## Summary
Adds the missing user-facing half of MCP server config ACLs: admins can
now share an MCP server with individual users and groups from the UI,
backed by a new permission-safe candidate-discovery endpoint.
## Problem
The MCP server config ACL backend already existed (share RBAC action,
hydrated `GET .../acl`, sparse `PATCH .../acl`), but there was no
frontend for it. There was also no way to populate a sharing
autocomplete without the generic organization member/group APIs, which
require `organization_member:read` and `group:read` and would wrongly
couple MCP sharing to the workspace-sharing mode (the same bug fixed for
chat models in #28542).
## Changes
Backend:
- New v2-only `GET
/api/v2/organizations/{organization}/mcp-servers/{mcpserverconfig}/acl/available`
returning `codersdk.ACLAvailable`; because this API is new, it is not
mounted under the experimental compatibility prefix. Gated on
`ActionShare` for the specific server config; performs bounded
org-scoped member/group lookups via `dbauthz.AsSystemRestricted`;
excludes system users; supports `q`, `limit`, `offset`, and `after_id`
with template/chat-model autocomplete semantics.
- Tests cover authorization (404 without share), search, pagination,
system-user exclusion, org scoping, and a share-only custom role under
all three workspace-sharing modes (`none`, `service_accounts`,
`everyone`).
Frontend:
- `shareMCPServerConfig` permission plumbing; the MCP servers list,
details page, and AI settings sidebar now admit share-only users (share
does not require update; share-only users cannot edit the server form).
- Share-only access follows the established permission contract: a
bare-share role manages sharing through the list and ACL endpoints (the
detail route still requires read, update, or delete, matching the
existing enterprise permission-matrix tests), and the disabled-config
gate now also admits the share permission so a sharer with read access
can open a disabled server. Top-level navigation (Admin settings menu
and the /ai/settings index redirect) discovers organization-level MCP
sharers and surfaces permission lookup failures instead of silently
falling back.
- "Share server" action on the MCP server edit page opening a sharing
dialog: hydrated ACL grants render from the `GET .../acl` response,
adds/removals are saved as sparse `PATCH` deltas (`"read"` / `""`).
- Principal autocomplete backed exclusively by the new `/acl/available`
endpoint; the sharing flow never calls the generic org member/group APIs
(Storybook enforces this by rejecting those API spies). A discovery
error surfaces under the autocomplete without hiding existing grants.
- Storybook interaction coverage for the dialog (hydrated rendering,
add/remove, sparse deltas, error/cancel/reopen paths, autocomplete
exclusion and failure) and share-only access to the page/form.
Dogfood UAT ran remotely against a dev instance and passed, including
verifying via the network log that candidate discovery only hits
`/acl/available`. The share-only custom role UI flow could not be
exercised there (no premium license on the dev instance); it is covered
by the backend permission-matrix tests.
> 🤖 This PR was authored by Xum (an AI coding agent) acting on Mike's
behalf.
## Stack context
This is the base of a 3-PR stack promoting the chat API from
`/api/experimental` to `/api/v2`: server compatibility mounts (this PR),
codersdk promotion (#28497), and frontend path updates (#28498).
## Summary
Double-mount the stable chat and MCP handlers under `/api/v2` while
retaining the existing experimental routes for the one-release
compatibility window decided in CODAGT-921. CODAGT-922 tracks removing
the compatibility mounts.
The shared route builders preserve existing authentication and
middleware behavior. Experiment-gated, debug, tombstone, and legacy
default-organization model routes remain experimental-only. Signed file
URLs, external OAuth callback URLs, and mixed-version replica relays
also remain on the experimental prefix during the transition.
Update Swagger and the generated API reference for the promoted routes,
including the workspace lookup and a runnable raw-body chat file upload
example. Retain internal endpoints outside the published reference,
share chat-file rate limits across both prefixes, enable CORS for the v2
MCP routes, and cover dual mounts plus exclusions with compatibility
tests. Remote dogfood UAT passed for the promoted chat, model, MCP, and
file flows.
> [!NOTE]
> Xum acted on Mike's behalf in this pull request.
<!-- xum-attribution: model=claude-fable-5 thinking=high -->
Adds group and user ACLs to org-scoped MCP server configs so
organizations can restrict specific MCP servers to subsets of members,
mirroring the template ACL pattern.
## Summary
- Migration adds `group_acl`/`user_acl` JSONB columns (nested `{"<id>":
{"permissions": [...]}}` shape) and seeds every existing config with its
organization's Everyone group read entry (the Everyone group ID equals
the org ID), so member access is unchanged by default. Creation seeds
the same entry.
- The blanket org-member read grant from the base PR is replaced by ACL
evaluation: Rego requires org membership for every ACL grant, and
`GetAuthorizedMCPServerConfigs` compiles ACL-aware SQL filters.
- New `ActionShare` (org admins) gates `GET|PATCH
/api/experimental/organizations/{organization}/mcp-servers/{mcpserverconfig}/acl`
(nested under the organization like the rest of the config surface).
PATCH validates principals against the config's organization, merges
sparse updates under a row lock, stamps `updated_by`/`updated_at`, and
is audited as a Write with `Old` captured before authorization. A config
deleted concurrently between the middleware fetch and the locked
re-fetch is concealed as 404, matching the update and delete handlers.
ACL columns are tracked in the audit table.
- ACL management is available in all editions (no enterprise
entitlement), documented in the MCP servers page. Revoking an ACL does
not retro-strip already-selected configs from existing chats; new
selection is blocked at chat create.
- Force On respects the ACL: the forced set is loaded as the chat owner,
so a `force_on` server whose ACL denies the owner never attaches at
create, send, or generation time.
- No rolling-upgrade machinery: upgrades run in scheduled maintenance
downtime, so the migration only backfills existing rows; the API sets
the Everyone read grant explicitly on every insert.
Stacked on #27943. Part of the MCP org-separation stack.
Closes https://linear.app/codercom/issue/CODAGT-712
UAT: verified on a dogfood instance with two members and a custom group:
Everyone-seed default visibility, group grant with Everyone removal
(non-member loses list/fetch/selection), foreign-principal rejection,
non-admin share denial (audited 403 / concealed 404), user_acl restore,
and audited ACL diffs.
> Mux (AI agent) authored this PR on Mike's behalf.
<!-- mux-attribution: model=claude-fable-5 thinking=high -->