on behalf of @spikecurtis.*
2026-08-24 16:17:55 +02:00
Ethan c275327fb7 feat: audit operational agent settings (#28369)
Depends on #28394.

Audit changes to seven operational agent settings through a typed
`chat_operational_settings` resource. Each handler serializes baseline
capture and mutation with a per-setting advisory lock, keeps both
operations in one transaction, and records field-specific diffs.

Effective no-op requests now skip both the database upsert and the
success audit, including absent rows whose effective value is already
the default. The change also retains the allowlisted raw `site_configs`
query, updates generated audit and API surfaces, adds failure and
concurrency coverage, and reuses the existing AuditPage resource-filter
story pattern.

Relates to CODAGT-720.
2026-08-24 11:53:47 +01:00
Michael SuchaczandEthan Dickson 0ef331fcd0 feat!: scope chat model override settings to organizations (#28442)
Moves chat model override settings from deployment scope to organization
scope, following the org-scoping of chat model configs in #28440.

Depends on #28440 (based on
`ethan/chat-models-availability-consolidation`).

Remote dogfood UAT passed on this change, including multi-organization
scenarios on a licensed deployment with real models.

## Problem

Chat model configs are now owned by organizations, but the override
settings that reference them stayed deployment-wide: admin
subagent/title/compaction overrides in `site_configs`, personal
overrides in `user_configs`, and the advisor model embedded in the
advisor runtime JSON. A single deployment-level override can only point
at one organization's model config, so overrides effectively worked for
the default organization only, and title generation had to soften its
hard-failure contract to tolerate unusable overrides.

## Fix

Admin overrides (general, explore, title generation, compaction,
advisor) and personal overrides (root, general, explore) become
organization-scoped rows in two new typed tables,
`chat_organization_model_overrides` and `chat_user_model_overrides`.
Composite foreign keys on `(organization_id, model_config_id)` make
cross-organization model references unrepresentable. The migration
deletes the legacy serialized `site_configs`/`user_configs` override
keys instead of migrating them; admins and users re-select models in the
new organization-scoped settings.

New endpoints live under
`/api/experimental/organizations/{organization}/chats/model-overrides`
(admin defaults) and
`/api/experimental/organizations/{organization}/members/{user}/chats/model-overrides`
(personal overrides); the legacy deployment-level routes are removed.
chatd resolves overrides via the chat's organization, restoring the
hard-failure contract for configured-but-unusable title generation
overrides. The deployment-level `AllowUsers` switch and advisor runtime
limits stay deployment-scoped.

The Coder Agents settings UI gains a per-organization "Defaults &
overrides" page under AI Settings > Models, and the personal overrides
page gains an organization selector for users in multiple organizations.
Advisor telemetry now reports per-organization override rows.

**BREAKING CHANGE**: Existing deployment-level overrides are dropped,
not migrated. Every organization starts with no overrides after upgrade,
and model selections must be re-applied in the new settings. The legacy
deployment-level override endpoints are removed.

Closes https://linear.app/coder/issue/CODAGT-872

> [!NOTE]
> Xum (AI agent) authored this PR on behalf of @ibetitsmike.

<!-- xum-attribution: model=claude-opus-4-6 thinking=high -->

---------

Co-authored-by: Ethan Dickson <ethan@coder.com>
2026-08-24 11:20:26 +01:00
Ethan aefc761fcf feat!: enforce organization scope for chat models (#27959)
## Summary

Move chat model management and runtime availability to
organization-scoped API routes. The API now identifies the organization
in every model-management operation, applies chat model RBAC and ACLs
within that organization, and returns only models the caller can use
there.

Depends on #27958.

## Problem

Chat model configurations now belong to organizations, but the existing
experimental management and discovery APIs are deployment-shaped. Their
routes do not identify an organization, SDK methods do not accept an
organization ID, and item operations address a model configuration by ID
alone.

That contract cannot safely expose organization-owned model
configurations. It also does not provide the organization-specific
provider information, authorization behavior, ACL management, or
recovery guidance needed by the settings and chat clients later in the
stack.

## Fix

Add organization-scoped chat model endpoints under:

```text
/api/experimental/organizations/{organization}/chats/models
```

The new API provides:

- Organization-scoped model listing and creation.
- Model get, update, and delete operations scoped by both organization
and model ID.
- Model ACL read and update operations.
- Organization-scoped runtime availability and provider status.
- Redacted provider descriptors for model-management clients.
- Chat model RBAC and row ACL enforcement for writes, runtime discovery,
and Chatd model selection.
- Recovery guidance when a chat's organization has no usable local
model.

Historical chats can retain a model reference owned by another
organization, but runtime selection uses an authorized local default
when one is available. Foreign, inaccessible, disabled, and otherwise
unusable models are not exposed as usable selections for the
organization.

The existing collection and availability routes remain as
default-organization compatibility endpoints in this layer:

```text
GET  /api/experimental/chats/model-configs
POST /api/experimental/chats/model-configs
GET  /api/experimental/chats/models
```

These compatibility routes do not provide access to models in
non-default organizations. The previous unscoped item update and delete
routes are removed because item operations must include the owning
organization.

## Breaking change

This changes the experimental HTTP API and Go SDK contracts for chat
model management.

Clients must migrate model-management and availability requests to the
organization-scoped routes and provide an organization identifier. In
the Go SDK, the following methods now require an organization ID:

- `ChatModelAvailability`
- `ChatModels`
- `CreateChatModel`
- `UpdateChatModel`
- `DeleteChatModel`

`ChatModels` also changes its return value from `[]ChatModel` to
`OrganizationChatModelsResponse`, which includes the organization models
and the redacted provider descriptors required by management clients.
New item and ACL methods likewise require both the organization ID and
model ID.

The default-organization compatibility routes reduce the immediate
impact for collection and availability callers, but they do not preserve
the previous item API or SDK method signatures. Generated clients and
direct consumers of the experimental API must be updated before adopting
this change.

_This pull request description was generated by Coder Agents._
2026-08-24 11:20:25 +01:00
Ethan cbe24a3da5 feat: add chat model config RBAC resource (#27957)
Add the `chat_model_config` RBAC resource, actions, and API key scopes.
This layer includes the scope migration and generated API types. Model
list queries apply token scopes, SQL authorization filters, and row
ACLs.

Write and default-management handlers keep deployment configuration
authorization until the next API layer replaces it.

Depends on #27956

_This pull request description was generated by Coder Agents._
2026-08-24 09:43:45 +00:00
Ethan ac41b5b4f9 feat(coderd): include chat model organization IDs in telemetry (#27956)
Include the owning organization ID for each chat model configuration in
telemetry snapshots.

Depends on #27955

_This pull request description was generated by Coder Agents._
2026-08-24 09:43:44 +00:00
Ethan f32592ec6b feat!: scope chat model configs to organizations (#27955)
## Summary

Scope chat model configurations and runtime model resolution to
organizations. Each model configuration now belongs to exactly one
organization, each organization can have its own default model, and
Chatd only uses models that belong to the chat's organization.

Depends on #27968.

## Problem

Chat model configurations are currently deployment-wide even though
chats belong to organizations. A default model, explicitly selected
model, or configured model override can therefore reference the same
model configuration from every organization. This prevents model
catalogs and defaults from being isolated by organization and allows a
chat to retain or select a model that its organization does not own.

Existing model configurations also have no organization ownership or
organization-scoped ACL data, and the database enforces a single live
default across the entire deployment.

## Fix

Add required organization ownership and ACL storage to chat model
configurations. The migration assigns every existing configuration to
the default organization, seeds organization-wide read access, and
replaces the deployment-wide default constraint with a per-organization
constraint.

Scope Chatd lookup, admission, fallback, and queue-promotion behavior to
the chat's organization:

- New chats use the usable default model from their organization.
- Explicit model selections from another organization are rejected.
- Deployment or personal overrides that point to a foreign model are not
used for the chat.
- Historical cross-organization model references remain unchanged in the
database, but runtime generation falls back to a usable local default.
- Queue promotion resolves unavailable, disabled, missing, or foreign
stored models to the usable local default and fails when no usable local
default exists.

The existing model configuration management and availability routes
remain compatibility routes for the default organization in this layer.
A later layer in the stack adds organization-scoped management routes
and updates clients to use them.

## Breaking change

This changes chat model behavior from deployment-wide to
organization-scoped. Existing configurations are migrated only to the
default organization; they are not copied into every organization.

As a result:

- A non-default organization no longer inherits the deployment's
existing default model.
- Creating a chat in an organization without a usable local default
fails with `400: No default chat model config is configured.`
- Explicitly selecting a configuration owned by another organization
fails with `400: Model config does not belong to the specified
organization.`
- Existing chats whose stored model belongs to another organization can
generate only if a usable local default is available; otherwise
generation fails.

Deployments using Agents in non-default organizations must configure a
usable default chat model separately for each organization after the
organization-scoped management layers in this stack are available.

_This pull request description was generated by Coder Agents._
2026-08-24 09:30:01 +00:00
Ethan cd1362abfd fix(coderd): prevent stale chat model config writes (#27968)
Chat model updates could merge PATCH fields from a row read before the
serialized transaction. Deletes could also succeed after another request
deleted the row.

Merge updates from the row read after the write lock. Make soft deletes
report missing rows, and validate provider availability and model
compatibility in the same transaction.

This PR also removes `DeleteChatModelConfigsByAIProviderID`. The query
has no production callers, including the AI provider deletion path, and
only remained in generated database wrappers and mocks. Its removal is
intentional dead-code cleanup and does not change provider deletion
behavior.

_This pull request description was generated by Coder Agents._
2026-08-24 09:30:00 +00:00
McKayla はな 5ca0143992 refactor: upgrade golangci-lint to v2.0.2 (#28416) 2026-08-21 23:46:27 -06:00
Susana Ferreira 363d7fc4d9 feat: add CTAs to AI budget admin notifications (#28138)
## Problem

AI budget admin notifications tell an admin that a user crossed a budget
threshold, but give them nothing to act on: no link to the user's
budget, and no pointer to the docs.

## Changes

- Add a **Manage user AI budget** action to both admin templates,
linking to the effective group's members page filtered to the affected
user, where the per-user override is set.
- Link to the AI budget documentation from both notification bodies.
- Say when the block lifts in the limit-reached notification ("blocked
until `{{period_end}}`").
- Add an `organization_name` label, needed to build the members page
URL.
- Grant the AI Gateway daemon subject read access to organizations,
which the label lookup requires.
- Add an authorization test for the notification path, which also covers
the existing group read grant.

<details>
<summary>Screenshots</summary>

**Admin Notifications in Coder UI**

<img width="456" height="695" alt="admin_notifications"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/a579f91c-55cc-497c-87f4-235f15493725"
/>

**Admin Notification in Email**

<img width="660" height="399" alt="admin_notifications_email"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/39b876fb-f512-41e5-997f-a5269cd26ddc"
/>
</details>

Related to internal Slack threads:
* https://codercom.slack.com/archives/C096PFVBZKN/p1786051630688569
* https://codercom.slack.com/archives/C04M9CNGHGF/p1786453662306149

> [!NOTE]
> Initially generated by Claude Opus 5, modified and reviewed by
@ssncferreira
2026-08-20 14:38:33 +01:00
Susana Ferreira 50ecd6959f feat: add a source filter to the AI model price list (#28329)
## Description

With prices from the price book and prices set through the API both in the table, `list` showed only the price in effect and gave no way to tell where it came from. There was also no way to see the price book's entry for a model that had been overridden, since the listing resolves to the custom price.

This adds a `source` column to the output and a `--source` filter for narrowing to one source, or to every row with `all`.

Note: `--source` selects rows rather than models. A model carrying both a price book price and a custom one appears under either value, so the two filtered listings do not sum to the unfiltered one. `--source all` reports both rows at once.

## Changes

- Add `Source` to `codersdk.AIModelPrice` and `AIModelPricesFilter`, and map it in `db2sdk`, which previously dropped it.
- Filter `GetAIModelPrices` by source before resolution, so the price book's row for an overridden model stays reachable.
- Accept `all` as a source, which reports every price a model holds instead of resolving to one.
- Accept a `source` query parameter on the list endpoint, rejected with a 400 when outside the enum.
- Add `--source` to the list command and a `source` column to its output.
- Document the column and the filter, and lead the price section with `coder exp ai-model-prices list`.
- Distinguish a deployment's default prices from the price book that ships with each release.

Closes https://linear.app/codercom/issue/AIGOV-593

> [!NOTE]
> Initially generated by Claude Opus 5, modified and reviewed by @ssncferreira
2026-08-20 11:56:58 +01:00
Susana Ferreira 9390e51422 feat: distinguish default and custom AI model prices (#28204)
## Description

Prices in `ai_model_prices` come from two places: the price book embedded in each Coder release, and prices set through the experimental CLI (https://github.com/coder/coder/pull/27926). Until now, they were indistinguishable, so the startup seeder re-applied the book over every row, and a price someone set would silently revert on the next restart.

This adds a `source` column with values `default` and `custom`, and keeps a row for each. Readers resolve a model to its custom price when one exists and fall back to the book, including the cost path that prices an interception.

Keeping both rows means the price book stays current underneath an override, so a future delete can restore it.

Note: the endpoint still only accepts models the price book does not cover. Overriding a price the book already carries is handled by the follow-up issue https://linear.app/codercom/issue/AIGOV-594.

## Changes

- Add a migration for the `ai_model_price_source` enum and a `source` column, backfilled to `default` and then `NOT NULL`. `source` joins the primary key, so a model can hold one row per source.
- Take a `source` parameter on `UpsertAIModelPrices`. Each source keeps its own row, so the price book and a custom price never overwrite each other.
- Resolve to the custom price in `GetAIModelPriceByProviderModel` and `GetAIModelPrices`, so both the interception cost snapshot and the list endpoint use it.
- Seed the price book as `default`, and write prices set through the endpoint as `custom`.

Closes https://linear.app/codercom/issue/AIGOV-592

> [!NOTE]
> Initially generated by Claude Opus 5, modified and reviewed by @ssncferreira
2026-08-20 11:36:58 +01:00
McKayla はな 676b9bb06b fix: only create workspace agents for start builds (#28276) 2026-08-19 16:16:51 -06:00
Asher 7ba2e6e22a fix: add distributed protection for external auth refresh (#27479)
Before refreshing, the caller has to put a lease on the row to prevent
any other replicas from trying to refresh using the same token. Callers
unable to get a lease enter a holding pattern waiting for the results.

Also use this same lease query to re-read the link. This more or less
functions the same as the re-read we used to have after a refresh
failure, except it also allows us to avoid making the failed request in
the first place. The downside is that we have to refetch the link every
time even if the caller just fetched it, but since we have to make a
database call to set the lease anyway...
2026-08-19 13:00:31 -08:00
Michael Suchacz a3eb1ee930 fix: gate MCP user tokens on owner-scoped personal RBAC (#27945)
Re-gates every `mcp_server_user_tokens` dbauthz method from
`rbac.ResourceDeploymentConfig` onto owner-scoped personal actions,
mirroring the `external_auth_links` prior art. These are per-user
credential rows, not deployment config, and the old gate forced every
call site to elevate with `dbauthz.AsSystemRestricted`.

## Summary

- Reads gate on `ActionReadPersonal` and writes on
`ActionUpdatePersonal` against the token owner
(`MCPServerUserToken.RBACObject()` derives from `user_id`). The id-keyed
refresh and refresh-failure mutations resolve the owner via a
`GetMCPServerUserTokenByID` prefetch inside dbauthz; the mutation
queries cannot retarget a row's owner, so there is no fetch-authorize
race.
- All seven token-path `AsSystemRestricted` elevations in
`coderd/mcp.go` and all four in chatd are removed along with their
`//nolint:gocritic` markers; handlers use the request actor.
- The daemon-wide chatd subject keeps only `ActionReadPersonal` on
`ResourceUser`. Background token refresh and failure persistence use a
new per-user `AsChatdTokenOwner` subject holding only user-level
`ActionUpdatePersonal` scoped to the token owner (both mutations resolve
the row via the underlying store, so the subject needs no read grant),
and chatd never holds site-wide personal-write access. `TestAsChatd`
pins the complete `ResourceUser` action set and
`TestMCPServerUserTokensAuth` exercises both subjects against the real
authorizer.
- New strict-authorizer test (`rbac.NewAuthorizer` against real rows):
owner passes get/upsert/delete, a stranger fails, and an org admin of
another org fails.

No user-visible behavior change. Stacked on #27944. Completes the MCP
org-separation stack.

Closes https://linear.app/codercom/issue/CODAGT-806

UAT: regression pass on a dogfood instance: OAuth2 connect redirect,
member list/status with redaction, self-scoped disconnect (cannot touch
another user's token), end-to-end chat MCP tool invocation, and
lower-stack audit/ACL smoke checks.

> Mux (AI agent) authored this PR on Mike's behalf.

<!-- mux-attribution: model=claude-fable-5 thinking=high -->
2026-08-19 19:36:59 +00:00
Michael Suchacz 7ca7c30f40 feat: add group and user ACLs to MCP server configs (#27944)
Adds group and user ACLs to org-scoped MCP server configs so
organizations can restrict specific MCP servers to subsets of members,
mirroring the template ACL pattern.

## Summary

- Migration adds `group_acl`/`user_acl` JSONB columns (nested `{"<id>":
{"permissions": [...]}}` shape) and seeds every existing config with its
organization's Everyone group read entry (the Everyone group ID equals
the org ID), so member access is unchanged by default. Creation seeds
the same entry.
- The blanket org-member read grant from the base PR is replaced by ACL
evaluation: Rego requires org membership for every ACL grant, and
`GetAuthorizedMCPServerConfigs` compiles ACL-aware SQL filters.
- New `ActionShare` (org admins) gates `GET|PATCH
/api/experimental/organizations/{organization}/mcp-servers/{mcpserverconfig}/acl`
(nested under the organization like the rest of the config surface).
PATCH validates principals against the config's organization, merges
sparse updates under a row lock, stamps `updated_by`/`updated_at`, and
is audited as a Write with `Old` captured before authorization. A config
deleted concurrently between the middleware fetch and the locked
re-fetch is concealed as 404, matching the update and delete handlers.
ACL columns are tracked in the audit table.
- ACL management is available in all editions (no enterprise
entitlement), documented in the MCP servers page. Revoking an ACL does
not retro-strip already-selected configs from existing chats; new
selection is blocked at chat create.
- Force On respects the ACL: the forced set is loaded as the chat owner,
so a `force_on` server whose ACL denies the owner never attaches at
create, send, or generation time.
- No rolling-upgrade machinery: upgrades run in scheduled maintenance
downtime, so the migration only backfills existing rows; the API sets
the Everyone read grant explicitly on every insert.

Stacked on #27943. Part of the MCP org-separation stack.

Closes https://linear.app/codercom/issue/CODAGT-712

UAT: verified on a dogfood instance with two members and a custom group:
Everyone-seed default visibility, group grant with Everyone removal
(non-member loses list/fetch/selection), foreign-principal rejection,
non-admin share denial (audited 403 / concealed 404), user_acl restore,
and audited ACL diffs.

> Mux (AI agent) authored this PR on Mike's behalf.

<!-- mux-attribution: model=claude-fable-5 thinking=high -->
2026-08-19 19:25:18 +00:00
Michael Suchacz 299e72ad30 feat: audit MCP server config changes (#27943)
Adds enterprise audit logging for MCP server config create, update, and
delete, with strict secret redaction. MCP configs hold credentials
(OAuth2 client secrets, API keys, custom headers), so admin changes to
them need an audit trail.

## Summary

- `enterprise/audit/table.go` gains an `MCPServerConfig` entry
enumerating every column: `oauth2_client_secret`, `api_key_value`, and
`custom_headers` are `ActionSecret` (never appear in diffs); dbcrypt
`*_key_id` bookkeeping, IDs, and timestamps are ignored; the remaining
config fields, including the endpoint URL fields, are tracked so
auditors can see which endpoints a config points at.
- Type registration in `coderd/audit` (diff, request, resource target
with org attribution), `codersdk/audit.go`, and a `resource_type` enum
migration.
- Handlers wire `audit.InitRequest`: create records `New`; update and
delete record `Old` from the param middleware before the
write-authorization check, so a readable-but-not-writable caller
produces an audited 403 while read-denied callers stay concealed as
unaudited 404s.
- Tests: create/update/delete audit entries, write-denied and
delete-denied 403 auditing, cross-org concealment producing zero
entries, and a serializer-level regression test proving none of the
three secret classes can reach a serialized diff.
- Review round: MCP config audit entries link to
`/ai/settings/mcp-servers/{id}`, audit table comments are trimmed per
review, and a fault-injection test pins that a config row surviving a
failed post-discovery credential update still gets its creation audit
entry.

Stacked on #27942 (org-scoped MCP configs). Part of the MCP
org-separation stack.

Closes https://linear.app/codercom/issue/CODAGT-717

UAT: verified on a trial-licensed dogfood instance: audit entries for
the full CRUD lifecycle with correct actor/org/target, redacted secrets
in the update and OAuth2 create diffs, and a full plaintext scan of the
audit dump finding zero secret leaks.

> Mux (AI agent) authored this PR on Mike's behalf.

<!-- mux-attribution: model=claude-fable-5 thinking=high -->
2026-08-19 19:11:52 +00:00
Michael SuchaczandMathias Fredriksson 443e3b9b80 feat!: org-scope MCP server configs with RBAC (#27942)
Moves `mcp_server_configs` from deployment scope to organization scope
so each organization fully controls the MCP servers its members can use
with Coder Agents.

## Summary

- Migration: adds `organization_id` (NOT NULL, FK) and keeps existing
rows as the default organization's originals with credentials intact.
Other organizations start with no MCP servers and configure their own;
nothing is copied across organizations. Chats outside the default
organization keep any now-cross-organization `mcp_server_ids` entries;
the runtime already ignores IDs that do not resolve in the chat's
organization, so no data rewrite is needed. Slug uniqueness becomes
`(organization_id, slug)`.
- RBAC: new org-scoped `ResourceMCPServerConfig` with regosql converter
and `GetAuthorizedMCPServerConfigs`; org admins get in-org CRUD, org
members get read (replaced by ACL evaluation in the follow-up ACL PR in
this stack).
- API: all config routes nest under the organization, matching
templates: `POST|GET
/api/experimental/organizations/{organization}/mcp-servers` and
`GET|PATCH|DELETE .../mcp-servers/{mcpserverconfig}` (plus
`oauth2/connect`), resolved by a read-only param middleware that
conceals read-denied and cross-organization access as 404. Two routes
stay on the frozen `/api/experimental/mcp/servers/{mcpServer}` block:
the OAuth2 callback (the redirect URI baked into existing AS-side client
registrations) and `oauth2/disconnect`, which must remain reachable by
users removed from the organization so they can still revoke their token
grant.
- Chat runtime: selection validation and generation resolve configs
strictly by IDs, enabled state, and the chat's organization in SQL;
requested duplicates are normalized; invalid or cross-org IDs are
rejected with the precise ID list. IDs already persisted on a chat are
exempt from message-time rejection so disabling a selected server never
blocks sends; generation skips servers that are no longer usable.
- Frontend: API layer and admin settings pages target the new endpoints.
The admin page manages the default organization's servers; the org
picker is tracked separately (CODAGT-714).

- Security hardening from review: OAuth user grants are additionally
bound to `oauth2_revocation_url` (changing it invalidates grants, and a
racing OAuth callback gets 409 instead of recreating a grant).
Stack-wide SSRF protection for MCP config-directed traffic was split
into its own PR at the top of this stack (#28242) to keep this diff
reviewable; this PR keeps main's existing discovery IP-range guard.
OAuth2 auto-discovery now completes before the config row is inserted: a
failed discovery persists nothing, and there is no provisional row that
concurrent updates could race against.

Two follow-up PRs in this stack were split out to keep this diff
reviewable: #28064 completes the swagger annotations for the moved
routes (main already ships these experimental MCP handlers unannotated),
and #28065 carries hardening fixes and regression pins on top of the
cutover.

- Force On enforcement (landed on main mid-review) is org-scoped: the
forced set is read per chat organization
(`GetForcedMCPServerConfigsByOrganization`), so another organization's
`force_on` server never attaches to a chat.

## Breaking changes (experimental API)

The MCP server config endpoints move from the deployment-scoped
`/api/experimental/mcp/servers` block to organization-nested paths:
`POST|GET /api/experimental/organizations/{organization}/mcp-servers`
and `GET|PATCH|DELETE
/api/experimental/organizations/{organization}/mcp-servers/{mcpserverconfig}`
(plus `oauth2/connect`). The old paths are removed, so API consumers
must supply an organization. Two routes intentionally stay on the frozen
`/api/experimental/mcp/servers/{mcpServer}` block: the OAuth2 callback
(its redirect URI is baked into existing AS-side client registrations)
and `oauth2/disconnect` (must remain reachable by users removed from the
organization). These endpoints are under `/api/experimental`, so no
deprecation window is provided.

## Rolling upgrades

During a rolling deploy, an old replica creating an MCP config can fail
the new `NOT NULL organization_id` constraint until it is upgraded
(reads are unaffected: old binaries' generated queries select their own
column lists). This matches the repo's existing precedent for additive
NOT NULL migrations (000562) and affects only the admin config-create
path in the upgrade window.

Upgrades are expected to run in scheduled maintenance downtime with the
database locked during migration, so the migration ships no
rolling-upgrade compatibility machinery. The down migration deletes
organization-created configs (their chat references are cleaned by the
000510 delete trigger) and restores deployment-wide slug uniqueness.

Part of the MCP org-separation stack (CODAGT-711 -> CODAGT-717 audit ->
CODAGT-712 ACLs -> CODAGT-806 token RBAC).

Closes https://linear.app/codercom/issue/CODAGT-711

UAT: validated end to end on a two-org dogfood deployment, including a
real pre-migration to post-migration upgrade, cross-org isolation
(404s), same-slug-two-orgs, chat selection gating, and a live MCP tool
call through the org-scoped generation path. The migration was later
revised to keep existing rows in the default organization only (no
per-organization copies); that revision is covered by the migration test
suite.

> Mux (AI agent) authored this PR on Mike's behalf.

<!-- mux-attribution: model=claude-fable-5 thinking=high -->

---------

Co-authored-by: Mathias Fredriksson <mafredri@gmail.com>
2026-08-19 18:04:13 +00:00
Bobby Ho 663f41ffa9 feat: derive OAuth2 client type from token_endpoint_auth_method (#28043)
Adds an OAuth2 client type (public vs confidential, RFC 7591 §2) derived
from the requested auth method instead of hardcoded confidential. The
type is stored and guarded here, but no endpoint enforces on it yet;
public behavior at the token endpoint follows in the next PR in the
stack.

- Client type is derived once and reused by both registration and
redirect URI validation, so they can't disagree
- IsPublic() fails closed: an unrecognized or missing value reads as
confidential
- RFC 7592 update (PUT) now rejects moving a client between public and
confidential (400) instead of silently flipping it when the auth method
is omitted
- Discovery still doesn't advertise "none"; follows once the token
endpoint honors it

### Behavior by client shape

`client_type` is derived from `token_endpoint_auth_method` at POST and
pinned at PUT. RFC 7592 GET/PUT authenticate with the registration
access token, not the client secret, so neither endpoint reads a secret.

| Registered with | Stored `client_type` / method | GET reports | PUT
that flips the method |

|------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------------------------|
| omitted, or `client_secret_basic` | `confidential` /
`client_secret_basic` | `client_secret_basic` | `none` → 400
`invalid_client_metadata` |
| `none` (new) | `public` / `none` | `none` | `client_secret_*` → 400
`invalid_client_metadata` |
| `none` (before this PR) | `confidential` / `none` | `none` | either →
200, type stays `confidential` |

- PUT still replaces every other RFC 7591 field. `client_type` is the
only pinned one; the method may move within a type
(`client_secret_basic` ↔ `client_secret_post`).
- Row 3 is the only shape where the two columns disagree. The guard
fires only on a method change that crosses the type line, so those
clients keep managing themselves instead of being locked out of their
own configuration endpoint.
- The token endpoint does not consult `client_type` yet, so every client
still authenticates with a secret and registration still issues one.

Split out of #27873, second in the stack (on top of #28041).
Refs
https://linear.app/codercom/issue/ENG-3029/oauth2-support-public-client
2026-08-18 21:12:44 -07:00
Mathias FredrikssonandMichael Suchacz d3f08b1983 feat: audit chat system instructions changes (#27668)
Adds an audit record for administrative events on the deployment-wide
chat instruction settings (system prompt, the include-default toggle,
and the plan-mode instructions), per CODAGT-719 and operator decision
D5. Each endpoint records under a stable identity: resource type
`chat_instruction_settings`, a fixed resource ID and a human-readable
target ("System prompt", "Plan mode instructions"), so two changes to
one setting share an ID and history-by-setting works. A real change
exports a Write entry with the old-to-new text visible; a
value-identical PUT still upserts and still returns 204 but records
nothing.

Attempts are recorded, not only transitions. Identity is assigned before
the authorization check, so a denied PUT exports a 403 row with an empty
diff (no request content reaches it), a validation failure exports a 400
row, and a write failure exports a 500 row, each with an empty diff; an
operator can tell "nothing changed" from "something changed and capture
degraded" by the status code.

The write path stays authoritative. The advisory lock and, on plan-mode,
the transaction exist only to serve change-detection; if any of that
machinery fails (lock, begin, commit, rollback), the handler runs main's
idempotent write path directly and derives the response from it, so a
member-visible failure of audit-only infrastructure can never replace
main's successful response. Accepted consequence: when the lock cannot
be taken, two concurrent identical writes can produce two rows instead
of one. That is audit degradation, which is allowed; changing a member's
response is not. Write failures keep the exact response the endpoint
produced before this wiring (transaction error for the system prompt,
which was always transactional; the raw write error for plan mode, which
was not), and the full transaction error is logged so rollback failures
cannot vanish.

<details>
<summary>CODAGT-66 plan entry: S1 (verbatim)</summary>

**S1 `feat: audit chat system instructions changes`** (CODAGT-719; base:
main)

- Struct: `database.ChatSystemPromptSettings{ID uuid.UUID; SystemPrompt
string; IncludeDefaultSystemPrompt bool; PlanModeInstructions string}`
in `coderd/database/types.go` (ticket-sketched shape; one struct, both
endpoints).
- Registration: union entry (diff.go), table.go entry (`id`
ActionIgnore, other three ActionTrack), `AuditActionMap` Write-only;
four request.go cases (`ResourceTarget` "", `ResourceID` from struct,
`ResourceType` new enum value `chat_system_prompt_settings`,
`ResourceRequiresOrgID` false with the "Artificial ID / deployment
singleton" comment convention).
- Migration: `ALTER TYPE resource_type ADD VALUE IF NOT EXISTS
'chat_system_prompt_settings';` comment-only no-op down (000558 shape);
number picked at push per the numbering constraint.
- codersdk: constant + prose `FriendlyString` ("chat system prompt
settings"); `TestAuditDBEnumsCovered` forces both. `coderd/audit.go`
presentation switches: rely on safe defaults (no link, generic
description); no FE changes (filter label falls back to capitalized
value; acceptable per precedent).
- Wiring `putChatSystemPrompt` and `putChatPlanModeInstructions`:
InitRequest with Action Write; artificial `ID: uuid.New()` on `New` only
when a change is detected; no-op suppression by leaving both aReq sides
unset (nil resource IDs skip the log, request.go skip rule); the write
path itself stays byte-identical (upserts still run unconditionally).
- `putChatSystemPrompt` (writes two keys conditionally in one existing
tx): inside that tx, read the pair via `GetChatSystemPromptConfig` for
`Old`, perform the conditional writes exactly as today, then RE-READ the
pair for `New`. The re-read is load-bearing:
`include_default_system_prompt` is computed from the toggle row AND the
prompt, so a prompt-only write can flip the effective value without the
request carrying the pointer. `PlanModeInstructions` stays zero on both
sides.
- `putChatPlanModeInstructions` (no tx exists today): wrap its
read-upsert in `InTx` (behavior-preserving: same single write);
`Old`/`New` populate only `PlanModeInstructions`; the two system-prompt
fields stay zero on both sides; no cross-key reads.
- Change detection compares the populated payload fields only (never the
artificial ID).
- Tests: handler-level coderdtest with `audit.NewMock()` asserting Write
entry on change and NO entry on a value-identical PUT, for both
endpoints (this also exercises `ResourceRequiresOrgID` end to end); the
fallback-flip case (no explicit include-default row, nonempty prompt set
to empty, effective boolean flips: entry emitted with the boolean diff);
diff assertions (old->new prompt text tracked, not secret) in
`enterprise/audit/diff_internal_test.go`; `TestAuditableResources`
passes by construction.
- Bookkeeping at PR open: correct CODAGT-719's no-op premise ("matches
the existing 204-on-unchanged behavior" does not exist on main;
suppression is new, write path unchanged).
- Review focus: Old capture and the New re-read inside the tx (three of
four existing singletons never set Old; do not copy them; and the
computed include-default value makes a naive New construction wrong);
the skip-on-no-op mechanism; prompt text deliberately visible in diffs.

</details>

Note: the plan excerpt above predates operator decision D5 (2026-07-30),
which this PR implements: the resource type is
`chat_instruction_settings` (not `chat_system_prompt_settings`), each
setting carries a stable ID and a display-name target (not a per-write
artificial ID and an empty target), no-op suppression runs through
`InitRequestWithCancel` (not the nil-ID skip), and attempts (denied,
failed, capture-degraded) record rows with real statuses and empty
diffs. Ticket bookkeeping for CODAGT-719 was corrected on Linear at
kickoff: the ticket's "matches the existing 204-on-unchanged behavior"
premise does not exist on main; suppression is new, and the write path
is unchanged.

> 🤖 This PR was created with the help of Coder Agents, and _will be_
reviewed by a human. 🏂🏻

---------

Co-authored-by: Michael Suchacz <203725896+ibetitsmike@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-08-18 20:03:06 +02:00
Michael Suchacz affeeaf9c8 feat: extend agent chat MCP tools for remote UAT evidence loops (#28233)
Extends the Agent-chat MCP tools so an unattended UAT evidence loop can
fetch artifacts, monitor long runs, and find prior runs without burning
model context.

## Backend

- New `chat_files_token` crypto key feature (migration 000571) with
rotator support and a dedicated signing keycache on coderd.
- `POST /api/experimental/chats/files/{file}/download-url`
(authenticated) mints a short-lived (5 min) signed URL and returns it
with `sha256`, `size_bytes`, `name`, `mime_type`, and `expires_at`.
- `GET /api/experimental/chats/files/{file}/download?token=` (no session
token) redeems the signed URL: verifies the JWS, requires the token's
`file_id` to match the path, and re-checks the minting user's RBAC
access live at redemption. Clients can `curl -o` artifacts with zero
credentials in the URL consumer.
- `ChatFileMetadata` gains `size_bytes` (via `octet_length`, no bytes
fetched).

## MCP tools (`codersdk/toolsdk`)

- `coder_download_chat_file`: by `file_id` or `chat_id`+`file_name`;
returns the signed URL plus checksum and size instead of base64.
- `coder_await_chat`: blocks (bounded `wait_secs`, 1-120) until a chat
leaves `running`/`interrupting`, using the existing watch stream with
subscribe-before-read.
- `coder_list_chats`: label, query, and limit filtering; chat
projections now include labels.
- `coder_get_chat_messages`: `after_id` forward cursor with
`next_after_id` (exact incremental reads), plus per-message `files`
metadata so artifact-bearing messages are identifiable.
- `coder_get_chat`: file listings now include `size_bytes` and
`created_at`.
- `coder_list_templates`: exposes `agents_allowed` for pre-flight
checks.

## Testing

- coderd: mint/redeem happy path with an unauthenticated client,
expired/tampered/file-mismatched tokens, auth still required on the
plain file endpoint, non-owner mint rejection.
- toolsdk: harness + integration coverage for all new/changed tools,
including signed-URL redemption with checksum verification,
forward-cursor exactness, await transition/timeout paths, and label
filtering.
- Remote dogfood UAT (dev.coder.com Coder Agent) passed all six
acceptance scenarios end to end over both MCP transports.

Note: `go test ./codersdk/toolsdk/` has a pre-existing goleak flake on
main (leaked `agentssh` non-PTY session goroutines from SSH exec tests;
reproduced 3/3 on clean `b4971bc49f1`). It is unrelated to this diff.

> Mux acted on Mike's behalf to create this PR.

<!-- mux-attribution: model=claude-sonnet-4-6 thinking=high -->
2026-08-18 19:15:30 +02:00
Michael Suchacz 119f2b1dd9 feat: limit concurrent chat agents with pooled admission (#27902)
Limits concurrent chat generation on capped deployments to 5 root chats
and 10 delegated subagent chats. The pools are deployment-wide and
independent, so delegated work can continue while root capacity is full.

The default caps live in AGPL code. Enterprise contributes only a
licensing unlock, so unlicensed deployments stay capped and cannot fail
open. Licensed deployments are uncapped while Agent Hours usage stays
below an explicit hard limit. Deployments without a hard limit remain
uncapped, and reaching the Agent Hours allocation only triggers
warnings.

Admission happens before a worker takes chat ownership. Capped
deployments serialize admission across replicas with a
transaction-scoped advisory lock and derive active and queued state from
current ownership plus fresh runner heartbeats, rather than persisted
queue markers or per-replica state. The acquisition query returns a
bounded, pool-interleaved candidate set instead of ranking the whole
backlog; a migration replaces the acquisition index with a pool-aware
one. Refused chats stay running but unowned, and interrupt requests
bypass admission so users can stop queued or over-cap chats.

The single-chat API derives `queued_for_capacity` from live pool state;
list endpoints do not report it. The UI polls that value every 5 seconds
while a chat is running and shows a callout when the chat is waiting for
capacity.

Updates the administrator documentation and deployment-wide Prometheus
gauges for active and queued agents. Replica-level values must be
aggregated with `max`, not `sum`.

> Mux updated this PR on Mike's behalf.
2026-08-18 16:55:43 +02:00
Jaayden Halko fa8ffe4eda feat: report agent runtime hours usage in entitlements (#27985)
Populate `FeatureAgentRuntimeHours.Actual` on every entitlements refresh
for licenses that grant the feature. A new
`GetTotalUsageHBAgentRuntimeV1` query sums `runtime_ms` over the
license's usage period, reading `usage_events` directly:
`hb_agent_runtime_v1` is exactly one row per hourly bucket
deployment-wide with `created_at` at the bucket start, enforced by the
unique partial index introduced in #27983.

The measurement reuses the shared `measureUsage` policy from #27984
through a new `AgentRuntimeMsFn` closure (usage publisher subject):
failures publish the stable
`LicenseAgentRuntimeUsageUnavailableErrorText` and log the cause. Usage
is floored to whole hours, matching the unit of the
`agent_runtime_hours_*` claims, and at most one warning is emitted per
refresh: reaching the allocation supersedes the advisory soft limit. The
dashboard renders the soft-limit advisory muted without a sales link and
treats the runtime usage-unavailable text as a diagnostic.

**Precise usage.** `Feature.ActualMs` (JSON `actual_ms`), set only for
`agent_runtime_hours`, carries the exact stored milliseconds backing the
floored `Actual` so clients can render fractional hours (e.g. `10.3`).
It has the same freshness as `Actual`; the whole-hour warning thresholds
are unchanged.

**Unlimited licenses.** A license minted with the unlimited (`-1`)
allocation decodes to an enabled feature with a nil `Limit` (#27984), so
the warning write-back now guards the allocation dereference: no
thresholds can exist for an unlimited license, so no runtime hours
warning is ever emitted, while `Actual` is still measured and published.
`Feature.Compare` is unchanged; for usage-period features the
issued-at/end dates decide first, so a metered feature outranks an
unlimited one only on an exact timestamp tie, an edge pinned by a
`TestFeatureComparison` case and documented on
`decodeAgentRuntimeHours`.

**Grandfathered premium licenses.** Premium licenses without
`agent_runtime_hours_*` claims are now granted the feature disabled with
a zero limit over the license term, identical to an explicit
`allocation: 0`: usage is measured and published for every Premium
deployment, and chatd's pooled admission (#27902) caps concurrent
agentic chats until a license with a positive allocation is added. The
default carries a fixed early `UsagePeriod.IssuedAt` (2026-08-01, the
same mechanism as the managed-agents default) so any license actually
carrying the claims outranks it in the `AddFeature` merge regardless of
the licenses' relative issue dates; the constant must stay earlier than
the earliest legitimately issued claim-bearing license. Zero allocations
(explicit or grandfathered) emit no deployment-wide warning banner:
those deployments are steered by the in-page upgrade CTA and the
concurrency cap. Enterprise licenses are unchanged.

Part 3 of a 3-PR stack splitting up #27796 (see there for review
history). Stack: #27983 → #27984 → this PR.

Closes CODAGT-852.
2026-08-18 12:40:33 +07:00
Jaayden Halko 20c376a575 fix: enforce uniqueness and hour alignment for agent runtime usage events (#27983)
The usage generator writes `hb_agent_runtime_v1` rows with `created_at`
at the UTC hourly bucket start and exactly one row per bucket, but
nothing in the schema enforced either invariant. A duplicate bucket row
under a different id would be double-counted by any consumer summing
`runtime_ms`, and a misaligned `created_at` would skew which usage
period a bucket is attributed to.

This replaces the non-unique partial index
`idx_usage_events_agent_runtime` (from migration 000561) with a unique
index of the same shape and adds an hour-alignment `CHECK` constraint.
Both statements validate existing rows: every supported writer has
always produced conforming data, so a pre-existing violator is anomalous
and failing the migration loudly beats silently rewriting usage rows.
`generateBucket` treats a unique violation on the bucket index as
another replica having won the race, mirroring the existing `ON CONFLICT
(id)` no-op for committed rows.

The `coderd/notifications` sync commit and its revert cancel out (the
drift they addressed was fixed on main by #27979); the PR's net diff is
only the usage-event changes.

Part 1 of a 3-PR stack splitting up #27796 (see there for review
history). Stack: this PR → #27984 → #27985.
2026-08-17 16:23:45 +07:00