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07f9018c61 feat: re-check the app allowlist at OAuth2 code redemption (#28740)
**TL;DR**

Second of the PLAT-480 stack. #28237 made the negotiated scope bound the
issued token; this PR makes a narrowing of an app's registered scopes
apply to codes that were already issued.

| PR | What it does |
|---|---|
| #28237 (merged) | Mints access tokens with the negotiated scope, so a
grant for one scope stops behaving as full access, and reports the
granted scope per RFC 6749 §5.1. |
| **#28740 (this)** | Re-checks the code's scope against the app's
registered scopes at redemption, closing the ten minute window in which
a narrowing was ignored. |
| #28744 | Makes code redemption single-use under concurrency. Carries
no scope logic and is independent of this PR. |

- #28237 has merged, so this targets main.
- No new endpoints and no schema change.

---

An authorization code is valid for ten minutes, and its scope is checked
against the app's registered scopes exactly once, when the code is
issued. A registration narrowed inside that window had the narrowing
ignored: the code still redeemed for a token carrying the wider scope.

- The token exchange re-checks the code's scope against the registration
as it stands at redemption and refuses with `invalid_grant`. RFC 6749
§5.2 reserves `invalid_scope` for the scope the client asked for, and
this one comes from the stored grant.
- The check is coverage rather than membership, and reuses the
comparison the authorize endpoint already runs. That comparison now goes
through a new `rbac.FirstScopeNotCovered`, which expands the allowlist
once rather than once per granted scope.
- Only the client can change its registered `scope`, through RFC 7592;
no administrator surface writes the column. The re-check reflects the
registration at redemption rather than constraining the client.
- Refresh keeps the scope originally granted. That is a product choice,
not an RFC requirement: a narrowing applies at the next authorization
rather than mid-session, so tightening an app's scopes does not break
integrations already running.
- Codes issued before migration 000569 carry `coder:all`. For an app
registered with a narrower `scope` those are refused at redemption until
they expire, at most ten minutes.

Stack: #28237 (merged), this PR, #28744.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Steven Masley <Emyrk@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-03 18:29:11 -07:00
68ca033d67 fix: deliver the rest of the invalid_request class to the client (#28736)
**TL;DR**

Fifth of the stack, split out of #28045. #28450 delivered the errors
raised *after* the callback is trusted and left the parameter failures
behind. This PR delivers those, and replaces the implicit ordering that
decided where an answer went with an explicit classification.

| PR | What it does |
|---|---|
| #28007 | Schema: `codes.scope` and `tokens.scope`, so a negotiated
scope has somewhere to live. |
| #28167 | `ScopesCover` compares an allowlist against a request by
permission coverage rather than by name. |
| #28178 | The authorize endpoint negotiates the scope against the app's
allowlist and persists it on the code. |
| #28179 | The consent page lists the negotiated permissions, and
`invalid_scope` reaches the client's callback. |
| #28450 | The same delivery for every other error raised once the
callback is trusted. |
| **#28736 (this)** | The parameter failures #28450 left behind, and the
classification that decides where each answer goes. |

- Stacked on #28450. Review that first.
- Nothing about what a token can do changes here. This is delivery, not
enforcement.

**Contract change**

A rejected parameter now arrives at the app's registered callback with
`error=invalid_request`, a description naming every failing field, and
the request's `state`. Both verbs.

| Verb | Was |
|---|---|
| GET | static "Invalid Query Parameters" page, 400 |
| POST | `WriteOAuth2Error`, 400 |

An integrator watching for either now reads the error from its own
callback instead.

**Two failures still answer on Coder**, because in neither case is the
callback trustworthy yet:

- A `redirect_uri` that does not parse, or does not exactly match the
registration. Redirecting to it would defeat the check that just
rejected it.
- A `client_id` sent more than once, or naming something other than the
app the callback was matched against. Coder cannot tell whose
registration it is about to redirect to.

An absent query `client_id` is **not** in that group. `httpmw` also
reads the POST form body and the §2.3.1 Basic credential, so an absent
query parameter still names a client and its failure is deliverable.

**Precedence change.** An app whose *registered* callback does not
parse, or uses a rejected scheme, now answers 500 even when the request
also carries parameter errors; that used to answer 400. Decided before
any parameter is read, so the others are never detected. Only reachable
for an app row that bypassed registration.
`DangerousCallbackSchemeOutranksParseFailure` pins it.

**Also in this PR**

- **Unrecognized parameters are ignored**, as §3.1 requires, rather than
rejected by `ErrorExcessParams`. An OIDC `nonce` or a vendor extension
no longer fails the request. Repeats of parameters the endpoint does
read are still rejected.
- **Every unsupported `response_type` gets one code.** Read as text
rather than through the SDK enum, so a value with no Go constant behind
it answers `unsupported_response_type` like `token` does, instead of
splitting on whether the SDK names it.
- **A malformed `resource` answers `invalid_target`** (RFC 8707 §2), but
only when nothing else failed. A client retrying on `invalid_target`
would otherwise resend a request still broken in a field it never heard
about.
- **`error_description` is bounded and readable.** Capped at 2048
characters and marked `(truncated)` before the log field or the
`Location` header is written. Entries read `field: reason` joined with
`; `, not the parser's debug shape, whose details contain commas and
cannot be split apart again.
- **A repeated `state` is charged to the client, not the callback.**
Reading `state` shares a function with the `redirect_uri` match, so it
used to fall into that carve-out and answer on Coder.

**Where in the OAuth Flow**

<details>
<summary>Diagram: the three-way dispatch, and what licenses a
redirect</summary>

```mermaid
flowchart TD
    NEW["newAuthorizeResponse<br/>parses the registered callback, checks its scheme,<br/>exact-matches any redirect_uri, reads state"]

    NEW -->|"registration unusable"| C500["500 on Coder<br/>server_error, value logged not echoed"]
    NEW --> PARSE["extractAuthorizeParams<br/>reads every parameter, collects all failures"]

    PARSE -->|"no failure"| OK["GET: consent page<br/>POST: authorization code"]
    PARSE -->|"failure"| KIND{"authorizeFailure.kind()"}

    KIND -->|"corrupt registration"| C500
    KIND -->|"redirect_uri or client_id at fault"| CODER["400 on Coder<br/>RFC 6749 4.1.2.1 carve-out"]
    KIND -->|"anything else"| CLIENT["302 to the callback<br/>invalid_request or invalid_target, with state"]
```

</details>

- Authorize endpoint only, both verbs. Token exchange, refresh, and
revocation are untouched, and `ErrorExcessParams` still guards the token
endpoint.
- `validatedCallbackURL` becomes `authorizeResponse`, built only by
`newAuthorizeResponse`, which runs the scheme check and the exact match
in that order. Holding one is what licenses a redirect, so the ordering
is structural rather than a convention each call site remembers.
- The scheme is checked on the *registered* URL, since `p.RedirectURL`
returns the client's URI on a mismatch and checking that would blame the
app for a request it never made.
- `state` moves onto the type, out of the parameter lists of
`withQuery`, `errorURL`, `codeURL`, and `redirectAuthorizeError`, so no
call site can emit a response the client cannot correlate.
- `extractAuthorizeParams` returns one `authorizeFailure` instead of two
trailing values, and both handlers dispatch on `kind()` rather than
re-deriving precedence from field checks.

**What it satisfies**

- RFC 6749 §4.1.2.1: a failure that is not a bad redirection URI or
client identifier is reported through the redirection URI. That is the
whole PR. Its two exceptions "MUST NOT" be redirected to, hence the
carve-outs.
- RFC 6749 §3.1: unrecognized parameters MUST be ignored, and no
parameter may appear more than once. Both now hold here.
- RFC 6749 Appendix A: `error_description` is confined to the permitted
set, on the decoded value.
- RFC 8707 §2: a `resource` that is not an absolute URI without a
fragment answers `invalid_target`.
- RFC 7636 §4.4.1: a malformed `code_challenge` is rejected at the
authorization request rather than deferred to token exchange, where the
error would point at the `code_verifier`.
- Not yet: CRF-26 (the `server_error` sites) and CRF-13 (fragment
delivery), both as in #28450.

**Docs and Swagger.** `docs/admin/integrations/oauth2-provider.md` gains
entries for the redirected parameter errors, `invalid_target`, and the
two failures that stay on Coder. Both authorize verbs document their 400
and 500 responses and stop advertising `response_type=token`, which
meant declaring the parameter as a `string`, since `Enums` appends to
what swaggo derives from the type.

---

Split out of #28045
([PLAT-479](https://linear.app/codercom/issue/PLAT-479)). Fifth of the
stack, stacked on #28450.
## Manual Tests

Verified by hand against a local dev deployment
(`v2.37.0-devel+1145d35a47`, dev Postgres), in addition to the automated
suite. The build string was checked first, because `develop.sh` builds
from whatever the tree held when it started and every result below would
otherwise be describing the wrong binary.

Two scenario groups need state the API cannot produce. The scope
allowlist is reachable only through dynamic client registration, which
was enabled for the run and disabled again at the end. A registered
callback that does not parse, or that uses a blocked scheme, is refused
at registration, so those rows were planted directly with `psql` on a
purpose-built client and restored afterwards.

**28 scenarios, all passing.** No correctness or security defect was
found in the
code this PR changes. Seven observations came out of the run: six are
consistency,
documentation or diagnosability points, and one is a small defect that
predates
this PR.

<details>
<summary><b>Scenario summary, all 28</b></summary>

| # | Scenario | Result |
|---|----------|--------|
| 1 | A well-formed request still succeeds on both verbs, and the
consent page renders | Pass |
| 2 | A rejected parameter now reaches the client's callback on `POST` |
Pass |
| 3 | The same on `GET`, and the consent page does not render first |
Pass |
| 4 | The description names every failing field, joined with `; ` | Pass
|
| 5 | A mismatched `redirect_uri` is answered on Coder with no
`Location` on either verb | Pass |
| 6 | An unparseable `redirect_uri` likewise, and the echoed value is
HTML escaped | Pass |
| 7 | A repeated `client_id` is answered on Coder although the callback
was valid | Pass |
| 8 | A single query `client_id` cannot disagree with the resolved app
over HTTP | Pass |
| 9 | A `client_id` supplied only in the `POST` form body is delivered,
not withheld | Pass |
| 10 | A `{UPPERCASE}` `client_id` is delivered, and also succeeds end
to end | Pass |
| 11 | A repeated `state` is delivered rather than charged to the
redirect carve-out | Pass |
| 12 | A registered callback with a blocked scheme answers 500 on both
verbs | Pass |
| 13 | An unparseable registered callback answers 500, indistinguishably
to the caller | Pass |
| 14 | Corrupt registration outranks a deliverable failure and both
carve-outs | Pass |
| 15 | The corrupt value is logged with the app ID and never appears in
a response | Pass |
| 16 | Restoring the row restores normal behaviour with no restart |
Pass |
| 17 | Every unsupported `response_type` gets one code; an empty one is
`invalid_request` | Pass |
| 18 | An unsupported `response_type` is not recast as a missing
`code_challenge` | Pass |
| 19 | Unrecognized parameters are ignored, including a case-variant
`REDIRECT_URI` | Pass |
| 20 | A misspelled `redirect_url` is ignored and cannot smuggle a
destination | Pass |
| 21 | Repeated known parameters are still rejected | Pass |
| 22 | `resource` answers `invalid_target` alone and `invalid_request`
in company | Pass |
| 23 | A fragment in `resource` is rejected | Pass, with one gap |
| 24 | A long description is capped at 2048 and marked `(truncated)`, on
both verbs | Pass |
| 25 | The description is sanitized to the RFC 6749 §4.1.2.1 character
set | Pass |
| 26 | The registered callback query is retained except the reserved
names | Pass |
| 27 | Scope rejections still reach the callback, and no consent page
renders | Pass |
| 28 | Declining consent carries `access_denied` and issues no code |
Pass |

</details>

<details>
<summary><b>Observations, all 7</b></summary>

| # | Observation | Severity |
|---|-------------|----------|
| 1 | `invalid_request` is returned in three description shapes: the
parser's `Invalid query params: field: reason; ...` aggregate, the PKCE
validator's single message, and `scopeFailureResponse`'s. A client
cannot parse all three with one rule. | Consistency, reviewer call |
| 2 | The phase 2 runbook for #28045 asserts the old `field: x detail:
y` message shape, which this PR replaces. That doc needs a one-line
update. | Docs follow-up |
| 3 | `clientIDInDoubt`'s `default` branch is unreachable over HTTP,
because `httpmw` derives `app.ID` from the same query value the parser
reads. Defensive rather than dead, but the comment does not say so. |
Comment clarity |
| 4 | A `POST` supplying `client_id` only in the form body always fails
with `client_id ... is required and cannot be empty`, naming a parameter
it did supply. `httpmw` reads the body, `RequiredNotEmpty` reads the
query. Pre-existing. | Misleading diagnostic |
| 5 | A misspelled parameter is invisible from every angle at default
verbosity. The client gets a 302 with a code, its redirect is silently
replaced by the registered one, and the `ignoring unrecognized
authorization parameters` line is `logger.Debug` so it is not emitted. |
Diagnosability |
| 6 | `resource` sent twice answers `invalid_target` rather than
`invalid_request`. RFC 8707 §2 frames `invalid_target` as being about
the resource value; a duplicated parameter is a malformed request under
RFC 6749 §3.1. | Low, error code choice |
| 7 | `resource=https://api.example.com/#` (trailing `#`, empty
fragment) is accepted and stored with the `#` intact, so the persisted
audience is not textually equal to the fragment-free form. `url.Parse`
maps empty and absent fragments both to `Fragment == ""`. Pre-existing,
in `tokens.go`. | Defect, low severity |

</details>

**One note for anyone re-running this.** Every request below depends on
`$CHALLENGE` from the most recent `new_pkce` call. Forgetting to call it
sends an empty `code_challenge`, which fails with the fixed "is required
and cannot be empty" message at 98 characters and looks exactly like a
cap or a validator failing to fire. That cost one wrong measurement
during this run before the numbers below were taken.

<details>
<summary><b>Shell helpers used throughout</b></summary>

```bash
export BASE_URL=http://localhost:3000
export AUTH_HEADER="Coder-Session-Token: $(cat ./.coderv2/session)"
export PGPASSWORD=$(cat ./.coderv2/postgres/password)
export PGPORT=$(cat ./.coderv2/postgres/port)

pg() { psql -h localhost -p "$PGPORT" -U coder -d coder -tAc "$1"; }
plant_callback() { pg "UPDATE oauth2_provider_apps SET callback_url = '$2' WHERE id = '$1';"; }
urlenc() { jq -rn --arg v "$1" '$v|@uri'; }

# 43 unreserved characters every time. Base64url of the raw 32 bytes.
new_pkce() {
  VERIFIER=$(openssl rand 32 | base64 | tr -d '\n=' | tr '+/' '-_')
  CHALLENGE=$(printf '%s' "$VERIFIER" | openssl dgst -sha256 -binary | base64 | tr -d "=" | tr '+/' '-_')
  STATE=$(openssl rand -hex 16)
}

authz_url() {
  local url="$BASE_URL/oauth2/authorize?client_id=$1&response_type=code"
  url="$url&redirect_uri=$(urlenc "$2")&state=$STATE"
  url="$url&code_challenge=$CHALLENGE&code_challenge_method=S256"
  printf '%s' "$url"
}

# The core assertion of the whole run: what answer, delivered where.
answer() { curl -s -o /dev/null -D - -X "$1" "$2" -H "$AUTH_HEADER" | grep -iE '^HTTP/|^location:'; }

show_callback() {
  python3 - "$1" <<'PY'
import sys, urllib.parse
q = urllib.parse.urlparse(sys.argv[1]).query
for k, v in urllib.parse.parse_qsl(q, keep_blank_values=True):
    print(f"{k} = {v}")
PY
}
```

Fixtures, all registered through DCR:

```text
plat479-plain    http://localhost:9876/callback
plat479-query    http://localhost:9876/callback?tenant=acme&error=stale
plat479-corrupt  http://localhost:9876/callback   (overwritten by psql in 12 to 16)
plat479-reserved http://localhost:9876/callback?tenant=acme&code=FAKECODE&error=stale&error_description=oldmsg&state=oldstate&keep=yes
plat479-ci       http://localhost:9876/callback   (scope allowlist coder:workspaces.access)
```

</details>

<details>
<summary><b>1. Baseline: a well-formed request still
succeeds</b></summary>

```bash
new_pkce; answer GET  "$(authz_url "$APP_ID" http://localhost:9876/callback)"
new_pkce; answer POST "$(authz_url "$APP_ID" http://localhost:9876/callback)"
```

```text
=== GET ===
HTTP/1.1 200 OK

=== POST ===
HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Location: http://localhost:9876/callback?code=coder_dzvaCPf9W1_...&state=e321bd5d5b594a1fae8a2d5da654b84a
```

`GET` carries no `Location` at all, so the consent page really rendered
rather than redirecting. The `state` echoed is the one sent. The code
persisted as `coder:all`, this app having no allowlist, with
`redirect_uri` recorded because the request supplied one.

Also driven through a real browser rather than curl, so the consent
form's `nosurf` token is the one submitted rather than the session-token
header alone. Clicking **Allow** delivered `code` and `state` to the
callback. Both request shapes agree on the success case.

Not to be misread: `oauth2_provider_app_codes` holds one row after both
POSTs, not two. `ProcessAuthorize` opens its transaction with
`DeleteOAuth2ProviderAppCodesByAppAndUserID`, so a row count is not a
count of successful authorizations. That predates this PR.

</details>

<details>
<summary><b>2 to 4. A rejected parameter now reaches the client's
callback</b></summary>

```bash
new_pkce
BAD="$BASE_URL/oauth2/authorize?client_id=$APP_ID&response_type=code"
BAD="$BAD&redirect_uri=$(urlenc http://localhost:9876/callback)&state=$STATE"
BAD="$BAD&code_challenge=short&code_challenge_method=S256"
answer POST "$BAD"
answer GET  "$BAD"
```

```text
HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Location: http://localhost:9876/callback?error=invalid_request&error_description=Invalid+query+params%3A+code_challenge%3A+must+be+43+to+128+characters+from+the+unreserved+character+set+%5BA-Za-z0-9-._~%5D&state=e89f4d98d4c8c347e5ae25175748b731
```

Identical on both verbs. Decoded:

```text
error = invalid_request
error_description = Invalid query params: code_challenge: must be 43 to 128 characters from the unreserved character set [A-Za-z0-9-._~]
state = e89f4d98d4c8c347e5ae25175748b731
```

The `GET` body confirms no page was rendered, against the baseline:

| Request | Body size | Occurrences of "Allow" |
|---|---|---|
| Malformed `code_challenge` | 263 bytes | 0 |
| Well formed (scenario 1) | 4928 bytes | 2 |

263 bytes is Go's redirect stub. There is no consent form in it, so
there is no Allow button to press for a request the server has already
refused.

Multiple failures are reported together (scenario 4):

```text
error_description = Invalid query params: code_challenge: must be 43 to 128 characters from the unreserved character set [A-Za-z0-9-._~]; resource: must be an absolute URI without fragment
```

The separator is `; `, and no entry uses the older `field: x detail: y`
shape. The code is `invalid_request` rather than `invalid_target` even
though `resource` is one of the two failures, which is the scenario 22
guard firing.

The same request also carried `code_challenge_method=plain`, which is
invalid and is *not* mentioned, because the method is validated after
`extractAuthorizeParams` returns and a parse failure short-circuits
first. Sent alone it is rejected as `code_challenge_method 'plain' is
not supported; use 'S256'`, with no `Invalid query params: ` prefix.
That difference is observation 1.

</details>

<details>
<summary><b>5 and 6. The redirect_uri carve-out keeps the answer
here</b></summary>

```bash
new_pkce
EVIL="$BASE_URL/oauth2/authorize?client_id=$APP_ID&response_type=code"
EVIL="$EVIL&redirect_uri=$(urlenc http://evil.example/steal)&state=$STATE"
EVIL="$EVIL&code_challenge=$CHALLENGE&code_challenge_method=S256"
answer POST "$EVIL"; answer GET "$EVIL"
```

```text
HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
```

**The absence in that output is the assertion**: no `Location` on either
verb, so nothing redirects to `evil.example`. Stronger, `evil.example`
appears zero times in either full response, headers and body together,
so the attacker-supplied host is not reflected into the page either.

```json
{"error":"invalid_request","error_description":"Invalid query params: redirect_uri: Query param \"redirect_uri\" must exactly match http://localhost:9876/callback"}
```

The `GET` page names the *registered* callback as the value the
parameter had to match, which is the app's own configuration and safe to
display.

An unparseable `redirect_uri` reaches the same outcome by a different
route, having never parsed at all:

```json
{"error":"invalid_request","error_description":"Invalid query params: redirect_uri: Query param \"redirect_uri\" must be a valid url: parse \"http://%zz\": invalid URL escape \"%zz\""}
```

That message echoes the caller's value, unlike the mismatch case, so the
`GET` path was probed with markup in it:

```text
input:  http://%zz"><img src=x onerror=BAD>
page:   ...must be a valid url: parse &#34;http://%zz\&#34;&gt;&lt;img src=x onerror=BAD&gt;&#34;...
literal `<img` in body: 0     entity encoded `&lt;img`: 1
```

Escaped correctly by the template layer. Recorded as a negative result
so a future change to the error page has something to regress against.

One note for the docs: this detail contains colons, so a client
splitting `field: reason` entries must split each on its **first** colon
only.

</details>

<details>
<summary><b>7 to 10. The client_id carve-out, and its
negatives</b></summary>

A repeated `client_id` in an otherwise perfect request:

```text
HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request   (both verbs, no Location)
{"error":"invalid_request","error_description":"Invalid query params: client_id: Query param \"client_id\" provided more than once, found 2 times. Only provide 1 instance of this query param."}
```

This is the one carve-out not implied by the response's shape. The
`redirect_uri` matched the registration, so `canRedirect()` was true and
there *was* somewhere to send the answer; it was withheld because
`extractAuthorizeParams` assigns `failure.redirect` only when
`clientIDInDoubt` is false.

**The `default` branch of that function is unreachable over HTTP**
(observation 3). `httpmw` resolves the app from
`r.URL.Query().Get("client_id")`, so `app.ID` and the parsed value
derive from the same string and cannot disagree. Three experiments:

```text
one query client_id, bad challenge          -> 302 delivered
two DIFFERENT client_id values              -> 400, caught by the repeated branch
query names app A, form body names app B    -> 302 to app A; the body is ignored
```

The negatives matter as much as the positives. An identifier absent from
the query but present in the `POST` form body is **delivered**,
correctly:

```text
HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Location: ...error=invalid_request&error_description=Invalid+query+params%3A+client_id%3A+...is+required+and+cannot+be+empty%3B+code_challenge%3A+...
```

That is observation 4: the description says `client_id` is required for
a request that supplied it. With everything else valid the same shape
still fails, while the identical request carrying `client_id` in the
query succeeds with a code. `RequiredNotEmpty` reads the query; `httpmw`
reads the body. Pre-existing, and arguably the parser is the layer in
the right, since RFC 6749 §4.1.1 puts authorization parameters in the
query string and §3.2.1 is the endpoint that uses a form body.

A braced upper-case UUID is delivered, and succeeds end to end:

```text
{UPPERCASE} client_id, bad challenge -> 302, description names ONLY code_challenge
{UPPERCASE} client_id, all valid     -> 302 with a real code
GET, all valid                       -> 200, consent page, heading resolves to the app's real name
```

`uuid.Parse` accepts that spelling and `httpmw` resolved through it, so
a string comparison here would withhold an answer the client is entitled
to, for no reason it could diagnose.

</details>

<details>
<summary><b>11. A repeated state is delivered, not
withheld</b></summary>

```text
HTTP/1.1 302 Found   (both verbs)
error = invalid_request
error_description = Invalid query params: state: Query param 'state' provided more than once, found 2 times. Only provide 1 instance of this query param.
```

Reading `state` happens inside `newAuthorizeResponse`, the same function
that runs the `redirect_uri` match. A count of errors across those two
lines would charge this to the redirect carve-out and answer 400. It
answered 302, so the field-specific test is doing the work.

The asymmetry with scenario 7 is deliberate: a repeated `client_id`
leaves the server unsure whose callback it holds, a repeated `state`
leaves the callback fully settled.

The response carries **no `state`**, since `parseSingle` collapsed the
repeat to the empty string and `withQuery` only sets it when non-empty.
Unavoidable rather than wrong: picking one of two values could satisfy a
CSRF check the client meant to be strict.

</details>

<details>
<summary><b>12 to 16. A corrupt registration outranks
everything</b></summary>

DCR refuses both planted values, which is why `psql` is needed and why
500 is the right answer: a stored one is not something a client did.

```json
{"error":"invalid_client_metadata","error_description":"invalid redirect_uris: redirect URI at index 0: redirect URI uses dangerous scheme javascript which is not allowed"}
{"error":"invalid_client_metadata","error_description":"invalid redirect_uris: redirect URI at index 0 is not a valid URL: parse \"http://%zz\": invalid URL escape \"%zz\""}
```

```bash
plant_callback "$APP_CORRUPT_ID" 'javascript:alert(1)'
new_pkce
CORRUPT="$BASE_URL/oauth2/authorize?client_id=$APP_CORRUPT_ID&response_type=code&state=$STATE"
CORRUPT="$CORRUPT&code_challenge=$CHALLENGE&code_challenge_method=S256"
answer POST "$CORRUPT"; answer GET "$CORRUPT"
```

```text
HTTP/1.1 500 Internal Server Error
{"error":"server_error","error_description":"The application's registered callback URL is not usable"}
GET: HTTP/1.1 500, page reads "500 - Invalid Callback URL", 3346 bytes, 0 Allow buttons
```

The unparseable callback is **indistinguishable to the caller**: same
description, and a `GET` page of exactly 3346 bytes, matching byte for
byte. Two different defects in stored state, one answer. Correct, since
neither is actionable by the client.

Note the request carried no `redirect_uri` of its own and still failed,
because the scheme is checked on the *registered* URL before the
client's value is consulted.

Precedence was tested against all three competitors, not one:

| Also wrong in the request | Would answer alone | Actually answered |
|---|---|---|
| `code_challenge=short` | 302 to the callback | **500** |
| `client_id` repeated | 400 kept here | **500** |
| `redirect_uri` mismatched | 400 kept here | **500** |

Reading the source, this is stronger than precedence.
`newAuthorizeResponse` runs at `authorize.go:250`, before any of
`client_id`, `code_challenge`, `scope` or `resource` is read, and the
early return discards whatever `p.Errors` already held. In rows two and
three those failures are never detected at all, so `kind()` ranking
`failureCorruptRegistration` first is belt and braces for a failure
constructed some other way.

**The value is logged and never echoed.** A distinctive marker was
planted and five requests fired:

```text
[erro] coderd: oauth2 app has an unusable registered callback URL
  request_id=01ca4796-c743-4923-a06b-afc1f3decc95
  app_id=12f9ca3b-7a2c-4c54-8ed7-723698c62bd1
  callback_url="javascript:alert(\"plat479-6d-marker\")"
  error= redirect URI uses dangerous scheme javascript which is not allowed:
         codersdk/oauth2_validation.go:116
```

Five requests, five lines, in request order. Occurrences of the marker
in the POST body, the rendered GET page, and the response headers: **0,
0, 0**.

The `request_id` joins that line to the request log entry whose
`response_body` field holds the vague message, so the server's own
record confirms what it sent for the same request rather than a replay.
The log is also where the two causes diverge, naming `validateScheme`
and its source line, which the response cannot do.

Restoring the row restores normal behaviour immediately, with no
restart:

```text
POST -> 302 with a code      GET -> 200 consent page
```

That is a control rather than housekeeping: it rules out the app having
been poisoned lastingly, and rules out a cached parse outliving the
`UPDATE`.

</details>

<details>
<summary><b>17 and 18. Every unsupported response_type gets one
code</b></summary>

| `response_type` sent | `error` | `error_description` |
|---|---|---|
| `token` | `unsupported_response_type` | Only response_type=code is
supported |
| `banana` | `unsupported_response_type` | Only response_type=code is
supported |
| `code token` | `unsupported_response_type` | Only response_type=code
is supported |
| `CODE` | `unsupported_response_type` | Only response_type=code is
supported |
| `code_extra` | `unsupported_response_type` | Only response_type=code
is supported |
| empty string | `invalid_request` | Invalid query params:
response_type: Query param 'response_type' is required and cannot be
empty |

`token` has a Go constant behind it and `banana` does not, so their
agreement is what reading the value as text bought. Three rows are more
interesting than `banana`: `code token` is a legal RFC 6749 §3.1.1
space-delimited list used by OIDC's hybrid flow, `CODE` confirms the
comparison is case sensitive, and `code_extra` confirms it is equality
rather than a prefix match.

The empty string is correctly the exception. A valueless parameter is
*missing*, not unsupported, and RFC 6749 §3.1 requires it be treated as
omitted.

**The error is in the query, not the fragment.** `response_type=token`
is the implicit grant's own value, so a fragment would be arguable, but
this deployment advertises `"response_types_supported":["code"]` alone,
and a fragment is never sent to the server, so it would be unreadable to
the client's backend.

PKCE is not recast, which the controls show:

| `response_type`, no `code_challenge` sent | `error` |
|---|---|
| `token` | `unsupported_response_type`, zero mentions of
`code_challenge` |
| `banana` | `unsupported_response_type`, zero mentions of
`code_challenge` |
| `code` | `invalid_request`, naming `code_challenge` |

Without the `if params.responseType == responseTypeCode` guard, a client
sending `token` would be told its `code_challenge` was missing, add one,
resend, and be told the same thing again.

</details>

<details>
<summary><b>19 to 21. Unrecognized parameters ignored, repeats still
rejected</b></summary>

Eight unknown parameters, each on an otherwise valid request, every one
issuing a code:

| Unknown parameter | Result |
|---|---|
| `nonce`, `prompt`, `login_hint`, `acr_values`, `max_age`, `ui_locales`
| code issued |
| `code_challenge_methods=S256` | code issued |
| `REDIRECT_URI=http://evil.example/steal` | code issued, **to the
registered callback** |

Five of those are OpenID Connect Core parameters, so an OIDC client
pointed here degrades to plain OAuth2 rather than failing. The ignored
parameters are **dropped, not forwarded**: the callback receives only
`code` and `state`.

The last two rows are the ones with teeth. Query parameter names are
case sensitive, so `REDIRECT_URI` must be ignored, and a misspelled
`redirect_url` likewise:

```text
case variant alongside a valid redirect_uri : Location host localhost:9876
case variant as the only redirect parameter : Location host localhost:9876
redirect_url typo, no valid redirect_uri    : Location host localhost:9876, code issued
evil.example occurrences in any Location    : 0
```

The consent page renders for the typo case too, and even its cancel link
targets the registered callback. A parser matching names
case-insensitively would have redirected to `evil.example` with a valid
code attached.

**Observation 5.** The `ignoring unrecognized authorization parameters`
line was never emitted. Three requests carrying a distinctive marker
produced no new server output at all, because the call is `logger.Debug`
(`authorize.go:307`) and the deployment runs with `verbose: null`. The
behaviour is correct and required by RFC 6749 §3.1, but at default
verbosity the misspelling is invisible from every angle: the client sees
a 302 with a code, its redirect is silently replaced, and nothing is
logged. The comment claiming the typo "surfaces here" is optimistic.

Repeats of known parameters are still rejected, which the replacement of
`ErrorExcessParams` had to leave alone:

| Repeated parameter | HTTP | `error` | Answered at |
|---|---|---|---|
| `code_challenge` | 302 | `invalid_request`, two entries one field |
client callback |
| `code_challenge_method` | 302 | `invalid_request` | client callback |
| `response_type` | 302 | `invalid_request` | client callback |
| `redirect_uri` | 400 | withheld | **Coder** |
| `scope` | 302 | `invalid_request` | client callback |
| `resource` | 302 | `invalid_target` | client callback |

`redirect_uri` being withheld confirms the carve-out keys on the field
name rather than the kind of mistake. `code_challenge` collects two
entries for one mistake, because `parseSingle` collapses the value to
empty and the PKCE block then reports it missing. The `resource` row is
observation 6.

</details>

<details>
<summary><b>22 and 23. resource, its own code, and the fragment
rule</b></summary>

Both sides of the rule, since a check enforced too broadly would reject
a valid URN:

| `resource` sent | `error` | Stored `resource_uri` |
|---|---|---|
| `not a uri` | `invalid_target` | not stored |
| `/api` relative | `invalid_target` | not stored |
| `https://api.example.com` | none, code issued | as sent |
| `https://api.example.com/v1?q=1` | none, code issued | as sent, query
is not a fragment |
| `urn:example:resource` | none, code issued | as sent |
| empty string | none, code issued | `NULL`, same as omitted |

`invalid_target` applies only when `resource` is the sole failure. Add
any second failure in any other field and the code becomes
`invalid_request` naming both, which is the retry-loop guard:

```text
resource + bad code_challenge -> invalid_request, both named
resource + repeated scope     -> invalid_request, both named
resource + repeated state     -> invalid_request, both named
resource alone (control)      -> invalid_target
```

Fragments are rejected in all three placements, with or without a path:

```text
https://api.example.com/#x         -> invalid_target
https://api.example.com#x          -> invalid_target
https://api.example.com/v1#frag    -> invalid_target
https://api.example.com/#          -> code issued, stored as https://api.example.com/#
```

**The last row is observation 7, and it predates this PR.** Go cannot
represent the distinction:

```text
https://a.example.com/    Fragment=""  String()="https://a.example.com/"
https://a.example.com/#   Fragment=""  String()="https://a.example.com/"
https://a.example.com/#x  Fragment="x" String()="https://a.example.com/#x"
```

`url.Parse` collapses "no fragment" and "empty fragment", so `if
u.Fragment != ""` in `validateResourceParameter`
(`coderd/oauth2provider/tokens.go:591`) cannot see a trailing `#`. RFC
3986 §3.5 permits a zero-length fragment, which RFC 8707 §2's "MUST NOT
include a fragment component" reads as forbidding. Validation parses the
value but persistence stores the raw string, so the `#` reaches
`resource_uri` and the stored audience is not textually equal to the
fragment-free form. A client appending a harmless-looking `#` would get
a token bound to an audience nothing matches.

The authorize-side call to `validateResourceParameter` is context in
this diff rather than an added line; this PR added the `invalid_target`
code for the failure.

</details>

<details>
<summary><b>24 and 25. The description cap and character
set</b></summary>

The obvious probe does not exercise the cap: a 4000-character
`code_challenge` produces a 116-character description, because that
message is fixed text and never quotes the offending value. The
descriptions that echo caller input come from a validator's own error.

| Request | `error` | Description length | Truncated | `Location` length
|
|---|---|---|---|---|
| `code_challenge_method` = 4000 chars | `invalid_request` | 2060 |
**yes** | 2176 |
| `scope` = 4000 chars | `invalid_scope` | 2060 | **yes** | 2174 |
| `code_challenge_method` = 2000 chars | `invalid_request` | 2035 | no |
2147 |
| `code_challenge` = 4000 chars | `invalid_request` | 116 | no | 234 |

2060 is exactly `maxErrorDescription` plus `" (truncated)"`. Row three
is the boundary control, so the cap fires on length rather than on the
presence of echoed input. Measured from the `Location` header rather
than a log line, since the stated reason for the cap is that the header
must survive intermediary proxies; the longest observed was 2176 bytes.

Both verbs agree, the cap living in the shared `redirectAuthorizeError`:

```text
GET, long method : desc_len=2060 truncated=True
GET, long scope  : desc_len=2060 truncated=True
```

The character set is enforced independently, later, in `errorURL`:

```text
input:       pl"ain\back<newline>tab<tab>end~unicode
description: unsupported code_challenge_method: pl'ainback tab end~ nicode
chars outside the RFC 6749 §4.1.2.1 set: []
```

`"` becomes `'`, `\` is dropped so it cannot escape the rewritten quote,
and anything below 0x20 or above 0x7E becomes a space. Checked
programmatically rather than by eye. The RFC sets no length limit, so
the 2048 cap is policy; the character set is conformance.

</details>

<details>
<summary><b>26. The registered callback query, retained except reserved
names</b></summary>

`plat479-reserved` registers a callback carrying all four reserved names
plus two ordinary ones, and DCR stores it unchanged:

```text
http://localhost:9876/callback?tenant=acme&code=FAKECODE&error=stale&error_description=oldmsg&state=oldstate&keep=yes
```

Success response, no `redirect_uri` sent:

```text
code  = coder_WXwBpvYR5u_...
keep  = yes
state = 516abeea9976119eb33ddc10f0ca04ed
tenant = acme
```

Failure response, same app:

```text
error = invalid_request
error_description = Invalid query params: code_challenge: must be 43 to 128 characters...
keep  = yes
state = 3a17bdd75dfcf740bda36124cd161fb7
tenant = acme
```

Stale registered values in either response: `FAKECODE` 0, `stale` 0,
`oldmsg` 0, `oldstate` 0.

Without the deletion step a registered `error=stale` would ride out on
the **success** response, and a client reading `error` before `code`,
the conventional order, would discard a valid authorization code.
`FAKECODE` is the mirror image on a failure response.

The cancel link obeys the same rule, being built by the same `withQuery`
path:

```text
http://localhost:9876/callback?error=access_denied&error_description=The+resource+owner...&keep=yes&state=e15b5f0f...&tenant=acme
```

RFC 6749 §3.1.2 requires the registered query be retained when adding
parameters, which is the `tenant` and `keep` half. It does not say what
to do when the registered query collides with the response parameters
§4.1.2 adds, so dropping the registered copies is the resolution that
keeps the client's read unambiguous.

</details>

<details>
<summary><b>27 and 28. Scope rejections, and declining
consent</b></summary>

`plat479-ci` carries the allowlist `coder:workspaces.access`.

```text
scope=template:update (outside)  -> error = invalid_scope
                                    'template:update': scope requests permissions beyond this app's allowed scopes
GET, same request                -> 302, 225 bytes, 0 Allow buttons, no consent page
scope=workspace:ssh (covered)    -> code issued, persisted scope workspace:ssh
GET, same request                -> 200, 5182 bytes, consent page naming the scope
```

`workspace:ssh` is granted although the allowlist names the composite
rather than that scope, which is the coverage-not-spelling rule from
#28045. This run only checks that the changes here left it delivering
the same answers.

The consent page for a narrow scope reads differently from the
unrestricted one: "to access your **admin** account with these
permissions?", the scope as `<li role="listitem">workspace:ssh`, and the
caution "These are technical permission names. Grant them only to an
application you trust."

The scope description shape differs from the parser's, coming from
`scopeFailureResponse` rather than the field join, which is the third
producer behind observation 1.

Declining consent, clicked in a real browser:

```text
error             = access_denied
error_description = The resource owner or authorization server denied the request
state             = a8bd538b365b61f54586892c73968b80
```

The page carries exactly one `href` and it is the cancel link. The
`state` matches, there is no `code`, and the code count for the app is
unchanged, the link being a plain `GET` to the client's callback that
never reaches `ProcessAuthorize`. The description is RFC 6749 §4.1.2.1's
own definition of `access_denied`, word for word.

That shared construction is what makes the `#nosec G203` annotation on
`CancelURI` sound: the URL is injected as a trusted `htmltemplate.URL`,
safe only because `newAuthorizeResponse` validated the registered scheme
before the response object could exist. Scenario 12 is the other half,
an app with a rejected scheme never reaching this page at all.

</details>

<details>
<summary><b>Where the consent page renders, across every GET
case</b></summary>

Only `GET` can render anything, and body size identifies which of four
renderers ran, so this is the table to check when a status code alone
looks right.

| Case | Status | Body bytes | Allow buttons | Rendered |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| well formed | 200 | 4928 | 1 | **consent page** |
| bad `code_challenge` | 302 | 263 | 0 | redirect stub |
| two bad fields | 302 | 319 | 0 | redirect stub |
| mismatched `redirect_uri` | 400 | 3814 | 0 | 400 error page |
| unparseable `redirect_uri` | 400 | 3846 | 0 | 400 error page |
| repeated `client_id` | 400 | 3846 | 0 | 400 error page |
| `client_id` in form body only | 400 | 77 | 0 | `httpmw` JSON, unstyled
|
| `{UPPERCASE}` `client_id` | 200 | 4940 | 1 | **consent page** |
| repeated `state` | 302 | 239 | 0 | redirect stub |
| corrupt callback, blocked scheme | 500 | 3346 | 0 | 500 error page |
| corrupt callback, unparseable | 500 | 3346 | 0 | 500 error page |
| `response_type=token` | 302 | 187 | 0 | redirect stub |
| `banana` / `code token` / `CODE` | 302 | 187 | 0 | redirect stub |
| empty `response_type` | 302 | 243 | 0 | redirect stub |
| `token`, no PKCE | 302 | 187 | 0 | redirect stub |
| `code`, no PKCE | 302 | 245 | 0 | redirect stub |
| unknown params, valid request | 200 | 4932 | 1 | **consent page** |
| `redirect_url` typo, valid request | 200 | 4932 | 1 | **consent page**
|
| `resource` malformed | 302 | 214 | 0 | redirect stub |
| `resource` valid absolute URI | 200 | 4932 | 1 | **consent page** |
| `resource=.../#` empty fragment | 200 | 4932 | 1 | **consent page**,
observation 7 |
| reserved params in registered callback | 200 | 4973 | 1 | **consent
page** |
| `scope` outside allowlist | 302 | 225 | 0 | redirect stub |
| `scope` covered by allowlist | 200 | 5182 | 1 | **consent page** |

The invariant: the page renders if and only if `extractAuthorizeParams`
returned no failure, so no input asks the owner to approve a request the
server has already refused. The `evil.example` rows are worth reading
carefully rather than alarming: RFC 6749 §3.1 requires a case variant
and a typo to be ignored, so from the server's view nothing was wrong
with either request, and both cancel links target the registered
callback.

About 4930 bytes is the consent page, about 3800 the 400 page, 3346 the
500 page, 77 the unstyled `httpmw` JSON, and low hundreds is Go's
redirect stub, whose length tracks the `Location` it embeds. Every
`unsupported_response_type` answer is exactly 187 bytes because they
share one description. Small variations within a renderer are expected:
the consent page moves 4928 to 4940 with a fresh CSRF token and the app
name.

As a regression signal, body size is more sensitive than the status
line. A change that rendered a page alongside a redirect would still
report 302, but the stub would come back at thousands of bytes rather
than hundreds.

</details>

<details>
<summary><b>Cleanup</b></summary>

```bash
for id in $(pg "SELECT id FROM oauth2_provider_apps WHERE name LIKE 'plat479%';"); do
  curl -s -X DELETE "$BASE_URL/api/v2/oauth2-provider/apps/$id" -H "$AUTH_HEADER" \
    -o /dev/null -w "$id -> %{http_code}\n"
done
pg "SELECT count(*) FROM oauth2_provider_apps WHERE name LIKE 'plat479%';"
./scripts/coder-dev.sh oauth2-provider dcr disable
```

All planted callback rows were restored before deletion, so no fixture
was left holding a value DCR would refuse.

</details>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Steven Masley <Emyrk@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-03 10:54:34 -07:00
e035967ef1 feat: mint access tokens with the negotiated scope (#28237)
**TL;DR**

First of PLAT-480, continuing the merged PLAT-479 stack. #28178 decided
what the scope is and #28179 reported it; this PR is the one that makes
it bind. Until now the scope negotiated at `/oauth2/authorize` was
recorded on the grant but never reached the token: every OAuth2 access
key was minted with `coder:all`, so a client that asked for
`coder:workspaces.access` still got full API access.

| PR | What it does |
|---|---|
| #28167 | `ScopesCover` compares an allowlist against a request by
permission coverage rather than by name. Merged. |
| #28178 | The authorize endpoint checks the request against the scope
catalog, grants it only if the app's filtered allowlist covers it, and
persists the result on the code. Merged. |
| #28179 | The consent page lists the negotiated permissions, and
`invalid_scope` reaches the client's own callback per RFC 6749 §4.1.2.1.
Merged. |
| **#28237 (this)** | The exchange mints the API key with the stored
scope, and the token response states what was granted. |
| #28740 | Re-checks the app allowlist at redemption, for a code whose
app was narrowed after the code was issued. |
| #28751 | Lets a refresh narrow the granted scope, which is the `scope`
request parameter this PR still ignores. |

- #28179 has merged, so this diff is against main and reviews on its
own.
- **This is the first PR in the stack where a token's authority actually
changes.** Everything before it recorded and reported. That is the blast
radius worth reviewing: a grant that negotiated a narrow scope now gets
a key that is genuinely narrower, and anything that was quietly relying
on `coder:all` will start seeing 403.
- Grants that predate the scope columns carry what migration 000569
backfilled, `coder:all`, so they refresh unrestricted and reach what
they reached before. Pinned by `BackfilledScopeRefreshesUnrestricted`,
seeded the way the migration leaves a row rather than exchanged.
- The actor that writes the key stays `rbac.ScopeAll`. Narrowing it to
the granted scope would deny `api_key:create` and fail the exchange. The
bound lives on `api_keys.scopes`, which dbauthz reads on every request,
not on the actor doing the insert.

**Where in the flow**

<details>
<summary>Diagram: where the stored scope turns into a bound on the
token</summary>

```mermaid
flowchart TD
    AZ["GET or POST /oauth2/authorize<br/>negotiates the scope and persists it on the code<br/>PR 28178, merged"]
    AZ --> TK["POST /oauth2/tokens"]

    TK --> GT{"grant_type"}
    GT -->|authorization_code| S1["scope read from codes.scope"]
    GT -->|refresh_token| S2["scope read from tokens.scope<br/>req.Scope is parsed and ignored, PR 28751"]

    S1 --> CV["scopeStringToAPIKeyScopes, this PR<br/>every name must be in the api_key_scope enum<br/>an empty list is an error, not coder:all"]
    S2 --> CV

    CV -->|"unknown name, or empty"| ERR["400 invalid_grant, this PR<br/>error_description names the offending value"]
    CV -->|mintable| GEN["apikey.Generate with Scopes, this PR<br/>was: no Scopes, so every key defaulted to coder:all"]

    GEN --> KEY["api_keys.scopes<br/>read by dbauthz on every later request:<br/>this is where the grant becomes a bound"]
    GEN --> ROW["the new tokens row carries the same scope,<br/>so the next refresh reads back the same grant"]

    KEY --> RESP["200 with scope in the token response, this PR<br/>RFC 6749 5.1, OAuth 2.1 1.4.1"]
    ROW --> RESP
```

</details>

- Token endpoint only, both grants. Authorize is untouched apart from
two comments that said the scope was not yet enforced.
- `scopeStringToAPIKeyScopes` turns the stored scope string into
`database.APIKeyScopes` for `apikey.Generate`. Names are checked there
rather than inside `apikey.Generate`, whose error would surface as a 500
rather than an OAuth2 error.
- An empty list is an error, not an unrestricted key. `apikey.Generate`
defaults an empty scope list to `coder:all`, so an empty stored scope
would silently widen the grant instead of failing it. The same reasoning
is why the `expandRBACScope` comment in `modelmethods.go` was stale:
that function already errored on an empty list while its comment still
promised `rbac.ScopeAll`.
- A stored scope outside the `api_key_scope` enum answers 400
`invalid_grant` rather than 500, with the offending name in
`error_description`. Not `invalid_scope`: RFC 6749 §5.2 and OAuth 2.1
§3.2.4 both scope that code to what the client requested, and this value
is server state the client cannot change by asking differently. The
grant is what is unusable, and re-authorizing is the only way out.
- Refresh copies the presented token's scope onto both the new API key
and the rotated refresh row. `req.Scope` is parsed but ignored; #28751
is where it starts being honoured.
- The swagger annotation moves from `oauth2.Token` to
`codersdk.OAuth2TokenResponse`, because `oauth2.Token` has no `scope`
field to document.
- `EveryCatalogNameMintable` pins the catalog against the
`api_key_scope` enum. The two are maintained separately, and a name
negotiable at authorization but unmintable at exchange would leave a
client holding a code it can never redeem.

**What it satisfies**

Checked against both RFC 6749 and the OAuth 2.1 draft
(draft-ietf-oauth-v2-1-15). The 2.1 draft moves the scope-reporting rule
from RFC 6749 §5.1 into §1.4.1 and grades it in §3.2.3, but the
requirement is the same one.

- RFC 6749 §5.1, OAuth 2.1 §1.4.1 — "If the issued access token scope is
different from the one requested by the client, the authorization server
MUST include the `scope` response parameter in the token response".
OAuth 2.1 §3.2.3 grades `scope` as "RECOMMENDED, if identical to the
scope requested by the client; otherwise, REQUIRED". Both grants set it
unconditionally, which covers both grades. Without it, a client whose
request was narrowed against the app's allowlist, or defaulted because
it requested nothing, first learns its bounds from an unexplained 403.
Pinned by `IssuedTokenBoundsTheAPI`, which requests no scope and asserts
the response names what it got.
- OAuth 2.1 §1.4.1 — "The authorization server MAY fully or partially
ignore the scope requested by the client, based on the authorization
server policy or the resource owner's instructions." This is what
licenses ignoring `scope` on a refresh, and the licence is conditional
on reporting the actual grant. Before this PR the exchange both ignored
the request and said nothing, which is the half that was not defensible.
- OAuth 2.1 §4.3.1, RFC 6749 §6 — the refresh `scope` parameter is
OPTIONAL and "if omitted is treated as equal to the scope originally
granted by the resource owner". Exactly what `refreshTokenGrant` does
with `dbToken.Scope`.
- OAuth 2.1 §4.3.3 — "If a new refresh token is issued, the refresh
token scope MUST be identical to that of the refresh token included by
the client in the request." Rotation copies `dbToken.Scope` onto the new
refresh row.
- OAuth 2.1 §3.2.3 — "If refresh tokens are issued, those refresh tokens
MUST be bound to the scope and resource servers as consented by the
resource owner. This is to prevent privilege escalation by the
legitimate client". The refresh row has carried the negotiated scope
since #28178; this PR is what makes the access token minted from it
carry the same bound. Pinned by `RefreshDoesNotWidenTheScope`.
- OAuth 2.1 §1.4.1 — a client that omits `scope` must be met with "a
pre-defined default value or fail the request indicating an invalid
scope", and the server "SHOULD document its scope requirements and
default value". #28178 chose the default; `scopes_supported` and the
integration guide document it. Unchanged here, but it is why
`IssuedTokenBoundsTheAPI` can request nothing and still receive a
bounded token.
- Not yet: OAuth 2.1 §4.3.1 also says "The requested scope MUST NOT
include any scope not originally granted by the resource owner." A
refresh naming a narrower scope is ignored rather than honoured, and one
naming a wider scope is ignored rather than rejected with
`invalid_scope` (§3.2.4, "exceeds the scope granted by the resource
owner"). Neither case widens a token, so there is no escalation, and
§1.4.1's MAY plus the `scope` response parameter keep the client
correctly informed in the meantime. #28751 is where narrowing lands.
Documented under Limitations until then.

---

First of three, [PLAT-480](https://linear.app/codercom/issue/PLAT-480).
Depends on #28179, which has merged, so this reviews against main.

#28178 decided the scope and #28179 reported it. This PR is the one that
makes a token feel it.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Steven Masley <Emyrk@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-02 13:14:44 -07:00
54e21f29a1 fix: deliver four more authorize errors to the client (#28450)
**TL;DR**

Fourth of the stack, split out of #28045. #28179 sent `invalid_scope` to
the client's own callback; this PR sends the rest of the errors raised
after the callback has been verified, behind one URL builder they all
now share.

| PR | What it does |
|---|---|
| #28007 | Schema: `codes.scope` and `tokens.scope`, so a negotiated
scope has somewhere to live. |
| #28167 | `ScopesCover` compares an allowlist against a request by
permission coverage rather than by name. |
| #28178 | The authorize endpoint negotiates the scope against the app's
allowlist and persists it on the code. |
| #28179 | The consent page lists the negotiated permissions, and
`invalid_scope` reaches the client's callback per RFC 6749 §4.1.2.1. |
| **#28450 (this)** | The same delivery for every other error raised
once the callback is trusted. |

- #28179 has merged, so this diff is against main and reviews on its
own.
- Nothing about what a token can do changes here. This is delivery, not
enforcement.

**Contract change**

Four failures now arrive at the app's registered callback instead of
terminating on Coder, so an integrator with error handling on its
callback starts seeing codes it never received.

| Verb | Condition | Error code | Was |
|------|-----------|------------|-----|
| GET | `response_type != code` | `unsupported_response_type` | static
"Unsupported Response Type" page, 400 |
| POST | `response_type != code` | `unsupported_response_type` |
`WriteOAuth2Error`, 400 |
| POST | `code_challenge_method=plain` | `invalid_request` |
`WriteOAuth2Error`, 400 |
| GET | `code_challenge_method=plain` | `invalid_request` | consent
page, 200, refused after Allow |

The GET static error page loses its only caller. The last row is what
review found: the method was checked on POST only, so the user approved
a request that could never succeed.

**Where in the OAuth Flow**

<details>
<summary>Diagram: where these errors are raised, and what licenses the
redirect</summary>

```mermaid
flowchart TD
    EX["GET or POST /oauth2/authorize<br/>extractAuthorizeParams exact-matches redirect_uri<br/>against the app's registered callback"]

    EX -->|"no match, rejected scheme, unparsable,<br/>other param failures"| CODER["Answers on Coder<br/>RFC 6749 3.1.2.4: MUST NOT redirect"]
    EX -->|"matched: a validatedCallbackURL,<br/>which is what licenses a redirect"| RT{"response_type == code?"}

    RT -->|no| E1["unsupported_response_type (this PR)"]
    RT -->|yes| PK{"code_challenge_method S256 or omitted?"}
    PK -->|no| E2["invalid_request (this PR, and newly checked on GET)"]
    PK -->|yes| SC{"scope negotiable?"}
    SC -->|no| E3["invalid_scope (previous PR)"]
    SC -->|yes| OK["GET: consent page, cancel link is access_denied<br/>POST: authorization code"]

    E1 --> OUT
    E2 --> OUT
    E3 --> OUT
    OK --> OUT["One builder produces every URL the flow emits:<br/>error redirect, cancel link, success code"]
```

</details>

- Authorize endpoint only, both verbs. The token exchange, refresh, and
revocation are untouched.
- Every redirect is licensed by a `validatedCallbackURL`, a type
produced only where `extractAuthorizeParams` exact-matches the URI
against the app's registration. A guard, not a proof: no other package
can fabricate one, this one still can.
- One builder now produces every response URL, including the consent
page's cancel link, which rolled its own and edited the shared URL in
place rather than copying it.
- Each rejection logs. The error leaves in a `Location` header, which
`loggermw` does not record, so a failed authorization used to look
exactly like a successful one.

**Three smaller behavior changes**

- A callback registered with `code`, `error`, `error_description`, or
`state` in its own query no longer receives that value back. A
registered `error=` rode out on the success redirect, where a client
that reads `error` first discards a valid code. The rest of the
registered query is kept, as §3.1.2 requires.
- `error_description` is confined to the NQSCHAR set Appendix A permits.
Descriptions name the offending value with `%q`, so every
`invalid_scope` Coder emits today carries excluded characters. Quotes
now render as apostrophes.
- An unparsable `redirect_uri` returns 400 instead of 500. It reached a
nil dereference in `httpapi.RedirectURL`, which `POST /oauth2/tokens`
also uses, and that endpoint takes no API key.

**What it satisfies**

- RFC 6749 §4.1.2.1 — on a failure that is not a bad redirection URI,
the server informs the client through the redirection URI. That is the
whole PR.
- RFC 6749 §3.1.2.4 and §4.1.2.1 — a missing, invalid, or mismatching
redirection URI "MUST NOT" be redirected to. A mismatched URI, and a
registered URI with a rejected scheme, still answer on Coder. Pinned by
`MismatchedRedirectURINotRedirected` and
`DangerousCallbackSchemeNotRedirected`.
- RFC 6749 Appendix A — `error_description` is NQSCHAR, and the rule is
on the decoded value, so percent-encoding on the wire does not satisfy
it.
- RFC 6749 §4.1.2 and §3.1.2 — the four reserved response parameters are
dropped from the registered query; everything else in it is retained.
- Not yet: the remaining parameter failures do have a trusted callback
in hand, but the parser reports one verdict for every field at once, so
the caller cannot say which field failed. A follow-up classifies them.
The two `server_error` sites also stay put: sending an internal fault
outbound with a Coder-written description wants its own review.

**Docs and Swagger.** `docs/admin/integrations/oauth2-provider.md` gains
a Common Issues entry per newly redirected code, and the implicit-grant
limitation now says where the error arrives. Both authorize verbs
document the 302, the GET side for the first time.

---

Split out of #28045
([PLAT-479](https://linear.app/codercom/issue/PLAT-479)). Fourth of the
stack. #28179 has merged, so this reviews against main.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Steven Masley <Emyrk@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-02 12:43:32 -07:00
Bobby Ho 20a41c067e feat: reject secret creation and fix reporting for public clients (#28097)
**TL;DR**

On top of #28047, closing the last two gaps in the stack split out of
#27873. A public client can now register (#28046) and exchange a code
(#28047), but the admin secrets API will still issue it a secret that
authenticates nothing, and the registration responses still report an
auth method the token endpoint will not accept.

| PR | What it does |
|---|---|
| #27712 | Schema: `app_secret_id` becomes nullable and tokens gain an
always-populated `app_id`, so ownership checks work without a secret
row. |
| #28041 | Accepts bare custom-scheme redirect URIs (`vscode://`,
`cursor://`) that native apps actually register. |
| #28043 | Derives and stores `client_type` (public vs confidential)
from the requested `token_endpoint_auth_method`, and pins it across
updates. |
| #28046 | Registration issues no secret for a public client and returns
no `client_secret`. |
| #28047 | The token endpoint accepts the exchange without a
`client_secret`. Discovery advertises `none`. |
| **#28097 (this)** | The admin secrets API refuses to create a secret
for a public client, and registration, read, and update report the auth
method the token endpoint actually enforces. |

A public client can only come into existence through dynamic client
registration, which is off by default, so neither guard is reachable
until DCR is enabled.

**Where in the flow**

- `POST /oauth2-provider/apps/{app}/secrets`, the admin secrets API. The
rest of the secret lifecycle is untouched: `GET` and `DELETE` are
unchanged, and a confidential app behaves exactly as before.
- The three RFC 7591 and 7592 responses that carry
`token_endpoint_auth_method`: registration (`POST`), read (`GET`), and
update (`PUT`). Only what is reported changes; the stored column is left
as the client sent it.
- Authorize, token exchange, refresh, and revocation are untouched.

**What it satisfies**

- RFC 7591 §2: `none` means the client is public and "does not have a
client secret", so the secrets API should not create one for it.
- RFC 7591 §3.2.1: the server MUST return all registered metadata and
MAY replace a requested value with a suitable one. Reporting the
enforced method in place of a stored one that contradicts `client_type`
is that substitution.
- RFC 7592 §2.2: an update MUST include all metadata as returned by a
previous registration, read, or update. Because clients echo back what
Coder reports, reporting the enforced method is what lets a legacy row
heal on the client's next `PUT`.
- RFC 7591 §2 default: an app with no stored method reports
`client_secret_basic`, which is both the RFC default and what
`ApplyDefaults` substitutes on update.
- OAuth 2.1 §3.2.1: the token endpoint enforces on `client_type`, so a
reported method that disagrees with it tells a client to authenticate in
a way the server will reject.

---

- `CreateAppSecret` returns 400 for a public client before generating
anything. The secret would authenticate nothing, since the token
endpoint no longer checks one for a public client. Deleting it would be
worse: `oauth2_provider_app_tokens.app_secret_id` is `ON DELETE
CASCADE`, so removing a confidential app's secret takes its tokens with
it, but a public client's tokens carry a NULL `app_secret_id` (#27712)
and survive. An admin who deleted the secret would think they had cut
off the client when they had not.
- `reportedAuthMethod()` replaces the raw stored value in all three
registration responses. It returns the stored method when it agrees with
`client_type`, `none` for a public app, and `client_secret_basic`
otherwise.
- The rows that can disagree are clients registered before #28043
derived the type from the method: the method was stored as sent while
the type was always `confidential`. Such a client holds a secret its
exchange still requires, while `GET` reported `none` and told it to drop
that secret.
- The stored column is deliberately not rewritten, so the response can
still differ from the row. That divergence is what a read-modify-write
client resolves on its next update, and the test asserts the row keeps
what the client sent.
- Coverage: the secrets guard asserts the 400 and that no partial secret
row was left behind. A table test walks `GET` then `PUT` over six
stored-method and client-type pairs: the legacy mismatch in both resend
shapes, the reverse mismatch that registration cannot produce but the
function still handles, an empty stored method, and the single pair that
already agrees and must be reported as stored.
- Docs: the client type is fixed at registration and a type-changing
update is rejected with `invalid_client_metadata` (behavior from #28043
that was never written down), plus what a legacy `none` client now sees.

Refs
https://linear.app/codercom/issue/ENG-3029/oauth2-support-public-client



## Manual Tests

Verified by hand against a local dev deployment
(`v2.36.3-devel+c85e4621ef`, dev Postgres), in addition to the automated
suite.

Both guards are reachable only through dynamic client registration,
which was confirmed off by default on this deployment and enabled for
the run. Two of the scenarios need a row where `client_type` and
`token_endpoint_auth_method` disagree, which registration cannot produce
since #28043 derives one from the other, so those rows were seeded by
updating the method column directly on a purpose-built client.

| # | Scenario | Result |
|---|----------|--------|
| 1 | Secrets API refuses a public client, with the guard's own message
| Pass |
| 2 | No partial secret row is left behind by the rejection | Pass |
| 3 | A confidential app's secret create, list, and delete are unchanged
| Pass |
| 4 | Admin-created apps are always confidential, so the guard is
unreachable there | Pass |
| 5 | When stored method and client type agree, the stored value is
reported unchanged | Pass |
| 6 | A legacy confidential row storing `none` reports
`client_secret_basic` | Pass |
| 7 | The reported method is the one the token endpoint enforces, in
both directions | Pass |
| 8 | An update resending the stored value is accepted and leaves the
row alone | Pass |
| 9 | An update resending the reported value heals the row | Pass |
| 10 | The reverse mismatch, a public row storing a secret method,
reports `none` | Pass |
| 11 | An empty or unrecognized stored method falls back to
`client_secret_basic` | Pass |
| 12 | Type-changing updates are rejected both ways,
`client_secret_basic` to `client_secret_post` is allowed | Pass |
| 13 | Regression sweep of the merged stack, discovery through
revocation | Pass |
| 14 | Every claim in the new docs paragraphs matches observed behavior
| Pass |

No correctness defects found. Commands and captured output for each
scenario below.

**Two notes for anyone re-running this.**

The previous runbook for this stack asserts the opposite of scenario 12:
it flips a confidential client to public with a `PUT` and records `200`.
That was correct before #28043 pinned the client type. The `400` here is
the fix, not a regression.

Generate the PKCE verifier with enough entropy that stripping `=+/`
still leaves 43 characters. The `openssl rand -base64 32 | tr -d "=+/" |
cut -c -43` recipe yields 38 to 43, so most runs are rejected by the
token endpoint under RFC 7636 section 4.1 with an error that looks
unrelated. Same trap noted in #28045.

<details>
<summary>Shell helpers used throughout</summary>

```bash
export BASE_URL=http://localhost:3000
export AUTH_HEADER="Coder-Session-Token: $(cat ./.coderv2/session)"
export PGURL="postgres://coder@localhost:$(cat ./.coderv2/postgres/port)/coder?sslmode=disable&password=$(cat ./.coderv2/postgres/password)"

# Enable DCR; both guards are unreachable without it.
curl -s -X PUT "$BASE_URL/api/v2/oauth2-provider/settings" -H "$AUTH_HEADER" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"dynamic_client_registration_enabled": true}'

# Print "HTTP <code>" then the body.
show() {
  local out; out=$(curl -s -w '\n%{http_code}' "$@")
  echo "HTTP $(printf '%s\n' "$out" | tail -n1)"
  printf '%s\n' "$out" | sed '$d' | jq . 2>/dev/null || printf '%s\n' "$out" | sed '$d'
}

# $1=name, $2=auth method ("" to omit the field).
register() {
  local body
  if [ -z "$2" ]; then
    body=$(jq -nc --arg n "$1" '{client_name:$n,redirect_uris:["http://localhost:9876/callback"]}')
  else
    body=$(jq -nc --arg n "$1" --arg m "$2" '{client_name:$n,redirect_uris:["http://localhost:9876/callback"],token_endpoint_auth_method:$m}')
  fi
  curl -s -X POST "$BASE_URL/oauth2/register" -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d "$body"
}

# The stored row, as opposed to what the API reports.
stored() {
  psql "$PGURL" -At -c "select client_type || ' | ' || coalesce(token_endpoint_auth_method,'<NULL>')
    from oauth2_provider_apps where id = '$1';"
}

# 43 characters from the unreserved set, always. See the note above.
gen_verifier() { openssl rand -base64 96 | tr -d "=+/\n" | cut -c -43; }
challenge_for() { printf '%s' "$1" | openssl dgst -sha256 -binary | base64 | tr -d "=" | tr '+/' '-_'; }

# Full PKCE authorize plus exchange. $1=client_id, $2=client_secret ("" for none).
exchange() {
  local verifier challenge redirect code args
  verifier=$(gen_verifier); challenge=$(challenge_for "$verifier")
  redirect=$(curl -s -X POST \
    "$BASE_URL/oauth2/authorize?client_id=$1&response_type=code&redirect_uri=http://localhost:9876/callback&state=$(openssl rand -hex 16)&code_challenge=$challenge&code_challenge_method=S256" \
    -H "$AUTH_HEADER" -w '\n%{redirect_url}' -o /dev/null)
  code=$(printf '%s' "$redirect" | grep -oE 'code=[^&]+' | sed 's/code=//')
  args=(-d "grant_type=authorization_code" -d "code=$code" -d "client_id=$1"
        -d "redirect_uri=http://localhost:9876/callback" -d "code_verifier=$verifier")
  [ -n "$2" ] && args+=(-d "client_secret=$2")
  curl -s -X POST "$BASE_URL/oauth2/tokens" -H "Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded" "${args[@]}"
}
```

</details>

<details>
<summary>1. Secrets API refuses a public client</summary>

A bare non-`201` would also be produced by a request that failed on
authentication, routing, or a malformed UUID before reaching the guard,
so the status and the message are both asserted.

```bash
PUB=$(register manual-28097-public none)
PUB_ID=$(echo "$PUB" | jq -r '.client_id')
stored "$PUB_ID"
show -X POST "$BASE_URL/api/v2/oauth2-provider/apps/$PUB_ID/secrets" -H "$AUTH_HEADER"
```

```text
public | none
HTTP 400
{
  "message": "Cannot create a client secret for a public OAuth2 app.",
  "detail": "Public clients authenticate with PKCE and have no client secret. The client type is fixed at registration, so register a new confidential client instead."
}
```

The message is the guard's own, so execution reached `CreateAppSecret`
and returned at the `IsPublic()` check. The detail points at registering
a new confidential client, which scenario 12 confirms is the only
remedy.

</details>

<details>
<summary>2. No partial secret row is left behind</summary>

The guard returns before `GenerateSecret()`, so nothing should exist at
either layer. The count was already `0` at registration, and a
confidential app is queried the same way as a control, so `0` is not
merely what this query always returns.

```bash
curl -s "$BASE_URL/api/v2/oauth2-provider/apps/$PUB_ID/secrets" -H "$AUTH_HEADER" | jq -c .
psql "$PGURL" -At -c "select count(*) from oauth2_provider_app_secrets where app_id = '$PUB_ID';"
psql "$PGURL" -At -c "select count(*) from oauth2_provider_app_secrets where app_id = '$CONF_ID';"
```

```text
[]
0
1
```

</details>

<details>
<summary>3. A confidential app's secret lifecycle is unchanged</summary>

```bash
CONF=$(register manual-28097-confidential "")
CONF_ID=$(echo "$CONF" | jq -r '.client_id')
show -X POST "$BASE_URL/api/v2/oauth2-provider/apps/$CONF_ID/secrets" -H "$AUTH_HEADER"
curl -s "$BASE_URL/api/v2/oauth2-provider/apps/$CONF_ID/secrets" -H "$AUTH_HEADER" | jq -c '[.[].id]'
curl -s -X DELETE "$BASE_URL/api/v2/oauth2-provider/apps/$CONF_ID/secrets/$SECRET_ID" \
  -H "$AUTH_HEADER" -o /dev/null -w "delete: HTTP %{http_code}\n"
```

```text
HTTP 201
{
  "id": "da7a1029-47c4-435e-988a-557ffa4aeacf",
  "client_secret_full": "coder_POUtoElODM_<redacted>"
}
["b2fc55b6-...","da7a1029-...","24f8f8c2-..."]
delete: HTTP 204
["b2fc55b6-...","da7a1029-..."]
```

Create, list, and delete all behave as before. The guard keys on
`client_type` and nothing else on this path changed.

Unrelated observation, not a finding against this PR: the listing
returns two different `client_secret_truncated` formats. Secrets issued
at registration are asterisk-padded (`***...TzqEOt`, from
`createDisplaySecret`), while secrets issued through the admin API show
the bare last six characters (`Rixs60`). Both write the same column and
surface through the same field. Cosmetic and pre-existing, but a UI
listing both kinds together would render them inconsistently.

</details>

<details>
<summary>4. Admin-created apps are always confidential</summary>

`postOAuth2ProviderApp` hardcodes the client type, so the guard is
unreachable through the admin create path.

```bash
ADMIN_APP=$(curl -s -X POST "$BASE_URL/api/v2/oauth2-provider/apps" -H "$AUTH_HEADER" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"name":"manual-28097-admin","callback_url":"http://localhost:9876/callback"}')
ADMIN_ID=$(echo "$ADMIN_APP" | jq -r '.id')
stored "$ADMIN_ID"
show -X POST "$BASE_URL/api/v2/oauth2-provider/apps/$ADMIN_ID/secrets" -H "$AUTH_HEADER"
```

```text
confidential | client_secret_post
HTTP 201
{
  "id": "a77ab276-ea74-4711-ba8b-955a8cb97951",
  "client_secret_full": "coder_eGlt04LhYg_<redacted>"
}
```

Together with scenario 1 this brackets the guard: it fires for a
dynamically registered public client and for nothing else. Note the
admin API stores `client_secret_post`, not the RFC 7591 section 2
default, so every admin-created app is an agreement case for scenario 5.
Such apps carry no registration access token, so they cannot reach the
RFC 7592 endpoints where the reporting change applies at all.

</details>

<details>
<summary>5. Agreement cases report the stored value unchanged</summary>

The `client_secret_post` case is the one that matters. An implementation
that substituted the type default on every call would still pass the
public case, since `none` is the public default, but would rewrite this
client to `client_secret_basic` and tell it to send its secret in the
wrong place.

```bash
curl -s "$BASE_URL/oauth2/clients/$PUB_ID" -H "Authorization: Bearer $PUB_RAT" \
  | jq -c '{reported: .token_endpoint_auth_method}'

POST_REG=$(register manual-28097-post client_secret_post)
POST_ID=$(echo "$POST_REG" | jq -r '.client_id')
echo "$POST_REG" | jq -c '{reported_on_register: .token_endpoint_auth_method}'
curl -s "$BASE_URL/oauth2/clients/$POST_ID" -H "Authorization: Bearer $POST_RAT" \
  | jq -c '.token_endpoint_auth_method'
stored "$POST_ID"
```

```text
{"reported":"none"}
{"reported_on_register":"client_secret_post"}
"client_secret_post"
confidential | client_secret_post
```

Registration and read both report the stored value. The update site is
covered by scenarios 8 and 9.

</details>

<details>
<summary>6. A legacy confidential row storing `none` reports
`client_secret_basic`</summary>

Seeded from a real confidential client so it genuinely holds the secret
its exchange requires, with only the method column rewritten. This is
the pre-#28043 shape and cannot be produced through the API any more.

```bash
LEGACY=$(register manual-28097-legacy "")
LEGACY_ID=$(echo "$LEGACY" | jq -r '.client_id')
LEGACY_SECRET=$(echo "$LEGACY" | jq -r '.client_secret')
stored "$LEGACY_ID"

psql "$PGURL" -c "update oauth2_provider_apps set token_endpoint_auth_method = 'none'
  where id = '$LEGACY_ID';"
stored "$LEGACY_ID"
psql "$PGURL" -At -c "select count(*) from oauth2_provider_app_secrets where app_id = '$LEGACY_ID';"

curl -s "$BASE_URL/oauth2/clients/$LEGACY_ID" -H "Authorization: Bearer $LEGACY_RAT" \
  | jq -c '{reported: .token_endpoint_auth_method}'
stored "$LEGACY_ID"
```

```text
confidential | client_secret_basic
UPDATE 1
confidential | none
1
{"reported":"client_secret_basic"}
confidential | none
```

The response substitutes and the row is deliberately not rewritten. A
read has no side effects.

</details>

<details>
<summary>7. The reported method is the one actually enforced</summary>

The token endpoint enforces on `client_type`, which is still
confidential, so the secret is required regardless of what the method
column says.

```bash
exchange "$LEGACY_ID" "$LEGACY_SECRET" | jq -c '{has_access: has("access_token"), error, error_description}'
exchange "$LEGACY_ID" ""               | jq -c '{has_access: has("access_token"), error, error_description}'
```

```text
{"has_access":true,"error":null,"error_description":null}
{"has_access":false,"error":"invalid_request","error_description":"Missing required parameter: client_secret"}
```

The second line is the pre-fix breakage reproduced. A client that read
`"token_endpoint_auth_method": "none"` from `GET` and dropped its secret
accordingly, which is what RFC 7592 tells it to do, would have hit
exactly this on its next exchange. The old response was not internally
inconsistent, it was actionable and wrong.

Scenario 10 shows the same property in the opposite direction.

</details>

<details>
<summary>8. An update resending the stored value is accepted and changes
nothing</summary>

```bash
show -X PUT "$BASE_URL/oauth2/clients/$LEGACY_ID" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $LEGACY_RAT" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"client_name":"manual-28097-legacy","redirect_uris":["http://localhost:9876/callback"],"token_endpoint_auth_method":"none"}'
stored "$LEGACY_ID"
```

```text
HTTP 200
  "token_endpoint_auth_method": "client_secret_basic",
confidential | none
```

Three things at once. The update is accepted, which is why the
type-change guard requires the auth method to actually change: the
requested `none` implies a public client while the row is confidential,
so a guard keyed on the type mismatch alone would reject this and lock a
legacy client out of managing its own registration. The `PUT` reports
the same substituted value as the `GET`, covering the third call site.
The row keeps what the client sent, so the divergence persists until
scenario 9.

</details>

<details>
<summary>9. An update resending the reported value heals the
row</summary>

```bash
show -X PUT "$BASE_URL/oauth2/clients/$LEGACY_ID" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $LEGACY_RAT" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"client_name":"manual-28097-legacy","redirect_uris":["http://localhost:9876/callback"],"token_endpoint_auth_method":"client_secret_basic"}'
stored "$LEGACY_ID"
curl -s "$BASE_URL/oauth2/clients/$LEGACY_ID" -H "Authorization: Bearer $LEGACY_RAT" \
  | jq -c '{reported: .token_endpoint_auth_method}'
exchange "$LEGACY_ID" "$LEGACY_SECRET" | jq -c '{has_access: has("access_token")}'
```

```text
HTTP 200
  "token_endpoint_auth_method": "client_secret_basic",
confidential | client_secret_basic
{"reported":"client_secret_basic"}
{"has_access":true}
```

The row healed through an ordinary read-modify-write cycle, with no
migration, backfill, or admin action. That works only because scenario 8
keeps the door open and this response gives the client a correct value
to echo back; remove either and the row stays inconsistent indefinitely.

</details>

<details>
<summary>10. The reverse mismatch reports `none`</summary>

Registration cannot produce this direction either, but
`reportedAuthMethod` branches on the general disagreement rather than
the one shape known to exist, so it is covered.

```bash
REVERSE=$(register manual-28097-reverse none)
REVERSE_ID=$(echo "$REVERSE" | jq -r '.client_id')
psql "$PGURL" -c "update oauth2_provider_apps set token_endpoint_auth_method = 'client_secret_basic'
  where id = '$REVERSE_ID';"
stored "$REVERSE_ID"
curl -s "$BASE_URL/oauth2/clients/$REVERSE_ID" -H "Authorization: Bearer $REVERSE_RAT" \
  | jq -c '{reported: .token_endpoint_auth_method}'
exchange "$REVERSE_ID" "" | jq -c '{has_access: has("access_token"), error}'
```

```text
public | client_secret_basic
{"reported":"none"}
{"has_access":true,"error":null}
```

This client has no secret row at all and the token endpoint does not ask
for one, so `none` is what the response should say. Reporting the stored
`client_secret_basic` would have instructed it to send a secret that
does not exist.

Both resend shapes behave symmetrically with scenarios 8 and 9:

```text
resend stored (client_secret_basic) -> reported "none", row unchanged
resend reported (none)              -> reported "none", row now public | none
```

</details>

<details>
<summary>11. Empty or unrecognized stored methods fall back to the
default</summary>

`NULL` and `''` are indistinguishable once read into `sql.NullString`. A
third case was added because the function gates on validity rather than
emptiness.

```bash
for v in "null" "''" "'private_key_jwt'"; do
  psql "$PGURL" -At -c "update oauth2_provider_apps set token_endpoint_auth_method = $v where id = '$CONF_ID';"
  stored "$CONF_ID"
  curl -s "$BASE_URL/oauth2/clients/$CONF_ID" -H "Authorization: Bearer $CONF_RAT" \
    | jq -c '.token_endpoint_auth_method'
done
```

```text
confidential | <NULL>
"client_secret_basic"
confidential |
"client_secret_basic"
confidential | private_key_jwt
"client_secret_basic"
```

`private_key_jwt` is a real RFC 7591 method that Coder does not
implement. Reporting it back would advertise an authentication scheme
the token endpoint cannot honor, which is the same class of problem as
the legacy `none` report in scenario 7.

</details>

<details>
<summary>12. Type-changing updates are rejected both ways</summary>

```bash
show -X PUT "$BASE_URL/oauth2/clients/$CONF_ID" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $CONF_RAT" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"client_name":"manual-28097-confidential","redirect_uris":["http://localhost:9876/callback"],"token_endpoint_auth_method":"none"}'
stored "$CONF_ID"

show -X PUT "$BASE_URL/oauth2/clients/$PUB_ID" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $PUB_RAT" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"client_name":"manual-28097-public","redirect_uris":["http://localhost:9876/callback"],"token_endpoint_auth_method":"client_secret_basic"}'
stored "$PUB_ID"

show -X PUT "$BASE_URL/oauth2/clients/$CONF_ID" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $CONF_RAT" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"client_name":"manual-28097-confidential","redirect_uris":["http://localhost:9876/callback"],"token_endpoint_auth_method":"client_secret_post"}'
stored "$CONF_ID"
```

```text
HTTP 400
{
  "error": "invalid_client_metadata",
  "error_description": "token_endpoint_auth_method cannot move an existing client between public and confidential (stored \"client_secret_basic\", requested \"none\"); the client type is fixed at registration, so register a new client instead"
}
confidential | client_secret_basic

HTTP 400
{
  "error": "invalid_client_metadata",
  "error_description": "token_endpoint_auth_method cannot move an existing client between public and confidential (stored \"none\", requested \"client_secret_basic\"); the client type is fixed at registration, so register a new client instead"
}
public | none

HTTP 200
  "token_endpoint_auth_method": "client_secret_post",
confidential | client_secret_post
```

Both rejections leave the row and its secrets untouched. A partial
application would be the dangerous outcome here, a client left
confidential while its caller believes it went public.

The third case is the control. Two `400`s alone would be equally
consistent with a guard that rejects every `token_endpoint_auth_method`
change, a considerably more disruptive rule than the documented one. The
`200` pins the guard to the derived client type rather than the method
string.

The second case is also what backs scenario 1. If public to confidential
were permitted, the workaround to a refused secret request would be to
flip the type and ask again. The two guards close that loop, which is
why the same remedy appears in both error messages.

</details>

<details>
<summary>13. Regression sweep of the merged stack</summary>

Nothing here is new in this PR, but the guards sit on top of it.

```text
discovery token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported : ["client_secret_basic","client_secret_post","none"]
public registration, client_secret key present  : false
confidential registration, secret issued        : true, method defaulted to client_secret_basic
PKCE-only exchange, no client_secret sent       : access + refresh issued
access token against /api/v2/users/me           : 200
token row app_id / app_secret_id                : populated / NULL
RFC 7009 revoke of own refresh token            : 200, access token then 401
authorized-apps listing while a token is live   : [{"name":"manual-28097-public"}]
bulk DELETE /oauth2/tokens                      : 204, listing then []
```

The NULL `app_secret_id` is what makes the secrets guard necessary. That
column is `ON DELETE CASCADE`, so deleting a confidential app's secret
takes its tokens with it, while a public client's tokens would survive.
An admin who deleted such a secret would believe access was cut off when
it was not.

PKCE failure modes were checked separately, since the token endpoint
distinguishes two the previous runbook treated as one:

```text
verifier omitted                     : invalid_request, RFC 7636 section 4.1 bounds
well-formed 43 chars but wrong       : invalid_grant, "The PKCE code verifier is invalid"
correct verifier, replaying that code: invalid_grant, "invalid or expired"
```

The third confirms the failed check destroys the code, so a leaked code
cannot absorb repeated verifier guesses.

</details>

<details>
<summary>14. The new docs paragraphs match observed behavior</summary>

`pnpm run lint-docs` reports 0 errors across 501 files, `pnpm run
format-docs` rewrites nothing, and Vale reports 0 errors with 2
warnings, both on pre-existing gerund headings that the same file on
`main` also produces. The new prose is one sentence per line.

| Documented claim | Verified by |
|---|---|
| A client's type is fixed when it registers | 12 |
| A type-changing update is rejected with `invalid_client_metadata` |
12, both directions |
| The client either holds a secret that would stop being required or has
none and no way to be issued one | 12 (2 secrets), 1 and 12 (0 secrets,
issuance refused) |
| Switching between `client_secret_basic` and `client_secret_post` is
allowed | 12 |
| To change type, register a new client | matches the remedy in both
errors and in scenario 1's detail |
| Legacy `none` clients are stored as confidential and still require
their `client_secret` | 6, 7 |
| Coder reports `client_secret_basic` for those clients | 6 |
| So that what it reports matches what it enforces | 7, both directions
|
| The mismatch clears itself the next time the client updates its
registration | 9 |

One wording note. Scenario 8 shows the mismatch does not clear on an
update that resends the stored value, so strictly it clears on the next
update carrying the reported value. A read-modify-write client, which is
what RFC 7592 section 2.2 prescribes, always carries the reported value,
so the sentence holds for the client it describes. A client that
hardcodes its own metadata would not self-heal, but it would also not be
following RFC 7592.

</details>

<details>
<summary>Cleanup</summary>

```bash
for id in "$PUB_ID" "$CONF_ID" "$POST_ID" "$LEGACY_ID" "$REVERSE_ID" "$ADMIN_ID"; do
  curl -s -X DELETE "$BASE_URL/api/v2/oauth2-provider/apps/$id" -H "$AUTH_HEADER" \
    -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n"
done
curl -s -X PUT "$BASE_URL/api/v2/oauth2-provider/settings" -H "$AUTH_HEADER" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{"dynamic_client_registration_enabled": false}'
show -X POST "$BASE_URL/oauth2/register" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"client_name":"should-fail","redirect_uris":["http://localhost:9876/callback"],"token_endpoint_auth_method":"none"}'
```

```text
204 (x6)
{"dynamic_client_registration_enabled":false}
HTTP 403
{"error":"invalid_request","error_description":"Dynamic client registration is disabled on this deployment"}
```

All six test apps deleted with no orphaned secret or token rows. Both
seeded rows had already healed to a consistent state before deletion.
DCR is back off, confirmed by a registration attempt rather than by
reading the flag back.

</details>
2026-09-01 08:58:01 -07:00
Bobby Ho 9be61a0c65 feat: accept PKCE-only token exchange for public clients (#28047)
**TL;DR**

Last of the stack, split out of #27873, that makes Coder usable by
public OAuth2 clients (CLIs, IDE plugins, MCP clients), which cannot
hold a secret and authenticate with PKCE alone.

| PR | What it does |
|---|---|
| #27712 | Schema: `app_secret_id` becomes nullable and tokens gain an
always-populated `app_id`, so ownership checks work without a secret
row. |
| #28041 | Accepts bare custom-scheme redirect URIs (`vscode://`,
`cursor://`) that native apps actually register. |
| #28043 | Derives and stores `client_type` (public vs confidential)
from the requested `token_endpoint_auth_method`, and pins it across
updates. |
| #28046 | Registration issues no secret for a public client and returns
no `client_secret`. |
| **#28047 (this)** | The token endpoint accepts the exchange without a
`client_secret`, so a public client can finally get a token. Discovery
now advertises `none`. |

Each of the earlier PRs is inert on its own: until this one, a
registered public client still could not complete a flow. Dynamic client
registration is off by default, so nothing here is user-visible until it
is enabled.

**Where in the flow**

- Token endpoint only — the `authorization_code` exchange. Authorize,
consent, and code issuance are untouched.
- Refresh and revocation come along for free: both already bind by
app_id, so a secretless token row works as-is.
- Discovery starts advertising `none`.

**What it satisfies**

- OAuth 2.1 §3.2.1 — only *confidential* clients must authenticate at
the token endpoint. A public client is no longer rejected for a missing
secret.
- OAuth 2.1 §4.1.3 — for a public client the server must instead ensure
the code was issued to the request's client_id. That check already
existed; here it becomes the sole binding.
- OAuth 2.1 §4.1.3 — client_id is required when the client does not
authenticate, and a code yields a token at most once: a failed PKCE
comparison consumes the code, so a leaked one cannot be brute-forced.
- OAuth 2.1 §2.1 + RFC 7591 §2 — `none` means public client with no
secret. The type is derived at registration (#28043) and read here.
- RFC 7636 §4.1 / §4.6 — a malformed verifier is `invalid_request`, a
wrong one `invalid_grant`. PKCE was already mandatory for every code
flow, so public clients inherit it.
- RFC 8414 §2 — advertised auth methods now match what the token
endpoint actually accepts.
- RFC 7009 — a cross-app revoke of a public client's token still returns
200 without revoking.

---

- The token endpoint stops requiring client_secret for a public client,
in both the presence check and secret validation. PKCE was already
mandatory for every authorization_code flow, so public clients inherit
it with no new validation code.
- The code ownership check (dbCode.AppID != app.ID) becomes the only
binding between the exchange and the app named by client_id for a public
client, where it was defense in depth for confidential ones. Retained,
now covered with a public client on both sides.
- Public client tokens carry a NULL app_secret_id rather than
referencing a secret row that does not exist. Refresh and revocation
already verify ownership via app_id, so they change only comments and
coverage.
- Discovery advertises `none` now that the token endpoint honors it.
- Valid() derives from the single canonical auth method list, so what
registration accepts and what discovery advertises cannot disagree.
- Swagger marks client_secret confidential-only.

Refs
https://linear.app/codercom/issue/ENG-3029/oauth2-support-public-client
2026-08-31 09:55:58 -07:00
57cbca585f feat: negotiate and persist authorization scope (#28178)
**TL;DR**

Middle of the stack, split out of #28045, that makes an OAuth2 app's
scope allowlist actually restrict what a client can be granted. The
authorize endpoint has always parsed `scope` and then thrown it away.

| PR | What it does |
|---|---|
| #28007 | Schema: `codes.scope` and `tokens.scope`, so a negotiated
scope has somewhere to live. Every code is still stamped unrestricted. |
| #28167 | `ScopesCover` compares an allowlist against a request by
permission coverage rather than by name, and fails closed on any shape
it does not model. Added with no production callers. |
| **#28178 (this)** | The authorize endpoint checks the request against
the scope catalog, grants it only if the app's filtered allowlist covers
it, and persists the result on the code. Both GET and POST negotiate, so
a doomed request fails before the consent page renders. |
| #28179 | The consent page states what was negotiated, and
`invalid_scope` is delivered to the client's own callback per RFC 6749
§4.1.2.1 instead of a Coder error page. |

- Each earlier PR is inert alone: the columns carry a placeholder, the
coverage rules have no caller.
- Visible on upgrade, unlike the rest of the stack. A scope name outside
the catalog, OIDC vocabulary included, now gets `invalid_scope`, on
admin-created apps as well as DCR ones.
- Tokens are unaffected. This changes which authorization requests
succeed, not what a token can do.

**Where in the flow**

- Authorize endpoint only, both legs: GET before the consent page
renders, POST before the code is minted. The token exchange, refresh,
and revocation are untouched.
- The result is persisted on the authorization code. The exchange copies
it onto the token row, but the API key it mints still carries no scope,
so nothing is enforced at request time yet.
- Registration and discovery are unchanged. The catalog checked against
is the `scopes_supported` both discovery documents already advertise.

**What it satisfies**

- OAuth 2.1 §1.4.1 — the server "MAY fully or partially ignore the scope
requested by the client, based on the authorization server policy". The
app's allowlist is that policy; until now the server ignored scope in
every direction.
- OAuth 2.1 §1.4.1 — on an omitted scope it "MUST either process the
request using a pre-defined default value or fail the request". The
filtered allowlist is that default; an allowlist filtering to nothing
takes the second branch. Same rule as RFC 6749 §3.3.
- OAuth 2.1 §1.4.1 — scope values "are defined by the authorization
server", and OIDC is named there as an extension that defines its own.
Hence `invalid_scope` for openid/profile/email rather than silent
acceptance.
- OAuth 2.1 §4.1.2.1 — `invalid_scope` is "invalid, unknown, or
malformed", which now covers an uncatalogued name and an over-broad one
alike. Delivery is interim here (static page on GET, error body on
POST); §4.1.2.1 wants it redirected to the client's callback, which is
#28179.
- OAuth 2.1 §4.1.1 — `scope` stays OPTIONAL. Omitting it selects a
default, never an error.
- RFC 7591 §2 — a registered `scope` is the list "the client can use
when requesting access tokens", a ceiling rather than a menu. Enforced
here for the first time; a client that registered an unsupportable one
repairs it via RFC 7592.
- RFC 8414 §2 — `scopes_supported` is that catalog, advertised since
before this stack, so a conformant client had no grounds to send a name
outside it.
- Not yet: §1.4.1 also requires `scope` in the token response when the
grant differs from the request. Tokens are untouched here, so that lands
with enforcement.

---

Split out of #28045
([PLAT-479](https://linear.app/codercom/issue/PLAT-479)). #28167 has
merged, so this diff is against main and reviews on its own.

The authorize endpoint parsed scope and threw it away, so an app's
allowlist never restricted anything and a client asking for too much was
never told no. Phase 1 added the columns that carry a negotiated scope
from a code to the token, but nothing wrote one.

**What changes**

- Requested names must be in the external scope catalog. The app's
stored allowlist is filtered through that same catalog, which only ever
narrows.
- The allowlist bounds authority, not spelling. A request is granted
when every permission it grants is also granted by the allowlist, named
or not, so an app allowed coder:workspaces.access can approve a client
asking only for workspace:ssh.
- Omitting scope grants the filtered allowlist (RFC 6749 §3.3).
- Both handlers negotiate, so a request that cannot succeed fails before
the consent page renders rather than after the user clicks Allow.
- Two paths produce an empty result and stay distinct. No allowlist and
no request keeps the previous unrestricted grant, written as an explicit
sentinel because the column is NOT NULL with a non-empty CHECK. An
allowlist filtering to nothing is rejected, since falling back would
grant more than it ever permitted.

**Accepted compatibility break, and it is wider than DCR.** The catalog
check runs before the allowlist is consulted, so it covers admin-created
apps too.

- Admin-created apps store no allowlist and had scope discarded
outright. A client sending OIDC vocabulary (openid, profile, email) now
gets invalid_scope on upgrade.
- DCR apps registered with openid, read or admin also hold allowlists
this server cannot grant from, and fail in both directions.
- scopes_supported has always been advertised on both discovery
documents, predating this stack, so a conformant client had no grounds
to send an uncatalogued name. RFC 6749 §4.1.2.1 makes invalid_scope the
answer for one that does.
- Grandfathering would seed the enforcement path with values it cannot
evaluate: a visible error now, a silent hole later.
- The rejection names the registered scopes and the remedy. Pinned in
TestOAuth2AuthorizeDCRScopeCompatibility.

**Interim error delivery, replaced in PR 3.** Rejections go out however
each handler already reports errors: a static error page on GET, an
OAuth2 error body on POST. #28179 delivers them to the client's own
callback (RFC 6749 §4.1.2.1) and rewrites the requireInvalidScope
helper. About 25 lines here are interim on purpose and flagged as such
in that helper.

**Not changed.** Issued tokens are still unrestricted. The exchange
copies the negotiated scope onto the token record, but the API key it
mints carries no scope. This changes which authorization requests
succeed, not what a token can do.

Stack: #28167 (merged), this PR, then #28179 for the consent page and
the invalid_scope redirect.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Steven Masley <Emyrk@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-08-31 09:29:27 -07:00
Bobby Ho fbac602456 feat!: add admin-controlled dynamic client registration toggle (#27316)
`POST /oauth2/register` (RFC 7591 Dynamic Client Registration) has
exactly one gate today: `ExperimentOAuth2`, a static, process-lifetime
flag that wraps the entire `/oauth2/*` route tree as an all-or-nothing
switch. That flag is scheduled for removal at GA, which would leave DCR
with zero admin control at all once it is gone.

Add a persistent, DCR-specific `oauth2_dcr_enabled` deployment setting,
independent of the experiment system, so admin control over DCR survives
GA. `POST /oauth2/register` checks the flag and rejects new
registrations with an RFC 7591-shaped `403` when disabled; discovery
metadata (`GET /.well-known/oauth-authorization-server`) conditionally
omits `registration_endpoint`. A new audited `GET`/`PUT
/api/v2/oauth2-provider/settings` endpoint lets an owner toggle it live,
no restart required. The setting defaults to disabled, matching the
canonical design proposal; disabling only stops new self-registrations,
clients that already registered continue to authorize and exchange
tokens normally.

Address issue described in
[ENG-3056](https://linear.app/codercom/issue/ENG-3056/oauth2-dcr-admin-configurable-enabledisable).

## Where this sits in the request path

```mermaid
sequenceDiagram
    autonumber
    participant A as Admin
    participant S as coderd
    participant DB as site_configs<br/>(oauth2_dcr_enabled)
    participant C as OAuth2/MCP Client

    Note over A,S: Admin toggles DCR (new)
    A->>S: PUT /api/v2/oauth2-provider/settings<br/>{dynamic_client_registration_enabled: false}
    S->>S: authorizeContext(ActionUpdate, ResourceDeploymentConfig)
    S->>DB: UPSERT oauth2_dcr_enabled = false
    S-->>A: 200 OK (audited)

    Note over C,S: Client discovery + registration afterward
    C->>S: GET /.well-known/oauth-authorization-server
    S->>DB: GetOAuth2DCREnabled (system ctx, every request, no cache)
    DB-->>S: false
    S-->>C: 200 metadata, registration_endpoint omitted

    C->>S: POST /oauth2/register
    S->>DB: GetOAuth2DCREnabled (system ctx, every request, no cache)
    DB-->>S: false
    S-->>C: 403 invalid_request,<br/>"Dynamic client registration is disabled"

    Note over C,S: A client that registered before the change is unaffected
    C->>S: GET /oauth2/authorize?client_id=...
    Note over S: no DCR-enabled check on this path
    S-->>C: 200 (proceeds normally)

    C->>S: PUT/DELETE /oauth2/clients/{client_id} (RFC 7592 self-management)
    Note over S: no DCR-enabled check on this path either
    S-->>C: 200 (proceeds normally)
```

## Files changed: manual vs. generated

Reviewers should focus on the **manual** files. The **generated** ones
are `make gen` output that follows mechanically from the manual changes
and don't need direct review.

<details>
<summary><b>Manual files (26)</b> — click to expand, grouped the same
way as "Suggested review order" below</summary>

**1. Database**

| File | What changed |
|---|---|
| `coderd/database/queries/siteconfig.sql` | New
`GetOAuth2DCREnabled`/`UpsertOAuth2DCREnabled` query pair on the
existing generic `site_configs` table. No schema change. |
| `coderd/database/dbauthz/dbauthz.go` | RBAC check
(`rbac.ResourceDeploymentConfig`) on the two new query methods; extends
the `subjectSystemOAuth2` system-actor role with read-only
`ResourceDeploymentConfig` access, needed so the public
discovery/registration endpoints can read the flag via
`dbauthz.AsSystemOAuth2`. |
| `coderd/database/dbauthz/dbauthz_test.go` | RBAC assertion coverage
for `GetOAuth2DCREnabled`/`UpsertOAuth2DCREnabled` in the
method-coverage test suite. |

**2. Request gating (the actual feature)**

| File | What changed |
|---|---|
| `coderd/oauth2provider/registration.go` | The actual gate:
`CreateDynamicClientRegistration` reads the flag first and returns an
RFC 7591-shaped `403` when disabled (defaults disabled if never
configured). |
| `coderd/oauth2provider/registration_test.go` | New unit test,
`TestCreateDynamicClientRegistration_DCREnabled`: calls the handler
directly (no HTTP server), covering enabled / explicitly disabled /
never-configured. |
| `coderd/oauth2provider/metadata.go` | `GetAuthorizationServerMetadata`
conditionally omits `registration_endpoint` from discovery metadata when
DCR is disabled. |
| `coderd/oauth2provider/metadata_test.go` | New unit test,
`TestGetAuthorizationServerMetadata_DCREnabled`: same three states, for
the discovery handler. |

**3. Admin settings endpoint**

| File | What changed |
|---|---|
| `codersdk/oauth2.go` | New `OAuth2ProviderSettings` SDK type plus
`Client.OAuth2ProviderSettings`/`PutOAuth2ProviderSettings` methods. |
| `coderd/oauth2.go` | New
`oauth2ProviderSettings`/`putOAuth2ProviderSettings` admin handlers
(audited via `audit.InitRequest`); updates the
`GetAuthorizationServerMetadata` call site to pass `api.Database`. |
| `coderd/coderd.go` | Registers `GET`/`PUT
/api/v2/oauth2-provider/settings`. |
| `coderd/oauth2_provider_settings_test.go` | New test file: admin
`GET`/`PUT` round-trip, default-disabled-before-any-`PUT`, and `403` for
a non-owner on both `GET` and `PUT`. |

**4. Audit wiring**

| File | What changed |
|---|---|
| `coderd/database/types.go` | New `database.OAuth2ProviderSettings`
audit-only struct (mirrors `NotificationsSettings`). |
| `coderd/audit/diff.go` | Adds the new struct to the `Auditable` type
union. |
| `coderd/audit/request.go` | Adds the new struct to all four dispatch
switches (`ResourceTarget`, `ResourceID`, `ResourceType`,
`ResourceRequiresOrgID`). |
| `codersdk/audit.go` | New API-facing
`ResourceTypeOAuth2ProviderSettings` constant and its `FriendlyString`
case. |
| `enterprise/audit/table.go` | Field-level audit action map
(`ActionTrack`/`ActionIgnore`) for the new struct. |
|
`coderd/database/migrations/000546_audit_oauth2_provider_settings.up.sql`
| Adds `oauth2_provider_settings` to the `resource_type` Postgres enum,
required for the audit wiring above (`resource_type` is a real enum, not
a Go-only value). |
|
`coderd/database/migrations/000546_audit_oauth2_provider_settings.down.sql`
| No-op (`ALTER TYPE ... ADD VALUE` can't be reverted). |

**5. Test-suite ripple from the disabled-by-default flip**

| File | What changed |
|---|---|
| `coderd/oauth2provider/oauth2providertest/helpers.go` | New shared
test helper, `EnableDCR`, since DCR now defaults to disabled and many
pre-existing tests need it turned on to register a client. |
| `coderd/oauth2_test.go` | Adds
`TestOAuth2DynamicClientRegistrationDisabled` (registers a client,
disables DCR, verifies new registration is rejected while the existing
client's self-management, authorize, and token exchange all keep
working); calls `EnableDCR` in every pre-existing test that registers a
client. |
| `coderd/oauth2_error_compliance_test.go` | Calls `EnableDCR` in every
test that registers a client, so RFC-error-format assertions aren't
masked by the new disabled-by-default gate. |
| `coderd/oauth2_metadata_validation_test.go` | Same: `EnableDCR` added
to every registration-dependent test. |
| `coderd/oauth2_security_test.go` | Same. |
| `coderd/oauth2provider/validation_test.go` | Same (near-duplicate of
`oauth2_metadata_validation_test.go` in a different package). |
| `coderd/oauth2provider/provider_test.go` | Same. |
| `coderd/mcp/mcp_e2e_test.go` | Same, for the MCP end-to-end
dynamic-registration flow test. |

</details>

<details>
<summary><b>Generated files (12)</b> — from <code>make gen</code>, no
need to review directly</summary>

`coderd/apidoc/docs.go`, `coderd/apidoc/swagger.json`,
`coderd/database/dbmetrics/querymetrics.go`,
`coderd/database/dbmock/dbmock.go`, `coderd/database/dump.sql`,
`coderd/database/models.go`, `coderd/database/querier.go`,
`coderd/database/queries.sql.go`, `docs/admin/security/audit-logs.md`,
`docs/reference/api/enterprise.md`, `docs/reference/api/schemas.md`,
`site/src/api/typesGenerated.ts`.

</details>

## Suggested review order

### 1. Database

Establishes the persisted setting and its RBAC rule; everything else
builds on `GetOAuth2DCREnabled`/`UpsertOAuth2DCREnabled`.

1. `coderd/database/queries/siteconfig.sql` — the two new queries. Same
boolean-encoding pattern as the existing
`oauth2_github_default_eligible` key right above them in the same file.
2. `coderd/database/dbauthz/dbauthz.go` — the RBAC wrapper for those two
queries, plus the `subjectSystemOAuth2` role extension (search this file
for `ResourceDeploymentConfig`, it appears in both spots).
3. `coderd/database/dbauthz/dbauthz_test.go` — asserts the RBAC checks
from (2) actually fire.

### 2. Request gating (the actual feature)

Where `POST /oauth2/register` and discovery metadata change behavior.

1. `coderd/oauth2provider/registration.go` — the primary gate. Read this
first; it's the feature.
2. `coderd/oauth2provider/registration_test.go` — its new unit test,
exercising the gate's three states directly against the handler.
3. `coderd/oauth2provider/metadata.go` — the same gating pattern applied
to the discovery `GET` endpoint.
4. `coderd/oauth2provider/metadata_test.go` — its new unit test.

### 3. Admin settings endpoint

How an owner flips the setting live.

1. `codersdk/oauth2.go` — the `OAuth2ProviderSettings` SDK type and
`Client` methods first; this is the public contract everything below
implements against.
2. `coderd/oauth2.go` — the `GET`/`PUT` handlers themselves.
3. `coderd/coderd.go` — route registration, to see where those handlers
get wired in.
4. `coderd/oauth2_provider_settings_test.go` — round-trip and permission
tests.

### 4. Audit wiring

Plumbing required so step 3's `PUT` is auditable; mechanical except for
(3).

1. `coderd/database/types.go` — the audit-only struct; everything else
in this layer exists to plumb it through.
2. `coderd/audit/diff.go` — adds it to the `Auditable` type union (the
compiler enforces this one).
3. `coderd/audit/request.go` — the four dispatch switches; the one part
of this layer worth reading closely.
4. `codersdk/audit.go` — the API-facing resource type constant.
5. `enterprise/audit/table.go` — the field-action map.
6.
`coderd/database/migrations/000546_audit_oauth2_provider_settings.{up,down}.sql`
— read last; a consequence of needing a new `resource_type` enum value
for (1)-(5), not a design decision of its own.

### 5. Test-suite ripple from the disabled-by-default flip

1. `coderd/oauth2provider/oauth2providertest/helpers.go` — the new
`EnableDCR` helper. Read first to understand the fix pattern before
seeing it applied repeatedly.
2. `coderd/oauth2_test.go` — next, since it also contains the new
`TestOAuth2DynamicClientRegistrationDisabled`, not just `EnableDCR` call
sites.
3. The rest, in any order, they're mechanical repeats of the same
one-line addition: `coderd/oauth2_error_compliance_test.go`,
`coderd/oauth2_metadata_validation_test.go`,
`coderd/oauth2_security_test.go`,
`coderd/oauth2provider/validation_test.go`,
`coderd/oauth2provider/provider_test.go`, `coderd/mcp/mcp_e2e_test.go`.

## Explicitly out of scope

Per the design proposal: rate limiting on `POST /oauth2/register`
(tracked separately), retroactively affecting already-registered clients
when DCR is disabled (this only gates new self-registration), and an
Initial Access Token requirement (a separate, follow-up ticket).
2026-07-28 16:59:33 -07:00
Atif Ali fad69df710 fix: correct SCIM Swagger try it out URLs (#24779) 2026-05-05 02:54:03 +05:00
Steven Masley 4bd7c7b7e0 feat: implement oauth2 RFC 7009 token revocation endpoint (#20362)
Adds RFC 7009 token revocation endpoint
2025-10-22 15:18:42 -05:00
Thomas Kosiewski 7b06fc77ae refactor: simplify OAuth2 authorization flow and use 302 redirects (#18923)
# Refactor OAuth2 Provider Authorization Flow

This PR refactors the OAuth2 provider authorization flow by:

1. Removing the `authorizeMW` middleware and directly implementing its functionality in the `ShowAuthorizePage` handler
2. Simplifying function signatures by removing unnecessary parameters:
   - Removed `db` parameter from `ShowAuthorizePage`
   - Removed `accessURL` parameter from `ProcessAuthorize`
3. Changing the redirect status code in `ProcessAuthorize` from 307 (Temporary Redirect) to 302 (Found) to improve compatibility with external OAuth2 apps and browsers. (Technical explanation: we replied with a 307 to a POST request, thus the browser performs a redirect to that URL as a POST request, but we need it to be a GET request to be compatible. Thus, we use the 302 redirect so that browsers turn it into a GET request when redirecting back to the redirect_uri.)

The changes maintain the same functionality while simplifying the code and improving compatibility with external systems.
2025-07-20 16:22:52 +02:00
Thomas Kosiewski c65013384a refactor: move OAuth2 provider code to dedicated package (#18746)
# Refactor OAuth2 Provider Code into Dedicated Package

This PR refactors the OAuth2 provider functionality by moving it from the main `coderd` package into a dedicated `oauth2provider` package. The change improves code organization and maintainability without changing functionality.

Key changes:

- Created a new `oauth2provider` package to house all OAuth2 provider-related code
- Moved existing OAuth2 provider functionality from `coderd/identityprovider` to the new package
- Refactored handler functions to follow a consistent pattern of returning `http.HandlerFunc` instead of being handlers directly
- Split large files into smaller, more focused files organized by functionality:
  - `app_secrets.go` - Manages OAuth2 application secrets
  - `apps.go` - Handles OAuth2 application CRUD operations
  - `authorize.go` - Implements the authorization flow
  - `metadata.go` - Provides OAuth2 metadata endpoints
  - `registration.go` - Handles dynamic client registration
  - `revoke.go` - Implements token revocation
  - `secrets.go` - Manages secret generation and validation
  - `tokens.go` - Handles token issuance and validation

This refactoring improves code organization and makes the OAuth2 provider functionality more maintainable while preserving all existing behavior.
2025-07-03 20:24:45 +02:00
Thomas Kosiewski 7fbb3ced5b feat: add MCP HTTP server experiment and improve experiment middleware (#18712)
# Add MCP HTTP Server Experiment

This PR adds a new experiment flag `mcp-server-http` to enable the MCP HTTP server functionality. The changes include:

1. Added a new experiment constant `ExperimentMCPServerHTTP` with the value "mcp-server-http"
2. Added display name and documentation for the new experiment
3. Improved the experiment middleware to:
   - Support requiring multiple experiments
   - Provide better error messages with experiment display names
   - Add a development mode bypass option
4. Applied the new experiment requirement to the MCP HTTP endpoint
5. Replaced the custom OAuth2 middleware with the standard experiment middleware

The PR also improves the `Enabled()` method on the `Experiments` type by using `slices.Contains()` for better readability.
2025-07-03 20:09:18 +02:00
Thomas Kosiewski 15551541e8 feat: add OAuth2 provider functionality as an experiment (#18692)
# Add OAuth2 Provider Functionality as an Experiment

This PR adds a new experiment flag `oauth2` that enables OAuth2 provider functionality in Coder. When enabled, this experiment allows Coder to act as an OAuth2 provider.

The changes include:
- Added the new `ExperimentOAuth2` constant with appropriate documentation
- Updated the OAuth2 provider middleware to check for the experiment flag
- Modified the error message to indicate that the OAuth2 provider requires enabling the experiment
- Added the new experiment to the known experiments list in the SDK

Previously, OAuth2 provider functionality was only available in development mode. With this change, it can be enabled in production environments by activating the experiment.
2025-07-03 19:44:29 +02:00
Thomas Kosiewski 494dccc510 feat: implement MCP HTTP server endpoint with authentication (#18670)
# Add MCP HTTP server with streamable transport support

- Add MCP HTTP server with streamable transport support
- Integrate with existing toolsdk for Coder workspace operations
- Add comprehensive E2E tests with OAuth2 bearer token support
- Register MCP endpoint at /api/experimental/mcp/http with authentication
- Support RFC 6750 Bearer token authentication for MCP clients

Change-Id: Ib9024569ae452729908797c42155006aa04330af
Signed-off-by: Thomas Kosiewski <tk@coder.com>
2025-07-03 19:27:41 +02:00
Thomas Kosiewski 74e1d5c4b6 feat: implement OAuth2 dynamic client registration (RFC 7591/7592) (#18645)
# Implement OAuth2 Dynamic Client Registration (RFC 7591/7592)

This PR implements OAuth2 Dynamic Client Registration according to RFC 7591 and Client Configuration Management according to RFC 7592. These standards allow OAuth2 clients to register themselves programmatically with Coder as an authorization server.

Key changes include:

1. Added database schema extensions to support RFC 7591/7592 fields in the `oauth2_provider_apps` table
2. Implemented `/oauth2/register` endpoint for dynamic client registration (RFC 7591)
3. Added client configuration management endpoints (RFC 7592):
   - GET/PUT/DELETE `/oauth2/clients/{client_id}`
   - Registration access token validation middleware

4. Added comprehensive validation for OAuth2 client metadata:
   - URI validation with support for custom schemes for native apps
   - Grant type and response type validation
   - Token endpoint authentication method validation

5. Enhanced developer documentation with:
   - RFC compliance guidelines
   - Testing best practices to avoid race conditions
   - Systematic debugging approaches for OAuth2 implementations

The implementation follows security best practices from the RFCs, including proper token handling, secure defaults, and appropriate error responses. This enables third-party applications to integrate with Coder's OAuth2 provider capabilities programmatically.
2025-07-03 18:33:47 +02:00
Thomas Kosiewski 09c50559f3 feat: implement RFC 6750 Bearer token authentication (#18644)
# Add RFC 6750 Bearer Token Authentication Support

This PR implements RFC 6750 Bearer Token authentication as an additional authentication method for Coder's API. This allows clients to authenticate using standard OAuth 2.0 Bearer tokens in two ways:

1. Using the `Authorization: Bearer <token>` header
2. Using the `access_token` query parameter

Key changes:

- Added support for extracting tokens from both Bearer headers and access_token query parameters
- Implemented proper WWW-Authenticate headers for 401/403 responses with appropriate error descriptions
- Added comprehensive test coverage for the new authentication methods
- Updated the OAuth2 protected resource metadata endpoint to advertise Bearer token support
- Enhanced the OAuth2 testing script to verify Bearer token functionality

These authentication methods are added as fallback options, maintaining backward compatibility with Coder's existing authentication mechanisms. The existing authentication methods (cookies, session token header, etc.) still take precedence.

This implementation follows the OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token specification (RFC 6750) and improves interoperability with standard OAuth 2.0 clients.
2025-07-02 19:14:54 +02:00
Thomas Kosiewski 33bbf18a4b feat: add OAuth2 protected resource metadata endpoint for RFC 9728 (#18643)
# Add OAuth2 Protected Resource Metadata Endpoint

This PR implements the OAuth2 Protected Resource Metadata endpoint according to RFC 9728. The endpoint is available at `/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource` and provides information about Coder as an OAuth2 protected resource.

Key changes:
- Added a new endpoint at `/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource` that returns metadata about Coder as an OAuth2 protected resource
- Created a new `OAuth2ProtectedResourceMetadata` struct in the SDK
- Added tests to verify the endpoint functionality
- Updated API documentation to include the new endpoint

The implementation currently returns basic metadata including the resource identifier and authorization server URL. The `scopes_supported` field is empty until a scope system based on RBAC permissions is implemented. The `bearer_methods_supported` field is omitted as Coder uses custom authentication methods rather than standard RFC 6750 bearer tokens.

A TODO has been added to implement RFC 6750 bearer token support in the future.
2025-07-02 18:58:41 +02:00
Thomas Kosiewski 6f2834f62a feat: oauth2 - add authorization server metadata endpoint and PKCE support (#18548)
## Summary

  This PR implements critical MCP OAuth2 compliance features for Coder's authorization server, adding PKCE support, resource parameter handling, and OAuth2 server metadata discovery. This brings Coder's OAuth2 implementation significantly closer to production readiness for MCP (Model Context Protocol)
  integrations.

  ## What's Added

  ### OAuth2 Authorization Server Metadata (RFC 8414)
  - Add `/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server` endpoint for automatic client discovery
  - Returns standardized metadata including supported grant types, response types, and PKCE methods
  - Essential for MCP client compatibility and OAuth2 standards compliance

  ### PKCE Support (RFC 7636)
  - Implement Proof Key for Code Exchange with S256 challenge method
  - Add `code_challenge` and `code_challenge_method` parameters to authorization flow
  - Add `code_verifier` validation in token exchange
  - Provides enhanced security for public clients (mobile apps, CLIs)

  ### Resource Parameter Support (RFC 8707)
  - Add `resource` parameter to authorization and token endpoints
  - Store resource URI and bind tokens to specific audiences
  - Critical for MCP's resource-bound token model

  ### Enhanced OAuth2 Error Handling
  - Add OAuth2-compliant error responses with proper error codes
  - Use standard error format: `{"error": "code", "error_description": "details"}`
  - Improve error consistency across OAuth2 endpoints

  ### Authorization UI Improvements
  - Fix authorization flow to use POST-based consent instead of GET redirects
  - Remove dependency on referer headers for security decisions
  - Improve CSRF protection with proper state parameter validation

  ## Why This Matters

  **For MCP Integration:** MCP requires OAuth2 authorization servers to support PKCE, resource parameters, and metadata discovery. Without these features, MCP clients cannot securely authenticate with Coder.

  **For Security:** PKCE prevents authorization code interception attacks, especially critical for public clients. Resource binding ensures tokens are only valid for intended services.

  **For Standards Compliance:** These are widely adopted OAuth2 extensions that improve interoperability with modern OAuth2 clients.

  ## Database Changes

  - **Migration 000343:** Adds `code_challenge`, `code_challenge_method`, `resource_uri` to `oauth2_provider_app_codes`
  - **Migration 000343:** Adds `audience` field to `oauth2_provider_app_tokens` for resource binding
  - **Audit Updates:** New OAuth2 fields properly tracked in audit system
  - **Backward Compatibility:** All changes maintain compatibility with existing OAuth2 flows

  ## Test Coverage

  - Comprehensive PKCE test suite in `coderd/identityprovider/pkce_test.go`
  - OAuth2 metadata endpoint tests in `coderd/oauth2_metadata_test.go`
  - Integration tests covering PKCE + resource parameter combinations
  - Negative tests for invalid PKCE verifiers and malformed requests

  ## Testing Instructions

  ```bash
  # Run the comprehensive OAuth2 test suite
  ./scripts/oauth2/test-mcp-oauth2.sh

  Manual Testing with Interactive Server

  # Start Coder in development mode
  ./scripts/develop.sh

  # In another terminal, set up test app and run interactive flow
  eval $(./scripts/oauth2/setup-test-app.sh)
  ./scripts/oauth2/test-manual-flow.sh
  # Opens browser with OAuth2 flow, handles callback automatically

  # Clean up when done
  ./scripts/oauth2/cleanup-test-app.sh

  Individual Component Testing

  # Test metadata endpoint
  curl -s http://localhost:3000/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server | jq .

  # Test PKCE generation
  ./scripts/oauth2/generate-pkce.sh

  # Run specific test suites
  go test -v ./coderd/identityprovider -run TestVerifyPKCE
  go test -v ./coderd -run TestOAuth2AuthorizationServerMetadata
```

  ### Breaking Changes

  None. All changes maintain backward compatibility with existing OAuth2 flows.

---

Change-Id: Ifbd0d9a543d545f9f56ecaa77ff2238542ff954a
Signed-off-by: Thomas Kosiewski <tk@coder.com>
2025-07-01 15:39:29 +02:00
Kayla Washburn-Love de2585b0b6 chore: use rw.WriteHeader to write responses without bodies (#13870) 2024-07-11 13:38:33 -06:00
Steven Masley 838e8df5be chore: merge apikey/token session config values (#12817)
* chore: merge apikey/token session config values

There is a confusing difference between an apikey and a token. This
difference leaks into our configs. This change does not resolve the
difference. It only groups the config values to try and manage any
bloat that occurs from adding more similar config values
2024-04-10 10:34:49 -05:00
Asher 40e5ad5499 feat: make OAuth2 provider not enterprise-only (#12732) 2024-03-25 11:52:22 -08:00