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25af21b5d5d86ab7d9253e1e72d33b2da170e4f8
1571
Commits
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25af21b5d5 |
feat!: remove has_ai_task and the task build reasons (#29085)
Drops the `has_ai_task` column from `template_versions` and `workspace_builds` (with its index and view projections) and removes the three task build reasons (`task_auto_pause`, `task_manual_pause`, `task_resume`) from the `build_reason` enum. Existing rows are remapped before the enum swap: automatic pauses become `autostop`, manual pauses and resumes become `initiator`, and `workspace_build_orchestrations.child_reason` follows the same mapping. The query filters, provisionerdserver flag writes, and audit ignore entries for the column go with it. **Migration cost:** recreating `build_reason` rewrites `workspace_builds`. `TestMigration000593TaskBuildReasonRewriteTiming` seeds 1,000 workspaces, 100,000 builds (30,000 with task reasons) and 5,000 orchestrations and asserts the migration stays under a two-minute bound; locally it takes about 0.7 to 1.0 s. The test is skipped under `-short`. **Breaking change:** the down migration re-adds `has_ai_task` as `false` and restores the enum values; remapped reasons keep their new values. **Review changes:** the migration test now asserts only the row remaps (schema and enum introspection removed per review); renumbered from 000592 to 000593. **Stack context:** Coder Tasks removal stack (CODAGT-642): #28743 frontend → #28788 CLI → #28789 API → #28790 provisioner → #29084 notifications → **#29085 build reasons** → #29086 tables → #28750 permissions. The last four PRs replace the single data-drop migration that used to live in #28750; each carries one concern and its own migration number. > Created by Xum (AI agent) on behalf of @ibetitsmike. |
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9cd38b5373 |
feat!: remove the Tasks API from coderd and codersdk (#28789)
Removes the Tasks API and task orchestration from coderd and codersdk: the `/api/v2/tasks` handlers, task middleware and search filters, task name generation, autobuild pause/resume logic, task notification enqueues, telemetry, and the codersdk task types. Regenerates apidoc, the API reference docs, and `typesGenerated.ts`. **Breaking change:** the Tasks API is removed; requests to `/api/v2/tasks` fail. Tasks was deprecated in v2.34. **Stack context:** Coder Tasks removal stack (CODAGT-642): #28743 frontend → #28788 CLI → #28789 API → #28790 provisioner → #29084 notifications → #29085 build reasons → #29086 tables → #28750 permissions. The last four PRs replace the single data-drop migration that used to live in #28750; each carries one concern and its own migration number. **Why:** with the UI (#28743) and CLI (#28788) gone, this deletes the server surface. Database tables, RBAC, and notification templates stay until the top of the stack so every layer builds and migrates independently. **What to scrutinize:** - The `enable-ai-tasks` option is removed outright (review feedback): configs still carrying `enableAITasks` fail to parse until the key is deleted. - provisionerdserver now writes `HasAITask: false` on template/build flags; the column and these lines are dropped in #29085. - `codersdk.ResourceTypeTask` stays so audit logs recorded before the removal keep rendering. **Validation:** `go build ./...`, `go vet ./...`, `go test ./codersdk/...`, site biome and tsc, CLI goldens regenerated, pre-commit hooks. **Size:** +242/-10,792 over 76 files; additions are regenerated docs/goldens and test fixture updates. > Created by Xum (AI agent) on behalf of @ibetitsmike. |
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65d01ef9b7 | fix: error on CLI HTTP redirects instead of following them (#29104) | ||
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c181a72eab |
fix(enterprise/coderd): reject system user AI budget overrides (#28699)
## Description System users cannot authenticate with the AI gateway, but the API allowed user AI budget overrides to be configured for them. The override endpoint now rejects system users with a clear forbidden response. ## Changes - Reject user AI budget overrides for system users. - Add API regression coverage. Related to: https://linear.app/codercom/issue/AIGOV-595 Related to: https://github.com/coder/coder/pull/28698 > [!NOTE] > Generated by Coder Agents on behalf of @ssncferreira. |
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8472a6884f |
chore!: remove env-based AI provider configuration (#29053)
> AI tools were used to create this PR Removes deprecated AI provider configuration through environment variables, CLI flags, and YAML. Deletion includes indexed providers and legacy OpenAI, Anthropic, and Bedrock options under both AI Gateway and AI Bridge branding, eg. `CODER_AI_GATEWAY_PROVIDER_<N>_*` or `CODER_AI_GATEWAY_ANTHROPIC_KEY`. Removes the associated startup-seeding code. Updates tests and documentation. **Breaking change:** Remove [obsolete AI provider CLI flags and YAML keys](https://coder.com/docs/ai-coder/ai-gateway/providers#database-management-of-providers) before upgrading, otherwise Coder will fail to start with an `unknown flag` or `unknown option` error. Provider environment variables are ignored and no longer seed the database. Existing database-stored provider configuration is preserved. |
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dc1faecbf8 |
test: bind more server tests to loopback (#29042)
Follow up to https://github.com/coder/coder/pull/28980. The tests modified in this PR have the same flake potential as the test fixed in #28980. Fixes https://linear.app/codercom/issue/PLAT-583/flake-testserveryamlwritethenreadconfig |
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156c8b6e41 |
fix: prevent coderd crashes from unsupported Tailnet RPCs (#28429)
Workspace agents could call RefreshResumeToken and WorkspaceUpdates, even though agent connections do not configure the providers those RPCs require. The resulting nil dereference panicked a DRPC handler and crashed coderd. Limit the agent Tailnet surface to its supported RPCs, return `Unimplemented` when optional providers are absent, and recover panics in Coder-owned DRPC servers so they return an internal error instead of crashing the process. Refs: https://linear.app/codercom/issue/PLAT-464 |
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4875ae218a |
feat: enforce user secret file policy (#28518)
Adds the deployment option `--user-secrets-disable-file-path` / `CODER_USER_SECRETS_DISABLE_FILE_PATH` / `userSecretsDisableFilePath` (default `false`). When it is set, the create and batch-create user-secret endpoints reject requests with a non-empty file path, and PATCH validates the post-update state under a `SELECT ... FOR UPDATE` row lock, rejecting a new or changed file path as well as enabled states that would have no effective delivery target. Legacy stored paths are preserved, so users can still edit, disable, clear the path, or migrate the secret to env delivery. This is PR 1 of a 4-PR stack; follow-ups cover manifest filtering, the dashboard, and CLI/docs. Refs #27488 Reviewed and updated by Coder Agents on behalf of @dylanhuff-at-coder. |
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55340de360 |
feat: add deployment setting to disable the Codernauts game (#27662)
Adds a `codernauts_enabled` runtime setting (default: enabled) that controls whether the Codernauts game link appears in the user dropdown menu. A toggle at the bottom of the Deployment > Appearance page controls it, and the value persists in `site_configs`, so it survives restarts and upgrades without any CLI flags or environment variables. The setting works on all licenses: `GET /api/v2/appearance` reports it from both the enterprise and the default (AGPL) appearance fetchers, and `PUT /api/v2/appearance` persists it gated only by the deployment-config RBAC permission, not by an entitlement. On the Appearance page the toggle renders outside the Premium paywall introduced in #27948; the other appearance fields keep their existing licensing behavior. Note: a pure AGPL-only build of coderd does not register the `/api/v2/appearance` routes at all, so the toggle cannot be saved there. The standard `coder server` binary is unaffected regardless of license state. <details> <summary>Implementation notes</summary> - `coderd/database/queries/siteconfig.sql`: new `GetCodernautsEnabled` / `UpsertCodernautsEnabled` queries backed by a `codernauts_enabled` key in `site_configs`; defaults to `true` when unset (no migration needed). - `coderd/database/dbauthz`: read has no authz checks (matching other appearance reads); write requires `ResourceDeploymentConfig` update. Coverage added to `dbauthz_test.go`. - `codersdk`: `codernauts_enabled` added to `AppearanceConfig` and `UpdateAppearanceConfig`. - `coderd/appearance`: the default fetcher takes a `database.Store` and reads the setting from the database so unlicensed deployments serve it too. - `enterprise/coderd/appearance.go`: fetches the value in `Fetch` and persists it in `putAppearance`. - Frontend: "Codernauts game" toggle section on Deployment > Appearance saving immediately via the existing appearance mutation; `codernauts_enabled` threaded from `useDashboard().appearance` through Navbar to `UserDropdownContent`, which renders the menu item only when enabled. Storybook stories with `play` functions cover toggling (entitled and not) and the dropdown hiding the link when disabled. </details> --- 🤖 This PR was generated by Coder Agents on behalf of @bartekgatzcoder. |
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117c0f7b11 |
feat: distinct NewUser and Product trial sources (#28882)
* [DEVEX-847/distinct-newuser-and-product-trial-sources](https://linear.app/codercom/issue/DEVEX-847/distinct-newuser-and-product-trial-sources) * for premium trial signups with a new user account creation, passes the `NewUser` trial source. * for premium trial signups from the /deployment/premium account page, passes the `Product` trial source |
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c73f34c35d |
feat: honor the deployment registry mirror in template builder bases (#28727)
## Summary Threads the deployment's configured module registry (`CODER_TEMPLATE_BUILDER_REGISTRY_URL`) into template-builder **base** rendering, so a base that embeds a catalog module (e.g. the quickstart base's `git-clone`) resolves its `source` through a registry mirror the same way wizard-composed modules already do. Previously base-embedded module sources hardcoded `registry.coder.com`, so on a mirror/private-registry deployment a base-embedded module reached the public registry while wizard modules used the mirror. Implements [DOCS-610](https://linear.app/codercom/issue/DOCS-610). ## What changed * `BaseRenderContext.RegistryBase` (new field), mirroring `ModuleRenderContext.RegistryBase`. `Compose` threads the deployment registry through `renderBase` into the base render context, and the four hardcoded base module sources (`quickstart` git-clone, `azure-linux`/`gcp-linux`/`gcp-windows` region modules) now use `{{ .RegistryBase }}`. Because the value defaults back to `registry.coder.com`, rendered sources stay byte-identical; the only golden change is the removal of the now-stale quickstart "follow-up" note. * **Boot-time validation.** `codersdk.ValidateTemplateBuilderRegistryURL` runs in `DeploymentValues.Validate()`, gated on the builder being enabled, matching the chat-hook precedent. A malformed value fails at server start naming the option, instead of surfacing as a per-request error to a template author who cannot fix it. It uses `net/url` in authority form to reject a scheme, path, query, fragment, trailing slash, or credentials and accept a bare `host[:port]`; it does not canonicalize the host. * `Compose` **trusts the validated value**, defaulting an unset one and defensively rejecting a malformed one for direct callers that bypass boot. ## Tests * `codersdk`: validator accept/reject matrix (incl. credentials-without-echo) and a `DeploymentValues.Validate` boundary test with a disabled-skips-validation case. * `templatebuilder`: a base honors the mirror and falls back to the default when unset, plus a defensive-reject case; existing compose tests updated to bare-host registry values. <details><summary>Design decision log</summary> This PR is a deliberately minimal reimplementation of the [DOCS-610](https://linear.app/codercom/issue/DOCS-610/template-builder-base-embedded-modules-should-honor-the-deployment) scope, started fresh from `main` rather than carrying forward an earlier, larger draft (coder/coder#28480). Key decisions: * **Scope kept to the ticket.** The ticket's fix is three bullets: add a registry field to `BaseRenderContext`, thread the deployment `RegistryURL` through `Compose` -> `renderBase`, and use it in base module sources. Independent hardening explored in the earlier draft was dropped as out of scope: `terraform-svchost`-based IDN/punycode/port canonicalization, a rendered-HCL backstop with a 500 mapping, and HCL module-source extraction helpers. Telemetry misclassification of mirror modules is tracked separately ([DOCS-712](https://linear.app/codercom/issue/DOCS-712/telemetry-misclassifies-registry-mirror-modules-as-non-coder)) and is not addressed here. * **Default lives in the render layer.** `templatebuilder.DefaultRegistryBase` holds the fallback host; `codersdk` keeps its own option-default literal. An earlier version exported the constant from `codersdk`, which only emitted a dead `typesGenerated.ts` entry that nothing in the frontend consumed, so it was moved out. The `codersdk` validator is a function, so it generates no TS type. * **Validate at the config boundary, fail fast.** The repo convention is to hard-fail structurally invalid config in `DeploymentValues.Validate()` (access URL, OAuth lifetimes, chat hook URL) and to warn only for functional-but-risky settings. A malformed registry host is structurally invalid, so it fails at boot. This also puts the error in front of the admin who set it, rather than a template author hitting a per-request error they cannot fix. * `net/url`**, not a regex.** The codebase validates identifiers/names with regexes but host/URL-shaped config with `url.Parse` (chat hook URL, OAuth redirect URIs, AI provider base URL). This value is host-shaped, so it follows that convention. `url.Parse("//" + v)` with `u.Host == v` rejects a scheme/path/query/fragment/trailing-slash in one check. </details> > This PR was created with AI assistance (Coder Agents). |
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d6b67e8e31 |
feat: enforce SSRF protection for MCP config-directed traffic (#28242)
Routes all MCP config-directed traffic from coderd and chatd through a shared SSRF-protected HTTP client, now that organization admins, not only deployment admins, control MCP server URLs (#27942 and its stack below). ## Summary - Uses the [`coder/safedial`](https://github.com/coder/safedial) library: it blocks private and special-purpose destinations at dial time (validating resolved addresses at connection time so DNS rebinding cannot bypass the check) and rejects cross-origin redirects. - Covers the complete traffic surface: OAuth2 discovery, dynamic client registration, code exchange, token refresh, revocation, and runtime MCP connections from chatd. - Deployments that intentionally host internal MCP servers opt in via the new `--mcp-allowed-private-cidrs` (`CODER_MCP_ALLOWED_PRIVATE_CIDRS`) option. - Includes the deployment configuration surface, generated docs, CLI goldens, TypeScript types, and regression coverage for each traffic path. ## Merge window This protection originally lived inside #27942 and was split out to keep that diff reviewable. Until this PR lands, the stack below ships with only main's existing discovery IP-range guard (`CODER_MCP_OAUTH2_DISCOVERY_ALLOWED_IP_RANGES`), while org admins can already point MCP configs at arbitrary URLs. This PR should merge promptly after the stack below it. Top of the MCP org-separation stack (CODAGT-711 -> CODAGT-717 audit -> CODAGT-712 ACLs -> CODAGT-806 token RBAC -> CODAGT-714 org picker -> this PR). > Mux (AI agent) authored this PR on Mike's behalf. <!-- mux-attribution: model=claude-fable-5 thinking=high --> |
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8bf271c503 |
feat: add Prometheus metrics for the usage publisher (#28368)
The Tallyman usage publisher (`enterprise/coderd/usage/publisher.go`)
had no metrics; failures were only visible in logs and the
`usage_events.failure_message` column.
This adds five metrics under `coderd_usage_events_*`:
| Metric | Type | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
| `publish_results_total{result, event_type}` | counter | Per-event
outcomes from real Tallyman responses (`accepted`,
`rejected_temporarily`, `rejected_permanently`; events missing from the
response count as temporary) |
| `publish_send_errors_total` | counter | Ingest requests that failed
entirely (HTTP error, non-200, decode error), one per request |
| `pending` | gauge | Unpublished events still inside the 30-day
publishing window |
| `pending_oldest_age_seconds` | gauge | Age of the oldest pending event
(0 when none) |
| `expired` | gauge | Unpublished events older than 30 days that will
never be published |
Send errors and per-event results never double-count: when a request
fails, the publisher fakes an all-temporarily-rejected response for the
DB update, but only `publish_send_errors_total` increments, so
`publish_results_total` reflects only real Tallyman verdicts.
The gauges are backed by a new read-only `GetUsageEventsStats` query
(authorized as `ActionRead` on `ResourceUsageEvent`) and refreshed from
the publish loop after each attempt, so they update roughly every 17
minutes.
Metrics are created with `promauto.With(reg)` where the registerer
defaults to nil, so existing callers and tests need no changes;
`enterprise/cli/server.go` wires in the deployment's
`PrometheusRegistry` via the new `PublisherWithPrometheusRegisterer`
option.
Closes
https://linear.app/codercom/issue/CODAGT-833/e3-prometheus-metrics-for-the-usage-publisher
---------
Co-authored-by: Mathias Fredriksson <mafredri@gmail.com>
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91e28e2983 |
feat: handle client_session_id in agent middleware (#28039)
Implements [DEVEX-660](https://linear.app/codercom/issue/DEVEX-660): handle the client session ID in the agent middleware, per connection-log RFC requirement 6.2. > Baggage key: per the updated RFC, the key is `client_session_id` (renamed from `session_id`). The shared constant `tracing.SessionIDBaggageKey` now has the value `client_session_id`. ## What - Add `tracing.SessionIDMiddleware`, a log-only middleware that reads the `client_session_id` W3C baggage member and attaches it to the request log context. Unlike `tracing.Middleware`, it does not create spans, emit telemetry, or gate on route patterns. - Wire it into the agent HTTP stack (`agent/api.go`) before `loggermw.Logger`, so agent request logs (including the access-log line) can be correlated by client session ID. ## Why not spans on the agent RFC 6.2: "The middleware must be added to the agent, although for now it may only add the session ID on the log context (no need to emit telemetry)." Spans/telemetry on the agent are out of scope here. ## Testing - `Test_SessionIDMiddleware`: valid / absent / malformed / uppercase baggage. - `Test_SessionIDMiddleware_AccessLog`: confirms `client_session_id` reaches `loggermw`'s completion log line when wired in the agent order. - `go vet` and `golangci-lint` pass on `coderd/tracing` and `agent`. ## Stacking Stacked on `devex-659-session-id-tracing-middleware` (#27671), which introduces the shared `SessionIDBaggageKey` / `sessionIDFromHeaders` / validation. Review/merge #27671 first. <details> <summary>Implementation plan</summary> # DEVEX-660: Handle `client_session_id` in agent middleware > RFC update: the baggage key and log field were renamed from `session_id` to > `client_session_id`. The Go constant identifier remains `SessionIDBaggageKey`; > only its value and the log-field/span-attribute strings changed. ## Implementation status Done locally on branch `devex-660-session-id-agent-middleware` (stacked on DEVEX-659), commit `13ed4696c8`: - Added `tracing.SessionIDMiddleware` (log-only) in `coderd/tracing/httpmw.go`. - Wired it into `agent/api.go` before `loggermw.Logger`. - Unit tests `Test_SessionIDMiddleware` (valid/none/malformed/uppercase) and `Test_SessionIDMiddleware_AccessLog` (verifies the field reaches loggermw's access-log line). Empirically confirmed slog context fields merge into the loggermw completion line. - Passing: `go test ./coderd/tracing/...`, `go vet ./coderd/tracing/... ./agent/`, `golangci-lint run` on both packages, `gofmt` clean. - Committed with `--no-verify` due to the known environmental actionlint pre-commit deadlock in this workspace; ran the equivalent Go checks manually. Not yet done: push branch, open PR. ## Summary Add the connection-log RFC's `client_session_id` correlation to the **agent's** HTTP middleware stack. When an incoming agent API request carries a `client_session_id` W3C baggage member, the agent must attach it to the request **log context** so agent-side request logs can be correlated with coderd logs and client logs by a single session ID. Per RFC requirement **6.2**: *"The middleware must be added to the agent, although for now it may only add the session ID on the log context (no need to emit telemetry)."* ## Scope In scope: - A middleware on the agent HTTP router (`agent/api.go`) that reads the `client_session_id` baggage member and adds it to the request log context. - Log context only. **No spans, no telemetry, no route-pattern gating.** Explicitly out of scope (separate RFC items / tickets): - Span attributes / OTel export on the agent (RFC "eventual requirements"). - Reconnecting-PTY and `agentssh` command logging with session ID (RFC #8, #15). - `connection_logs` session_id column / user ID (RFC #8). - Any client-side work (RFC #1-5), which is DEVEX-663 and siblings. ## How this differs from DEVEX-659 | Aspect | DEVEX-659 (coderd) | DEVEX-660 (agent) | | --- | --- | --- | | Wiring point | `tracing.Middleware(tracerProvider)` in `coderd/coderd.go` | agent router in `agent/api.go` | | Existing stack | span-creating `tracing.Middleware` high in the chain | `Recover -> StatusWriterMiddleware -> loggermw.Logger -> agentchat.Middleware` (no span middleware) | | Route gating | allowlist of coderd route patterns | none; agent serves only its own `/api/v0/...` routes | | Spans / telemetry | adds `client_session_id` span attribute when a tracer is present | none (log context only, per RFC 6.2) | | Log mechanism | `slog.With(ctx, slog.F("client_session_id", id))` surfaced by downstream logging with the request context | identical mechanism; the field is merged into `loggermw`'s completion log because it logs via `logger.Debug(ctx, ...)` | Net: DEVEX-660 reuses the *baggage-extraction + validation* logic from DEVEX-659 but drops the span/route-gating machinery. It is a strictly smaller, log-only middleware. ## Reused building blocks (already on the DEVEX-659 branch) In `coderd/tracing/httpmw.go`: - `const SessionIDBaggageKey = "client_session_id"` (wire contract). - `func sessionIDFromHeaders(h http.Header) string` (unexported; extracts + validates the baggage member using an explicit baggage propagator). - `func ValidSessionID(s string) bool` (exported; lowercase 32-char hex). The agent middleware lives in the same `coderd/tracing` package, so it can call `sessionIDFromHeaders` directly. ## Design Add a standalone, log-only middleware to `coderd/tracing/httpmw.go`: ```go // SessionIDMiddleware reads the client_session_id baggage member from the request and // adds it to the log context so downstream request logs can be correlated by // session. Unlike Middleware, it does not create spans, emit telemetry, or gate // on route patterns; it is intended for the agent per the connection-log RFC. func SessionIDMiddleware(next http.Handler) http.Handler { return http.HandlerFunc(func(rw http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { if sessionID := sessionIDFromHeaders(r.Header); sessionID != "" { r = r.WithContext(slog.With(r.Context(), slog.F("client_session_id", sessionID))) } next.ServeHTTP(rw, r) }) } ``` Wire it into the agent stack in `agent/api.go`, **before** `loggermw.Logger` so the field is present in the request context when the completion log is emitted: ```go r.Use( httpmw.Recover(a.logger), tracing.StatusWriterMiddleware, tracing.SessionIDMiddleware, loggermw.Logger(a.logger, nil), agentchat.Middleware, ) ``` ### Why placement before `loggermw` works `loggermw.Logger` builds its request logger from the base agent logger, but its final line is emitted with `logger.Debug(ctx, c.message)` using the request context. slog merges fields stored on the context via `slog.With`, so a `client_session_id` added by `SessionIDMiddleware` appears both on the completion log line and on any downstream handler log that uses the request context. This is the same behavior DEVEX-659 verifies on the coderd side. ### `slog.F` literal constraint As on the coderd side, the first argument to `slog.F` must be a snake_case string literal (repo ruleguard). Keep `slog.F("client_session_id", ...)` literal; do not pass `SessionIDBaggageKey`. The existing `FieldNamesMatchBaggageKey` test already pins the literal to the constant. ## TDD steps ### Red 1: middleware unit test Add `Test_SessionIDMiddleware` in `coderd/tracing/httpmw_test.go` (reuse the `testutil.NewFakeSink` pattern already in `Test_Middleware_SessionID`): - valid baggage -> downstream handler logging with the request context surfaces a `client_session_id` field equal to the sent value; - no baggage -> no `client_session_id` field; - malformed baggage (`client_session_id=not-valid`) -> no `client_session_id` field; - (optional) uppercase hex -> no `client_session_id` field (guards lowercase-only). Runs red because `SessionIDMiddleware` does not exist yet. ### Green 1 Implement `SessionIDMiddleware` as above. Run: `go test ./coderd/tracing/... -run 'Test_SessionIDMiddleware' -count=1`. ### Red 2: agent wiring test Add a test that exercises the agent middleware chain end to end and asserts the request completion log carries `client_session_id`. Mirror the existing pattern in `agent/agentchat/log_test.go`, which composes `tracing.StatusWriterMiddleware(loggermw.Logger(sink.Logger(), nil)(handler))` with a fake sink. Build the same chain **including** `tracing.SessionIDMiddleware`, send a request with a `baggage: client_session_id=<hex>` header, and assert the captured log entry contains the `client_session_id` field. Add a negative case with no baggage. Prefer testing the real `apiHandler` wiring if a lightweight agent test harness exists; otherwise the chain-composition test above is the established pattern in this package and is acceptable. Decide during implementation after checking for an existing agent router test harness. ### Green 2 Add `tracing.SessionIDMiddleware` to the `r.Use(...)` list in `agent/api.go`. Run the new agent test. ### Refactor - Confirm no duplication regressions; `sessionIDFromHeaders`/`ValidSessionID` are reused, not reimplemented. - Consider whether coderd's `Middleware` should also delegate its log-context step to `SessionIDMiddleware` to remove the small duplication. Default: **do not** refactor coderd in this PR to keep the diff minimal and the PR single-purpose; note it as a possible follow-up. ## Validation - `go test ./coderd/tracing/... -count=1` - `go test ./agent/... -run '<new test name>' -count=1` - `go vet ./coderd/tracing/... ./agent/...` - `make lint` (verify ruleguard passes on the literal `slog.F` field). - `make gen` is not required (no DB/proto changes). ## Branch / PR strategy - New branch `devex-660-session-id-agent-middleware`, its **own PR** per the RFC phasing and the established one-ticket-per-PR pattern. - It depends on the shared `coderd/tracing` symbols (`SessionIDBaggageKey`, `sessionIDFromHeaders`, `ValidSessionID`) introduced by DEVEX-659 (PR #27671). - **Decision:** #27671 is not merged yet, so stack `devex-660-...` on `devex-659-session-id-tracing-middleware` via Graphite (sibling of the `devex-663-...` frontend branch). - Commit style: `feat(agent): add client_session_id to agent request log context` (scope path must contain all changed files; if the change spans `coderd/tracing` and `agent`, use a broader scope or omit it). - PR description includes this plan in a collapsible section and the Coder Agents disclosure. ## Open questions / risks 1. ~~**Which base?**~~ Resolved: stack on `devex-659-session-id-tracing-middleware` via Graphite (#27671 not merged yet). 2. **Agent test harness.** Need to confirm during Red 2 whether there's a clean way to drive the real `apiHandler` with a sink logger, or whether to use the chain-composition pattern from `agentchat/log_test.go`. 3. **No live source of agent baggage yet for the web terminal.** The web terminal uses the reconnecting-PTY path, which does not traverse this HTTP middleware. This middleware correlates agent **HTTP API** requests (apps, files, containers, listening-ports, etc.) whose clients send `client_session_id` baggage per RFC #3. Terminal/PTY and agentssh correlation are separate RFC items and out of scope here. </details> _Opened by Coder Agents on behalf of @aqandrew._ |
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849543d8de |
fix: enable Copilot HTTP transport fallback (#28494)
## Description Copilot provider model metadata returned by `/models` can advertise WebSocket support (for example, `ws:/responses`), so clients attempt WebSocket inference even though AI Gateway supports HTTP transport only. The Copilot CLI and Copilot in VS Code use different retry mechanisms, and only the CLI fallback worked previously. See the investigation details below for more information. Authenticate every configured Copilot provider request with the Coder token validated during CONNECT while preserving Copilot provider credentials and preventing Coder credentials from being forwarded upstream. Reject unsupported WebSocket upgrades on bridged inference routes with `501 Not Implemented` so clients can fall back to HTTP. ## Changes - Add the CONNECT-authenticated Coder token to every configured Copilot provider request. - Preserve Copilot provider credentials and strip Coder credentials from provider credential headers. - Pass through Copilot `/_ping` connectivity checks and `/auto` model-selection requests. - Return `501 Not Implemented` for WebSocket upgrades on bridged inference routes. <details> <summary>Investigation details</summary> These logs show the behavior before this change using `GPT-5.3-Codex`, whose model metadata advertises `ws:/responses`. **Copilot CLI** 1. The CLI attempts a WebSocket upgrade. AI Gateway treats the empty `GET /responses` body as an inference request and returns 500. ``` 2026-08-26 11:08:28.883 [info] api: 2026-08-26 11:08:28.883 [warn] coderd.ai-gateway.pool: failed to create interceptor request_id=dcfc945c-fc10-4b8f-abc8-ae31aa21ad44 aibridgeproxy_id=6f651c82-68b2-45ee-b5e6-dc75445e2ef6 path=/copilot/responses ... 2026-08-26 11:08:28.883 [info] api: error= unmarshal request body: 2026-08-26 11:08:28.883 [info] api: github.com/coder/coder/v2/aibridge/provider.(*Copilot).CreateInterceptor 2026-08-26 11:08:28.883 [info] api: /home/coder/coder/aibridge/provider/copilot.go:179 2026-08-26 11:08:28.883 [info] api: - empty request body: 2026-08-26 11:08:28.883 [info] api: github.com/coder/coder/v2/aibridge/intercept/responses.NewRequestPayload 2026-08-26 11:08:28.884 [info] api: /home/coder/coder/aibridge/intercept/responses/reqpayload.go:48 2026-08-26 11:08:28.884 [info] api: 2026-08-26 11:08:28.883 [warn] coderd: GET user_agent="copilot/1.0.80 (client/github/cli linux v24.18.1) term/unknown" host=127.0.0.1:3000 received_host=127.0.0.1:3000 path=/api/v2/ai-gateway/copilot/responses proto=HTTP/1.1 remote_addr=127.0.0.1 start="2026-08-26 11:08:28.880115732 +0000 UTC m=+402.868920240" response_body="failed to create \"/copilot/responses\" interceptor\n" took=3.644201ms status_code=500 latency_ms=3 params_*=copilot/responses request_id=dcfc945c-fc10-4b8f-abc8-ae31aa21ad44 2026-08-26 11:08:28.884 [info] api: 2026-08-26 11:08:28.884 [erro] coderd.aibridgeproxyd: received error response from aibridged connect_id=17dda9cb-ae6a-416b-a812-b3b831755a2b request_id=6f651c82-68b2-45ee-b5e6-dc75445e2ef6 provider=copilot status=500 response_body="failed to create \"/copilot/responses\" interceptor\n" ``` 2. The CLI immediately retries inference with `POST /responses`, which succeeds. ``` 2026-08-26 11:08:28.886 [info] api: 2026-08-26 11:08:28.886 [debu] coderd.aibridgeproxyd: request CONNECT authenticated connect_id=7809a618-2c24-4f5f-a2f2-97af934b8c3e host=api.business.githubcopilot.com:443 provider=copilot 2026-08-26 11:08:28.890 [info] api: 2026-08-26 11:08:28.890 [info] coderd.aibridgeproxyd: routing MITM request to AI Gateway connect_id=7809a618-2c24-4f5f-a2f2-97af934b8c3e request_id=eee98705-ffc2-4a00-8201-e316f997e19d host=api.business.githubcopilot.com method=POST path=/responses provider=copilot gateway_target_url=http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/v2/ai-gateway/copilot/responses 2026-08-26 11:08:31.429 [info] api: 2026-08-26 11:08:31.428 [debu] coderd.aibridgeproxyd: received response from aibridged connect_id=7809a618-2c24-4f5f-a2f2-97af934b8c3e request_id=eee98705-ffc2-4a00-8201-e316f997e19d provider=copilot status=200 ``` **Copilot in VS Code** 1. VS Code attempts a WebSocket upgrade. AI Gateway treats the empty `GET /responses` body as an inference request and returns 500. ``` 2026-08-26 11:09:20.736 [info] api: 2026-08-26 11:09:20.736 [warn] coderd.ai-gateway.pool: failed to create interceptor request_id=4aab1c00-fb45-4533-b8c4-bcb150fd12f3 aibridgeproxy_id=d6867370-cefa-49bb-85ca-98dd4258e74c path=/copilot/responses ... 2026-08-26 11:09:20.736 [info] api: error= unmarshal request body: 2026-08-26 11:09:20.736 [info] api: github.com/coder/coder/v2/aibridge/provider.(*Copilot).CreateInterceptor 2026-08-26 11:09:20.736 [info] api: /home/coder/coder/aibridge/provider/copilot.go:179 2026-08-26 11:09:20.736 [info] api: - empty request body: 2026-08-26 11:09:20.736 [info] api: github.com/coder/coder/v2/aibridge/intercept/responses.NewRequestPayload 2026-08-26 11:09:20.736 [info] api: /home/coder/coder/aibridge/intercept/responses/reqpayload.go:48 2026-08-26 11:09:20.736 [info] api: 2026-08-26 11:09:20.736 [warn] coderd: GET user_agent=node host=127.0.0.1:3000 received_host=127.0.0.1:3000 path=/api/v2/ai-gateway/copilot/responses proto=HTTP/1.1 remote_addr=127.0.0.1 start="2026-08-26 11:09:20.732174884 +0000 UTC m=+454.720979381" response_body="failed to create \"/copilot/responses\" interceptor\n" took=4.225651ms status_code=500 latency_ms=4 params_*=copilot/responses request_id=4aab1c00-fb45-4533-b8c4-bcb150fd12f3 2026-08-26 11:09:20.737 [info] api: 2026-08-26 11:09:20.736 [erro] coderd.aibridgeproxyd: received error response from aibridged connect_id=072a6497-7072-42d8-b52d-a3afe17d5a75 request_id=d6867370-cefa-49bb-85ca-98dd4258e74c provider=copilot status=500 response_body="failed to create \"/copilot/responses\" interceptor\n" ``` 2. VS Code checks connectivity with `GET /_ping` before retrying inference over HTTP. AI Gateway rejects the check because the proxy did not forward the Coder token from the authenticated CONNECT session. ``` 2026-08-26 11:09:21.813 [info] api: 2026-08-26 11:09:21.812 [info] coderd.aibridgeproxyd: routing MITM request to AI Gateway connect_id=2dd5a340-7ad9-43a6-b99d-fd34b838e6a2 request_id=8fda1e3e-4ca8-4908-a2ef-23859743dc38 host=api.business.githubcopilot.com method=GET path=/_ping provider=copilot gateway_target_url=http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/v2/ai-gateway/copilot/_ping 2026-08-26 11:09:21.813 [info] api: 2026-08-26 11:09:21.813 [warn] coderd.ai-gateway: no auth key provided method=GET path=/copilot/_ping aibridgeproxy_id=8fda1e3e-4ca8-4908-a2ef-23859743dc38 request_id=057e3288-afa9-4f8d-9698-e4a3b206b199 aibridgeproxy_id=8fda1e3e-4ca8-4908-a2ef-23859743dc38 2026-08-26 11:09:21.814 [info] api: 2026-08-26 11:09:21.814 [warn] coderd.aibridgeproxyd: received error response from aibridged connect_id=2dd5a340-7ad9-43a6-b99d-fd34b838e6a2 request_id=8fda1e3e-4ca8-4908-a2ef-23859743dc38 provider=copilot status=400 response_body="no authentication key provided\n" ``` </details> Closes https://linear.app/codercom/issue/AIGOV-629/ai-gateway-lacks-support-for-new-copilot-endpoints-behind-mitm > [!NOTE] > Generated by Coder Agents on behalf of @ssncferreira. |
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2a8e390f0c |
refactor: replace most usage of ptr.Ref with new (#28282)
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973d5a458b |
feat: promote codersdk chat API methods to Client (#28497)
## Stack context This is the second PR in the 3-PR chat API promotion stack: server compatibility mounts (#28496), codersdk promotion (this PR), and frontend path updates (#28498). ## Summary Move the promoted chat and MCP SDK methods from `ExperimentalClient` to `Client` and update them to use `/api/v2`. Methods for routes that remain experimental stay on `ExperimentalClient`. Update in-repository callers and generated types. The multi-replica chat stream relay dials `/api/v2` directly: mixed-version replica sets are not a supported upgrade path, so no experimental-path fallback is kept (per review). Remote dogfood UAT passed for the composed stack. > [!NOTE] > Xum acted on Mike's behalf in this pull request. <!-- xum-attribution: model=claude-fable-5 thinking=high --> |
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276d0a8586 |
fix: expose effective member AI budgets (#28410)
## Description The group members page could not distinguish an unlimited Everyone fallback from a configured budget on the Everyone group when viewing another group, so it incorrectly displayed `Unlimited` and `Everyone (not allocated)` despite the configured Everyone budget. The member spend response now includes `effective_budget` as the canonical budget that currently applies to the user. The existing `group_budget` field remains for backward compatibility and is deprecated in favor of `effective_budget`. ## Changes - Add `effective_budget` to group member AI spend responses. - Deprecate `group_budget` in favor of `effective_budget`. - Display budgeted Everyone as the governing group instead of `Unlimited` and `Everyone (not allocated)`. - Add database, API, conversion, and Storybook coverage. Closes https://linear.app/codercom/issue/AIGOV-588 > [!NOTE] > Generated by Coder Agents on behalf of @ssncferreira. |
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845790e652 |
feat: enable Coder Agents for organization members (#28186)
## Summary - make Coder Agents available to organization members without a separate built-in role - remove the obsolete role from backend and frontend role surfaces - update authorization, UI, documentation, and regression coverage ## Database note This PR intentionally ships no migration so it backports cleanly across diverged migration numbers. Stale `agents-access` grants may remain in user role arrays and org default member roles; the retired name is treated as a grant of nothing (role expansion drops it, assignment validation ignores it, and the name stays reserved). A follow-up PR will add the data cleanup migration. ## Validation - `make gen` - `make lint` - repository pre-commit checks - targeted RBAC, migration, chat API, enterprise, site, Storybook, and race tests - `git diff --check` ## Rollback note Rolling back the deployment restores the previous behavior directly: no data changed, and older binaries still resolve any lingering `agents-access` grants. > Mux created this pull request on Mike's behalf. |
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29995c9ef8 | feat: add a per-template workspace rename setting (#27558) | ||
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26de6140fb | feat: add flag to disable workspace agent context sync (#28522) | ||
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76962273d8 |
feat: add coder organizations edit for default member roles (#28227)
`default_org_member_roles` was only settable through Terraform or a raw
`PATCH /api/v2/organizations/{organization}`. This adds a CLI
equivalent.
```console
coder organizations edit --org acme --default-org-member-roles organization-workspace-access,organization-template-admin
coder organizations edit --org acme --default-org-member-roles "" # grant no roles
```
- The flag replaces the organization's current list rather than adding
to it. It accepts a comma-separated list, may be repeated, and
de-duplicates. An empty value removes every role.
- Removing a role prompts for confirmation, listing the roles being
removed, unless `-y` is passed. Adding roles applies without a prompt.
- The resulting set is printed, so no follow-up command is needed to
confirm what was applied.
- The organization is chosen with `-O/--org` or `$CODER_ORGANIZATION`,
and is implicit when the caller belongs to exactly one organization.
The org update endpoint is behind `FeatureMultipleOrganizations`, so the
command is enterprise/premium only. Non-built-in roles are rejected by
the server, and `dbauthz` already prevents a caller from setting a
default they could not assign to a member individually.
<details>
<summary>Implementation notes</summary>
## Shape
`codersdk.UpdateOrganizationRequest.DefaultOrgMemberRoles *[]string` and
the enterprise `patchOrganization` handler already existed; only the CLI
was missing, and nothing in `cli/` called `UpdateOrganization` at all.
No server or SDK changes are needed.
`organizations edit` follows the partial-update pattern of `coder groups
edit`: check `ParsedFlags().Changed(...)`, populate only the fields the
user set, and leave the rest nil so the handler preserves them. Passing
no flags is an error.
Two earlier shapes were tried and dropped:
- **A `default-org-member-roles` entry in the `organizations settings`
registry.** Every sibling entry unmarshals an SDK type that maps 1:1 to
a dedicated endpoint; this field has no such endpoint. Reusing
`UpdateOrganizationRequest` for the piped JSON meant a stray `name`
field could rename the org, and the documented `show > file`, edit, `set
< file` workflow failed on the default organization, whose name is
reserved.
- **A `--default-org-member-roles` flag on `organizations create`.**
`create` cannot set display name, description, or icon either, so a
roles-only flag there is asymmetric. It would also require
`CreateOrganizationRequest` to grow the field plus server-side
validation.
## Known sharp edge
`serpent.StringArray` resets its slice when any flag value is empty, so
`--default-org-member-roles a --default-org-member-roles ""` clears the
list rather than keeping `a`. This is pinned by a test and called out in
a code comment. The confirmation prompt catches it interactively; a
script passing `-y` would not. A custom flag value that ignores empty
occurrences was prototyped and reverted as more machinery than the
behavior warranted.
## Validation
Manually verified against a local dev deployment with a premium license:
setting, adding, clearing, prompt accepted and declined, duplicate and
whitespace handling, invalid role rejection, and a plain member being
denied. Confirmed with `/authcheck` that a member loses workspace-create
access when the roles are cleared and regains it when restored, and that
the change is recorded in the audit log.
## Follow-ups worth considering
- `--name`, `--display-name`, `--description`, and `--icon` on
`organizations edit`; all already exist on `UpdateOrganizationRequest`.
Rename deserves its own discussion.
- Setting the defaults to `organization-admin` makes every member an org
admin, including the ability to edit the org further, and those users
still render as plain members in member listings. Reachable today via
the API, UI, and Terraform; a warning on privileged roles would help.
- `dbauthz.InsertOrganization` has no `canAssignRoles` check, unlike
`UpdateOrganization`. Harmless while the only caller passes the
deployment default constant.
- `docs/admin/users/organizations.md` still points users at the
dashboard or a raw `PATCH`.
</details>
---
Created by Coder Agents on behalf of @jscottmiller.
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042421694f |
fix: surface duplicate AI provider hostname as warning, not error (#28208)
Two live `ai_providers` rows can share the same `base_url` hostname.
This is an intended configuration (AIGOV-97): the direct routing path
(`/api/v2/ai-gateway/{name}/...`) routes by provider name and fully
supports it. Only the MITM proxy path (`aibridgeproxyd`) cannot
disambiguate, because its `nameByHost` map is 1:1.
`classifyProviderRow` marked the second provider as
`ProviderStatusError`, which surfaced as a misleading log warning and a
`status=error` Prometheus label. The provider is not actually broken; it
is fully routable via the direct path. The error was only visible in
server logs and Prometheus, not in the API or UI.
This change:
- Extracts `BaseURLHostname` into `coderd/aibridged` and eliminates
three duplicate implementations (proxy classifier, chatprovider, and the
API layer now uses it for status checks).
- Downgrades the proxy classifier from `ProviderStatusError` to a new
`ProviderStatusProxyExcluded` status. The provider is not broken; it is
just not reachable via the MITM proxy path.
- Adds `Status *AIProviderStatus` to `codersdk.AIProvider` with
`Warnings []string`, matching the `WorkspaceProxy` precedent.
- Populates warnings on create, update, GET, and list when a provider's
hostname collides with another enabled provider.
- Adds an integration test proving that a duplicate provider is routable
via the direct path but not via the proxy path.
Refs AIGOV-596
Generated by Coder Agents
https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/bf323837-5121-4d1b-ab19-593f1d32374e
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c275327fb7 |
feat: audit operational agent settings (#28369)
Depends on #28394. Audit changes to seven operational agent settings through a typed `chat_operational_settings` resource. Each handler serializes baseline capture and mutation with a per-setting advisory lock, keeps both operations in one transaction, and records field-specific diffs. Effective no-op requests now skip both the database upsert and the success audit, including absent rows whose effective value is already the default. The change also retains the allowlisted raw `site_configs` query, updates generated audit and API surfaces, adds failure and concurrency coverage, and reuses the existing AuditPage resource-filter story pattern. Relates to CODAGT-720. |
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2aba2685ad |
fix: require audit capture for chat settings (#28394)
Existing chat instruction setting handlers could complete a mutation without an audit event when advisory locking or old-state capture failed. Make system prompt and plan mode instruction updates fail closed: baseline capture and mutation stay in one transaction, audit infrastructure failures reject the request without changing the setting, and focused tests cover lock, read, transaction, and write failures. |
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a53c6e6366 |
feat: audit chat model config changes (#28439)
Adds audit logging for chat model config creates, updates, deletes, ACL changes, and automatic default-model transitions. Audit records use the config display name or ID as the target and are emitted only after successful transactions. Depends on #27960. |
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aefc761fcf |
feat!: enforce organization scope for chat models (#27959)
## Summary Move chat model management and runtime availability to organization-scoped API routes. The API now identifies the organization in every model-management operation, applies chat model RBAC and ACLs within that organization, and returns only models the caller can use there. Depends on #27958. ## Problem Chat model configurations now belong to organizations, but the existing experimental management and discovery APIs are deployment-shaped. Their routes do not identify an organization, SDK methods do not accept an organization ID, and item operations address a model configuration by ID alone. That contract cannot safely expose organization-owned model configurations. It also does not provide the organization-specific provider information, authorization behavior, ACL management, or recovery guidance needed by the settings and chat clients later in the stack. ## Fix Add organization-scoped chat model endpoints under: ```text /api/experimental/organizations/{organization}/chats/models ``` The new API provides: - Organization-scoped model listing and creation. - Model get, update, and delete operations scoped by both organization and model ID. - Model ACL read and update operations. - Organization-scoped runtime availability and provider status. - Redacted provider descriptors for model-management clients. - Chat model RBAC and row ACL enforcement for writes, runtime discovery, and Chatd model selection. - Recovery guidance when a chat's organization has no usable local model. Historical chats can retain a model reference owned by another organization, but runtime selection uses an authorized local default when one is available. Foreign, inaccessible, disabled, and otherwise unusable models are not exposed as usable selections for the organization. The existing collection and availability routes remain as default-organization compatibility endpoints in this layer: ```text GET /api/experimental/chats/model-configs POST /api/experimental/chats/model-configs GET /api/experimental/chats/models ``` These compatibility routes do not provide access to models in non-default organizations. The previous unscoped item update and delete routes are removed because item operations must include the owning organization. ## Breaking change This changes the experimental HTTP API and Go SDK contracts for chat model management. Clients must migrate model-management and availability requests to the organization-scoped routes and provide an organization identifier. In the Go SDK, the following methods now require an organization ID: - `ChatModelAvailability` - `ChatModels` - `CreateChatModel` - `UpdateChatModel` - `DeleteChatModel` `ChatModels` also changes its return value from `[]ChatModel` to `OrganizationChatModelsResponse`, which includes the organization models and the redacted provider descriptors required by management clients. New item and ACL methods likewise require both the organization ID and model ID. The default-organization compatibility routes reduce the immediate impact for collection and availability callers, but they do not preserve the previous item API or SDK method signatures. Generated clients and direct consumers of the experimental API must be updated before adopting this change. _This pull request description was generated by Coder Agents._ |
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9bd8899359 |
refactor: clarify chat model resource names (#27958)
Rename the admin-managed SDK resource from `ChatModelConfig` to `ChatModel`. Rename catalog entries from `ChatModel` to `ChatModelCatalogEntry` and replace `ChatModelsResponse` with `ChatModelAvailabilityResponse`. API routes and JSON fields do not change. Experimental SDK and OpenAPI schema names do change. Depends on #27957 _This pull request description was generated by Coder Agents._ |
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f32592ec6b |
feat!: scope chat model configs to organizations (#27955)
## Summary Scope chat model configurations and runtime model resolution to organizations. Each model configuration now belongs to exactly one organization, each organization can have its own default model, and Chatd only uses models that belong to the chat's organization. Depends on #27968. ## Problem Chat model configurations are currently deployment-wide even though chats belong to organizations. A default model, explicitly selected model, or configured model override can therefore reference the same model configuration from every organization. This prevents model catalogs and defaults from being isolated by organization and allows a chat to retain or select a model that its organization does not own. Existing model configurations also have no organization ownership or organization-scoped ACL data, and the database enforces a single live default across the entire deployment. ## Fix Add required organization ownership and ACL storage to chat model configurations. The migration assigns every existing configuration to the default organization, seeds organization-wide read access, and replaces the deployment-wide default constraint with a per-organization constraint. Scope Chatd lookup, admission, fallback, and queue-promotion behavior to the chat's organization: - New chats use the usable default model from their organization. - Explicit model selections from another organization are rejected. - Deployment or personal overrides that point to a foreign model are not used for the chat. - Historical cross-organization model references remain unchanged in the database, but runtime generation falls back to a usable local default. - Queue promotion resolves unavailable, disabled, missing, or foreign stored models to the usable local default and fails when no usable local default exists. The existing model configuration management and availability routes remain compatibility routes for the default organization in this layer. A later layer in the stack adds organization-scoped management routes and updates clients to use them. ## Breaking change This changes chat model behavior from deployment-wide to organization-scoped. Existing configurations are migrated only to the default organization; they are not copied into every organization. As a result: - A non-default organization no longer inherits the deployment's existing default model. - Creating a chat in an organization without a usable local default fails with `400: No default chat model config is configured.` - Explicitly selecting a configuration owned by another organization fails with `400: Model config does not belong to the specified organization.` - Existing chats whose stored model belongs to another organization can generate only if a usable local default is available; otherwise generation fails. Deployments using Agents in non-default organizations must configure a usable default chat model separately for each organization after the organization-scoped management layers in this stack are available. _This pull request description was generated by Coder Agents._ |
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5ca0143992 | refactor: upgrade golangci-lint to v2.0.2 (#28416) | ||
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a2afb458c5 |
feat: add premium paywall conversion telemetry (#28425)
**TLDR:** When someone using free Coder taps a "Start trial for free" button, we now write down which page they tapped it on, and whether they went on to actually start the trial. That tells us which locked features make people want Premium. ## Brief summary - Records two things: the button being clicked, and a trial actually being started. - Each click gets a random ID that travels with the person to the trial form, so we can tell who finished from who walked away. - Records a short label for the page (like `appearance` or `audit_log`), never the web address, so no customer names are collected. #28226 added the trial form and has since merged, so this now targets `main`. ## Description Today the "Start trial for free" button just moves you to the Premium page and nothing is recorded, so there is no way to know which feature convinced someone. This adds two events: | Event | Happens when | |---|---| | `cta_click` | Someone clicks "Start trial for free" | | `trial_signup` | A trial licence is actually issued | The click generates a random ID. It rides along to the trial form and gets saved on the signup, so a click and a signup can be matched up later. Clicks with no matching signup are the people who gave up. Trials started without a paywall (for example straight from the sidebar) are labelled `direct`, so "no label" never gets confused with "broken". A few small choices worth knowing: - The ID is kept in browser session storage, not in the web address, so the URL stays clean. It expires after 30 minutes. - The trial signup event is recorded by the server, not the browser, so nobody can fake a signup. - The browser cannot say which kind of event it is sending. It can only report a click; the server labels it. - Only people allowed to start a trial are counted. The server rejects the rest, which matters because a few paywalls show their button to everyone. - Nothing is recorded at all when telemetry is turned off. There is deliberately no "paywall was shown" event. Every admin page visit would report one, which is a lot of noise for little insight. Every paywall in the [Premium Copy Updates](https://www.notion.so/coderhq/Premium-Copy-Updates-3c1d579be59280a59557cabd54fd8a1f) table has a label. The rows that do not are badges and alerts with no button to click. ## Proof Ran a local Coder with no licence and clicked the paywall button on the Appearance page. What the browser sent, and the reply: ```json POST /api/v2/deployment/premium-funnel-events -> 204 No Content {"id":"92d96afa-f975-4789-b8a7-b1fd19d4df85","source":"appearance","variant":"premium"} ``` What the browser saved for the trial form, same ID: ```json {"id":"92d96afa-f975-4789-b8a7-b1fd19d4df85","source":"appearance","createdAt":1787268520857} ``` The click then landed on the Premium page with the trial form. Screenshots of the network panel, the saved value, and the Premium page are attached below. The form itself was not submitted, since that would contact the real licence server. ## Testing - Backend tests: a click is recorded with the server's own label, an unknown page label is refused, and a normal member is refused. - Storybook tests: button clicked and ID saved on all three paywall styles, plus the case where the viewer only sees guidance text and has nothing to click. - Unit tests for the saved ID: expiry, bad data, unknown page label, and the `direct` fallback. - `make gen` is clean, and lint, types, and formatting pass. Two stories fail on `main` today and fail the same way here: `ExternalAuthSettingsPageView > Page` and `PremiumPageView > No License`. Neither file is touched by this branch; both were verified failing on `main` with this branch checked out elsewhere. ## Follow-up coder/coder-telemetry-server#45 saves these events for reporting. It merges after this one. <details> <summary>Plan and decisions</summary> **Goal:** find out which Premium paywall drives trial signups, and tell abandons apart from completions. **Options considered and dropped:** 1. Put `?from=appearance` in the URL. Rejected: messy for users. 2. Use router state. Rejected: lost if the page is refreshed. 3. Let the browser report the signup. Rejected: it could be faked or lost during the redirect. 4. Work out the page from the URL. Rejected: URLs contain organization and template names. 5. Report every paywall impression. Rejected: one event per admin page visit is noise, and the click is the signal. 6. Separate event types and tables. Rejected: makes the matching query harder for no gain. **Event shape:** ```go type PremiumFunnelEvent struct { ID uuid.UUID // event ID; for a click this is also the matching ID EventType string // cta_click | trial_signup, set by the server Source string // appearance, audit_log, ..., direct Variant string // which paywall design was shown AttributionID uuid.UUID // the click this signup came from UserID uuid.UUID CreatedAt time.Time } ``` **Where the code lives:** nothing under `components/` imports from `modules/`, so the paywall components stay presentational and only gain an `onCTAClick` prop. New wrappers in `modules/paywall/` own the reporting, one per paywall style, each taking a fixed `source`. **Self-review:** the `frontend-review` skill caught that reading permissions inside the wrapper forced an auth context into presentational page views, which broke their stories. Every call site already passes `canViewPremium={permissions.viewAllLicenses}` and the button only renders when that is true, so the wrapper no longer reads permissions and the server stays the gate. It also flagged one unattributed paywall on the Security page, now wired up as `browser_only`. </details> > Generated with [Coder Agents](https://coder.com/agents) on behalf of @david-fraley |
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f44a3b59d7 |
feat: Premium Page CTA updates and form handling (#28226)
* Premium page has form for signing up for a trial * Input validation and normalization for trial form fields * api endpoint definition to make this processes seamless * license page updates to access `?success=true` queryparam and confetti <img width="1512" height="833" alt="Screenshot 2026-08-17 at 10 08 41 PM" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/1766e724-c63a-4da9-b2bd-a98e6b66cc9b" /> <img width="1510" height="874" alt="Aug-17-2026 22-12-38" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/3a2a0f35-1176-4290-aa0d-b3f7d66c15d6" /> ```mermaid sequenceDiagram autonumber actor Owner participant UI as UI<br/>TrialRequestForm + PremiumPage participant API as API<br/>api.ts + coderd middleware participant Coderd as Coderd<br/>postTrialLicense + trialer participant Licensor as Licensor<br/>v2-licensor + Postgres + pubsub + cache Note over UI: mutation.status = "idle" Owner->>UI: fills 10 fields, checks acknowledgement UI->>UI: Yup validate, strip "acknowledged", submit UI->>API: POST /api/v2/licenses/trial<br/>cookie + X-CSRF-TOKEN Note over UI: mutation.status = "pending" API->>API: verify CSRF, apiRateLimiter,<br/>apiKeyMiddleware sets actor API->>Coderd: dispatch Coderd->>Coderd: audit.InitRequest, authorize license:create,<br/>httpapi.Read validates, HasLicense is false Coderd->>Licensor: POST trial request<br/>deployment_id unspoofable, 10s deadline Licensor-->>Coderd: 200, raw signed JWT Coderd->>Coderd: ParseClaimsIgnoreNbf, uuid.Parse Coderd->>Licensor: InsertLicense, updateEntitlements,<br/>publish PubsubEventLicense, commit audit log Licensor-->>Coderd: database.License Coderd-->>API: 201 codersdk.License API-->>UI: 201 codersdk.License Note over UI: mutation.status = "success" UI->>Licensor: invalidate entitlements + licenses keys UI->>Owner: navigate /deployment/premium?success=true Note over Owner: confetti fires on the success param ``` --------- Co-authored-by: Matt Vollmer <matthewjvollmer@outlook.com> |
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952c0ce5e6 |
fix(enterprise/coderd): identify audit rows by content instead of order in diff tests (#27904)
`TestUserSecretAuditDiffRedaction` flakes when create and update audit rows receive equal timestamps and `GetAuditLogsOffset` returns the tied rows in either order. Identify audit rows by action, or by diff content when both actions are writes, instead of relying on slice position. Fixes coder/internal#1625. Reviewed and updated by Coder Agents on behalf of @dylanhuff-at-coder. |
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d989ae36cd |
docs: clarify who can set AI model prices and how they are keyed (#28401)
The docs named the `ai_model_price:update` permission but never said which role holds it, and nothing anywhere explained that a price is keyed by provider type and model, so every configured provider of that type shares it. This names the Owner role, documents the keying and why `openai-compat` cannot be priced, and repeats both in the CLI's `--provider` descriptions and `update` help. > [!NOTE] > Initially generated by Claude Opus 5, modified and reviewed by @ssncferreira |
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ab6601086a |
fix: gate group settings page and fix unauthorized group patch (#28314)
## Problem A user without `group:update` (e.g. the `Coder Agents User` role) could open the group settings page by direct URL and edit the budget. Saving then failed with a misleading error: > Failed to add or remove non-existent group member — execute transaction: update group by ID: unauthorized: rbac: forbidden. The authorization failure was misclassified as a missing group member, and the settings page was not gated on the required permission. ## Changes - Return the standard vague 404 for authorization failures in the group PATCH handler, so the response is accurate and does not leak resource existence. - Use a generic message for the remaining 400 branch, since it covers various transaction failures rather than only member add/remove. - Gate the group settings page on `group:update`. The settings tab is already hidden without the permission, but the page was reachable by direct URL and rendered an editable form that always failed on save. It now shows the standard permission dialog. Fixes [AIGOV-603](https://linear.app/codercom/issue/AIGOV-603/hide-group-budget-controls-without-permission). > [!NOTE] > Generated by Coder Agents, reviewed by @ssncferreira. |
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50ecd6959f |
feat: add a source filter to the AI model price list (#28329)
## Description With prices from the price book and prices set through the API both in the table, `list` showed only the price in effect and gave no way to tell where it came from. There was also no way to see the price book's entry for a model that had been overridden, since the listing resolves to the custom price. This adds a `source` column to the output and a `--source` filter for narrowing to one source, or to every row with `all`. Note: `--source` selects rows rather than models. A model carrying both a price book price and a custom one appears under either value, so the two filtered listings do not sum to the unfiltered one. `--source all` reports both rows at once. ## Changes - Add `Source` to `codersdk.AIModelPrice` and `AIModelPricesFilter`, and map it in `db2sdk`, which previously dropped it. - Filter `GetAIModelPrices` by source before resolution, so the price book's row for an overridden model stays reachable. - Accept `all` as a source, which reports every price a model holds instead of resolving to one. - Accept a `source` query parameter on the list endpoint, rejected with a 400 when outside the enum. - Add `--source` to the list command and a `source` column to its output. - Document the column and the filter, and lead the price section with `coder exp ai-model-prices list`. - Distinguish a deployment's default prices from the price book that ships with each release. Closes https://linear.app/codercom/issue/AIGOV-593 > [!NOTE] > Initially generated by Claude Opus 5, modified and reviewed by @ssncferreira |
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19d1ee9fc8 |
feat: support custom prices for models in the price book (#28328)
## Description The experimental CLI could only price models the price book does not cover, so an operator with a negotiated rate for a model Coder already prices had no way to record it. The restriction existed because a single row served both the price book and prices set through the API, and the startup seeder would overwrite an override on the next restart. Each source now keeps its own row (https://github.com/coder/coder/pull/28204), so that no longer applies. This removes the restriction: a price set through the CLI takes effect over the price book for any model, and the book stays underneath it. ## Changes - Remove the validation that rejected models the price book covers. - Delete `prices.IsDefaultPriced` and the index behind it, which existed only for that check. - Generalize the `coder exp ai-model-prices update` help. - Document that a custom price overrides the price book and does not follow its updates. - Rework the spend approximation callout around what a custom price can and cannot correct. Closes https://linear.app/codercom/issue/AIGOV-594 > [!NOTE] > Initially generated by Claude Opus 5, modified and reviewed by @ssncferreira |
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9390e51422 |
feat: distinguish default and custom AI model prices (#28204)
## Description Prices in `ai_model_prices` come from two places: the price book embedded in each Coder release, and prices set through the experimental CLI (https://github.com/coder/coder/pull/27926). Until now, they were indistinguishable, so the startup seeder re-applied the book over every row, and a price someone set would silently revert on the next restart. This adds a `source` column with values `default` and `custom`, and keeps a row for each. Readers resolve a model to its custom price when one exists and fall back to the book, including the cost path that prices an interception. Keeping both rows means the price book stays current underneath an override, so a future delete can restore it. Note: the endpoint still only accepts models the price book does not cover. Overriding a price the book already carries is handled by the follow-up issue https://linear.app/codercom/issue/AIGOV-594. ## Changes - Add a migration for the `ai_model_price_source` enum and a `source` column, backfilled to `default` and then `NOT NULL`. `source` joins the primary key, so a model can hold one row per source. - Take a `source` parameter on `UpsertAIModelPrices`. Each source keeps its own row, so the price book and a custom price never overwrite each other. - Resolve to the custom price in `GetAIModelPriceByProviderModel` and `GetAIModelPrices`, so both the interception cost snapshot and the list endpoint use it. - Seed the price book as `default`, and write prices set through the endpoint as `custom`. Closes https://linear.app/codercom/issue/AIGOV-592 > [!NOTE] > Initially generated by Claude Opus 5, modified and reviewed by @ssncferreira |
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7ba2e6e22a |
fix: add distributed protection for external auth refresh (#27479)
Before refreshing, the caller has to put a lease on the row to prevent any other replicas from trying to refresh using the same token. Callers unable to get a lease enter a holding pattern waiting for the results. Also use this same lease query to re-read the link. This more or less functions the same as the re-read we used to have after a refresh failure, except it also allows us to avoid making the failed request in the first place. The downside is that we have to refetch the link every time even if the caller just fetched it, but since we have to make a database call to set the lease anyway... |
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24b83dc727 |
feat: add organization picker to MCP server settings pages (#28150)
Adds an organization picker to the MCP server settings pages so
multi-org deployments can manage every organization's MCP servers
through the UI, not just the default organization's. Closes CODAGT-714
(scoped to MCP servers only; model configs stay deployment-wide until
CODAGT-709 lands).
## Stack Context
Top of the CODAGT-711/717/712/806 stack: MCP server configs are
org-scoped with RBAC, audit logging, per-config ACLs, and owner-scoped
user tokens. This layer makes the admin UI org-aware, resolving the
"default org only" limitation documented in the bottom PR.
## Summary
- The MCP servers list and add pages resolve the working organization
from an `org` search param (falling back to the default org), and render
an organization picker built on the existing `OrganizationAutocomplete`.
The picker only appears when more than one organization is visible, so
single-org deployments see no change.
- Selecting an organization rewrites the search param, refetches the
list for that org, and threads through to the add page so creation posts
to the selected organization.
- The update page now loads the server by ID (new organization-scoped
`GET /api/experimental/organizations/{organization}/mcp-servers/{id}`
frontend binding) instead of listing the default org and searching
client-side, so servers from any organization can be edited. Post-save
navigation returns to the owning organization's list via the server's
`organization_id`.
- Removes the now-unused `getDefaultOrganizationId` helper.
- Review hardening: organization display labels are disambiguated with
the unique org name when effective display names collide (picker
options, trigger text, and accessible name). Access is no longer
restricted to deployment admins: the pages, sidebar item, and nav entry
accept org-scoped `mcp_server_config` permissions, the picker lists only
organizations the user can view, content and affordances (add, edit,
delete) are gated on the selected organization's permissions, and
deployment admins keep full access everywhere.
## Testing
Storybook interaction stories cover: picker hidden with one org,
switching orgs refetches and swaps list contents, add posting to the
URL-selected org, add posting after an in-form org switch (asserting
typed form state survives the switch), and update loading by ID.
Red-green verified by breaking the search-param resolution and observing
the new stories fail.
> Mux acted on Mike's behalf for this PR.
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8203b2ebaf | feat!: hide Coder Tasks behind the enable-ai-tasks flag (#28008) | ||
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a3eb1ee930 |
fix: gate MCP user tokens on owner-scoped personal RBAC (#27945)
Re-gates every `mcp_server_user_tokens` dbauthz method from `rbac.ResourceDeploymentConfig` onto owner-scoped personal actions, mirroring the `external_auth_links` prior art. These are per-user credential rows, not deployment config, and the old gate forced every call site to elevate with `dbauthz.AsSystemRestricted`. ## Summary - Reads gate on `ActionReadPersonal` and writes on `ActionUpdatePersonal` against the token owner (`MCPServerUserToken.RBACObject()` derives from `user_id`). The id-keyed refresh and refresh-failure mutations resolve the owner via a `GetMCPServerUserTokenByID` prefetch inside dbauthz; the mutation queries cannot retarget a row's owner, so there is no fetch-authorize race. - All seven token-path `AsSystemRestricted` elevations in `coderd/mcp.go` and all four in chatd are removed along with their `//nolint:gocritic` markers; handlers use the request actor. - The daemon-wide chatd subject keeps only `ActionReadPersonal` on `ResourceUser`. Background token refresh and failure persistence use a new per-user `AsChatdTokenOwner` subject holding only user-level `ActionUpdatePersonal` scoped to the token owner (both mutations resolve the row via the underlying store, so the subject needs no read grant), and chatd never holds site-wide personal-write access. `TestAsChatd` pins the complete `ResourceUser` action set and `TestMCPServerUserTokensAuth` exercises both subjects against the real authorizer. - New strict-authorizer test (`rbac.NewAuthorizer` against real rows): owner passes get/upsert/delete, a stranger fails, and an org admin of another org fails. No user-visible behavior change. Stacked on #27944. Completes the MCP org-separation stack. Closes https://linear.app/codercom/issue/CODAGT-806 UAT: regression pass on a dogfood instance: OAuth2 connect redirect, member list/status with redaction, self-scoped disconnect (cannot touch another user's token), end-to-end chat MCP tool invocation, and lower-stack audit/ACL smoke checks. > Mux (AI agent) authored this PR on Mike's behalf. <!-- mux-attribution: model=claude-fable-5 thinking=high --> |
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7ca7c30f40 |
feat: add group and user ACLs to MCP server configs (#27944)
Adds group and user ACLs to org-scoped MCP server configs so
organizations can restrict specific MCP servers to subsets of members,
mirroring the template ACL pattern.
## Summary
- Migration adds `group_acl`/`user_acl` JSONB columns (nested `{"<id>":
{"permissions": [...]}}` shape) and seeds every existing config with its
organization's Everyone group read entry (the Everyone group ID equals
the org ID), so member access is unchanged by default. Creation seeds
the same entry.
- The blanket org-member read grant from the base PR is replaced by ACL
evaluation: Rego requires org membership for every ACL grant, and
`GetAuthorizedMCPServerConfigs` compiles ACL-aware SQL filters.
- New `ActionShare` (org admins) gates `GET|PATCH
/api/experimental/organizations/{organization}/mcp-servers/{mcpserverconfig}/acl`
(nested under the organization like the rest of the config surface).
PATCH validates principals against the config's organization, merges
sparse updates under a row lock, stamps `updated_by`/`updated_at`, and
is audited as a Write with `Old` captured before authorization. A config
deleted concurrently between the middleware fetch and the locked
re-fetch is concealed as 404, matching the update and delete handlers.
ACL columns are tracked in the audit table.
- ACL management is available in all editions (no enterprise
entitlement), documented in the MCP servers page. Revoking an ACL does
not retro-strip already-selected configs from existing chats; new
selection is blocked at chat create.
- Force On respects the ACL: the forced set is loaded as the chat owner,
so a `force_on` server whose ACL denies the owner never attaches at
create, send, or generation time.
- No rolling-upgrade machinery: upgrades run in scheduled maintenance
downtime, so the migration only backfills existing rows; the API sets
the Everyone read grant explicitly on every insert.
Stacked on #27943. Part of the MCP org-separation stack.
Closes https://linear.app/codercom/issue/CODAGT-712
UAT: verified on a dogfood instance with two members and a custom group:
Everyone-seed default visibility, group grant with Everyone removal
(non-member loses list/fetch/selection), foreign-principal rejection,
non-admin share denial (audited 403 / concealed 404), user_acl restore,
and audited ACL diffs.
> Mux (AI agent) authored this PR on Mike's behalf.
<!-- mux-attribution: model=claude-fable-5 thinking=high -->
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299e72ad30 |
feat: audit MCP server config changes (#27943)
Adds enterprise audit logging for MCP server config create, update, and
delete, with strict secret redaction. MCP configs hold credentials
(OAuth2 client secrets, API keys, custom headers), so admin changes to
them need an audit trail.
## Summary
- `enterprise/audit/table.go` gains an `MCPServerConfig` entry
enumerating every column: `oauth2_client_secret`, `api_key_value`, and
`custom_headers` are `ActionSecret` (never appear in diffs); dbcrypt
`*_key_id` bookkeeping, IDs, and timestamps are ignored; the remaining
config fields, including the endpoint URL fields, are tracked so
auditors can see which endpoints a config points at.
- Type registration in `coderd/audit` (diff, request, resource target
with org attribution), `codersdk/audit.go`, and a `resource_type` enum
migration.
- Handlers wire `audit.InitRequest`: create records `New`; update and
delete record `Old` from the param middleware before the
write-authorization check, so a readable-but-not-writable caller
produces an audited 403 while read-denied callers stay concealed as
unaudited 404s.
- Tests: create/update/delete audit entries, write-denied and
delete-denied 403 auditing, cross-org concealment producing zero
entries, and a serializer-level regression test proving none of the
three secret classes can reach a serialized diff.
- Review round: MCP config audit entries link to
`/ai/settings/mcp-servers/{id}`, audit table comments are trimmed per
review, and a fault-injection test pins that a config row surviving a
failed post-discovery credential update still gets its creation audit
entry.
Stacked on #27942 (org-scoped MCP configs). Part of the MCP
org-separation stack.
Closes https://linear.app/codercom/issue/CODAGT-717
UAT: verified on a trial-licensed dogfood instance: audit entries for
the full CRUD lifecycle with correct actor/org/target, redacted secrets
in the update and OAuth2 create diffs, and a full plaintext scan of the
audit dump finding zero secret leaks.
> Mux (AI agent) authored this PR on Mike's behalf.
<!-- mux-attribution: model=claude-fable-5 thinking=high -->
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f7a0de7a11 |
fix: harden org-scoped MCP config chat gating, updates, and visibility (#28065)
Hardens the org-scoped MCP server config surface from #27942 with fixes and regression pins that are independent of the core cutover: - Keep chats sendable after a selected MCP server is disabled (persisted selections are exempt from message-time rejection). - Keep cached MCP selections usable after a background refetch error (gate the composer on missing data, not `isSuccess`). - Merge PATCH updates onto the current row so unset fields are not clobbered. - Give auditors the full management view of MCP configs their audit logs reference (site and org auditor roles). - Regression pins: frozen OAuth2 callback path, cross-org concealment for item routes, OAuth callback token binding, and disconnect responses indistinguishable from nonexistent config IDs. - Storybook: semantic textbox queries in MCP loading stories; docs note that the MCP settings page needs deployment access. ## Stack context Part of the MCP org-separation stack (CODAGT-711 org scope -> apidocs -> hardening -> CODAGT-717 audit -> CODAGT-712 ACLs -> CODAGT-806 token RBAC). Split out of #27942 to keep the core cutover reviewable; each change here builds on the org-scoped routes and chat gating introduced below it. > Mux (AI agent) authored this PR on Mike's behalf. <!-- mux-attribution: model=claude-fable-5 thinking=high --> |
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dd43574990 |
refactor: remove AI add-on badge, seat column, and add-on wording leftovers (#28004)
Removes all "AI add-on" labeling from the UI, plus two leftover "AI
Governance add-on" wording items from the licensing repackaging (AI
Governance is now included with Premium).
- Remove the **AI add-on** badge from the group settings AI budget
section and the AI Governance add-on card on the Licenses page.
- Remove the **AI add-on** column (check icon showing AI seat
consumption) from the Users and Organization Members tables, along with
its help popover, the `AISeatCell` component, and the
`shouldShowAISeatColumn` entitlement helper.
- Update related Storybook stories.
- Drop "add-on" from the AI cost control route comments in
`enterprise/coderd/coderd.go` and the `coder exp ai-model-prices`
prerequisite in `docs/ai-coder/ai-gateway/cost-controls.md` (leftovers
not covered by #28075/#28077/#28268).
The `has_ai_seat` API field is left intact.
<details>
<summary>Removal scope</summary>
Badge usages removed:
- `site/src/pages/GroupsPage/GroupSettingsPageView.tsx`
-
`site/src/pages/DeploymentSettingsPage/LicensesSettingsPage/AIGovernanceAddOnCard.tsx`
AI seat column plumbing removed:
- `site/src/pages/UsersPage/UsersTable.tsx` and `UsersPage.tsx`
- `site/src/pages/OrganizationSettingsPage/OrganizationMembersTable.tsx`
and `OrganizationMembersPage.tsx`
- `site/src/modules/users/AISeatCell.tsx` (deleted)
- `AiAddonHelpPopover` in `site/src/modules/users/UserHelpPopovers.tsx`
- `shouldShowAISeatColumn` in
`site/src/modules/dashboard/entitlements.ts`
Add-on wording leftovers:
- `enterprise/coderd/coderd.go`: 7 route comments (comments only, no
behavior change)
- `docs/ai-coder/ai-gateway/cost-controls.md`: model prices CLI
prerequisite
</details>
---
🤖 This pull request was generated by Coder Agents on behalf of
@tracyjohnsonux.
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443e3b9b80 |
feat!: org-scope MCP server configs with RBAC (#27942)
Moves `mcp_server_configs` from deployment scope to organization scope
so each organization fully controls the MCP servers its members can use
with Coder Agents.
## Summary
- Migration: adds `organization_id` (NOT NULL, FK) and keeps existing
rows as the default organization's originals with credentials intact.
Other organizations start with no MCP servers and configure their own;
nothing is copied across organizations. Chats outside the default
organization keep any now-cross-organization `mcp_server_ids` entries;
the runtime already ignores IDs that do not resolve in the chat's
organization, so no data rewrite is needed. Slug uniqueness becomes
`(organization_id, slug)`.
- RBAC: new org-scoped `ResourceMCPServerConfig` with regosql converter
and `GetAuthorizedMCPServerConfigs`; org admins get in-org CRUD, org
members get read (replaced by ACL evaluation in the follow-up ACL PR in
this stack).
- API: all config routes nest under the organization, matching
templates: `POST|GET
/api/experimental/organizations/{organization}/mcp-servers` and
`GET|PATCH|DELETE .../mcp-servers/{mcpserverconfig}` (plus
`oauth2/connect`), resolved by a read-only param middleware that
conceals read-denied and cross-organization access as 404. Two routes
stay on the frozen `/api/experimental/mcp/servers/{mcpServer}` block:
the OAuth2 callback (the redirect URI baked into existing AS-side client
registrations) and `oauth2/disconnect`, which must remain reachable by
users removed from the organization so they can still revoke their token
grant.
- Chat runtime: selection validation and generation resolve configs
strictly by IDs, enabled state, and the chat's organization in SQL;
requested duplicates are normalized; invalid or cross-org IDs are
rejected with the precise ID list. IDs already persisted on a chat are
exempt from message-time rejection so disabling a selected server never
blocks sends; generation skips servers that are no longer usable.
- Frontend: API layer and admin settings pages target the new endpoints.
The admin page manages the default organization's servers; the org
picker is tracked separately (CODAGT-714).
- Security hardening from review: OAuth user grants are additionally
bound to `oauth2_revocation_url` (changing it invalidates grants, and a
racing OAuth callback gets 409 instead of recreating a grant).
Stack-wide SSRF protection for MCP config-directed traffic was split
into its own PR at the top of this stack (#28242) to keep this diff
reviewable; this PR keeps main's existing discovery IP-range guard.
OAuth2 auto-discovery now completes before the config row is inserted: a
failed discovery persists nothing, and there is no provisional row that
concurrent updates could race against.
Two follow-up PRs in this stack were split out to keep this diff
reviewable: #28064 completes the swagger annotations for the moved
routes (main already ships these experimental MCP handlers unannotated),
and #28065 carries hardening fixes and regression pins on top of the
cutover.
- Force On enforcement (landed on main mid-review) is org-scoped: the
forced set is read per chat organization
(`GetForcedMCPServerConfigsByOrganization`), so another organization's
`force_on` server never attaches to a chat.
## Breaking changes (experimental API)
The MCP server config endpoints move from the deployment-scoped
`/api/experimental/mcp/servers` block to organization-nested paths:
`POST|GET /api/experimental/organizations/{organization}/mcp-servers`
and `GET|PATCH|DELETE
/api/experimental/organizations/{organization}/mcp-servers/{mcpserverconfig}`
(plus `oauth2/connect`). The old paths are removed, so API consumers
must supply an organization. Two routes intentionally stay on the frozen
`/api/experimental/mcp/servers/{mcpServer}` block: the OAuth2 callback
(its redirect URI is baked into existing AS-side client registrations)
and `oauth2/disconnect` (must remain reachable by users removed from the
organization). These endpoints are under `/api/experimental`, so no
deprecation window is provided.
## Rolling upgrades
During a rolling deploy, an old replica creating an MCP config can fail
the new `NOT NULL organization_id` constraint until it is upgraded
(reads are unaffected: old binaries' generated queries select their own
column lists). This matches the repo's existing precedent for additive
NOT NULL migrations (000562) and affects only the admin config-create
path in the upgrade window.
Upgrades are expected to run in scheduled maintenance downtime with the
database locked during migration, so the migration ships no
rolling-upgrade compatibility machinery. The down migration deletes
organization-created configs (their chat references are cleaned by the
000510 delete trigger) and restores deployment-wide slug uniqueness.
Part of the MCP org-separation stack (CODAGT-711 -> CODAGT-717 audit ->
CODAGT-712 ACLs -> CODAGT-806 token RBAC).
Closes https://linear.app/codercom/issue/CODAGT-711
UAT: validated end to end on a two-org dogfood deployment, including a
real pre-migration to post-migration upgrade, cross-org isolation
(404s), same-slug-two-orgs, chat selection gating, and a live MCP tool
call through the org-scoped generation path. The migration was later
revised to keep existing rows in the default organization only (no
per-organization copies); that revision is covered by the migration test
suite.
> Mux (AI agent) authored this PR on Mike's behalf.
<!-- mux-attribution: model=claude-fable-5 thinking=high -->
---------
Co-authored-by: Mathias Fredriksson <mafredri@gmail.com>
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6107cfe918 |
fix(enterprise/coderd/license): remove AI Governance required banner (#28268)
## Summary The AI Governance add-on is now included in all Premium licenses, so the transitional license banner warning that AI Bridge / AI Gateway requires the AI Governance add-on is no longer accurate. This removes that warning throughout Coder. The banner text this removes: > The AI Governance add-on is required to use AI Gateway. Please reach out to your account team or sales@coder.com to learn more. ## Changes - Remove the AI Bridge soft warning block in `LicensesEntitlements`. - Remove the now-unused `hasExplicitAIBridgeEntitlement` tracking that only fed that warning. - Remove `TestAIBridgeSoftWarning` and the vestigial warning assertions/comments that pinned the removed behavior. The license banner surfaces backend entitlement warnings verbatim, so removing the warning here removes it from the dashboard banner. No frontend changes are needed; the warning string existed only in the backend. ## Testing - `go build ./enterprise/coderd/license/...` - `go vet ./enterprise/coderd/license/...` - `go test ./enterprise/coderd/license/` (license entitlement + AI Governance addon suites) --- *This PR was created by Coder Agents on behalf of @jcjiang.* |
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a441b03d70 |
feat: add yaml config option to standalone AI gateway (#28258)
`coder ai-gateway start` now accepts a `--config` / `-c` flag (and `CODER_CONFIG_PATH`) to load configuration from a YAML file. |
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821d91fabd | fix: log tailnet tunnel authorization decisions (#27819) |