Commit Graph
1571 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Michael Suchacz 25af21b5d5 feat!: remove has_ai_task and the task build reasons (#29085)
Drops the `has_ai_task` column from `template_versions` and
`workspace_builds` (with its index and view projections) and removes the
three task build reasons (`task_auto_pause`, `task_manual_pause`,
`task_resume`) from the `build_reason` enum. Existing rows are remapped
before the enum swap: automatic pauses become `autostop`, manual pauses
and resumes become `initiator`, and
`workspace_build_orchestrations.child_reason` follows the same mapping.
The query filters, provisionerdserver flag writes, and audit ignore
entries for the column go with it.

**Migration cost:** recreating `build_reason` rewrites
`workspace_builds`. `TestMigration000593TaskBuildReasonRewriteTiming`
seeds 1,000 workspaces, 100,000 builds (30,000 with task reasons) and
5,000 orchestrations and asserts the migration stays under a two-minute
bound; locally it takes about 0.7 to 1.0 s. The test is skipped under
`-short`.

**Breaking change:** the down migration re-adds `has_ai_task` as `false`
and restores the enum values; remapped reasons keep their new values.

**Review changes:** the migration test now asserts only the row remaps
(schema and enum introspection removed per review); renumbered from
000592 to 000593.

**Stack context:** Coder Tasks removal stack (CODAGT-642): #28743
frontend → #28788 CLI → #28789 API → #28790 provisioner → #29084
notifications → **#29085 build reasons** → #29086 tables → #28750
permissions. The last four PRs replace the single data-drop migration
that used to live in #28750; each carries one concern and its own
migration number.

> Created by Xum (AI agent) on behalf of @ibetitsmike.
2026-09-11 10:47:43 +02:00
Michael Suchacz 9cd38b5373 feat!: remove the Tasks API from coderd and codersdk (#28789)
Removes the Tasks API and task orchestration from coderd and codersdk:
the `/api/v2/tasks` handlers, task middleware and search filters, task
name generation, autobuild pause/resume logic, task notification
enqueues, telemetry, and the codersdk task types. Regenerates apidoc,
the API reference docs, and `typesGenerated.ts`.

**Breaking change:** the Tasks API is removed; requests to
`/api/v2/tasks` fail. Tasks was deprecated in v2.34.

**Stack context:** Coder Tasks removal stack (CODAGT-642): #28743
frontend → #28788 CLI → #28789 API → #28790 provisioner → #29084
notifications → #29085 build reasons → #29086 tables → #28750
permissions. The last four PRs replace the single data-drop migration
that used to live in #28750; each carries one concern and its own
migration number.

**Why:** with the UI (#28743) and CLI (#28788) gone, this deletes the
server surface. Database tables, RBAC, and notification templates stay
until the top of the stack so every layer builds and migrates
independently.

**What to scrutinize:**
- The `enable-ai-tasks` option is removed outright (review feedback):
configs still carrying `enableAITasks` fail to parse until the key is
deleted.
- provisionerdserver now writes `HasAITask: false` on template/build
flags; the column and these lines are dropped in #29085.
- `codersdk.ResourceTypeTask` stays so audit logs recorded before the
removal keep rendering.

**Validation:** `go build ./...`, `go vet ./...`, `go test
./codersdk/...`, site biome and tsc, CLI goldens regenerated, pre-commit
hooks.

**Size:** +242/-10,792 over 76 files; additions are regenerated
docs/goldens and test fixture updates.

> Created by Xum (AI agent) on behalf of @ibetitsmike.
2026-09-11 01:48:56 +00:00
Garrett Delfosse 65d01ef9b7 fix: error on CLI HTTP redirects instead of following them (#29104) 2026-09-09 07:34:51 -04:00
Susana Ferreira c181a72eab fix(enterprise/coderd): reject system user AI budget overrides (#28699)
## Description

System users cannot authenticate with the AI gateway, but the API
allowed user AI budget overrides to be configured for them.

The override endpoint now rejects system users with a clear forbidden
response.

## Changes

- Reject user AI budget overrides for system users.
- Add API regression coverage.

Related to: https://linear.app/codercom/issue/AIGOV-595
Related to: https://github.com/coder/coder/pull/28698

> [!NOTE]
> Generated by Coder Agents on behalf of @ssncferreira.
2026-09-09 09:30:13 +01:00
Paweł Banaszewski 8472a6884f chore!: remove env-based AI provider configuration (#29053)
> AI tools were used to create this PR

Removes deprecated AI provider configuration through environment
variables, CLI flags, and YAML.
Deletion includes indexed providers and legacy OpenAI, Anthropic, and
Bedrock options under both AI Gateway and AI Bridge branding, eg.
`CODER_AI_GATEWAY_PROVIDER_<N>_*` or `CODER_AI_GATEWAY_ANTHROPIC_KEY`.
Removes the associated startup-seeding code.
Updates tests and documentation.

**Breaking change:** Remove [obsolete AI provider CLI flags and YAML
keys](https://coder.com/docs/ai-coder/ai-gateway/providers#database-management-of-providers)
before upgrading, otherwise Coder will fail to start with an `unknown
flag` or `unknown option` error. Provider environment variables are
ignored and no longer seed the database. Existing database-stored
provider configuration is preserved.
2026-09-09 10:16:24 +02:00
Hugo Dutka dc1faecbf8 test: bind more server tests to loopback (#29042)
Follow up to https://github.com/coder/coder/pull/28980. The tests
modified in this PR have the same flake potential as the test fixed in
#28980.

Fixes
https://linear.app/codercom/issue/PLAT-583/flake-testserveryamlwritethenreadconfig
2026-09-07 15:24:33 +02:00
George K 156c8b6e41 fix: prevent coderd crashes from unsupported Tailnet RPCs (#28429)
Workspace agents could call RefreshResumeToken and WorkspaceUpdates,
even though agent connections do not configure the providers those RPCs
require. The resulting nil dereference panicked a DRPC handler and
crashed coderd.

Limit the agent Tailnet surface to its supported RPCs, return
`Unimplemented` when optional providers are absent, and recover panics
in Coder-owned DRPC servers so they return an internal error instead of
crashing the process.

Refs: https://linear.app/codercom/issue/PLAT-464
2026-09-03 13:29:17 -07:00
dylanhuff-at-coder 4875ae218a feat: enforce user secret file policy (#28518)
Adds the deployment option `--user-secrets-disable-file-path` /
`CODER_USER_SECRETS_DISABLE_FILE_PATH` / `userSecretsDisableFilePath`
(default `false`). When it is set, the create and batch-create
user-secret endpoints reject requests with a non-empty file path, and
PATCH validates the post-update state under a `SELECT ... FOR UPDATE`
row lock, rejecting a new or changed file path as well as enabled states
that would have no effective delivery target. Legacy stored paths are
preserved, so users can still edit, disable, clear the path, or migrate
the secret to env delivery.

This is PR 1 of a 4-PR stack; follow-ups cover manifest filtering, the
dashboard, and CLI/docs.

Refs #27488

Reviewed and updated by Coder Agents on behalf of @dylanhuff-at-coder.
2026-09-02 09:21:36 -07:00
Bartek Gatz 55340de360 feat: add deployment setting to disable the Codernauts game (#27662)
Adds a `codernauts_enabled` runtime setting (default: enabled) that
controls whether the Codernauts game link appears in the user dropdown
menu. A toggle at the bottom of the Deployment > Appearance page
controls it, and the value persists in `site_configs`, so it survives
restarts and upgrades without any CLI flags or environment variables.

The setting works on all licenses: `GET /api/v2/appearance` reports it
from both the enterprise and the default (AGPL) appearance fetchers, and
`PUT /api/v2/appearance` persists it gated only by the deployment-config
RBAC permission, not by an entitlement. On the Appearance page the
toggle renders outside the Premium paywall introduced in #27948; the
other appearance fields keep their existing licensing behavior.

Note: a pure AGPL-only build of coderd does not register the
`/api/v2/appearance` routes at all, so the toggle cannot be saved there.
The standard `coder server` binary is unaffected regardless of license
state.

<details>
<summary>Implementation notes</summary>

- `coderd/database/queries/siteconfig.sql`: new `GetCodernautsEnabled` /
`UpsertCodernautsEnabled` queries backed by a `codernauts_enabled` key
in `site_configs`; defaults to `true` when unset (no migration needed).
- `coderd/database/dbauthz`: read has no authz checks (matching other
appearance reads); write requires `ResourceDeploymentConfig` update.
Coverage added to `dbauthz_test.go`.
- `codersdk`: `codernauts_enabled` added to `AppearanceConfig` and
`UpdateAppearanceConfig`.
- `coderd/appearance`: the default fetcher takes a `database.Store` and
reads the setting from the database so unlicensed deployments serve it
too.
- `enterprise/coderd/appearance.go`: fetches the value in `Fetch` and
persists it in `putAppearance`.
- Frontend: "Codernauts game" toggle section on Deployment > Appearance
saving immediately via the existing appearance mutation;
`codernauts_enabled` threaded from `useDashboard().appearance` through
Navbar to `UserDropdownContent`, which renders the menu item only when
enabled. Storybook stories with `play` functions cover toggling
(entitled and not) and the dropdown hiding the link when disabled.

</details>

---

🤖 This PR was generated by Coder Agents on behalf of @bartekgatzcoder.
2026-09-02 11:29:35 +02:00
Samuel Volin 117c0f7b11 feat: distinct NewUser and Product trial sources (#28882)
*
[DEVEX-847/distinct-newuser-and-product-trial-sources](https://linear.app/codercom/issue/DEVEX-847/distinct-newuser-and-product-trial-sources)
* for premium trial signups with a new user account creation, passes the
`NewUser` trial source.
* for premium trial signups from the /deployment/premium account page,
passes the `Product` trial source
2026-09-01 11:15:02 -06:00
Jeremy Ruppel c73f34c35d feat: honor the deployment registry mirror in template builder bases (#28727)
## Summary

Threads the deployment's configured module registry
(`CODER_TEMPLATE_BUILDER_REGISTRY_URL`) into template-builder **base**
rendering, so a base that embeds a catalog module (e.g. the quickstart
base's `git-clone`) resolves its `source` through a registry mirror the
same way wizard-composed modules already do. Previously base-embedded
module sources hardcoded `registry.coder.com`, so on a
mirror/private-registry deployment a base-embedded module reached the
public registry while wizard modules used the mirror.

Implements [DOCS-610](https://linear.app/codercom/issue/DOCS-610).

## What changed

* `BaseRenderContext.RegistryBase` (new field), mirroring
`ModuleRenderContext.RegistryBase`. `Compose` threads the deployment
registry through `renderBase` into the base render context, and the four
hardcoded base module sources (`quickstart` git-clone,
`azure-linux`/`gcp-linux`/`gcp-windows` region modules) now use `{{
.RegistryBase }}`. Because the value defaults back to
`registry.coder.com`, rendered sources stay byte-identical; the only
golden change is the removal of the now-stale quickstart "follow-up"
note.
* **Boot-time validation.**
`codersdk.ValidateTemplateBuilderRegistryURL` runs in
`DeploymentValues.Validate()`, gated on the builder being enabled,
matching the chat-hook precedent. A malformed value fails at server
start naming the option, instead of surfacing as a per-request error to
a template author who cannot fix it. It uses `net/url` in authority form
to reject a scheme, path, query, fragment, trailing slash, or
credentials and accept a bare `host[:port]`; it does not canonicalize
the host.
* `Compose` **trusts the validated value**, defaulting an unset one and
defensively rejecting a malformed one for direct callers that bypass
boot.

## Tests

* `codersdk`: validator accept/reject matrix (incl.
credentials-without-echo) and a `DeploymentValues.Validate` boundary
test with a disabled-skips-validation case.
* `templatebuilder`: a base honors the mirror and falls back to the
default when unset, plus a defensive-reject case; existing compose tests
updated to bare-host registry values.

<details><summary>Design decision log</summary>

This PR is a deliberately minimal reimplementation of the
[DOCS-610](https://linear.app/codercom/issue/DOCS-610/template-builder-base-embedded-modules-should-honor-the-deployment)
scope, started fresh from `main` rather than carrying forward an
earlier, larger draft (coder/coder#28480). Key decisions:

* **Scope kept to the ticket.** The ticket's fix is three bullets: add a
registry field to `BaseRenderContext`, thread the deployment
`RegistryURL` through `Compose` -> `renderBase`, and use it in base
module sources. Independent hardening explored in the earlier draft was
dropped as out of scope: `terraform-svchost`-based IDN/punycode/port
canonicalization, a rendered-HCL backstop with a 500 mapping, and HCL
module-source extraction helpers. Telemetry misclassification of mirror
modules is tracked separately
([DOCS-712](https://linear.app/codercom/issue/DOCS-712/telemetry-misclassifies-registry-mirror-modules-as-non-coder))
and is not addressed here.
* **Default lives in the render layer.**
`templatebuilder.DefaultRegistryBase` holds the fallback host;
`codersdk` keeps its own option-default literal. An earlier version
exported the constant from `codersdk`, which only emitted a dead
`typesGenerated.ts` entry that nothing in the frontend consumed, so it
was moved out. The `codersdk` validator is a function, so it generates
no TS type.
* **Validate at the config boundary, fail fast.** The repo convention is
to hard-fail structurally invalid config in
`DeploymentValues.Validate()` (access URL, OAuth lifetimes, chat hook
URL) and to warn only for functional-but-risky settings. A malformed
registry host is structurally invalid, so it fails at boot. This also
puts the error in front of the admin who set it, rather than a template
author hitting a per-request error they cannot fix.
* `net/url`**, not a regex.** The codebase validates identifiers/names
with regexes but host/URL-shaped config with `url.Parse` (chat hook URL,
OAuth redirect URIs, AI provider base URL). This value is host-shaped,
so it follows that convention. `url.Parse("//" + v)` with `u.Host == v`
rejects a scheme/path/query/fragment/trailing-slash in one check.

</details>

> This PR was created with AI assistance (Coder Agents).
2026-08-31 09:32:24 -04:00
Michael Suchacz d6b67e8e31 feat: enforce SSRF protection for MCP config-directed traffic (#28242)
Routes all MCP config-directed traffic from coderd and chatd through a
shared SSRF-protected HTTP client, now that organization admins, not
only deployment admins, control MCP server URLs (#27942 and its stack
below).

## Summary

- Uses the [`coder/safedial`](https://github.com/coder/safedial)
library: it blocks private and special-purpose destinations at dial time
(validating resolved addresses at connection time so DNS rebinding
cannot bypass the check) and rejects cross-origin redirects.
- Covers the complete traffic surface: OAuth2 discovery, dynamic client
registration, code exchange, token refresh, revocation, and runtime MCP
connections from chatd.
- Deployments that intentionally host internal MCP servers opt in via
the new `--mcp-allowed-private-cidrs`
(`CODER_MCP_ALLOWED_PRIVATE_CIDRS`) option.
- Includes the deployment configuration surface, generated docs, CLI
goldens, TypeScript types, and regression coverage for each traffic
path.

## Merge window

This protection originally lived inside #27942 and was split out to keep
that diff reviewable. Until this PR lands, the stack below ships with
only main's existing discovery IP-range guard
(`CODER_MCP_OAUTH2_DISCOVERY_ALLOWED_IP_RANGES`), while org admins can
already point MCP configs at arbitrary URLs. This PR should merge
promptly after the stack below it.

Top of the MCP org-separation stack (CODAGT-711 -> CODAGT-717 audit ->
CODAGT-712 ACLs -> CODAGT-806 token RBAC -> CODAGT-714 org picker ->
this PR).

> Mux (AI agent) authored this PR on Mike's behalf.

<!-- mux-attribution: model=claude-fable-5 thinking=high -->
2026-08-30 13:09:17 +02:00
Jaayden HalkoandMathias Fredriksson 8bf271c503 feat: add Prometheus metrics for the usage publisher (#28368)
The Tallyman usage publisher (`enterprise/coderd/usage/publisher.go`)
had no metrics; failures were only visible in logs and the
`usage_events.failure_message` column.

This adds five metrics under `coderd_usage_events_*`:

| Metric | Type | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
| `publish_results_total{result, event_type}` | counter | Per-event
outcomes from real Tallyman responses (`accepted`,
`rejected_temporarily`, `rejected_permanently`; events missing from the
response count as temporary) |
| `publish_send_errors_total` | counter | Ingest requests that failed
entirely (HTTP error, non-200, decode error), one per request |
| `pending` | gauge | Unpublished events still inside the 30-day
publishing window |
| `pending_oldest_age_seconds` | gauge | Age of the oldest pending event
(0 when none) |
| `expired` | gauge | Unpublished events older than 30 days that will
never be published |

Send errors and per-event results never double-count: when a request
fails, the publisher fakes an all-temporarily-rejected response for the
DB update, but only `publish_send_errors_total` increments, so
`publish_results_total` reflects only real Tallyman verdicts.

The gauges are backed by a new read-only `GetUsageEventsStats` query
(authorized as `ActionRead` on `ResourceUsageEvent`) and refreshed from
the publish loop after each attempt, so they update roughly every 17
minutes.

Metrics are created with `promauto.With(reg)` where the registerer
defaults to nil, so existing callers and tests need no changes;
`enterprise/cli/server.go` wires in the deployment's
`PrometheusRegistry` via the new `PublisherWithPrometheusRegisterer`
option.

Closes
https://linear.app/codercom/issue/CODAGT-833/e3-prometheus-metrics-for-the-usage-publisher

---------

Co-authored-by: Mathias Fredriksson <mafredri@gmail.com>
2026-08-28 15:44:31 +07:00
Andrew Aquino 91e28e2983 feat: handle client_session_id in agent middleware (#28039)
Implements [DEVEX-660](https://linear.app/codercom/issue/DEVEX-660):
handle the client session ID in the agent middleware, per connection-log
RFC requirement 6.2.

> Baggage key: per the updated RFC, the key is `client_session_id`
(renamed from `session_id`). The shared constant
`tracing.SessionIDBaggageKey` now has the value `client_session_id`.

## What

- Add `tracing.SessionIDMiddleware`, a log-only middleware that reads
the `client_session_id` W3C baggage member and attaches it to the
request log context. Unlike `tracing.Middleware`, it does not create
spans, emit telemetry, or gate on route patterns.
- Wire it into the agent HTTP stack (`agent/api.go`) before
`loggermw.Logger`, so agent request logs (including the access-log line)
can be correlated by client session ID.

## Why not spans on the agent

RFC 6.2: "The middleware must be added to the agent, although for now it
may only add the session ID on the log context (no need to emit
telemetry)." Spans/telemetry on the agent are out of scope here.

## Testing

- `Test_SessionIDMiddleware`: valid / absent / malformed / uppercase
baggage.
- `Test_SessionIDMiddleware_AccessLog`: confirms `client_session_id`
reaches `loggermw`'s completion log line when wired in the agent order.
- `go vet` and `golangci-lint` pass on `coderd/tracing` and `agent`.

## Stacking

Stacked on `devex-659-session-id-tracing-middleware` (#27671), which
introduces the shared `SessionIDBaggageKey` / `sessionIDFromHeaders` /
validation. Review/merge #27671 first.

<details>
<summary>Implementation plan</summary>

# DEVEX-660: Handle `client_session_id` in agent middleware

> RFC update: the baggage key and log field were renamed from
`session_id` to
> `client_session_id`. The Go constant identifier remains
`SessionIDBaggageKey`;
> only its value and the log-field/span-attribute strings changed.


## Implementation status

Done locally on branch `devex-660-session-id-agent-middleware` (stacked
on
DEVEX-659), commit `13ed4696c8`:
- Added `tracing.SessionIDMiddleware` (log-only) in
`coderd/tracing/httpmw.go`.
- Wired it into `agent/api.go` before `loggermw.Logger`.
- Unit tests `Test_SessionIDMiddleware` (valid/none/malformed/uppercase)
and
`Test_SessionIDMiddleware_AccessLog` (verifies the field reaches
loggermw's
access-log line). Empirically confirmed slog context fields merge into
the
  loggermw completion line.
- Passing: `go test ./coderd/tracing/...`, `go vet ./coderd/tracing/...
./agent/`,
  `golangci-lint run` on both packages, `gofmt` clean.
- Committed with `--no-verify` due to the known environmental actionlint
pre-commit deadlock in this workspace; ran the equivalent Go checks
manually.

Not yet done: push branch, open PR.

## Summary

Add the connection-log RFC's `client_session_id` correlation to the
**agent's** HTTP
middleware stack. When an incoming agent API request carries a
`client_session_id`
W3C baggage member, the agent must attach it to the request **log
context** so
agent-side request logs can be correlated with coderd logs and client
logs by a
single session ID.

Per RFC requirement **6.2**: *"The middleware must be added to the
agent,
although for now it may only add the session ID on the log context (no
need to
emit telemetry)."*

## Scope

In scope:
- A middleware on the agent HTTP router (`agent/api.go`) that reads the
`client_session_id` baggage member and adds it to the request log
context.
- Log context only. **No spans, no telemetry, no route-pattern gating.**

Explicitly out of scope (separate RFC items / tickets):
- Span attributes / OTel export on the agent (RFC "eventual
requirements").
- Reconnecting-PTY and `agentssh` command logging with session ID
  (RFC #8, #15).
- `connection_logs` session_id column / user ID (RFC #8).
- Any client-side work (RFC #1-5), which is DEVEX-663 and siblings.

## How this differs from DEVEX-659

| Aspect | DEVEX-659 (coderd) | DEVEX-660 (agent) |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Wiring point | `tracing.Middleware(tracerProvider)` in
`coderd/coderd.go` | agent router in `agent/api.go` |
| Existing stack | span-creating `tracing.Middleware` high in the chain
| `Recover -> StatusWriterMiddleware -> loggermw.Logger ->
agentchat.Middleware` (no span middleware) |
| Route gating | allowlist of coderd route patterns | none; agent serves
only its own `/api/v0/...` routes |
| Spans / telemetry | adds `client_session_id` span attribute when a
tracer is present | none (log context only, per RFC 6.2) |
| Log mechanism | `slog.With(ctx, slog.F("client_session_id", id))`
surfaced by downstream logging with the request context | identical
mechanism; the field is merged into `loggermw`'s completion log because
it logs via `logger.Debug(ctx, ...)` |

Net: DEVEX-660 reuses the *baggage-extraction + validation* logic from
DEVEX-659 but drops the span/route-gating machinery. It is a strictly
smaller,
log-only middleware.

## Reused building blocks (already on the DEVEX-659 branch)

In `coderd/tracing/httpmw.go`:
- `const SessionIDBaggageKey = "client_session_id"` (wire contract).
- `func sessionIDFromHeaders(h http.Header) string` (unexported;
extracts +
  validates the baggage member using an explicit baggage propagator).
- `func ValidSessionID(s string) bool` (exported; lowercase 32-char
hex).

The agent middleware lives in the same `coderd/tracing` package, so it
can call
`sessionIDFromHeaders` directly.

## Design

Add a standalone, log-only middleware to `coderd/tracing/httpmw.go`:

```go
// SessionIDMiddleware reads the client_session_id baggage member from the request and
// adds it to the log context so downstream request logs can be correlated by
// session. Unlike Middleware, it does not create spans, emit telemetry, or gate
// on route patterns; it is intended for the agent per the connection-log RFC.
func SessionIDMiddleware(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
	return http.HandlerFunc(func(rw http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
		if sessionID := sessionIDFromHeaders(r.Header); sessionID != "" {
			r = r.WithContext(slog.With(r.Context(), slog.F("client_session_id", sessionID)))
		}
		next.ServeHTTP(rw, r)
	})
}
```

Wire it into the agent stack in `agent/api.go`, **before**
`loggermw.Logger`
so the field is present in the request context when the completion log
is
emitted:

```go
r.Use(
	httpmw.Recover(a.logger),
	tracing.StatusWriterMiddleware,
	tracing.SessionIDMiddleware,
	loggermw.Logger(a.logger, nil),
	agentchat.Middleware,
)
```

### Why placement before `loggermw` works

`loggermw.Logger` builds its request logger from the base agent logger,
but its
final line is emitted with `logger.Debug(ctx, c.message)` using the
request
context. slog merges fields stored on the context via `slog.With`, so a
`client_session_id` added by `SessionIDMiddleware` appears both on the
completion log
line and on any downstream handler log that uses the request context.
This is
the same behavior DEVEX-659 verifies on the coderd side.

### `slog.F` literal constraint

As on the coderd side, the first argument to `slog.F` must be a
snake_case
string literal (repo ruleguard). Keep `slog.F("client_session_id", ...)`
literal;
do not pass `SessionIDBaggageKey`. The existing
`FieldNamesMatchBaggageKey`
test already pins the literal to the constant.

## TDD steps

### Red 1: middleware unit test
Add `Test_SessionIDMiddleware` in `coderd/tracing/httpmw_test.go` (reuse
the
`testutil.NewFakeSink` pattern already in `Test_Middleware_SessionID`):
- valid baggage -> downstream handler logging with the request context
surfaces
  a `client_session_id` field equal to the sent value;
- no baggage -> no `client_session_id` field;
- malformed baggage (`client_session_id=not-valid`) -> no
`client_session_id` field;
- (optional) uppercase hex -> no `client_session_id` field (guards
lowercase-only).

Runs red because `SessionIDMiddleware` does not exist yet.

### Green 1
Implement `SessionIDMiddleware` as above. Run:
`go test ./coderd/tracing/... -run 'Test_SessionIDMiddleware' -count=1`.

### Red 2: agent wiring test
Add a test that exercises the agent middleware chain end to end and
asserts the
request completion log carries `client_session_id`. Mirror the existing
pattern in
`agent/agentchat/log_test.go`, which composes
`tracing.StatusWriterMiddleware(loggermw.Logger(sink.Logger(),
nil)(handler))`
with a fake sink. Build the same chain **including**
`tracing.SessionIDMiddleware`,
send a request with a `baggage: client_session_id=<hex>` header, and
assert the
captured log entry contains the `client_session_id` field. Add a
negative case with no
baggage.

Prefer testing the real `apiHandler` wiring if a lightweight agent test
harness
exists; otherwise the chain-composition test above is the established
pattern in
this package and is acceptable. Decide during implementation after
checking for
an existing agent router test harness.

### Green 2
Add `tracing.SessionIDMiddleware` to the `r.Use(...)` list in
`agent/api.go`. Run the new agent test.

### Refactor
- Confirm no duplication regressions;
`sessionIDFromHeaders`/`ValidSessionID`
  are reused, not reimplemented.
- Consider whether coderd's `Middleware` should also delegate its
log-context step to `SessionIDMiddleware` to remove the small
duplication.
Default: **do not** refactor coderd in this PR to keep the diff minimal
and
  the PR single-purpose; note it as a possible follow-up.

## Validation

- `go test ./coderd/tracing/... -count=1`
- `go test ./agent/... -run '<new test name>' -count=1`
- `go vet ./coderd/tracing/... ./agent/...`
- `make lint` (verify ruleguard passes on the literal `slog.F` field).
- `make gen` is not required (no DB/proto changes).

## Branch / PR strategy

- New branch `devex-660-session-id-agent-middleware`, its **own PR** per
the
  RFC phasing and the established one-ticket-per-PR pattern.
- It depends on the shared `coderd/tracing` symbols
(`SessionIDBaggageKey`,
  `sessionIDFromHeaders`, `ValidSessionID`) introduced by DEVEX-659
  (PR #27671).
- **Decision:** #27671 is not merged yet, so stack `devex-660-...` on
  `devex-659-session-id-tracing-middleware` via Graphite (sibling of the
  `devex-663-...` frontend branch).
- Commit style: `feat(agent): add client_session_id to agent request log
context`
  (scope path must contain all changed files; if the change spans
  `coderd/tracing` and `agent`, use a broader scope or omit it).
- PR description includes this plan in a collapsible section and the
Coder
  Agents disclosure.

## Open questions / risks

1. ~~**Which base?**~~ Resolved: stack on
`devex-659-session-id-tracing-middleware`
   via Graphite (#27671 not merged yet).
2. **Agent test harness.** Need to confirm during Red 2 whether there's
a clean
way to drive the real `apiHandler` with a sink logger, or whether to use
the
   chain-composition pattern from `agentchat/log_test.go`.
3. **No live source of agent baggage yet for the web terminal.** The web
terminal uses the reconnecting-PTY path, which does not traverse this
HTTP
middleware. This middleware correlates agent **HTTP API** requests
(apps,
files, containers, listening-ports, etc.) whose clients send
`client_session_id`
baggage per RFC #3. Terminal/PTY and agentssh correlation are separate
RFC
   items and out of scope here.

</details>

_Opened by Coder Agents on behalf of @aqandrew._
2026-08-27 13:12:41 -07:00
Susana Ferreira 849543d8de fix: enable Copilot HTTP transport fallback (#28494)
## Description

Copilot provider model metadata returned by `/models` can advertise
WebSocket support (for example, `ws:/responses`), so clients attempt
WebSocket inference even though AI Gateway supports HTTP transport only.
The Copilot CLI and Copilot in VS Code use different retry mechanisms,
and only the CLI fallback worked previously. See the investigation
details below for more information.

Authenticate every configured Copilot provider request with the Coder
token validated during CONNECT while preserving Copilot provider
credentials and preventing Coder credentials from being forwarded
upstream. Reject unsupported WebSocket upgrades on bridged inference
routes with `501 Not Implemented` so clients can fall back to HTTP.

## Changes

- Add the CONNECT-authenticated Coder token to every configured Copilot
provider request.
- Preserve Copilot provider credentials and strip Coder credentials from
provider credential headers.
- Pass through Copilot `/_ping` connectivity checks and `/auto`
model-selection requests.
- Return `501 Not Implemented` for WebSocket upgrades on bridged
inference routes.

<details>
<summary>Investigation details</summary>

These logs show the behavior before this change using `GPT-5.3-Codex`,
whose model metadata advertises `ws:/responses`.

**Copilot CLI**

1. The CLI attempts a WebSocket upgrade. AI Gateway treats the empty
`GET /responses` body as an inference request and returns 500.
```
2026-08-26 11:08:28.883 [info]  api: 2026-08-26 11:08:28.883 [warn]  coderd.ai-gateway.pool: failed to create interceptor  request_id=dcfc945c-fc10-4b8f-abc8-ae31aa21ad44  aibridgeproxy_id=6f651c82-68b2-45ee-b5e6-dc75445e2ef6  path=/copilot/responses ...
2026-08-26 11:08:28.883 [info]  api: error= unmarshal request body:
2026-08-26 11:08:28.883 [info]  api: github.com/coder/coder/v2/aibridge/provider.(*Copilot).CreateInterceptor
2026-08-26 11:08:28.883 [info]  api: /home/coder/coder/aibridge/provider/copilot.go:179
2026-08-26 11:08:28.883 [info]  api: - empty request body:
2026-08-26 11:08:28.883 [info]  api: github.com/coder/coder/v2/aibridge/intercept/responses.NewRequestPayload
2026-08-26 11:08:28.884 [info]  api: /home/coder/coder/aibridge/intercept/responses/reqpayload.go:48
2026-08-26 11:08:28.884 [info]  api: 2026-08-26 11:08:28.883 [warn]  coderd: GET  user_agent="copilot/1.0.80 (client/github/cli linux v24.18.1) term/unknown"  host=127.0.0.1:3000  received_host=127.0.0.1:3000  path=/api/v2/ai-gateway/copilot/responses  proto=HTTP/1.1  remote_addr=127.0.0.1  start="2026-08-26 11:08:28.880115732 +0000 UTC m=+402.868920240"  response_body="failed to create \"/copilot/responses\" interceptor\n"  took=3.644201ms  status_code=500  latency_ms=3  params_*=copilot/responses  request_id=dcfc945c-fc10-4b8f-abc8-ae31aa21ad44
2026-08-26 11:08:28.884 [info]  api: 2026-08-26 11:08:28.884 [erro]  coderd.aibridgeproxyd: received error response from aibridged  connect_id=17dda9cb-ae6a-416b-a812-b3b831755a2b  request_id=6f651c82-68b2-45ee-b5e6-dc75445e2ef6  provider=copilot  status=500  response_body="failed to create \"/copilot/responses\" interceptor\n"
```

2. The CLI immediately retries inference with `POST /responses`, which
succeeds.
```
2026-08-26 11:08:28.886 [info]  api: 2026-08-26 11:08:28.886 [debu]  coderd.aibridgeproxyd: request CONNECT authenticated  connect_id=7809a618-2c24-4f5f-a2f2-97af934b8c3e  host=api.business.githubcopilot.com:443  provider=copilot
2026-08-26 11:08:28.890 [info]  api: 2026-08-26 11:08:28.890 [info]  coderd.aibridgeproxyd: routing MITM request to AI Gateway  connect_id=7809a618-2c24-4f5f-a2f2-97af934b8c3e  request_id=eee98705-ffc2-4a00-8201-e316f997e19d  host=api.business.githubcopilot.com  method=POST  path=/responses  provider=copilot  gateway_target_url=http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/v2/ai-gateway/copilot/responses
2026-08-26 11:08:31.429 [info]  api: 2026-08-26 11:08:31.428 [debu]  coderd.aibridgeproxyd: received response from aibridged  connect_id=7809a618-2c24-4f5f-a2f2-97af934b8c3e  request_id=eee98705-ffc2-4a00-8201-e316f997e19d  provider=copilot  status=200
```

**Copilot in VS Code**
1. VS Code attempts a WebSocket upgrade. AI Gateway treats the empty
`GET /responses` body as an inference request and returns 500.
```
2026-08-26 11:09:20.736 [info]  api: 2026-08-26 11:09:20.736 [warn]  coderd.ai-gateway.pool: failed to create interceptor  request_id=4aab1c00-fb45-4533-b8c4-bcb150fd12f3  aibridgeproxy_id=d6867370-cefa-49bb-85ca-98dd4258e74c  path=/copilot/responses ...
2026-08-26 11:09:20.736 [info]  api: error= unmarshal request body:
2026-08-26 11:09:20.736 [info]  api: github.com/coder/coder/v2/aibridge/provider.(*Copilot).CreateInterceptor
2026-08-26 11:09:20.736 [info]  api: /home/coder/coder/aibridge/provider/copilot.go:179
2026-08-26 11:09:20.736 [info]  api: - empty request body:
2026-08-26 11:09:20.736 [info]  api: github.com/coder/coder/v2/aibridge/intercept/responses.NewRequestPayload
2026-08-26 11:09:20.736 [info]  api: /home/coder/coder/aibridge/intercept/responses/reqpayload.go:48
2026-08-26 11:09:20.736 [info]  api: 2026-08-26 11:09:20.736 [warn]  coderd: GET  user_agent=node  host=127.0.0.1:3000  received_host=127.0.0.1:3000  path=/api/v2/ai-gateway/copilot/responses  proto=HTTP/1.1  remote_addr=127.0.0.1  start="2026-08-26 11:09:20.732174884 +0000 UTC m=+454.720979381"  response_body="failed to create \"/copilot/responses\" interceptor\n"  took=4.225651ms  status_code=500  latency_ms=4  params_*=copilot/responses  request_id=4aab1c00-fb45-4533-b8c4-bcb150fd12f3
2026-08-26 11:09:20.737 [info]  api: 2026-08-26 11:09:20.736 [erro]  coderd.aibridgeproxyd: received error response from aibridged  connect_id=072a6497-7072-42d8-b52d-a3afe17d5a75  request_id=d6867370-cefa-49bb-85ca-98dd4258e74c  provider=copilot  status=500  response_body="failed to create \"/copilot/responses\" interceptor\n"
```

2. VS Code checks connectivity with `GET /_ping` before retrying
inference over HTTP. AI Gateway rejects the check because the proxy did
not forward the Coder token from the authenticated CONNECT session.
```
2026-08-26 11:09:21.813 [info]  api: 2026-08-26 11:09:21.812 [info]  coderd.aibridgeproxyd: routing MITM request to AI Gateway  connect_id=2dd5a340-7ad9-43a6-b99d-fd34b838e6a2  request_id=8fda1e3e-4ca8-4908-a2ef-23859743dc38  host=api.business.githubcopilot.com  method=GET  path=/_ping  provider=copilot  gateway_target_url=http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/v2/ai-gateway/copilot/_ping
2026-08-26 11:09:21.813 [info]  api: 2026-08-26 11:09:21.813 [warn]  coderd.ai-gateway: no auth key provided  method=GET  path=/copilot/_ping  aibridgeproxy_id=8fda1e3e-4ca8-4908-a2ef-23859743dc38  request_id=057e3288-afa9-4f8d-9698-e4a3b206b199  aibridgeproxy_id=8fda1e3e-4ca8-4908-a2ef-23859743dc38
2026-08-26 11:09:21.814 [info]  api: 2026-08-26 11:09:21.814 [warn]  coderd.aibridgeproxyd: received error response from aibridged  connect_id=2dd5a340-7ad9-43a6-b99d-fd34b838e6a2  request_id=8fda1e3e-4ca8-4908-a2ef-23859743dc38  provider=copilot  status=400  response_body="no authentication key provided\n"
```
</details>

Closes
https://linear.app/codercom/issue/AIGOV-629/ai-gateway-lacks-support-for-new-copilot-endpoints-behind-mitm

> [!NOTE]
> Generated by Coder Agents on behalf of @ssncferreira.
2026-08-27 13:10:34 +01:00
McKayla はな 2a8e390f0c refactor: replace most usage of ptr.Ref with new (#28282) 2026-08-26 11:57:56 -06:00
Michael Suchacz 973d5a458b feat: promote codersdk chat API methods to Client (#28497)
## Stack context

This is the second PR in the 3-PR chat API promotion stack: server
compatibility mounts (#28496), codersdk promotion (this PR), and
frontend path updates (#28498).

## Summary

Move the promoted chat and MCP SDK methods from `ExperimentalClient` to
`Client` and update them to use `/api/v2`. Methods for routes that
remain experimental stay on `ExperimentalClient`.

Update in-repository callers and generated types. The multi-replica chat
stream relay dials `/api/v2` directly: mixed-version replica sets are
not a supported upgrade path, so no experimental-path fallback is kept
(per review). Remote dogfood UAT passed for the composed stack.

> [!NOTE]
> Xum acted on Mike's behalf in this pull request.
<!-- xum-attribution: model=claude-fable-5 thinking=high -->
2026-08-26 18:46:34 +02:00
Susana Ferreira 276d0a8586 fix: expose effective member AI budgets (#28410)
## Description

The group members page could not distinguish an unlimited Everyone
fallback from a configured budget on the Everyone group when viewing
another group, so it incorrectly displayed `Unlimited` and `Everyone
(not allocated)` despite the configured Everyone budget.

The member spend response now includes `effective_budget` as the
canonical budget that currently applies to the user. The existing
`group_budget` field remains for backward compatibility and is
deprecated in favor of `effective_budget`.

## Changes

- Add `effective_budget` to group member AI spend responses.
- Deprecate `group_budget` in favor of `effective_budget`.
- Display budgeted Everyone as the governing group instead of
`Unlimited` and `Everyone (not allocated)`.
- Add database, API, conversion, and Storybook coverage.

Closes https://linear.app/codercom/issue/AIGOV-588

> [!NOTE]
> Generated by Coder Agents on behalf of @ssncferreira.
2026-08-26 16:17:07 +01:00
Michael Suchacz 845790e652 feat: enable Coder Agents for organization members (#28186)
## Summary

- make Coder Agents available to organization members without a separate
built-in role
- remove the obsolete role from backend and frontend role surfaces
- update authorization, UI, documentation, and regression coverage

## Database note

This PR intentionally ships no migration so it backports cleanly across
diverged migration numbers. Stale `agents-access` grants may remain in
user role arrays and org default member roles; the retired name is
treated as a grant of nothing (role expansion drops it, assignment
validation ignores it, and the name stays reserved). A follow-up PR will
add the data cleanup migration.

## Validation

- `make gen`
- `make lint`
- repository pre-commit checks
- targeted RBAC, migration, chat API, enterprise, site, Storybook, and
race tests
- `git diff --check`

## Rollback note

Rolling back the deployment restores the previous behavior directly: no
data changed, and older binaries still resolve any lingering
`agents-access` grants.

> Mux created this pull request on Mike's behalf.
2026-08-26 13:33:13 +02:00
McKayla はな 29995c9ef8 feat: add a per-template workspace rename setting (#27558) 2026-08-25 11:05:42 -06:00
Jon Ayers 26de6140fb feat: add flag to disable workspace agent context sync (#28522) 2026-08-24 19:58:30 -05:00
J. Scott Miller 76962273d8 feat: add coder organizations edit for default member roles (#28227)
`default_org_member_roles` was only settable through Terraform or a raw
`PATCH /api/v2/organizations/{organization}`. This adds a CLI
equivalent.

```console
coder organizations edit --org acme --default-org-member-roles organization-workspace-access,organization-template-admin
coder organizations edit --org acme --default-org-member-roles ""   # grant no roles
```

- The flag replaces the organization's current list rather than adding
to it. It accepts a comma-separated list, may be repeated, and
de-duplicates. An empty value removes every role.
- Removing a role prompts for confirmation, listing the roles being
removed, unless `-y` is passed. Adding roles applies without a prompt.
- The resulting set is printed, so no follow-up command is needed to
confirm what was applied.
- The organization is chosen with `-O/--org` or `$CODER_ORGANIZATION`,
and is implicit when the caller belongs to exactly one organization.

The org update endpoint is behind `FeatureMultipleOrganizations`, so the
command is enterprise/premium only. Non-built-in roles are rejected by
the server, and `dbauthz` already prevents a caller from setting a
default they could not assign to a member individually.

<details>
<summary>Implementation notes</summary>

## Shape

`codersdk.UpdateOrganizationRequest.DefaultOrgMemberRoles *[]string` and
the enterprise `patchOrganization` handler already existed; only the CLI
was missing, and nothing in `cli/` called `UpdateOrganization` at all.
No server or SDK changes are needed.

`organizations edit` follows the partial-update pattern of `coder groups
edit`: check `ParsedFlags().Changed(...)`, populate only the fields the
user set, and leave the rest nil so the handler preserves them. Passing
no flags is an error.

Two earlier shapes were tried and dropped:

- **A `default-org-member-roles` entry in the `organizations settings`
registry.** Every sibling entry unmarshals an SDK type that maps 1:1 to
a dedicated endpoint; this field has no such endpoint. Reusing
`UpdateOrganizationRequest` for the piped JSON meant a stray `name`
field could rename the org, and the documented `show > file`, edit, `set
< file` workflow failed on the default organization, whose name is
reserved.
- **A `--default-org-member-roles` flag on `organizations create`.**
`create` cannot set display name, description, or icon either, so a
roles-only flag there is asymmetric. It would also require
`CreateOrganizationRequest` to grow the field plus server-side
validation.

## Known sharp edge

`serpent.StringArray` resets its slice when any flag value is empty, so
`--default-org-member-roles a --default-org-member-roles ""` clears the
list rather than keeping `a`. This is pinned by a test and called out in
a code comment. The confirmation prompt catches it interactively; a
script passing `-y` would not. A custom flag value that ignores empty
occurrences was prototyped and reverted as more machinery than the
behavior warranted.

## Validation

Manually verified against a local dev deployment with a premium license:
setting, adding, clearing, prompt accepted and declined, duplicate and
whitespace handling, invalid role rejection, and a plain member being
denied. Confirmed with `/authcheck` that a member loses workspace-create
access when the roles are cleared and regains it when restored, and that
the change is recorded in the audit log.

## Follow-ups worth considering

- `--name`, `--display-name`, `--description`, and `--icon` on
`organizations edit`; all already exist on `UpdateOrganizationRequest`.
Rename deserves its own discussion.
- Setting the defaults to `organization-admin` makes every member an org
admin, including the ability to edit the org further, and those users
still render as plain members in member listings. Reachable today via
the API, UI, and Terraform; a warning on privileged roles would help.
- `dbauthz.InsertOrganization` has no `canAssignRoles` check, unlike
`UpdateOrganization`. Harmless while the only caller passes the
deployment default constant.
- `docs/admin/users/organizations.md` still points users at the
dashboard or a raw `PATCH`.
</details>

---

Created by Coder Agents on behalf of @jscottmiller.
2026-08-24 09:41:21 -05:00
Cian Johnston 042421694f fix: surface duplicate AI provider hostname as warning, not error (#28208)
Two live `ai_providers` rows can share the same `base_url` hostname.
This is an intended configuration (AIGOV-97): the direct routing path
(`/api/v2/ai-gateway/{name}/...`) routes by provider name and fully
supports it. Only the MITM proxy path (`aibridgeproxyd`) cannot
disambiguate, because its `nameByHost` map is 1:1.

`classifyProviderRow` marked the second provider as
`ProviderStatusError`, which surfaced as a misleading log warning and a
`status=error` Prometheus label. The provider is not actually broken; it
is fully routable via the direct path. The error was only visible in
server logs and Prometheus, not in the API or UI.

This change:

- Extracts `BaseURLHostname` into `coderd/aibridged` and eliminates
three duplicate implementations (proxy classifier, chatprovider, and the
API layer now uses it for status checks).
- Downgrades the proxy classifier from `ProviderStatusError` to a new
`ProviderStatusProxyExcluded` status. The provider is not broken; it is
just not reachable via the MITM proxy path.
- Adds `Status *AIProviderStatus` to `codersdk.AIProvider` with
`Warnings []string`, matching the `WorkspaceProxy` precedent.
- Populates warnings on create, update, GET, and list when a provider's
hostname collides with another enabled provider.
- Adds an integration test proving that a duplicate provider is routable
via the direct path but not via the proxy path.

Refs AIGOV-596

Generated by Coder Agents



https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/bf323837-5121-4d1b-ab19-593f1d32374e
2026-08-24 13:27:22 +01:00
Ethan c275327fb7 feat: audit operational agent settings (#28369)
Depends on #28394.

Audit changes to seven operational agent settings through a typed
`chat_operational_settings` resource. Each handler serializes baseline
capture and mutation with a per-setting advisory lock, keeps both
operations in one transaction, and records field-specific diffs.

Effective no-op requests now skip both the database upsert and the
success audit, including absent rows whose effective value is already
the default. The change also retains the allowlisted raw `site_configs`
query, updates generated audit and API surfaces, adds failure and
concurrency coverage, and reuses the existing AuditPage resource-filter
story pattern.

Relates to CODAGT-720.
2026-08-24 11:53:47 +01:00
Ethan 2aba2685ad fix: require audit capture for chat settings (#28394)
Existing chat instruction setting handlers could complete a mutation
without an audit event when advisory locking or old-state capture
failed.

Make system prompt and plan mode instruction updates fail closed:
baseline capture and mutation stay in one transaction, audit
infrastructure failures reject the request without changing the setting,
and focused tests cover lock, read, transaction, and write failures.
2026-08-24 11:53:47 +01:00
Ethan a53c6e6366 feat: audit chat model config changes (#28439)
Adds audit logging for chat model config creates, updates, deletes, ACL
changes, and automatic default-model transitions. Audit records use the
config display name or ID as the target and are emitted only after
successful transactions.

Depends on #27960.
2026-08-24 11:20:26 +01:00
Ethan aefc761fcf feat!: enforce organization scope for chat models (#27959)
## Summary

Move chat model management and runtime availability to
organization-scoped API routes. The API now identifies the organization
in every model-management operation, applies chat model RBAC and ACLs
within that organization, and returns only models the caller can use
there.

Depends on #27958.

## Problem

Chat model configurations now belong to organizations, but the existing
experimental management and discovery APIs are deployment-shaped. Their
routes do not identify an organization, SDK methods do not accept an
organization ID, and item operations address a model configuration by ID
alone.

That contract cannot safely expose organization-owned model
configurations. It also does not provide the organization-specific
provider information, authorization behavior, ACL management, or
recovery guidance needed by the settings and chat clients later in the
stack.

## Fix

Add organization-scoped chat model endpoints under:

```text
/api/experimental/organizations/{organization}/chats/models
```

The new API provides:

- Organization-scoped model listing and creation.
- Model get, update, and delete operations scoped by both organization
and model ID.
- Model ACL read and update operations.
- Organization-scoped runtime availability and provider status.
- Redacted provider descriptors for model-management clients.
- Chat model RBAC and row ACL enforcement for writes, runtime discovery,
and Chatd model selection.
- Recovery guidance when a chat's organization has no usable local
model.

Historical chats can retain a model reference owned by another
organization, but runtime selection uses an authorized local default
when one is available. Foreign, inaccessible, disabled, and otherwise
unusable models are not exposed as usable selections for the
organization.

The existing collection and availability routes remain as
default-organization compatibility endpoints in this layer:

```text
GET  /api/experimental/chats/model-configs
POST /api/experimental/chats/model-configs
GET  /api/experimental/chats/models
```

These compatibility routes do not provide access to models in
non-default organizations. The previous unscoped item update and delete
routes are removed because item operations must include the owning
organization.

## Breaking change

This changes the experimental HTTP API and Go SDK contracts for chat
model management.

Clients must migrate model-management and availability requests to the
organization-scoped routes and provide an organization identifier. In
the Go SDK, the following methods now require an organization ID:

- `ChatModelAvailability`
- `ChatModels`
- `CreateChatModel`
- `UpdateChatModel`
- `DeleteChatModel`

`ChatModels` also changes its return value from `[]ChatModel` to
`OrganizationChatModelsResponse`, which includes the organization models
and the redacted provider descriptors required by management clients.
New item and ACL methods likewise require both the organization ID and
model ID.

The default-organization compatibility routes reduce the immediate
impact for collection and availability callers, but they do not preserve
the previous item API or SDK method signatures. Generated clients and
direct consumers of the experimental API must be updated before adopting
this change.

_This pull request description was generated by Coder Agents._
2026-08-24 11:20:25 +01:00
Ethan 9bd8899359 refactor: clarify chat model resource names (#27958)
Rename the admin-managed SDK resource from `ChatModelConfig` to
`ChatModel`. Rename catalog entries from `ChatModel` to
`ChatModelCatalogEntry` and replace `ChatModelsResponse` with
`ChatModelAvailabilityResponse`.

API routes and JSON fields do not change. Experimental SDK and OpenAPI
schema names do change.

Depends on #27957

_This pull request description was generated by Coder Agents._
2026-08-24 09:43:45 +00:00
Ethan f32592ec6b feat!: scope chat model configs to organizations (#27955)
## Summary

Scope chat model configurations and runtime model resolution to
organizations. Each model configuration now belongs to exactly one
organization, each organization can have its own default model, and
Chatd only uses models that belong to the chat's organization.

Depends on #27968.

## Problem

Chat model configurations are currently deployment-wide even though
chats belong to organizations. A default model, explicitly selected
model, or configured model override can therefore reference the same
model configuration from every organization. This prevents model
catalogs and defaults from being isolated by organization and allows a
chat to retain or select a model that its organization does not own.

Existing model configurations also have no organization ownership or
organization-scoped ACL data, and the database enforces a single live
default across the entire deployment.

## Fix

Add required organization ownership and ACL storage to chat model
configurations. The migration assigns every existing configuration to
the default organization, seeds organization-wide read access, and
replaces the deployment-wide default constraint with a per-organization
constraint.

Scope Chatd lookup, admission, fallback, and queue-promotion behavior to
the chat's organization:

- New chats use the usable default model from their organization.
- Explicit model selections from another organization are rejected.
- Deployment or personal overrides that point to a foreign model are not
used for the chat.
- Historical cross-organization model references remain unchanged in the
database, but runtime generation falls back to a usable local default.
- Queue promotion resolves unavailable, disabled, missing, or foreign
stored models to the usable local default and fails when no usable local
default exists.

The existing model configuration management and availability routes
remain compatibility routes for the default organization in this layer.
A later layer in the stack adds organization-scoped management routes
and updates clients to use them.

## Breaking change

This changes chat model behavior from deployment-wide to
organization-scoped. Existing configurations are migrated only to the
default organization; they are not copied into every organization.

As a result:

- A non-default organization no longer inherits the deployment's
existing default model.
- Creating a chat in an organization without a usable local default
fails with `400: No default chat model config is configured.`
- Explicitly selecting a configuration owned by another organization
fails with `400: Model config does not belong to the specified
organization.`
- Existing chats whose stored model belongs to another organization can
generate only if a usable local default is available; otherwise
generation fails.

Deployments using Agents in non-default organizations must configure a
usable default chat model separately for each organization after the
organization-scoped management layers in this stack are available.

_This pull request description was generated by Coder Agents._
2026-08-24 09:30:01 +00:00
McKayla はな 5ca0143992 refactor: upgrade golangci-lint to v2.0.2 (#28416) 2026-08-21 23:46:27 -06:00
david-fraley a2afb458c5 feat: add premium paywall conversion telemetry (#28425)
**TLDR:** When someone using free Coder taps a "Start trial for free"
button, we now write down which page they tapped it on, and whether they
went on to actually start the trial. That tells us which locked features
make people want Premium.

## Brief summary

- Records two things: the button being clicked, and a trial actually
being started.
- Each click gets a random ID that travels with the person to the trial
form, so we can tell who finished from who walked away.
- Records a short label for the page (like `appearance` or `audit_log`),
never the web address, so no customer names are collected.

#28226 added the trial form and has since merged, so this now targets
`main`.

## Description

Today the "Start trial for free" button just moves you to the Premium
page and nothing is recorded, so there is no way to know which feature
convinced someone.

This adds two events:

| Event | Happens when |
|---|---|
| `cta_click` | Someone clicks "Start trial for free" |
| `trial_signup` | A trial licence is actually issued |

The click generates a random ID. It rides along to the trial form and
gets saved on the signup, so a click and a signup can be matched up
later. Clicks with no matching signup are the people who gave up. Trials
started without a paywall (for example straight from the sidebar) are
labelled `direct`, so "no label" never gets confused with "broken".

A few small choices worth knowing:

- The ID is kept in browser session storage, not in the web address, so
the URL stays clean. It expires after 30 minutes.
- The trial signup event is recorded by the server, not the browser, so
nobody can fake a signup.
- The browser cannot say which kind of event it is sending. It can only
report a click; the server labels it.
- Only people allowed to start a trial are counted. The server rejects
the rest, which matters because a few paywalls show their button to
everyone.
- Nothing is recorded at all when telemetry is turned off.

There is deliberately no "paywall was shown" event. Every admin page
visit would report one, which is a lot of noise for little insight.

Every paywall in the [Premium Copy
Updates](https://www.notion.so/coderhq/Premium-Copy-Updates-3c1d579be59280a59557cabd54fd8a1f)
table has a label. The rows that do not are badges and alerts with no
button to click.

## Proof

Ran a local Coder with no licence and clicked the paywall button on the
Appearance page.

What the browser sent, and the reply:

```json
POST /api/v2/deployment/premium-funnel-events  ->  204 No Content
{"id":"92d96afa-f975-4789-b8a7-b1fd19d4df85","source":"appearance","variant":"premium"}
```

What the browser saved for the trial form, same ID:

```json
{"id":"92d96afa-f975-4789-b8a7-b1fd19d4df85","source":"appearance","createdAt":1787268520857}
```

The click then landed on the Premium page with the trial form.
Screenshots of the network panel, the saved value, and the Premium page
are attached below. The form itself was not submitted, since that would
contact the real licence server.

## Testing

- Backend tests: a click is recorded with the server's own label, an
unknown page label is refused, and a normal member is refused.
- Storybook tests: button clicked and ID saved on all three paywall
styles, plus the case where the viewer only sees guidance text and has
nothing to click.
- Unit tests for the saved ID: expiry, bad data, unknown page label, and
the `direct` fallback.
- `make gen` is clean, and lint, types, and formatting pass.

Two stories fail on `main` today and fail the same way here:
`ExternalAuthSettingsPageView > Page` and `PremiumPageView > No
License`. Neither file is touched by this branch; both were verified
failing on `main` with this branch checked out elsewhere.

## Follow-up

coder/coder-telemetry-server#45 saves these events for reporting. It
merges after this one.

<details>
<summary>Plan and decisions</summary>

**Goal:** find out which Premium paywall drives trial signups, and tell
abandons apart from completions.

**Options considered and dropped:**

1. Put `?from=appearance` in the URL. Rejected: messy for users.
2. Use router state. Rejected: lost if the page is refreshed.
3. Let the browser report the signup. Rejected: it could be faked or
lost during the redirect.
4. Work out the page from the URL. Rejected: URLs contain organization
and template names.
5. Report every paywall impression. Rejected: one event per admin page
visit is noise, and the click is the signal.
6. Separate event types and tables. Rejected: makes the matching query
harder for no gain.

**Event shape:**

```go
type PremiumFunnelEvent struct {
	ID            uuid.UUID // event ID; for a click this is also the matching ID
	EventType     string    // cta_click | trial_signup, set by the server
	Source        string    // appearance, audit_log, ..., direct
	Variant       string    // which paywall design was shown
	AttributionID uuid.UUID // the click this signup came from
	UserID        uuid.UUID
	CreatedAt     time.Time
}
```

**Where the code lives:** nothing under `components/` imports from
`modules/`, so the paywall components stay presentational and only gain
an `onCTAClick` prop. New wrappers in `modules/paywall/` own the
reporting, one per paywall style, each taking a fixed `source`.

**Self-review:** the `frontend-review` skill caught that reading
permissions inside the wrapper forced an auth context into
presentational page views, which broke their stories. Every call site
already passes `canViewPremium={permissions.viewAllLicenses}` and the
button only renders when that is true, so the wrapper no longer reads
permissions and the server stays the gate. It also flagged one
unattributed paywall on the Security page, now wired up as
`browser_only`.

</details>

> Generated with [Coder Agents](https://coder.com/agents) on behalf of
@david-fraley
2026-08-21 10:31:01 -04:00
Samuel VolinandMatt Vollmer f44a3b59d7 feat: Premium Page CTA updates and form handling (#28226)
* Premium page has form for signing up for a trial
* Input validation and normalization for trial form fields
* api endpoint definition to make this processes seamless 
* license page updates to access `?success=true` queryparam and confetti

<img width="1512" height="833" alt="Screenshot 2026-08-17 at 10 08
41 PM"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/1766e724-c63a-4da9-b2bd-a98e6b66cc9b"
/>

<img width="1510" height="874" alt="Aug-17-2026 22-12-38"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/3a2a0f35-1176-4290-aa0d-b3f7d66c15d6"
/>


```mermaid
sequenceDiagram
    autonumber
    actor Owner
    participant UI as UI<br/>TrialRequestForm + PremiumPage
    participant API as API<br/>api.ts + coderd middleware
    participant Coderd as Coderd<br/>postTrialLicense + trialer
    participant Licensor as Licensor<br/>v2-licensor + Postgres + pubsub + cache

    Note over UI: mutation.status = "idle"

    Owner->>UI: fills 10 fields, checks acknowledgement
    UI->>UI: Yup validate, strip "acknowledged", submit
    UI->>API: POST /api/v2/licenses/trial<br/>cookie + X-CSRF-TOKEN
    Note over UI: mutation.status = "pending"

    API->>API: verify CSRF, apiRateLimiter,<br/>apiKeyMiddleware sets actor
    API->>Coderd: dispatch

    Coderd->>Coderd: audit.InitRequest, authorize license:create,<br/>httpapi.Read validates, HasLicense is false
    Coderd->>Licensor: POST trial request<br/>deployment_id unspoofable, 10s deadline
    Licensor-->>Coderd: 200, raw signed JWT

    Coderd->>Coderd: ParseClaimsIgnoreNbf, uuid.Parse
    Coderd->>Licensor: InsertLicense, updateEntitlements,<br/>publish PubsubEventLicense, commit audit log
    Licensor-->>Coderd: database.License
    Coderd-->>API: 201 codersdk.License
    API-->>UI: 201 codersdk.License

    Note over UI: mutation.status = "success"
    UI->>Licensor: invalidate entitlements + licenses keys
    UI->>Owner: navigate /deployment/premium?success=true
    Note over Owner: confetti fires on the success param
```

---------

Co-authored-by: Matt Vollmer <matthewjvollmer@outlook.com>
2026-08-21 09:54:54 -04:00
dylanhuff-at-coder 952c0ce5e6 fix(enterprise/coderd): identify audit rows by content instead of order in diff tests (#27904)
`TestUserSecretAuditDiffRedaction` flakes when create and update audit
rows receive equal timestamps and `GetAuditLogsOffset` returns the tied
rows in either order.

Identify audit rows by action, or by diff content when both actions are
writes, instead of relying on slice position. Fixes coder/internal#1625.

Reviewed and updated by Coder Agents on behalf of @dylanhuff-at-coder.
2026-08-20 15:43:58 -07:00
Susana Ferreira d989ae36cd docs: clarify who can set AI model prices and how they are keyed (#28401)
The docs named the `ai_model_price:update` permission but never said
which role holds it, and nothing anywhere explained that a price is
keyed by provider type and model, so every configured provider of that
type shares it. This names the Owner role, documents the keying and why
`openai-compat` cannot be priced, and repeats both in the CLI's
`--provider` descriptions and `update` help.

> [!NOTE]
> Initially generated by Claude Opus 5, modified and reviewed by
@ssncferreira
2026-08-20 17:35:30 +01:00
Susana Ferreira ab6601086a fix: gate group settings page and fix unauthorized group patch (#28314)
## Problem

A user without `group:update` (e.g. the `Coder Agents User` role) could
open the group settings page by direct URL and edit the budget. Saving
then failed with a misleading error:

> Failed to add or remove non-existent group member — execute
transaction: update group by ID: unauthorized: rbac: forbidden.

The authorization failure was misclassified as a missing group member,
and the settings page was not gated on the required permission.

## Changes

- Return the standard vague 404 for authorization failures in the group
PATCH handler, so the response is accurate and does not leak resource
existence.
- Use a generic message for the remaining 400 branch, since it covers
various transaction failures rather than only member add/remove.
- Gate the group settings page on `group:update`. The settings tab is
already hidden without the permission, but the page was reachable by
direct URL and rendered an editable form that always failed on save. It
now shows the standard permission dialog.

Fixes
[AIGOV-603](https://linear.app/codercom/issue/AIGOV-603/hide-group-budget-controls-without-permission).

> [!NOTE]
> Generated by Coder Agents, reviewed by @ssncferreira.
2026-08-20 14:51:27 +01:00
Susana Ferreira 50ecd6959f feat: add a source filter to the AI model price list (#28329)
## Description

With prices from the price book and prices set through the API both in the table, `list` showed only the price in effect and gave no way to tell where it came from. There was also no way to see the price book's entry for a model that had been overridden, since the listing resolves to the custom price.

This adds a `source` column to the output and a `--source` filter for narrowing to one source, or to every row with `all`.

Note: `--source` selects rows rather than models. A model carrying both a price book price and a custom one appears under either value, so the two filtered listings do not sum to the unfiltered one. `--source all` reports both rows at once.

## Changes

- Add `Source` to `codersdk.AIModelPrice` and `AIModelPricesFilter`, and map it in `db2sdk`, which previously dropped it.
- Filter `GetAIModelPrices` by source before resolution, so the price book's row for an overridden model stays reachable.
- Accept `all` as a source, which reports every price a model holds instead of resolving to one.
- Accept a `source` query parameter on the list endpoint, rejected with a 400 when outside the enum.
- Add `--source` to the list command and a `source` column to its output.
- Document the column and the filter, and lead the price section with `coder exp ai-model-prices list`.
- Distinguish a deployment's default prices from the price book that ships with each release.

Closes https://linear.app/codercom/issue/AIGOV-593

> [!NOTE]
> Initially generated by Claude Opus 5, modified and reviewed by @ssncferreira
2026-08-20 11:56:58 +01:00
Susana Ferreira 19d1ee9fc8 feat: support custom prices for models in the price book (#28328)
## Description

The experimental CLI could only price models the price book does not cover, so an operator with a negotiated rate for a model Coder already prices had no way to record it. The restriction existed because a single row served both the price book and prices set through the API, and the startup seeder would overwrite an override on the next restart.

Each source now keeps its own row (https://github.com/coder/coder/pull/28204), so that no longer applies. This removes the restriction: a price set through the CLI takes effect over the price book for any model, and the book stays underneath it.

## Changes

- Remove the validation that rejected models the price book covers.
- Delete `prices.IsDefaultPriced` and the index behind it, which existed only for that check.
- Generalize the `coder exp ai-model-prices update` help.
- Document that a custom price overrides the price book and does not follow its updates.
- Rework the spend approximation callout around what a custom price can and cannot correct.

Closes https://linear.app/codercom/issue/AIGOV-594

> [!NOTE]
> Initially generated by Claude Opus 5, modified and reviewed by @ssncferreira
2026-08-20 11:46:38 +01:00
Susana Ferreira 9390e51422 feat: distinguish default and custom AI model prices (#28204)
## Description

Prices in `ai_model_prices` come from two places: the price book embedded in each Coder release, and prices set through the experimental CLI (https://github.com/coder/coder/pull/27926). Until now, they were indistinguishable, so the startup seeder re-applied the book over every row, and a price someone set would silently revert on the next restart.

This adds a `source` column with values `default` and `custom`, and keeps a row for each. Readers resolve a model to its custom price when one exists and fall back to the book, including the cost path that prices an interception.

Keeping both rows means the price book stays current underneath an override, so a future delete can restore it.

Note: the endpoint still only accepts models the price book does not cover. Overriding a price the book already carries is handled by the follow-up issue https://linear.app/codercom/issue/AIGOV-594.

## Changes

- Add a migration for the `ai_model_price_source` enum and a `source` column, backfilled to `default` and then `NOT NULL`. `source` joins the primary key, so a model can hold one row per source.
- Take a `source` parameter on `UpsertAIModelPrices`. Each source keeps its own row, so the price book and a custom price never overwrite each other.
- Resolve to the custom price in `GetAIModelPriceByProviderModel` and `GetAIModelPrices`, so both the interception cost snapshot and the list endpoint use it.
- Seed the price book as `default`, and write prices set through the endpoint as `custom`.

Closes https://linear.app/codercom/issue/AIGOV-592

> [!NOTE]
> Initially generated by Claude Opus 5, modified and reviewed by @ssncferreira
2026-08-20 11:36:58 +01:00
Asher 7ba2e6e22a fix: add distributed protection for external auth refresh (#27479)
Before refreshing, the caller has to put a lease on the row to prevent
any other replicas from trying to refresh using the same token. Callers
unable to get a lease enter a holding pattern waiting for the results.

Also use this same lease query to re-read the link. This more or less
functions the same as the re-read we used to have after a refresh
failure, except it also allows us to avoid making the failed request in
the first place. The downside is that we have to refetch the link every
time even if the caller just fetched it, but since we have to make a
database call to set the lease anyway...
2026-08-19 13:00:31 -08:00
Michael Suchacz 24b83dc727 feat: add organization picker to MCP server settings pages (#28150)
Adds an organization picker to the MCP server settings pages so
multi-org deployments can manage every organization's MCP servers
through the UI, not just the default organization's. Closes CODAGT-714
(scoped to MCP servers only; model configs stay deployment-wide until
CODAGT-709 lands).

## Stack Context

Top of the CODAGT-711/717/712/806 stack: MCP server configs are
org-scoped with RBAC, audit logging, per-config ACLs, and owner-scoped
user tokens. This layer makes the admin UI org-aware, resolving the
"default org only" limitation documented in the bottom PR.

## Summary

- The MCP servers list and add pages resolve the working organization
from an `org` search param (falling back to the default org), and render
an organization picker built on the existing `OrganizationAutocomplete`.
The picker only appears when more than one organization is visible, so
single-org deployments see no change.
- Selecting an organization rewrites the search param, refetches the
list for that org, and threads through to the add page so creation posts
to the selected organization.
- The update page now loads the server by ID (new organization-scoped
`GET /api/experimental/organizations/{organization}/mcp-servers/{id}`
frontend binding) instead of listing the default org and searching
client-side, so servers from any organization can be edited. Post-save
navigation returns to the owning organization's list via the server's
`organization_id`.
- Removes the now-unused `getDefaultOrganizationId` helper.
- Review hardening: organization display labels are disambiguated with
the unique org name when effective display names collide (picker
options, trigger text, and accessible name). Access is no longer
restricted to deployment admins: the pages, sidebar item, and nav entry
accept org-scoped `mcp_server_config` permissions, the picker lists only
organizations the user can view, content and affordances (add, edit,
delete) are gated on the selected organization's permissions, and
deployment admins keep full access everywhere.

## Testing

Storybook interaction stories cover: picker hidden with one org,
switching orgs refetches and swaps list contents, add posting to the
URL-selected org, add posting after an in-form org switch (asserting
typed form state survives the switch), and update loading by ID.
Red-green verified by breaking the search-param resolution and observing
the new stories fail.

> Mux acted on Mike's behalf for this PR.
2026-08-19 19:46:23 +00:00
david-fraley 8203b2ebaf feat!: hide Coder Tasks behind the enable-ai-tasks flag (#28008) 2026-08-19 14:46:10 -05:00
Michael Suchacz a3eb1ee930 fix: gate MCP user tokens on owner-scoped personal RBAC (#27945)
Re-gates every `mcp_server_user_tokens` dbauthz method from
`rbac.ResourceDeploymentConfig` onto owner-scoped personal actions,
mirroring the `external_auth_links` prior art. These are per-user
credential rows, not deployment config, and the old gate forced every
call site to elevate with `dbauthz.AsSystemRestricted`.

## Summary

- Reads gate on `ActionReadPersonal` and writes on
`ActionUpdatePersonal` against the token owner
(`MCPServerUserToken.RBACObject()` derives from `user_id`). The id-keyed
refresh and refresh-failure mutations resolve the owner via a
`GetMCPServerUserTokenByID` prefetch inside dbauthz; the mutation
queries cannot retarget a row's owner, so there is no fetch-authorize
race.
- All seven token-path `AsSystemRestricted` elevations in
`coderd/mcp.go` and all four in chatd are removed along with their
`//nolint:gocritic` markers; handlers use the request actor.
- The daemon-wide chatd subject keeps only `ActionReadPersonal` on
`ResourceUser`. Background token refresh and failure persistence use a
new per-user `AsChatdTokenOwner` subject holding only user-level
`ActionUpdatePersonal` scoped to the token owner (both mutations resolve
the row via the underlying store, so the subject needs no read grant),
and chatd never holds site-wide personal-write access. `TestAsChatd`
pins the complete `ResourceUser` action set and
`TestMCPServerUserTokensAuth` exercises both subjects against the real
authorizer.
- New strict-authorizer test (`rbac.NewAuthorizer` against real rows):
owner passes get/upsert/delete, a stranger fails, and an org admin of
another org fails.

No user-visible behavior change. Stacked on #27944. Completes the MCP
org-separation stack.

Closes https://linear.app/codercom/issue/CODAGT-806

UAT: regression pass on a dogfood instance: OAuth2 connect redirect,
member list/status with redaction, self-scoped disconnect (cannot touch
another user's token), end-to-end chat MCP tool invocation, and
lower-stack audit/ACL smoke checks.

> Mux (AI agent) authored this PR on Mike's behalf.

<!-- mux-attribution: model=claude-fable-5 thinking=high -->
2026-08-19 19:36:59 +00:00
Michael Suchacz 7ca7c30f40 feat: add group and user ACLs to MCP server configs (#27944)
Adds group and user ACLs to org-scoped MCP server configs so
organizations can restrict specific MCP servers to subsets of members,
mirroring the template ACL pattern.

## Summary

- Migration adds `group_acl`/`user_acl` JSONB columns (nested `{"<id>":
{"permissions": [...]}}` shape) and seeds every existing config with its
organization's Everyone group read entry (the Everyone group ID equals
the org ID), so member access is unchanged by default. Creation seeds
the same entry.
- The blanket org-member read grant from the base PR is replaced by ACL
evaluation: Rego requires org membership for every ACL grant, and
`GetAuthorizedMCPServerConfigs` compiles ACL-aware SQL filters.
- New `ActionShare` (org admins) gates `GET|PATCH
/api/experimental/organizations/{organization}/mcp-servers/{mcpserverconfig}/acl`
(nested under the organization like the rest of the config surface).
PATCH validates principals against the config's organization, merges
sparse updates under a row lock, stamps `updated_by`/`updated_at`, and
is audited as a Write with `Old` captured before authorization. A config
deleted concurrently between the middleware fetch and the locked
re-fetch is concealed as 404, matching the update and delete handlers.
ACL columns are tracked in the audit table.
- ACL management is available in all editions (no enterprise
entitlement), documented in the MCP servers page. Revoking an ACL does
not retro-strip already-selected configs from existing chats; new
selection is blocked at chat create.
- Force On respects the ACL: the forced set is loaded as the chat owner,
so a `force_on` server whose ACL denies the owner never attaches at
create, send, or generation time.
- No rolling-upgrade machinery: upgrades run in scheduled maintenance
downtime, so the migration only backfills existing rows; the API sets
the Everyone read grant explicitly on every insert.

Stacked on #27943. Part of the MCP org-separation stack.

Closes https://linear.app/codercom/issue/CODAGT-712

UAT: verified on a dogfood instance with two members and a custom group:
Everyone-seed default visibility, group grant with Everyone removal
(non-member loses list/fetch/selection), foreign-principal rejection,
non-admin share denial (audited 403 / concealed 404), user_acl restore,
and audited ACL diffs.

> Mux (AI agent) authored this PR on Mike's behalf.

<!-- mux-attribution: model=claude-fable-5 thinking=high -->
2026-08-19 19:25:18 +00:00
Michael Suchacz 299e72ad30 feat: audit MCP server config changes (#27943)
Adds enterprise audit logging for MCP server config create, update, and
delete, with strict secret redaction. MCP configs hold credentials
(OAuth2 client secrets, API keys, custom headers), so admin changes to
them need an audit trail.

## Summary

- `enterprise/audit/table.go` gains an `MCPServerConfig` entry
enumerating every column: `oauth2_client_secret`, `api_key_value`, and
`custom_headers` are `ActionSecret` (never appear in diffs); dbcrypt
`*_key_id` bookkeeping, IDs, and timestamps are ignored; the remaining
config fields, including the endpoint URL fields, are tracked so
auditors can see which endpoints a config points at.
- Type registration in `coderd/audit` (diff, request, resource target
with org attribution), `codersdk/audit.go`, and a `resource_type` enum
migration.
- Handlers wire `audit.InitRequest`: create records `New`; update and
delete record `Old` from the param middleware before the
write-authorization check, so a readable-but-not-writable caller
produces an audited 403 while read-denied callers stay concealed as
unaudited 404s.
- Tests: create/update/delete audit entries, write-denied and
delete-denied 403 auditing, cross-org concealment producing zero
entries, and a serializer-level regression test proving none of the
three secret classes can reach a serialized diff.
- Review round: MCP config audit entries link to
`/ai/settings/mcp-servers/{id}`, audit table comments are trimmed per
review, and a fault-injection test pins that a config row surviving a
failed post-discovery credential update still gets its creation audit
entry.

Stacked on #27942 (org-scoped MCP configs). Part of the MCP
org-separation stack.

Closes https://linear.app/codercom/issue/CODAGT-717

UAT: verified on a trial-licensed dogfood instance: audit entries for
the full CRUD lifecycle with correct actor/org/target, redacted secrets
in the update and OAuth2 create diffs, and a full plaintext scan of the
audit dump finding zero secret leaks.

> Mux (AI agent) authored this PR on Mike's behalf.

<!-- mux-attribution: model=claude-fable-5 thinking=high -->
2026-08-19 19:11:52 +00:00
Michael Suchacz f7a0de7a11 fix: harden org-scoped MCP config chat gating, updates, and visibility (#28065)
Hardens the org-scoped MCP server config surface from #27942 with fixes
and regression pins that are independent of the core cutover:

- Keep chats sendable after a selected MCP server is disabled (persisted
selections are exempt from message-time rejection).
- Keep cached MCP selections usable after a background refetch error
(gate the composer on missing data, not `isSuccess`).
- Merge PATCH updates onto the current row so unset fields are not
clobbered.
- Give auditors the full management view of MCP configs their audit logs
reference (site and org auditor roles).
- Regression pins: frozen OAuth2 callback path, cross-org concealment
for item routes, OAuth callback token binding, and disconnect responses
indistinguishable from nonexistent config IDs.
- Storybook: semantic textbox queries in MCP loading stories; docs note
that the MCP settings page needs deployment access.

## Stack context

Part of the MCP org-separation stack (CODAGT-711 org scope -> apidocs ->
hardening -> CODAGT-717 audit -> CODAGT-712 ACLs -> CODAGT-806 token
RBAC). Split out of #27942 to keep the core cutover reviewable; each
change here builds on the org-scoped routes and chat gating introduced
below it.

> Mux (AI agent) authored this PR on Mike's behalf.

<!-- mux-attribution: model=claude-fable-5 thinking=high -->
2026-08-19 18:50:31 +00:00
TJ dd43574990 refactor: remove AI add-on badge, seat column, and add-on wording leftovers (#28004)
Removes all "AI add-on" labeling from the UI, plus two leftover "AI
Governance add-on" wording items from the licensing repackaging (AI
Governance is now included with Premium).

- Remove the **AI add-on** badge from the group settings AI budget
section and the AI Governance add-on card on the Licenses page.
- Remove the **AI add-on** column (check icon showing AI seat
consumption) from the Users and Organization Members tables, along with
its help popover, the `AISeatCell` component, and the
`shouldShowAISeatColumn` entitlement helper.
- Update related Storybook stories.
- Drop "add-on" from the AI cost control route comments in
`enterprise/coderd/coderd.go` and the `coder exp ai-model-prices`
prerequisite in `docs/ai-coder/ai-gateway/cost-controls.md` (leftovers
not covered by #28075/#28077/#28268).

The `has_ai_seat` API field is left intact.

<details>
<summary>Removal scope</summary>

Badge usages removed:

- `site/src/pages/GroupsPage/GroupSettingsPageView.tsx`
-
`site/src/pages/DeploymentSettingsPage/LicensesSettingsPage/AIGovernanceAddOnCard.tsx`

AI seat column plumbing removed:

- `site/src/pages/UsersPage/UsersTable.tsx` and `UsersPage.tsx`
- `site/src/pages/OrganizationSettingsPage/OrganizationMembersTable.tsx`
and `OrganizationMembersPage.tsx`
- `site/src/modules/users/AISeatCell.tsx` (deleted)
- `AiAddonHelpPopover` in `site/src/modules/users/UserHelpPopovers.tsx`
- `shouldShowAISeatColumn` in
`site/src/modules/dashboard/entitlements.ts`

Add-on wording leftovers:

- `enterprise/coderd/coderd.go`: 7 route comments (comments only, no
behavior change)
- `docs/ai-coder/ai-gateway/cost-controls.md`: model prices CLI
prerequisite

</details>

---

🤖 This pull request was generated by Coder Agents on behalf of
@tracyjohnsonux.
2026-08-19 11:43:27 -07:00
Michael SuchaczandMathias Fredriksson 443e3b9b80 feat!: org-scope MCP server configs with RBAC (#27942)
Moves `mcp_server_configs` from deployment scope to organization scope
so each organization fully controls the MCP servers its members can use
with Coder Agents.

## Summary

- Migration: adds `organization_id` (NOT NULL, FK) and keeps existing
rows as the default organization's originals with credentials intact.
Other organizations start with no MCP servers and configure their own;
nothing is copied across organizations. Chats outside the default
organization keep any now-cross-organization `mcp_server_ids` entries;
the runtime already ignores IDs that do not resolve in the chat's
organization, so no data rewrite is needed. Slug uniqueness becomes
`(organization_id, slug)`.
- RBAC: new org-scoped `ResourceMCPServerConfig` with regosql converter
and `GetAuthorizedMCPServerConfigs`; org admins get in-org CRUD, org
members get read (replaced by ACL evaluation in the follow-up ACL PR in
this stack).
- API: all config routes nest under the organization, matching
templates: `POST|GET
/api/experimental/organizations/{organization}/mcp-servers` and
`GET|PATCH|DELETE .../mcp-servers/{mcpserverconfig}` (plus
`oauth2/connect`), resolved by a read-only param middleware that
conceals read-denied and cross-organization access as 404. Two routes
stay on the frozen `/api/experimental/mcp/servers/{mcpServer}` block:
the OAuth2 callback (the redirect URI baked into existing AS-side client
registrations) and `oauth2/disconnect`, which must remain reachable by
users removed from the organization so they can still revoke their token
grant.
- Chat runtime: selection validation and generation resolve configs
strictly by IDs, enabled state, and the chat's organization in SQL;
requested duplicates are normalized; invalid or cross-org IDs are
rejected with the precise ID list. IDs already persisted on a chat are
exempt from message-time rejection so disabling a selected server never
blocks sends; generation skips servers that are no longer usable.
- Frontend: API layer and admin settings pages target the new endpoints.
The admin page manages the default organization's servers; the org
picker is tracked separately (CODAGT-714).

- Security hardening from review: OAuth user grants are additionally
bound to `oauth2_revocation_url` (changing it invalidates grants, and a
racing OAuth callback gets 409 instead of recreating a grant).
Stack-wide SSRF protection for MCP config-directed traffic was split
into its own PR at the top of this stack (#28242) to keep this diff
reviewable; this PR keeps main's existing discovery IP-range guard.
OAuth2 auto-discovery now completes before the config row is inserted: a
failed discovery persists nothing, and there is no provisional row that
concurrent updates could race against.

Two follow-up PRs in this stack were split out to keep this diff
reviewable: #28064 completes the swagger annotations for the moved
routes (main already ships these experimental MCP handlers unannotated),
and #28065 carries hardening fixes and regression pins on top of the
cutover.

- Force On enforcement (landed on main mid-review) is org-scoped: the
forced set is read per chat organization
(`GetForcedMCPServerConfigsByOrganization`), so another organization's
`force_on` server never attaches to a chat.

## Breaking changes (experimental API)

The MCP server config endpoints move from the deployment-scoped
`/api/experimental/mcp/servers` block to organization-nested paths:
`POST|GET /api/experimental/organizations/{organization}/mcp-servers`
and `GET|PATCH|DELETE
/api/experimental/organizations/{organization}/mcp-servers/{mcpserverconfig}`
(plus `oauth2/connect`). The old paths are removed, so API consumers
must supply an organization. Two routes intentionally stay on the frozen
`/api/experimental/mcp/servers/{mcpServer}` block: the OAuth2 callback
(its redirect URI is baked into existing AS-side client registrations)
and `oauth2/disconnect` (must remain reachable by users removed from the
organization). These endpoints are under `/api/experimental`, so no
deprecation window is provided.

## Rolling upgrades

During a rolling deploy, an old replica creating an MCP config can fail
the new `NOT NULL organization_id` constraint until it is upgraded
(reads are unaffected: old binaries' generated queries select their own
column lists). This matches the repo's existing precedent for additive
NOT NULL migrations (000562) and affects only the admin config-create
path in the upgrade window.

Upgrades are expected to run in scheduled maintenance downtime with the
database locked during migration, so the migration ships no
rolling-upgrade compatibility machinery. The down migration deletes
organization-created configs (their chat references are cleaned by the
000510 delete trigger) and restores deployment-wide slug uniqueness.

Part of the MCP org-separation stack (CODAGT-711 -> CODAGT-717 audit ->
CODAGT-712 ACLs -> CODAGT-806 token RBAC).

Closes https://linear.app/codercom/issue/CODAGT-711

UAT: validated end to end on a two-org dogfood deployment, including a
real pre-migration to post-migration upgrade, cross-org isolation
(404s), same-slug-two-orgs, chat selection gating, and a live MCP tool
call through the org-scoped generation path. The migration was later
revised to keep existing rows in the default organization only (no
per-organization copies); that revision is covered by the migration test
suite.

> Mux (AI agent) authored this PR on Mike's behalf.

<!-- mux-attribution: model=claude-fable-5 thinking=high -->

---------

Co-authored-by: Mathias Fredriksson <mafredri@gmail.com>
2026-08-19 18:04:13 +00:00
Jiachen Jiang 6107cfe918 fix(enterprise/coderd/license): remove AI Governance required banner (#28268)
## Summary

The AI Governance add-on is now included in all Premium licenses, so the
transitional license banner warning that AI Bridge / AI Gateway requires
the AI Governance add-on is no longer accurate. This removes that
warning throughout Coder.

The banner text this removes:

> The AI Governance add-on is required to use AI Gateway. Please reach
out to your account team or sales@coder.com to learn more.

## Changes

- Remove the AI Bridge soft warning block in `LicensesEntitlements`.
- Remove the now-unused `hasExplicitAIBridgeEntitlement` tracking that
only fed that warning.
- Remove `TestAIBridgeSoftWarning` and the vestigial warning
assertions/comments that pinned the removed behavior.

The license banner surfaces backend entitlement warnings verbatim, so
removing the warning here removes it from the dashboard banner. No
frontend changes are needed; the warning string existed only in the
backend.

## Testing

- `go build ./enterprise/coderd/license/...`
- `go vet ./enterprise/coderd/license/...`
- `go test ./enterprise/coderd/license/` (license entitlement + AI
Governance addon suites)

---

*This PR was created by Coder Agents on behalf of @jcjiang.*
2026-08-19 08:50:17 -07:00
Paweł Banaszewski a441b03d70 feat: add yaml config option to standalone AI gateway (#28258)
`coder ai-gateway start` now accepts a `--config` / `-c` flag (and
`CODER_CONFIG_PATH`) to load configuration from a YAML file.
2026-08-19 10:07:22 +00:00
Jon Ayers 821d91fabd fix: log tailnet tunnel authorization decisions (#27819) 2026-08-18 18:21:50 -05:00