mirror of
https://github.com/coder/coder.git
synced 2026-11-22 03:18:31 +08:00
25af21b5d5d86ab7d9253e1e72d33b2da170e4f8
274
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
07f9018c61 |
feat: re-check the app allowlist at OAuth2 code redemption (#28740)
**TL;DR** Second of the PLAT-480 stack. #28237 made the negotiated scope bound the issued token; this PR makes a narrowing of an app's registered scopes apply to codes that were already issued. | PR | What it does | |---|---| | #28237 (merged) | Mints access tokens with the negotiated scope, so a grant for one scope stops behaving as full access, and reports the granted scope per RFC 6749 §5.1. | | **#28740 (this)** | Re-checks the code's scope against the app's registered scopes at redemption, closing the ten minute window in which a narrowing was ignored. | | #28744 | Makes code redemption single-use under concurrency. Carries no scope logic and is independent of this PR. | - #28237 has merged, so this targets main. - No new endpoints and no schema change. --- An authorization code is valid for ten minutes, and its scope is checked against the app's registered scopes exactly once, when the code is issued. A registration narrowed inside that window had the narrowing ignored: the code still redeemed for a token carrying the wider scope. - The token exchange re-checks the code's scope against the registration as it stands at redemption and refuses with `invalid_grant`. RFC 6749 §5.2 reserves `invalid_scope` for the scope the client asked for, and this one comes from the stored grant. - The check is coverage rather than membership, and reuses the comparison the authorize endpoint already runs. That comparison now goes through a new `rbac.FirstScopeNotCovered`, which expands the allowlist once rather than once per granted scope. - Only the client can change its registered `scope`, through RFC 7592; no administrator surface writes the column. The re-check reflects the registration at redemption rather than constraining the client. - Refresh keeps the scope originally granted. That is a product choice, not an RFC requirement: a narrowing applies at the next authorization rather than mid-session, so tightening an app's scopes does not break integrations already running. - Codes issued before migration 000569 carry `coder:all`. For an app registered with a narrower `scope` those are refused at redemption until they expire, at most ten minutes. Stack: #28237 (merged), this PR, #28744. --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Steven Masley <Emyrk@users.noreply.github.com> |
||
|
|
9368917813 |
feat: report the negotiated scope to the user and the client (#28179)
**TL;DR** Last of the stack, split out of #28045. #28178 decided what the scope is; this PR is everything that reports it, to the user on the consent page and to the client on rejection. | PR | What it does | |---|---| | #28007 | Schema: `codes.scope` and `tokens.scope`, so a negotiated scope has somewhere to live. Every code is still stamped unrestricted. | | #28167 | `ScopesCover` compares an allowlist against a request by permission coverage rather than by name, and fails closed on any shape it does not model. Added with no production callers. | | #28178 | The authorize endpoint checks the request against the scope catalog, grants it only if the app's filtered allowlist covers it, and persists the result on the code. | | **#28179 (this)** | The consent page lists the negotiated permissions, and `invalid_scope` reaches the client's own callback per RFC 6749 §4.1.2.1 instead of a Coder error page. Retires the interim plumbing #28178 left behind. | - #28178 has merged, so this diff is against main and reviews on its own. It is still worth reading first: nothing here decides a scope, it only reports the one `negotiateScope` already returns. - **The consent page HTML is not final.** Layout and wording in `site/static/oauth2allow.html` are still being refined. It is in this branch so the scope-enforcement flow can be exercised end to end in a browser, not because the markup is settled. The reviewable part of Half A is the Go side that decides what the page states; the presentation will change. - An unrestricted grant still reads as full access, not as a scope name. Nothing about what a token can do changes in this PR either. **Where in the flow** - Authorize endpoint only, both verbs. GET decides what the consent page states; both verbs send `invalid_scope` to the callback. The token exchange, refresh, and revocation are untouched. - `negotiateScope` is unchanged from #28178, so which requests succeed is unchanged. This PR reads its result twice: once to decide what the page lists, once to decide where the rejection goes. - The endpoint sits behind `apiKeyMiddlewareRedirect`, so the user is authenticated before any of this runs. That matters for the redirect, not just for the page. - Consent page rendering moves a decision into Go rather than the template: `RenderOAuthAllowData` carries `Scopes` and `Unrestricted` separately, and the template branches on `Unrestricted` alone. **What it satisfies** - RFC 6749 §4.1.2.1 — on a failure that is not a bad redirection URI, the server "informs the client by adding the following parameters to the query component of the redirection URI". `invalid_scope` now goes there. #28178's interim delivery, a static error page on GET and an error body on POST, is what this replaces. - RFC 6749 §4.1.2.1 — `state` is "REQUIRED if a `state` parameter was present in the client authorization request", so it is echoed only when the client sent one, never synthesized. Pinned by `OmittedStateNotEchoed`. - RFC 6749 §3.1.2.4 and §4.1.2.1 — on a "missing, invalid, or mismatching redirection URI" the server "MUST NOT automatically redirect the user-agent to the invalid redirection URI". This is the whole ordering argument, and the file's other error paths keep their existing delivery precisely because several of them are where that validation fails. - RFC 9700 §2.1 — pre-registered redirection URIs "MUST utilize exact string matching". `extractAuthorizeParams` already did this before the stack; Half B depends on it rather than adding it. - RFC 9700 §4.11.2 — names this exact hazard: an attacker who registers a client can "intentionally send an erroneous authorization request, e.g., by using an invalid scope value, thus instructing the authorization server to redirect the user agent to its phishing site". The destination is still only ever a URI that client registered, so this is a phishing surface that costs an attacker a registration, not an open redirect. The precaution the section requires, authenticating the user first, is what `apiKeyMiddlewareRedirect` provides. - RFC 9700 §4.12 — a server redirecting a request that may carry credentials "MUST NOT use the HTTP 307 status code". 302, matching the success redirect beside it. - RFC 6749 §4.1.2.1 — `server_error` exists "because a 500 Internal Server Error HTTP status code cannot be returned to the client via an HTTP redirect". An unusable registered callback is the one case with nowhere to redirect, so it answers 500 on both verbs and logs the app and URL for an operator to correlate by. - Not yet: §1.4.1 still wants `scope` in the token response when the grant differs from the request. Tokens are untouched here, as in #28178, so that lands with enforcement. --- Split out of #28045 ([PLAT-479](https://linear.app/codercom/issue/PLAT-479)). Last of three. #28178 has merged, so this reviews against main. #28178 decided what the scope is. This PR is everything that tells someone about it. --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Steven Masley <Emyrk@users.noreply.github.com> |
||
|
|
57cbca585f |
feat: negotiate and persist authorization scope (#28178)
**TL;DR** Middle of the stack, split out of #28045, that makes an OAuth2 app's scope allowlist actually restrict what a client can be granted. The authorize endpoint has always parsed `scope` and then thrown it away. | PR | What it does | |---|---| | #28007 | Schema: `codes.scope` and `tokens.scope`, so a negotiated scope has somewhere to live. Every code is still stamped unrestricted. | | #28167 | `ScopesCover` compares an allowlist against a request by permission coverage rather than by name, and fails closed on any shape it does not model. Added with no production callers. | | **#28178 (this)** | The authorize endpoint checks the request against the scope catalog, grants it only if the app's filtered allowlist covers it, and persists the result on the code. Both GET and POST negotiate, so a doomed request fails before the consent page renders. | | #28179 | The consent page states what was negotiated, and `invalid_scope` is delivered to the client's own callback per RFC 6749 §4.1.2.1 instead of a Coder error page. | - Each earlier PR is inert alone: the columns carry a placeholder, the coverage rules have no caller. - Visible on upgrade, unlike the rest of the stack. A scope name outside the catalog, OIDC vocabulary included, now gets `invalid_scope`, on admin-created apps as well as DCR ones. - Tokens are unaffected. This changes which authorization requests succeed, not what a token can do. **Where in the flow** - Authorize endpoint only, both legs: GET before the consent page renders, POST before the code is minted. The token exchange, refresh, and revocation are untouched. - The result is persisted on the authorization code. The exchange copies it onto the token row, but the API key it mints still carries no scope, so nothing is enforced at request time yet. - Registration and discovery are unchanged. The catalog checked against is the `scopes_supported` both discovery documents already advertise. **What it satisfies** - OAuth 2.1 §1.4.1 — the server "MAY fully or partially ignore the scope requested by the client, based on the authorization server policy". The app's allowlist is that policy; until now the server ignored scope in every direction. - OAuth 2.1 §1.4.1 — on an omitted scope it "MUST either process the request using a pre-defined default value or fail the request". The filtered allowlist is that default; an allowlist filtering to nothing takes the second branch. Same rule as RFC 6749 §3.3. - OAuth 2.1 §1.4.1 — scope values "are defined by the authorization server", and OIDC is named there as an extension that defines its own. Hence `invalid_scope` for openid/profile/email rather than silent acceptance. - OAuth 2.1 §4.1.2.1 — `invalid_scope` is "invalid, unknown, or malformed", which now covers an uncatalogued name and an over-broad one alike. Delivery is interim here (static page on GET, error body on POST); §4.1.2.1 wants it redirected to the client's callback, which is #28179. - OAuth 2.1 §4.1.1 — `scope` stays OPTIONAL. Omitting it selects a default, never an error. - RFC 7591 §2 — a registered `scope` is the list "the client can use when requesting access tokens", a ceiling rather than a menu. Enforced here for the first time; a client that registered an unsupportable one repairs it via RFC 7592. - RFC 8414 §2 — `scopes_supported` is that catalog, advertised since before this stack, so a conformant client had no grounds to send a name outside it. - Not yet: §1.4.1 also requires `scope` in the token response when the grant differs from the request. Tokens are untouched here, so that lands with enforcement. --- Split out of #28045 ([PLAT-479](https://linear.app/codercom/issue/PLAT-479)). #28167 has merged, so this diff is against main and reviews on its own. The authorize endpoint parsed scope and threw it away, so an app's allowlist never restricted anything and a client asking for too much was never told no. Phase 1 added the columns that carry a negotiated scope from a code to the token, but nothing wrote one. **What changes** - Requested names must be in the external scope catalog. The app's stored allowlist is filtered through that same catalog, which only ever narrows. - The allowlist bounds authority, not spelling. A request is granted when every permission it grants is also granted by the allowlist, named or not, so an app allowed coder:workspaces.access can approve a client asking only for workspace:ssh. - Omitting scope grants the filtered allowlist (RFC 6749 §3.3). - Both handlers negotiate, so a request that cannot succeed fails before the consent page renders rather than after the user clicks Allow. - Two paths produce an empty result and stay distinct. No allowlist and no request keeps the previous unrestricted grant, written as an explicit sentinel because the column is NOT NULL with a non-empty CHECK. An allowlist filtering to nothing is rejected, since falling back would grant more than it ever permitted. **Accepted compatibility break, and it is wider than DCR.** The catalog check runs before the allowlist is consulted, so it covers admin-created apps too. - Admin-created apps store no allowlist and had scope discarded outright. A client sending OIDC vocabulary (openid, profile, email) now gets invalid_scope on upgrade. - DCR apps registered with openid, read or admin also hold allowlists this server cannot grant from, and fail in both directions. - scopes_supported has always been advertised on both discovery documents, predating this stack, so a conformant client had no grounds to send an uncatalogued name. RFC 6749 §4.1.2.1 makes invalid_scope the answer for one that does. - Grandfathering would seed the enforcement path with values it cannot evaluate: a visible error now, a silent hole later. - The rejection names the registered scopes and the remedy. Pinned in TestOAuth2AuthorizeDCRScopeCompatibility. **Interim error delivery, replaced in PR 3.** Rejections go out however each handler already reports errors: a static error page on GET, an OAuth2 error body on POST. #28179 delivers them to the client's own callback (RFC 6749 §4.1.2.1) and rewrites the requireInvalidScope helper. About 25 lines here are interim on purpose and flagged as such in that helper. **Not changed.** Issued tokens are still unrestricted. The exchange copies the negotiated scope onto the token record, but the API key it mints carries no scope. This changes which authorization requests succeed, not what a token can do. Stack: #28167 (merged), this PR, then #28179 for the consent page and the invalid_scope redirect. --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Steven Masley <Emyrk@users.noreply.github.com> |
||
|
|
45f2eb48cc |
refactor(coderd): restore agents-access cleanup migration (#28587)
## Summary - restore the `agents-access` data cleanup migration as `000587` (renumbered from `000585`; main advanced past that number) - revert the temporary RBAC tolerance for retired role names now that the migration strips stale grants - make the migration test discover its predecessor dynamically, since this branch does not carry main's `000585`/`000586` ## Stack context Stacked on #28186, which retires the `agents-access` role but intentionally ships without a migration so it can be backported across diverged migration numbers. This layer completes the retirement on main: it cleans up stale role grants in `users.rbac_roles`, `organization_members.roles`, and `organizations.default_org_member_roles`, then reverts the interim leniency (role expansion dropping legacy names, assignment validation ignoring them) that existed only to keep the migration-less base safe. `rbac.ReservedRoleName` still reserves the retired name so custom roles cannot shadow it on rollback. Do not backport this PR alongside the base PR. ## Rollback note The down migration restores effective access broadly because it cannot reconstruct which users previously held the removed role. ## Validation - `go build ./coderd/... ./enterprise/...` - full `coderd/database/migrations`, `coderd/rbac/...`, and `coderd/database/dbauthz` suites - targeted members tests in `coderd` - repository pre-commit checks (`lint/go`, `lint/ts`, etc.) > Mux created this pull request on Mike's behalf. |
||
|
|
845790e652 |
feat: enable Coder Agents for organization members (#28186)
## Summary - make Coder Agents available to organization members without a separate built-in role - remove the obsolete role from backend and frontend role surfaces - update authorization, UI, documentation, and regression coverage ## Database note This PR intentionally ships no migration so it backports cleanly across diverged migration numbers. Stale `agents-access` grants may remain in user role arrays and org default member roles; the retired name is treated as a grant of nothing (role expansion drops it, assignment validation ignores it, and the name stays reserved). A follow-up PR will add the data cleanup migration. ## Validation - `make gen` - `make lint` - repository pre-commit checks - targeted RBAC, migration, chat API, enterprise, site, Storybook, and race tests - `git diff --check` ## Rollback note Rolling back the deployment restores the previous behavior directly: no data changed, and older binaries still resolve any lingering `agents-access` grants. > Mux created this pull request on Mike's behalf. |
||
|
|
c9fc5b7ea1 |
fix: canonicalize API key scope aliases at ingress (#28322)
`rbac.IsExternalScope` accepts `all` and `application_connect`, neither
of which is an `api_key_scope` enum member. The plural `Scopes` field
stored the name as given, so `{"scopes":["all"]}` passed validation and
then 500'd inside `apikey.Generate` with `invalid API key scope: "all"`.
Reachable from `coder tokens create --scope all`, from the spellings
`docs/admin/users/sessions-tokens.md` taught, and from the `codersdk`
constants exported for exactly this purpose.
- Canonicalize inside `apikey.Generate`, in the loop that already
validates each name. One statement covers every caller and all three
input paths: plural `Scopes`, deprecated singular `Scope`, and the
default. Replaces two open-coded switches and the handler's own
per-element copy, so one place decides the stored spelling and the
handler only decides what may be requested.
- Deduplicate in the same pass. An alias and its canonical spelling are
two names going in and one name in the column.
- `ExternalScopeNames()` lists every name `IsExternalScope` accepts,
instead of dropping catalog entries that fail to parse. A curated entry
that cannot be stored used to pass every test and 500 at runtime; it now
fails two.
- Split the 400. A misspelled name and an internal `api_key_scope`
member need different words, since no re-spelling makes the second
requestable. Both rejection sites share one helper that names the case
and links the docs.
- Add reject-path tests for `not_a_real_scope` and `debug_info:read`.
The second is a valid enum member the rbac catalog treats as internal,
so before this both handler guards could be deleted with the suite still
green. A further case pins that plural `Scopes` wins when a caller sets
both fields.
- `TestExternalScopesAreStorable` pins the class rather than the two
known instances: every public rbac scope name must be storable.
`coderd/rbac` cannot assert this itself, since `database` imports `rbac`
and not the reverse.
- Docs use the canonical spellings, link the `codersdk.APIKeyScope`
schema, and say which scopes a token cannot request.
Egress is unchanged: `convertAPIKey` still derives a legacy singular
name on the way out. `ExternalScopeNames()` returns the same 57 names as
before, and `codersdk/apikey_scopes_gen.go` regenerates identically.
`rbac.CanonicalScopeName` merged with #28167, so this applies to `main`
and reviews on its own. The OAuth2 provider ignores scopes entirely
today (`authorize.go:237`, `tokens.go:377`, `tokens.go:520`), so it is
unaffected until those TODOs resolve.
Deferred from review: PLAT-528, PLAT-529, PLAT-530, and PLAT-532.
PLAT-532 covers `{"scopes":[]}` and `{"allow_list":[]}` defaulting open,
which predates this PR.
---------
Co-authored-by: McKayla はな <mckayla@hey.com>
|
||
|
|
cbe24a3da5 |
feat: add chat model config RBAC resource (#27957)
Add the `chat_model_config` RBAC resource, actions, and API key scopes. This layer includes the scope migration and generated API types. Model list queries apply token scopes, SQL authorization filters, and row ACLs. Write and default-management handlers keep deployment configuration authorization until the next API layer replaces it. Depends on #27956 _This pull request description was generated by Coder Agents._ |
||
|
|
5ca0143992 | refactor: upgrade golangci-lint to v2.0.2 (#28416) | ||
|
|
dea3a2944a |
feat(coderd/rbac): compare scopes by permission coverage (#28167)
Split out of #28045 ([PLAT-479](https://linear.app/codercom/issue/PLAT-479)) so the coverage rules can be reviewed on their own. First of three. No behavior change: both functions are added without production callers, and the OAuth2 authorize endpoint consumes them in the next PR. **ScopesCover(allowed, requested)** reports whether every permission the request grants is also granted by the allowlist. It expands both sides and compares permissions rather than names, so coder:workspaces.access covers workspace:read without ever naming it. The fail-closed rules are the part worth reviewing: - Coverage models site-level grants only. A scope carrying org or user permissions, a negative permission, or a narrowed allow list is refused on either side rather than compared on the part that is modeled. Answering "covered" from the fraction that was read would report authority that was never examined. - An unknown name on either side is an error, not a false, since a caller cannot tell "not covered" apart from "could not decide". - A wildcard request is covered only by a wildcard grant. Enumerating every workspace action that exists today does not cover workspace:*, because the wildcard also authorizes the actions added tomorrow. **CanonicalScopeName** maps the aliases IsExternalScope accepts, all and application_connect, onto the api_key_scope enum spellings. IsExternalScope answers whether a name may be requested, not how it is spelled once persisted, so anything storing a validated name has to canonicalize in between. Both sides of ScopesCover must already be canonical, which its parameter names restate at every call site. Covered by 17 coverage cases, guard cases that drive each unmodeled shape through both sides of the comparison, and an exhaustive sweep over the external catalog: coder:all covers all of it, and every catalog name covers itself. Stack: this PR, then negotiate and persist the scope, then the consent page and invalid_scope redirect. --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|
|
a3eb1ee930 |
fix: gate MCP user tokens on owner-scoped personal RBAC (#27945)
Re-gates every `mcp_server_user_tokens` dbauthz method from `rbac.ResourceDeploymentConfig` onto owner-scoped personal actions, mirroring the `external_auth_links` prior art. These are per-user credential rows, not deployment config, and the old gate forced every call site to elevate with `dbauthz.AsSystemRestricted`. ## Summary - Reads gate on `ActionReadPersonal` and writes on `ActionUpdatePersonal` against the token owner (`MCPServerUserToken.RBACObject()` derives from `user_id`). The id-keyed refresh and refresh-failure mutations resolve the owner via a `GetMCPServerUserTokenByID` prefetch inside dbauthz; the mutation queries cannot retarget a row's owner, so there is no fetch-authorize race. - All seven token-path `AsSystemRestricted` elevations in `coderd/mcp.go` and all four in chatd are removed along with their `//nolint:gocritic` markers; handlers use the request actor. - The daemon-wide chatd subject keeps only `ActionReadPersonal` on `ResourceUser`. Background token refresh and failure persistence use a new per-user `AsChatdTokenOwner` subject holding only user-level `ActionUpdatePersonal` scoped to the token owner (both mutations resolve the row via the underlying store, so the subject needs no read grant), and chatd never holds site-wide personal-write access. `TestAsChatd` pins the complete `ResourceUser` action set and `TestMCPServerUserTokensAuth` exercises both subjects against the real authorizer. - New strict-authorizer test (`rbac.NewAuthorizer` against real rows): owner passes get/upsert/delete, a stranger fails, and an org admin of another org fails. No user-visible behavior change. Stacked on #27944. Completes the MCP org-separation stack. Closes https://linear.app/codercom/issue/CODAGT-806 UAT: regression pass on a dogfood instance: OAuth2 connect redirect, member list/status with redaction, self-scoped disconnect (cannot touch another user's token), end-to-end chat MCP tool invocation, and lower-stack audit/ACL smoke checks. > Mux (AI agent) authored this PR on Mike's behalf. <!-- mux-attribution: model=claude-fable-5 thinking=high --> |
||
|
|
7ca7c30f40 |
feat: add group and user ACLs to MCP server configs (#27944)
Adds group and user ACLs to org-scoped MCP server configs so
organizations can restrict specific MCP servers to subsets of members,
mirroring the template ACL pattern.
## Summary
- Migration adds `group_acl`/`user_acl` JSONB columns (nested `{"<id>":
{"permissions": [...]}}` shape) and seeds every existing config with its
organization's Everyone group read entry (the Everyone group ID equals
the org ID), so member access is unchanged by default. Creation seeds
the same entry.
- The blanket org-member read grant from the base PR is replaced by ACL
evaluation: Rego requires org membership for every ACL grant, and
`GetAuthorizedMCPServerConfigs` compiles ACL-aware SQL filters.
- New `ActionShare` (org admins) gates `GET|PATCH
/api/experimental/organizations/{organization}/mcp-servers/{mcpserverconfig}/acl`
(nested under the organization like the rest of the config surface).
PATCH validates principals against the config's organization, merges
sparse updates under a row lock, stamps `updated_by`/`updated_at`, and
is audited as a Write with `Old` captured before authorization. A config
deleted concurrently between the middleware fetch and the locked
re-fetch is concealed as 404, matching the update and delete handlers.
ACL columns are tracked in the audit table.
- ACL management is available in all editions (no enterprise
entitlement), documented in the MCP servers page. Revoking an ACL does
not retro-strip already-selected configs from existing chats; new
selection is blocked at chat create.
- Force On respects the ACL: the forced set is loaded as the chat owner,
so a `force_on` server whose ACL denies the owner never attaches at
create, send, or generation time.
- No rolling-upgrade machinery: upgrades run in scheduled maintenance
downtime, so the migration only backfills existing rows; the API sets
the Everyone read grant explicitly on every insert.
Stacked on #27943. Part of the MCP org-separation stack.
Closes https://linear.app/codercom/issue/CODAGT-712
UAT: verified on a dogfood instance with two members and a custom group:
Everyone-seed default visibility, group grant with Everyone removal
(non-member loses list/fetch/selection), foreign-principal rejection,
non-admin share denial (audited 403 / concealed 404), user_acl restore,
and audited ACL diffs.
> Mux (AI agent) authored this PR on Mike's behalf.
<!-- mux-attribution: model=claude-fable-5 thinking=high -->
|
||
|
|
f7a0de7a11 |
fix: harden org-scoped MCP config chat gating, updates, and visibility (#28065)
Hardens the org-scoped MCP server config surface from #27942 with fixes and regression pins that are independent of the core cutover: - Keep chats sendable after a selected MCP server is disabled (persisted selections are exempt from message-time rejection). - Keep cached MCP selections usable after a background refetch error (gate the composer on missing data, not `isSuccess`). - Merge PATCH updates onto the current row so unset fields are not clobbered. - Give auditors the full management view of MCP configs their audit logs reference (site and org auditor roles). - Regression pins: frozen OAuth2 callback path, cross-org concealment for item routes, OAuth callback token binding, and disconnect responses indistinguishable from nonexistent config IDs. - Storybook: semantic textbox queries in MCP loading stories; docs note that the MCP settings page needs deployment access. ## Stack context Part of the MCP org-separation stack (CODAGT-711 org scope -> apidocs -> hardening -> CODAGT-717 audit -> CODAGT-712 ACLs -> CODAGT-806 token RBAC). Split out of #27942 to keep the core cutover reviewable; each change here builds on the org-scoped routes and chat gating introduced below it. > Mux (AI agent) authored this PR on Mike's behalf. <!-- mux-attribution: model=claude-fable-5 thinking=high --> |
||
|
|
443e3b9b80 |
feat!: org-scope MCP server configs with RBAC (#27942)
Moves `mcp_server_configs` from deployment scope to organization scope
so each organization fully controls the MCP servers its members can use
with Coder Agents.
## Summary
- Migration: adds `organization_id` (NOT NULL, FK) and keeps existing
rows as the default organization's originals with credentials intact.
Other organizations start with no MCP servers and configure their own;
nothing is copied across organizations. Chats outside the default
organization keep any now-cross-organization `mcp_server_ids` entries;
the runtime already ignores IDs that do not resolve in the chat's
organization, so no data rewrite is needed. Slug uniqueness becomes
`(organization_id, slug)`.
- RBAC: new org-scoped `ResourceMCPServerConfig` with regosql converter
and `GetAuthorizedMCPServerConfigs`; org admins get in-org CRUD, org
members get read (replaced by ACL evaluation in the follow-up ACL PR in
this stack).
- API: all config routes nest under the organization, matching
templates: `POST|GET
/api/experimental/organizations/{organization}/mcp-servers` and
`GET|PATCH|DELETE .../mcp-servers/{mcpserverconfig}` (plus
`oauth2/connect`), resolved by a read-only param middleware that
conceals read-denied and cross-organization access as 404. Two routes
stay on the frozen `/api/experimental/mcp/servers/{mcpServer}` block:
the OAuth2 callback (the redirect URI baked into existing AS-side client
registrations) and `oauth2/disconnect`, which must remain reachable by
users removed from the organization so they can still revoke their token
grant.
- Chat runtime: selection validation and generation resolve configs
strictly by IDs, enabled state, and the chat's organization in SQL;
requested duplicates are normalized; invalid or cross-org IDs are
rejected with the precise ID list. IDs already persisted on a chat are
exempt from message-time rejection so disabling a selected server never
blocks sends; generation skips servers that are no longer usable.
- Frontend: API layer and admin settings pages target the new endpoints.
The admin page manages the default organization's servers; the org
picker is tracked separately (CODAGT-714).
- Security hardening from review: OAuth user grants are additionally
bound to `oauth2_revocation_url` (changing it invalidates grants, and a
racing OAuth callback gets 409 instead of recreating a grant).
Stack-wide SSRF protection for MCP config-directed traffic was split
into its own PR at the top of this stack (#28242) to keep this diff
reviewable; this PR keeps main's existing discovery IP-range guard.
OAuth2 auto-discovery now completes before the config row is inserted: a
failed discovery persists nothing, and there is no provisional row that
concurrent updates could race against.
Two follow-up PRs in this stack were split out to keep this diff
reviewable: #28064 completes the swagger annotations for the moved
routes (main already ships these experimental MCP handlers unannotated),
and #28065 carries hardening fixes and regression pins on top of the
cutover.
- Force On enforcement (landed on main mid-review) is org-scoped: the
forced set is read per chat organization
(`GetForcedMCPServerConfigsByOrganization`), so another organization's
`force_on` server never attaches to a chat.
## Breaking changes (experimental API)
The MCP server config endpoints move from the deployment-scoped
`/api/experimental/mcp/servers` block to organization-nested paths:
`POST|GET /api/experimental/organizations/{organization}/mcp-servers`
and `GET|PATCH|DELETE
/api/experimental/organizations/{organization}/mcp-servers/{mcpserverconfig}`
(plus `oauth2/connect`). The old paths are removed, so API consumers
must supply an organization. Two routes intentionally stay on the frozen
`/api/experimental/mcp/servers/{mcpServer}` block: the OAuth2 callback
(its redirect URI is baked into existing AS-side client registrations)
and `oauth2/disconnect` (must remain reachable by users removed from the
organization). These endpoints are under `/api/experimental`, so no
deprecation window is provided.
## Rolling upgrades
During a rolling deploy, an old replica creating an MCP config can fail
the new `NOT NULL organization_id` constraint until it is upgraded
(reads are unaffected: old binaries' generated queries select their own
column lists). This matches the repo's existing precedent for additive
NOT NULL migrations (000562) and affects only the admin config-create
path in the upgrade window.
Upgrades are expected to run in scheduled maintenance downtime with the
database locked during migration, so the migration ships no
rolling-upgrade compatibility machinery. The down migration deletes
organization-created configs (their chat references are cleaned by the
000510 delete trigger) and restores deployment-wide slug uniqueness.
Part of the MCP org-separation stack (CODAGT-711 -> CODAGT-717 audit ->
CODAGT-712 ACLs -> CODAGT-806 token RBAC).
Closes https://linear.app/codercom/issue/CODAGT-711
UAT: validated end to end on a two-org dogfood deployment, including a
real pre-migration to post-migration upgrade, cross-org isolation
(404s), same-slug-two-orgs, chat selection gating, and a live MCP tool
call through the org-scoped generation path. The migration was later
revised to keep existing rows in the default organization only (no
per-organization copies); that revision is covered by the migration test
suite.
> Mux (AI agent) authored this PR on Mike's behalf.
<!-- mux-attribution: model=claude-fable-5 thinking=high -->
---------
Co-authored-by: Mathias Fredriksson <mafredri@gmail.com>
|
||
|
|
d9d6ce9ddf |
perf(coderd/rbac): build span role attributes only when recording (#27310)
`rbacTraceAttributes` materialized the subject's role names (one string allocation per role) and was passed into every `Filter`, `Authorize`, and `Prepare` span at creation time, so the O(roles) work ran even when no tracer was recording. It also called `SafeRoleNames()` twice. Replace it with `setRBACAttributes`, which attaches the same attributes *after* the span is created and only when `span.IsRecording()` is true, reading `SafeRoleNames()` once. Recorded spans are unchanged; untraced and unsampled calls skip the per-role work. This originated from #27309: once `/authcheck` checks are batched through `rbac.Filter`, each below-threshold group paid the role-attribute build for the `Filter` span *and* for every per-object `Authorize` span, so the redundant per-call work showed up as extra allocations per request. ## Benchmarks `AMD EPYC 9575F`, `benchstat`, no tracer configured (exercises the `IsRecording()==false` path). **`BenchmarkRBACManyOrgs`** (general RBAC eval), before vs after: wall time flat (geomean −0.04%), allocations strictly lower everywhere (geomean B/op −0.52%; `Authorize` −1.0 to −1.3% B/op), no regressions. **Authcheck path** (`BenchmarkAuthcheckGrouping`, #27309 vs #27310, back-to-back): this change is an **allocation reduction and is time-neutral**. On the endpoint (`Grouped`) path, per-request allocations drop ~4-5% B/op at common org counts (1-10); on the pure per-object path the reduction grows with org count (B/op −2.6% → −7.3% at 100 orgs). Wall time is flat within noise: low-org deltas sit inside this host's ±10-23% run-to-run variance, so no wall-time claim is made. Net: same speed, less garbage per request, which also lowers GC pressure under real concurrent load. <details> <summary>Decision log</summary> - The `Filter` span wraps the whole filtering routine (total latency + `num_objects`); it is the valuable span and is kept. The costly part was `rbacTraceAttributes`, not the span itself. - `rbacTraceAttributes` was O(roles): it allocated a string per role for the `subject_roles` attribute and called `SafeRoleNames()` twice. On `Filter`'s below-threshold fallback it ran once for the `Filter` span and again for each per-object `Authorize` span, so a group of N objects paid N+1 builds vs the old loop's N. Benchmarks confirm this as real per-call allocation; its wall-time cost is below the authcheck benchmark's noise floor. - Deferring attribute construction behind `IsRecording()` requires the span object, so the three callsites moved from `StartSpan(ctx, rbacTraceAttributes(...))` to `StartSpan(ctx)` then `setRBACAttributes(span, ...)`. No spans were removed or renamed; recorded output is identical. - Tradeoff: when a span is not recording, `subject_roles`/`num_subject_roles`/etc. are not computed. Unsampled spans emit nothing anyway, so there is no observable output change. </details> --- Authored with Coder Agents. |
||
|
|
51a9aa1bfc |
perf(coderd): batch authcheck permissions via rbac.Filter (#27309)
`POST /api/v2/authcheck` evaluated every check with a full policy evaluation in a serial loop. A subject in many organizations (100+) produced hundreds of full evaluations, taking seconds on a cold cache (DEVEX-608). Group the checks by `(action, resource type)` and authorize each group with the existing `rbac.Filter`, which amortizes a single partial evaluation across the group once it is large enough. Each check is wrapped in a small value struct that carries its response key, so `Filter`'s returned subset maps back to keys by reading a field rather than relying on element identity. `Filter` now takes an explicit `prepareThreshold`; existing callers pass the new `rbac.DefaultFilterThreshold` (10), and `checkAuthorization` passes 50, above the ~35-group crossover measured for this workload, so subjects with few objects of a given type keep the per-object path and cannot regress. ## Stacking This is stacked on top of #27244. `Filter` runs `Prepare` (partial evaluation), and those residuals are only compact once #27244's set-membership residuals land. On plain `main` the existing O(N) residual fanout means batching can regress at high org counts, so this change should land with or after #27244. <details> <summary>Decision log</summary> ### Bottleneck - `site/src/modules/permissions/organizations.ts` defines ~14 permission checks per org; `organizationsPermissions()` flattens them across all orgs into one `POST /api/v2/authcheck`. A 100-org request is ~1400 checks. - `checkAuthorization` looped serially, calling `Authorizer.Authorize` (full eval) once per check. - The endpoint's `maxFetch = 10` only caps checks that carry a `resource_id`, not total checks, so it does not bound this workload. ### Approach - Group checks by `(action, resource type)` and run each group through `rbac.Filter`, which does one partial evaluation (`Prepare`) and reuses it across the group. - Carry the response key as data in a small value struct implementing `RBACObject()`, so allowed results map back to keys without pointer identity: ```go type authorizeCheck struct { key string object rbac.Object } func (c authorizeCheck) RBACObject() rbac.Object { return c.object } ``` - `Filter` takes a required `prepareThreshold int` (no functional options). Generic callers pass `rbac.DefaultFilterThreshold = 10`; `/authcheck` passes 50 because the measured crossover for this workload is ~35 groups. ### Alternatives rejected - **Bounded `errgroup` parallelism**: reduced wall time at high org counts but not aggregate work (allocations flat). Discarded in favor of reducing work via partial evaluation. - **Symmetric-deny Rego simplification** (on the #27244 branch): replacing the known-org deny-fold with symmetric `org := -1` / `scope_org := -1` rules failed existing SQL-compile tests. A `-1` known-org vote gated by `not org = -1` produces a negated membership test over the unknown org id, which OPA emits as an unconvertible support rule. #27244's fold (`member_allow - org_deny`, a positive set-difference membership test) is therefore load-bearing, not incidental. </details> --- Authored with Coder Agents. --------- Co-authored-by: Steven Masley <Emyrk@users.noreply.github.com> |
||
|
|
7e708b24ce |
perf(coderd/rbac): collapse org authorization to a set-membership test (#27244)
## Problem Authorization for users who belong to many organizations is slow. On the list <br>endpoints (`/api/v2/organizations`, `/users`, `/groups`) a user in hundreds of <br>orgs saw multi-second page loads <br>([DEVEX-608](https://linear.app/codercom/issue/DEVEX-608/performance-degrades-for-users-in-many-organizations-across-multiple) <br>/ coder/coder#21890 / Pylon [#2758](<https://github.com/coder/coder/issues/2758>)). This is partial-evaluation bound: `rbac.Prepare` <br>scales with the number of org-scoped roles the subject carries. ## Root cause The known-org path in `check_org_permissions` indexed an N-entry vote map by the <br>object's org id: ```rego vote := allow_map[input.object.org_owner] ``` `input.object.org_owner` is unknown during partial evaluation. Indexing a map by <br>an unknown key cannot reduce to a single expression, so OPA emits one residual <br>query per org membership, and `newPartialAuthorizer` then calls `PrepareForEval` <br>once per residual, making `Prepare` O(N) in org count. The list endpoints <br>intentionally use partial eval; the fan-out is in partial eval itself. ## Change Test the object's org id for membership in a set that is fully known at <br>partial-evaluation time, so the query collapses to a single <br>`organization_id = ANY(ARRAY[...])` residual instead of N residuals: * The known-org clause only ever votes to allow, tested via <br>`org_owner in org_ids_with_vote(role_org_votes, 1)`. * Org-level denies are folded into the org-member level as a ground set <br>difference (`member_allow - org_deny`), so the unknown org id appears in only <br>one positive membership test and the decision never branches on it. * The per-org vote maps are computed once as memoized zero-arg rules <br>(`role_org_votes`, `role_member_votes`, `scope_org_votes`, <br>`scope_member_votes`) instead of through parametrized functions that OPA <br>re-evaluates at every call site. * `role_allow`/`scope_allow`, the `any_org` path, and full evaluation are <br>unchanged in behavior. Semantics are unchanged (see the equivalence argument below). The only <br>representational change is that a denied known org's intermediate `org` vote is <br>now `0` instead of `-1`, compensated by the set difference and not observable in <br>the final `allow` decision. ## Results Measured with `BenchmarkRBACManyOrgs` (added on `main` in coder/coder#27270). Full tables: <br>[B/op and allocs/op](<https://github.com/coder/coder/pull/27244#issuecomment-4984523720>). * Residual queries: O(N) -> O(1). * `Prepare` / `PrepareAndCompile` memory changes from < />quadratic growth on `main` <br>(176 MiB, 7.08M allocs per op at 100 orgs) to near-linear (6.5 MiB, 258k <br>allocs), a < />96% reduction at 100 orgs, with similar wins in time. * Memoizing the vote maps removed an early single-org regression: at 1 org <br>`Prepare` now allocates < />7% fewer bytes and < />9% fewer objects than `main`. * `Authorize` (full evaluation) memory is marginally higher (+1-8%, largest at <br>1 org) and time-neutral. This is the inherent cost of the set-membership form <br>that keeps partial evaluation from fanning out; full evaluation builds an <br>allow set it would not otherwise need. * `go test ./coderd/rbac/...` passes, including `TestAuthorizeDomain` (full- vs <br>partial-eval equivalence) and the regosql suite. A second, independent bottleneck remains (out of scope here): the vote map is <br>still built in O(N^2) in `check_all_org_permissions` <br>(`roles[_].by_org_id[org_id]` scans all roles per org). Fixing it means <br>pre-merging roles' `by_org_id` into one org->perms map in the OPA input, and is <br>tracked as a follow-up. ## Testing * `OrgDenyBlocksMember` (`TestAuthorizeLevels`): an org-level deny blocks a <br>member-allowed action on an owned in-org object, while a clean org is allowed, <br>including an action-scoped deny. * `ScopeOrgDenyBlocksMember` (`TestAuthorizeScope`): the same fold at the scope <br>level. * The shared harness covers full and partial evaluation and asserts the partial <br>result compiles to SQL with zero support rules. <details><summary>Decision log and equivalence argument</summary> ### Why not deny-via-set-membership The first attempt expressed deny as a second set-membership clause (`:= -1 if org_owner in deny_set`). That makes `org`/`scope_org` multi-valued, and the `not org = -1` checks in `role_allow`/`scope_allow` then cause OPA to emit a `data.partial.__not__` support rule that regosql cannot compile (`TestAuthorizeDomain/UserACLList` failed). It failed even when the deny set was empty, purely because the `-1` clause exists. ### Why not deny-via-enumeration A follow-up enumerated only the (usually empty) deny set. It compiled and passed, but it branches on the unknown org id (one ground residual per denied org), which violates the "do not branch on the unknown" rule in `coderd/rbac/POLICY.md`. ### Final approach: allow-only + ground set difference The known-org clause votes only to allow, and the org-level deny gate is moved into the org-member level as `member_allow - org_deny`, a set difference over fully-known sets. The unknown org id is used only in positive `in` tests, so there is no enumeration, no negated membership, and no branching on the unknown. ### Empty-set residual pruning A naive set-membership left unsatisfiable residuals (`org_owner in set()`) for levels with no matching permissions (e.g. the org level for an org-member role, or scope-org for `ScopeAll`), each still costing a `PrepareForEval`. Guarding each membership with a ground `count(...) > 0` lets OPA drop those branches, flattening the residual count across org sizes. ### Memoized vote maps Profiling the single-org path showed the cost was repeated function evaluation: the parametrized helpers rebuilt the same vote map for the org, member, and scope paths on every check. Hoisting the maps into memoized zero-arg complete rules (which OPA evaluates once per query) removed that overhead and eliminated the single-org `Prepare` regression, while composition keeps the policy readable. ### Equivalence (known-org path, `site != -1`) * A: original `org == 1` <=> `org_owner in org_allow` (unchanged). * B: original `org != -1 and member == 1` <=> `org_owner not in org_deny and org_owner in member_allow` <=> `org_owner in (member_allow - org_deny)` = new `org_member == 1`. The critical case (`org` denies, member allows): old blocks it via `not org = -1`; new blocks it because `org_owner` is removed from `member_allow - org_deny`. Same outcome. Deny-wins aggregation is intact because `check_all_org_permissions` still nets an org to `-1` via `to_vote`, landing it in `org_deny`. </details> --- This PR was generated by Coder Agents on behalf of @jeremyruppel. |
||
|
|
52423eb87b |
feat: promote MinimumImplicitMember experiment to GA (#27472)
Promotes the `minimum-implicit-member` experiment to GA and removes it.
## What changes
- The `minimum-implicit-member` experiment constant, its
`RoleOptions.MinimumImplicitMember` toggle, and the global
`rbac.MinimumImplicitMember()` accessor are deleted. The minimal-member
behavior is now the only behavior: `organization-member` and
`organization-service-account` carry only the floor (read-self records,
notifications, and similar) and grant **no workspace permissions**.
Workspace access lives exclusively on the
`organization-workspace-access` role.
- The experiment gate on customizing `default_org_member_roles` (`PATCH
/organizations/{org}`) is removed; the built-in-roles-only validation
remains.
- The dashboard's Default Roles section and the implied-roles display on
the members page are no longer experiment-gated.
- Admin docs: new "Default member roles" section in
`docs/admin/users/organizations.md`, cross-linked from
`groups-roles.md`.
## Why this is safe for existing deployments
Migration `000516` (shipped earlier) backfilled
`default_org_member_roles` with `['organization-workspace-access']` on
every organization. Members therefore keep exactly the effective
permissions they had with the experiment off; the workspace elevation
flows through the default role instead of being baked into
`organization-member`.
**Rollback caveat:** rolling back past this release restores the bundled
elevation, silently re-granting workspace access to members of
organizations that cleared their default roles.
## Review
Deep-review R1 findings are addressed in `chore: address deep-review
findings` (copy fixes, read-only Default Roles for viewers, removable
overlapping explicit grants, RBAC prose restoration, test
de-tautologizing, docs). Point-by-point disposition is in the PR
comments.
---
Generated by Coder Agents on behalf of @Emyrk.
|
||
|
|
6c102cc3f3 |
feat: count only workspace-capable users toward license seats (#27279)
Adds permission-based license seat counting behind the
`workspace-capable-licensing` experiment. When the experiment is enabled
and a valid license carries the AI Governance add-on, the `user_limit`
feature counts only active users the RBAC engine authorizes to create a
workspace, instead of every active user. Users without workspace-create
capability ("gateway accounts", e.g. AI-Gateway-only users) no longer
consume seats.
## How it works
- A new `GetActiveUsersAuthorizationRoles` bulk query returns effective
roles (implied member roles, org default member roles) and group
memberships for every seat-eligible user (active, not deleted, not
system, not a service account), matching `GetActiveUserCount` semantics.
- `license.CountWorkspaceCapableUsers` evaluates `workspace.create`
against the any-organization object form, which covers site-wide grants,
membership grants, and org-scoped bans in one check. Evaluation is
deduplicated on a sha256 of each user's canonical subject JSON (a fixed
sentinel user ID, sorted deduplicated roles and groups), so cost scales
with unique subjects rather than user count, and every subject field
participates in both the evaluation and the key.
- The AI Governance add-on is only known after license claims are
parsed, so `Entitlements()` passes a lazy `WorkspaceCapableUserCountFn`
(following the `ManagedAgentCountFn` precedent) and
`LicensesEntitlements` resolves it when a validated add-on is present.
Each license's `user_limit` claim becomes a candidate pair of limit and
counting mode, the most favorable pair is selected (see Behavior notes),
and the selected pair's limit, entitlement, and count become the
`user_limit` feature's terms; the warnings read the same values.
`license.Entitlements` gains `logger`, `authorizer`, and `experiments`
parameters.
- All custom roles are prefetched in a single query before evaluation
(new exported `rolestore.PrefetchCustomRoles`), and each count emits one
Info log line (capable count, eligible active users, unique subjects,
elapsed) whose presence identifies the counting mode. The count is
bounded by a 60s timeout.
## Behavior notes
- Without the experiment or without the add-on, the legacy
`GetActiveUserCount` path is unchanged.
- When the mode is active, the over-limit and expired-limit warnings say
"workspace-capable users" instead of "active users", since that is what
was counted.
- With multiple licenses, each license's `user_limit` claim forms a
candidate pair of limit and counting mode (workspace-capable for add-on
licenses, all active users otherwise), and the most favorable pair is
enforced: a pair satisfied by its own count wins over any unsatisfied
one, then higher entitlement, then higher limit. One license's limit is
never combined with another license's counting mode, so a small add-on
license can neither borrow a bigger non-add-on limit nor suppress it.
- Licenses in their grace period still gate the count; it reverts to the
legacy count only on hard expiry. While the add-on exists only on
grace-period licenses, a warning tells admins the counting mode will
revert and states the legacy active-user count they will then be
measured by.
- Count errors (database failures, timeout) abort the entitlements
computation, matching the legacy count's error semantics: the refresh
fails and the caller keeps the previous entitlements rather than a
silently different count. One exception: a stored role string that fails
to parse is logged and treated as not workspace-capable instead of
failing the refresh, since authorization fails closed on such roles
anyway.
- The experiment is deliberately not in `ExperimentsSafe`.
Part of the gateway-accounts feature; no behavior changes for
deployments without the experiment.
## Stack
Part 1 of the gateway-accounts stack. Each PR builds on the previous:
1. **#27279 (this PR)**: permission-based license seat counting. Behind
the `workspace-capable-licensing` experiment and gated on the AI
Governance add-on, `user_limit` counts only users the RBAC engine
authorizes to create workspaces.
2. **#27280**: adds the `organization-ai-gateway-access` org role
carrying the AI Bridge interception permissions (extracted from the
member floors, backfilled into org default roles by migration) and
enforces it at AI Gateway authentication; bridge usage stops claiming AI
Governance seats under the experiment.
3. ~~**#27281**: gates workspace ACL grants on matching member-level
capability (each granted action only takes effect while the recipient
holds that action in the org), so workspace sharing is ineffective for
(and rejected toward) users without workspace capabilities, evaluated
live on every authorization.~~ Tabled — excluded from the
gateway-accounts MVP.
Related but independent: **#27278** hides the Workspaces page create
CTAs for users without workspace-create permission.
## Benchmarks
`BenchmarkCountWorkspaceCapableUsers` (in `usercount_bench_test.go`, run
manually with `go test ./enterprise/coderd/license/ -bench
BenchmarkCountWorkspaceCapableUsers -benchtime 5x -run '^$'` — never
executed by CI) measures the count across user-scale and role-diversity
shapes:
| Scenario | Users | ~Unique subjects | per count |
|---|---|---|---|
| Uniform | 1k | 4 | 8.5ms |
| Uniform | 10k | 4 | 71ms |
| Uniform | 50k | 4 | 344ms |
| ManyOrgs (100 orgs) | 10k | ~200 | 112ms |
| CustomRoles (1000 org-scoped roles) | 10k | ~1000 | 168ms |
| UniquePairs (every user a distinct subject) | 10k | ~10,000 | 2.66s |
Summary:
- **Row-side cost is ~7µs per user, linear** (role parsing, subject
canonicalization, and sha256 per row). The bulk query + subject dedupe
handles 50k users in ~350ms; extrapolated 100k ≈ 0.7s. A non-issue at
the 10-minute refresh cadence.
- **Unique subjects are the dominant axis at ~0.26ms each** (role
expansion + one any-organization rego evaluation per subject). The
worst-case scenario — every user a distinct subject — costs ~2.7s at 10k
users, extrapolating to ~13s at 50k.
- **Realistic deployments sit near the cheap rows.** Subject diversity
tracks orgs × role/group combinations, not user count; only per-user
custom roles or per-user org-membership patterns approach the worst
case.
- Caveat encountered while building the harness: the roles query's plan
depends on accurate table statistics. With stale stats (e.g. right after
a bulk user import, before autovacuum ANALYZEs), the planner picks a
nested-loop plan that re-runs the aggregation per user row — a ~300×
regression (1.08s for 1k users). Fresh statistics restore the hash-join
plan; the harness ANALYZEs after seeding, so the numbers above reflect
the healthy plan.
|
||
|
|
5af3d95b06 |
test(coderd/rbac): verify workspace creation ban denies any_org create (#27533)
<!-- Created by Coder Agents on behalf of @Emyrk. --> Adds RBAC tests for a user holding both `organization-workspace-access` and `organization-workspace-creation-ban`. - Single org with both roles: the `any_org` workspace create check returns **false**, since the ban's negative permission is the only organization vote. - Member of two orgs, banned in one, workspace-access in the other: `any_org` create returns **true**, since the max vote across organizations wins. - Per-org checks confirm the ban denies create/delete only in the banned org, and non-banned actions (read, update) remain allowed. --- <sub>Coder Agents on behalf of @Emyrk.</sub> |
||
|
|
3cf97ff8e7 | fix: show selected owner's external auth when creating a workspace (#26653) | ||
|
|
997b5d0843 |
feat: add synthetic gateway keys (#27170)
> Mux is working on behalf of Mike. ## Summary Add a per-user synthetic API key for chatd AI Gateway attribution. Chatd resolves the key from the chat owner, extends it before expiry, and discards the generated bearer token so the key is never a usable credential. There is no mapping table. The key is resolved from `api_keys` by a deterministic token name (`chatd_<owner_id>_session_token`), mirroring the provisionerd session token model, with three deltas that chatd needs: - **Login type guard**: token names are unvalidated user input, so a user can create a bearer token with the colliding name. The lookup excludes `login_type = 'token'` rows, so chatd never picks up (or extends) a real user token. Synthetic keys are minted with the owner's login type, which is never `token`. - **In-place expiry extension instead of delete-and-reinsert**: chat generations have no stop boundary, and an in-flight generation may have already delegated the current key ID to aibridged. Extending `expires_at` keeps the key ID stable forever. - **Advisory-lock mint**: the unique index on token names is partial (`WHERE login_type = 'token'`), so nothing DB-enforces uniqueness for synthetic keys. A per-user advisory lock serializes concurrent mints. Keys carry a minimal scope (`api_key:read`) as defense in depth; the delegated gateway path never evaluates scopes and the secret is discarded at mint. Migration 000544 removes the foreign keys from the legacy message and queue `api_key_id` columns while chatd continues stamping them for rolling compatibility. Stale IDs are tolerated because routing uses `chats.owner_id`. Individual key deletion, delete-all, and password reset remove the key without changing chat history or queue versions, and the next lookup remints it. Suspension does not delete the key; delegated gateway authorization rejects inactive users at request time. This is the first PR in a three-PR rollout and must be fully deployed before #27171. Refs https://linear.app/codercom/issue/CODAGT-561/maintain-synthetic-api-key-per-user-per-chat |
||
|
|
3b72a3e5dd |
test(coderd/rbac): add many-orgs authorization benchmark (#27270)
<!-- Authored with Coder Agents on behalf of @Emyrk --> Adds `BenchmarkRBACManyOrgs` to measure `Authorize`, `Prepare` (partial evaluation), and `Prepare`+`CompileToSQL` as a subject's org-membership count grows (1, 5, 10, 50, 100 orgs). - Written to evaluate the org set-membership rewrite in #27244, where partial-eval cost scales with org count. - Subject uses pre-expanded cached roles (`WithCachedASTValue`), member + per-org `organization-member` roles, `ScopeAll`; authorizer has no cache so each iteration measures a real evaluation. Results comparing `main` vs #27244 are posted on that PR. <sub>Coder Agents on behalf of @Emyrk.</sub> |
||
|
|
6af0f4d698 |
feat: add workspace restart functionality to API (#25757)
This models restart as durable orchestration of existing stop and start workspace builds instead of adding a new restart transition. Keeping restart as two existing transitions preserves the current build/provisioner model. The child start build is created only after the parent stop build succeeds, rather than being inserted immediately in a pending state. That keeps `workspace_builds` aligned with actual provisioner-ready work and avoids introducing a second pending-build lifecycle that the provisioner and build acquisition paths would need to understand. Refs: https://linear.app/codercom/issue/PLAT-143 |
||
|
|
ba094c5706 |
fix(coderd): allow user-admin password resets to succeed (#26537)
User Admin password resets could update the target user's hashed password but fail while revoking that user's API keys. The transaction then rolled back and returned HTTP 500, so the password was never changed. Add a user-scoped API key revoker actor and use it in both password reset flows so key revocation succeeds without broader system auth. Refs: https://linear.app/codercom/issue/PLAT-316 |
||
|
|
6b3341aad3 | fix!: require org membership for user ACLs (#26852) | ||
|
|
0f1e792f3f |
feat(coderd/database): add AI Gateway key auth lookup and last-used queries (#26505)
Adds DB methods`GetAIGatewayKeyIDByHashedSecret` and `UpdateAIGatewayKeyLastUsedAt`. `GetAIGatewayKeyIDByHashedSecret` - returns AI Gateway key ID by hashed secret value. `UpdateAIGatewayKeyLastUsedAt` - updates last used timestamp for given AI Gateway key. Used by standalone AI Gateway for authentication and keeping track of currently used keys. |
||
|
|
195c545bc1 |
fix(coderd/rbac): guard builtInRoles with atomic.Pointer (#26384)
<sub>Coder Agents on behalf of @Emyrk.</sub> |
||
|
|
f17f8392bd |
feat(coderd): gate org-member workspace elevation behind experiment (#26027)
Gates the workspace-ops elevation on `organization-member` and `organization-service-account` behind the `minimum-implicit-member` experiment. |
||
|
|
938c2080f3 |
feat: configurable default org member roles (#25994)
Refs #25936. Adds a configurable per-org default member role set. Unioned into each member's effective roles at read time. <sub>with Coder Agents on behalf of @Emyrk.</sub> |
||
|
|
bec2115e75 |
refactor: extract organization-workspace-access role (#25929)
<!-- Authored by Coder Agents on behalf of @Emyrk. --> Refs [PLAT-217](https://linear.app/codercom/issue/PLAT-217/rfc-for-gateway-accounts). Extracts an `organization-workspace-access` role so workspace elevation can be split off the organization-member floor without changing behavior. - New role holds the workspace-side resources currently granted by `organization-member`. - The `MinimumImplicitMember` floor preserves the existing behavior until #26027 shrinks it. - Prebuilds orchestrator inserts memberships via `dbauthz.AsSystemRestricted` and no longer needs `OrganizationMember` or `AssignOrgRole` grants. <details><summary>Agent context</summary> - `coderd/rbac/roles.go`: `OrgWorkspaceAccessMemberPerms()` grants `Workspace`, `WorkspaceDormant`, `File` (Create+Read), `ProvisionerDaemon` (Create+Read), and `Task`. Deliberate omissions (`Template`, `Group`, `WorkspaceProxy`, etc.) are documented inline. - `coderd/rbac/roles_test.go`: `orgWorkspaceAccessUser` is added to `requiredSubjects`. `UserProvisionerDaemons` is split into `UserProvisionerDaemonsCreate` and `UserProvisionerDaemonsUpdateDelete` because the new role grants Create+Read only and the test framework requires uniform pass/fail per case. - `codersdk/rbacroles.go`: exposes `RoleOrganizationWorkspaceAccess`. - `enterprise/coderd/prebuilds/membership.go`: `InsertOrganizationMember` runs under `dbauthz.AsSystemRestricted`. The orchestrator never acts with the elevation role; the membership row only exists so prebuilt workspaces have a valid owner. - `coderd/database/dbauthz/dbauthz.go`: drops the now-dead `OrganizationMember` and `AssignOrgRole` permissions from the prebuilds-orchestrator role and the orchestrator's entry in `assignRoles`. </details> --- <sub>Coder Agents on behalf of @Emyrk.</sub> |
||
|
|
6366c380fe |
fix: correct user:* scope typo (#26049)
The wildcard entry in `externalLowLevel` was `"user.*"` (period) instead of `"user:*"` (colon). Every other entry uses the `resource:action` colon convention, and `parseLowLevelScope` rejects the period form, so the wildcard was silently dropped from `ExternalScopeNames()` and could not be requested via `coder tokens create --scope=user:*`. Closes https://github.com/coder/coder/issues/25623 |
||
|
|
f1ebc42859 |
refactor(coderd/rbac): enumerate org-member and org-service-account perms (#25928)
`organization-member` was created from `allPermsExcept(...)`. This is changed to an explicit enumeration of capabilities. - New resources no longer auto-grant to org members or service accounts. - Adding one now requires an explicit decision in `coderd/rbac/roles.go`. |
||
|
|
f22d4e2cbb |
feat: add ai_gateway_keys table and related RBAC (#25563)
Adds table to store keys that AI Gateway standalone replicas will use to authenticate into Coderd. Also adds RBAC and audit boilerplate. |
||
|
|
a586b7e5e0 |
feat: add boundary_log rbac resource (#24810)
RFC: [Bridge ↔ Boundaries Correlation RFC](https://www.notion.so/coderhq/Gateway-and-Firewall-Correlation-RFC-31ad579be592803aa8b3d48348ccdde9) Register a dedicated `boundary_log` RBAC resource type with `create`, `read`, and `delete` actions, replacing the placeholder `rbac.ResourceAuditLog` and `rbac.ResourceSystem` references previously used in the dbauthz layer. Create is granted at user-level so workspace agents can only write logs owned by their workspace owner, preventing cross-workspace log fabrication. Delete is restricted to `DBPurge` only; no human role (including owner) can delete boundary logs. | Subject | Create (own) | Create (other) | Read (all) | Delete | |---|---|---|---|---| | Workspace agent | yes | no | no | no | | Owner (site admin) | yes (via member) | no | yes | no | | Auditor | no | no | yes | no | | DBPurge | no | no | no | yes | ### Changes - **RBAC policy & resource definition**: add `boundary_log` to `policy.go` and generate `ResourceBoundaryLog` object, scope constants, and codersdk/TypeScript types. - **dbauthz authorization**: replace all `ResourceAuditLog`/`ResourceSystem` placeholders with `ResourceBoundaryLog`. `InsertBoundaryLog` and `InsertBoundarySession` derive the workspace owner from the agent and authorize with `.WithOwner()` for user-scoped create. - **Role assignments:** - **Owner (site):** read only. Excluded from `allPermsExcept` wildcard; create is inherited from member at user-level. - **Member (user-level):** create. User-scoped so agents can only write logs they own. - **Auditor (site):** read. - `boundary_log` is excluded from org-admin, org-member, and org-service-account `allPermsExcept` calls for consistency with `ResourceBoundaryUsage`. - **System subjects:** - **DB Purge** (`SubjectTypeDBPurge`): delete. The only subject that can remove boundary logs. - **Workspace agent scope**: `ResourceBoundaryLog` with wildcard ID in the agent scope allow-list (necessary for creation since no pre-existing ID exists). User-level role scoping prevents deployment-wide access. - **DB migration** (`000510_boundary_log_scopes`): add `boundary_log:*`, `boundary_log:create`, `boundary_log:delete`, `boundary_log:read` enum values to `api_key_scope`. - **Test coverage**: `BoundaryLogCreate` (user-scoped, only matching owner succeeds), `BoundaryLogDelete` (all human roles denied), `BoundaryLogRead` (owner + auditor). dbauthz mock tests set up workspace agent lookups for owner derivation. - **Generated docs**: update OpenAPI specs, API reference docs, and frontend type definitions. --------- Co-authored-by: Muhammad Danish <mdanishkhdev@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Coder Agents <coder-agents-review[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
||
|
|
4591212482 |
feat: implement SCIM handler for SCIM 2.0 compliance (#25572)
Rewrites the SCIM 2.0 user provisioning handler to be RFC 7644 compliant. Verified against an external IdP Okta. Behavior is OPT IN |
||
|
|
06526a5822 | feat: use AI provider chat APIs (#25415) | ||
|
|
8dc4d76890 |
chore: add agent-connection-watch for workspaces (#24507)
<!-- If you have used AI to produce some or all of this PR, please ensure you have read our [AI Contribution guidelines](https://coder.com/docs/about/contributing/AI_CONTRIBUTING) before submitting. --> relates to GRU-18 Adds basic implementation for Workspace Agent Connection Watch and tests. Missing are handling of logs. |
||
|
|
96e3c49670 | feat: add chat sharing API (#24968) | ||
|
|
5a8d0016a5 |
feat: add personal skill storage, API, and SDK (#25363)
> Mux updated this PR on behalf of Mike. ## Stack Context This PR is the storage, permissions, API, and SDK layer for experimental personal skills. #25362 has landed on `main`, so this branch is restacked directly on `main`. Stack order: 1. #25363 storage, permissions, API, and SDK 2. #25365 API test coverage 3. #25366 chattool and chatd integration 4. #25066 settings UI and docs 5. #25386 personal skills slash menu ## What? Adds the `user_skills` database table, generated queries, RBAC resources and scopes, audit resource handling, experimental user-scoped CRUD endpoints, SDK types, and generated API/site types. Follow-up review and restack fixes: - Enforce a bounded personal skill description in parser and database constraints. - Return `403 Forbidden` for unauthorized create and update attempts. - Return explicit conflict responses when soft-deleted users are targeted. - Keep user admins out of personal skills, while site owners can read and delete but not create or update. - Document trigger-raised constraint names and keep schema constants covered by tests. - Reuse `UserSkillMetadata` in the full `UserSkill` SDK response type. - Generate user skill IDs in Go instead of relying on a database default. - Rebase on latest `main` and renumber the user skills migration to `000502_user_skills`. ## Why? Personal skills need durable user-owned storage with owner authorization, limited site-owner moderation, and a hidden API surface before chatd can consume them. ## Validation - `make gen` - `go test ./coderd/database -run '^TestUserSkillSchemaConstants$' -count=1` - `go test ./coderd/database/dbauthz -run '^TestMethodTestSuite/TestUserSkills$' -count=1` - `go test ./coderd -run '^TestPatchUserSkill$' -count=1` - `go test ./codersdk ./coderd/database/db2sdk` - `make lint` - pre-commit hook on `97fd58108d` |
||
|
|
170a6e1fe9 | feat: add chat sharing foundation (#25041) | ||
|
|
841b777ccd | feat: add ai_providers table, queries, dbauthz, audit, RBAC (#24892) | ||
|
|
4124d1137d |
feat: add ai_model_prices table (#24932)
# Summary Implements https://linear.app/codercom/issue/AIGOV-282/add-ai-model-price-table-and-seed-generator This PR lays the groundwork for AI Bridge cost controls (per the AI Governance RFC). It adds the foundation needed for future cost tracking: a place to store per-model token prices, a way to keep those prices in sync with upstream pricing data, and a startup mechanism that ensures every deployment has prices loaded before AI Bridge starts processing requests. The price data comes from [models.dev](https://models.dev/), a community-maintained catalogue of AI provider pricing. A generator script fetches the latest prices, filters to Anthropic and OpenAI for now, and produces a seed file checked into the repository. On every server startup the seed is applied to the database, so new releases automatically pick up any price corrections that landed since the previous one. Existing rows are overwritten with the latest prices; rows for models no longer in the seed are left untouched. # Batching the AI model price seed: three approaches Context: at server startup we seed the `ai_model_prices` table from an embedded JSON price book (~70 rows today, will grow as we add providers, potentially 4000+). Each row is: ```text (provider, model, input_price, output_price, cache_read_price, cache_write_price) ``` Any of the four price columns can be: - `NULL` → “price unknown for this dimension” - explicit `0` → “free” The batch must be an UPSERT so re-running is idempotent and existing rows pick up new prices. We considered three implementations. --- ## Approach 1 — Per-row UPSERT in a Go loop ```go for _, row := range rows { if err := db.UpsertAIModelPrice(ctx, database.UpsertAIModelPriceParams{ Provider: row.Provider, Model: row.Model, InputPrice: nullInt64(row.InputPrice), // ... }); err != nil { return err } } ``` ### Pros - Trivial. - NULL handling falls out naturally from `sql.NullInt64`. ### Cons - `N` round-trips per seed. - With ~70 rows that means ~70 statement executions on every startup, even inside a transaction. - Doesn't scale gracefully as the price book grows, potentially 4000+. --- ## Approach 2 — `UNNEST` with parallel arrays Pass each column as a separate Go slice. Postgres unnests them in parallel into a virtual table, then `INSERT ... SELECT`. ```sql INSERT INTO ai_model_prices ( provider, model, input_price, output_price, cache_read_price, cache_write_price ) SELECT UNNEST(@providers::text[]), UNNEST(@models::text[]), NULLIF(UNNEST(@input_prices::bigint[]), -1), NULLIF(UNNEST(@output_prices::bigint[]), -1), NULLIF(UNNEST(@cache_read_prices::bigint[]), -1), NULLIF(UNNEST(@cache_write_prices::bigint[]), -1) ON CONFLICT (provider, model) DO UPDATE SET input_price = EXCLUDED.input_price, output_price = EXCLUDED.output_price, cache_read_price = EXCLUDED.cache_read_price, cache_write_price = EXCLUDED.cache_write_price, updated_at = NOW(); ``` Go side: flatten rows into six parallel slices. Use a sentinel (`-1`) for “missing”, since `lib/pq` can't encode `NULL` into a `bigint[]` element. ```go providers := make([]string, len(rows)) models := make([]string, len(rows)) inputs := make([]int64, len(rows)) outputs := make([]int64, len(rows)) cacheR := make([]int64, len(rows)) cacheW := make([]int64, len(rows)) for i, r := range rows { providers[i] = r.Provider models[i] = r.Model inputs[i] = -1 if r.InputPrice != nil { inputs[i] = *r.InputPrice } outputs[i] = -1 if r.OutputPrice != nil { outputs[i] = *r.OutputPrice } cacheR[i] = -1 if r.CacheReadPrice != nil { cacheR[i] = *r.CacheReadPrice } cacheW[i] = -1 if r.CacheWritePrice != nil { cacheW[i] = *r.CacheWritePrice } } return db.UpsertAIModelPrices(ctx, database.UpsertAIModelPricesParams{ Providers: providers, Models: models, InputPrices: inputs, OutputPrices: outputs, CacheReadPrices: cacheR, CacheWritePrices: cacheW, }) ``` ### Pros - Single round-trip. ### Cons - The generated `sqlc` params become plain `[]int64`, which can't represent `NULL`. --- ## Approach 3 — `jsonb_array_elements` over a single `@seed::jsonb` (chosen) Pass the raw seed JSON as one parameter; let Postgres expand and parse it. ```sql INSERT INTO ai_model_prices ( provider, model, input_price, output_price, cache_read_price, cache_write_price ) SELECT elem->>'provider', elem->>'model', (elem->>'input_price')::bigint, (elem->>'output_price')::bigint, (elem->>'cache_read_price')::bigint, (elem->>'cache_write_price')::bigint FROM jsonb_array_elements(@seed::jsonb) AS elem ON CONFLICT (provider, model) DO UPDATE SET input_price = EXCLUDED.input_price, output_price = EXCLUDED.output_price, cache_read_price = EXCLUDED.cache_read_price, cache_write_price = EXCLUDED.cache_write_price, updated_at = NOW(); ``` Go side reduces to: ```go return db.UpsertAIModelPrices(ctx, seedJSON) ``` ### Pros - Single round-trip. - NULLs fall out naturally: - `(elem->>'cache_write_price')::bigint` becomes `NULL` - no sentinels - The seed is already JSON: - Existing precedent: - `jsonb_array_elements` is already used elsewhere in the codebase ### Cons - Less type-safe at the SQL boundary than `UNNEST` - Slightly less standard than `UNNEST` - Readers need familiarity with: - `jsonb_array_elements` - `->>` extraction syntax - Postgres pays JSON parse cost - negligible at our scale --- --- # Decision We picked Approach 3. It collapses the round-trips like `UNNEST` does, but without: - nullable-array workarounds - sentinel values |
||
|
|
761adfa62a |
fix(coderd/rbac): grant template admin read access to dormant workspaces (#23554)
## Summary Template admins could **list** dormant workspaces but could not **read** them individually, resulting in a 403 when clicking into a dormant workspace that was visible in the list. ### Root cause - `GetWorkspaces` prepares its SQL authorization filter against the `workspace` type, so dormant workspaces pass the filter and appear in list results for template admins. - `GetWorkspaceByID` calls `RBACObject()` on the fetched workspace, which returns `workspace_dormant` when `DormantAt` is set. Template admin had zero permissions on that type, so the read was denied. ### Fix Add `ActionRead` on `ResourceWorkspaceDormant` to both the site-level `template-admin` and org-level `organization-template-admin` roles. This is the minimal grant needed to make list and read consistent without granting any lifecycle permissions (create, update, delete, stop, etc.) on dormant workspaces. Split the `WorkspaceDormant` RBAC test case into `WorkspaceDormantRead` (read only) and `WorkspaceDormant` (remaining write/lifecycle actions) so the new permission can be asserted independently. Template admins can read non-dormant workspaces, so this is the only missing permission. --- > This PR was generated with Coder agents and reviewed by a human. |
||
|
|
f993b72628 |
fix: introduce ResourceAiSeat for fine-grained AI seat RBAC (#24613)
Fixes: https://github.com/coder/internal/issues/1444 |
||
|
|
b5a625549e |
feat: migrate agents-access to org-scoped system role for proper chat RBAC (#24438)
The agents-access role previously granted chat permissions at user
scope, but chats are org-scoped objects. Rego skips user-level perms
when org_owner is set, making the grants invisible. Handler-level
band-aids used synthetic non-org-scoped objects as a workaround.
- Migrates agents-access from users.rbac_roles (site-level) to
organization_members.roles (org-scoped) via DB migration
- Redefines agents-access as a predefined org-scoped builtin role
alongside organization-admin, organization-auditor, etc., with
Member permissions granting chat create/read/update
- Excludes ResourceChat from OrgMemberPermissions so org membership
alone no longer grants chat access
- Fixes handler Authorize checks to use org-scoped objects with
semantically correct actions (ActionUpdate for message/tool operations)
- Grants org admins the ability to assign agents-access
Closes #24250
Fixes CODAGT-174
Note: this does not update the "Usage" endpoints. Tracked by CODAGT-161.
> 🤖
|
||
|
|
227f20df6a |
perf(coderd): cheaper chatd org membership checks (#24361)
This change reuses the authenticated subject's existing organization membership information during chat creation instead of issuing an `OrganizationMembers` query. The current query is still correct, so this is not required for correctness. However, `workspaceapps` already answers the same question more cheaply from the request's RBAC subject. This extracts that logic into `rbac.Subject.HasOrganizationMembership` and reuses it in both places, removing an extra database lookup from chat creation without changing the authorization behavior. I'm currently debugging a Coder agents scaletest regression where a run on April 2, 2026 with 4800 concurrent chat creations passed, while the same run on April 15, 2026 does not. We could stagger chat creation to reduce the burst, but I'd rather understand why this bottleneck appeared in the first place so we can keep making small hot-path improvements like this one instead of only smoothing over the symptom. |
||
|
|
22062ec52e |
feat: add organization scoping to chats (#23827)
Fixes https://github.com/coder/internal/issues/1436 * Adds organization_id to chats with backfill (workspace org → user org membership → default org) * No support yet for ACLs (follow-up issue) - Cross-org workspace binding rejected (both in `CreateChatRequest` and in `create_workspace` tool - Adds `OrganizationAutocomplete` to `AgentCreateForm` - Docs updated with `organization_id` in chats-api.md > 🤖 Written by a Coder Agent. Reviewed by many humans and many agents. --------- Co-authored-by: Mathias Fredriksson <mafredri@gmail.com> |
||
|
|
86ca61d6ca |
perf: cap count queries and emit native UUID comparisons for audit/connection logs (#23835)
Audit and connection log pages were timing out due to expensive COUNT(*) queries over large tables. This commit adds opt-in count capping: requests can return a `count_cap` field signaling that the count was truncated at a threshold, avoiding full table scans that caused page timeouts. Text-cast UUID comparisons in regosql-generated authorization queries also contributed to the slowdown by preventing index usage for connection and audit log queries. These now emit native UUID operators. Frontend changes handle the capped state in usePaginatedQuery and PaginationWidget, optionally displaying a capped count in the pagination UI (e.g. "Showing 2,076 to 2,100 of 2,000+ logs") Related to: https://linear.app/codercom/issue/PLAT-31/connectionaudit-log-performance-issue |
||
|
|
2a990ce758 |
feat: show friendly alert for missing agents-access role (#23831)
Replaces the generic red `ErrorAlert` ("Forbidden.") with a proactive
permission check and friendly info alert when a user lacks the
`agents-access` role.
- Add `createChat` permission check to `permissions.json` using
`owner_id: "me"`
- Handle `"me"` owner substitution in `renderPermissions` (SSR path)
- Pass `canCreateChat` from `useAuthenticated().permissions` into
`AgentCreateForm`
- Show `ChatAccessDeniedAlert` and disable input immediately (no need to
trigger a 403 first)
- Also catch 403 errors as a fallback in case permissions aren't yet
loaded
- Add `ForbiddenNoAgentsRole` Storybook story with `play` assertions
- Add `TestRenderPermissionsResolvesMe` Go test to pin the `"me"`
sentinel substitution
<details><summary>Implementation plan & decision log</summary>
- Uses the existing `permissions.json` + `checkAuthorization` system
rather than a separate API call
- `owner_id: "me"` is resolved to the actor's ID by both the auth-check
API endpoint and the SSR `renderPermissions` function
- Go test uses a real `rbac.StrictCachingAuthorizer` (not a mock) so it
verifies both the sentinel substitution and the RBAC role evaluation
end-to-end
- Alert follows the exact same `Alert` pattern as the 409 usage-limit
block
- Uses `severity="info"` and links to the getting-started docs Step 3
- Textarea is disabled proactively so the user never sees the scary
generic error
</details>
> 🤖 Created by a Coder Agent and will be reviewed by a human.
|
||
|
|
3ce82bb885 |
feat: add chat-access site-wide role to gate chat creation (#23724)
- Add `chat-access` built-in role granting chat CRUD at User scope
- Exclude `ResourceChat` from member, org member, and org service
account `allPermsExcept` calls
- Allow system, owner, and user-admin to assign the new role
- Migration auto-assigns role to users who have ever created a chat
- Update RBAC test matrix: `memberMe` denied, `chatAccessUser` allowed
**Breaking change**: Members without `chat-access` lose chat creation
ability. Migration covers existing chat creators. Members who have never
created a chat do not get this role automatically applied.
> 🤖 This PR was created by a Coder Agent and reviewed by me.
|