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9368917813 |
feat: report the negotiated scope to the user and the client (#28179)
**TL;DR** Last of the stack, split out of #28045. #28178 decided what the scope is; this PR is everything that reports it, to the user on the consent page and to the client on rejection. | PR | What it does | |---|---| | #28007 | Schema: `codes.scope` and `tokens.scope`, so a negotiated scope has somewhere to live. Every code is still stamped unrestricted. | | #28167 | `ScopesCover` compares an allowlist against a request by permission coverage rather than by name, and fails closed on any shape it does not model. Added with no production callers. | | #28178 | The authorize endpoint checks the request against the scope catalog, grants it only if the app's filtered allowlist covers it, and persists the result on the code. | | **#28179 (this)** | The consent page lists the negotiated permissions, and `invalid_scope` reaches the client's own callback per RFC 6749 §4.1.2.1 instead of a Coder error page. Retires the interim plumbing #28178 left behind. | - #28178 has merged, so this diff is against main and reviews on its own. It is still worth reading first: nothing here decides a scope, it only reports the one `negotiateScope` already returns. - **The consent page HTML is not final.** Layout and wording in `site/static/oauth2allow.html` are still being refined. It is in this branch so the scope-enforcement flow can be exercised end to end in a browser, not because the markup is settled. The reviewable part of Half A is the Go side that decides what the page states; the presentation will change. - An unrestricted grant still reads as full access, not as a scope name. Nothing about what a token can do changes in this PR either. **Where in the flow** - Authorize endpoint only, both verbs. GET decides what the consent page states; both verbs send `invalid_scope` to the callback. The token exchange, refresh, and revocation are untouched. - `negotiateScope` is unchanged from #28178, so which requests succeed is unchanged. This PR reads its result twice: once to decide what the page lists, once to decide where the rejection goes. - The endpoint sits behind `apiKeyMiddlewareRedirect`, so the user is authenticated before any of this runs. That matters for the redirect, not just for the page. - Consent page rendering moves a decision into Go rather than the template: `RenderOAuthAllowData` carries `Scopes` and `Unrestricted` separately, and the template branches on `Unrestricted` alone. **What it satisfies** - RFC 6749 §4.1.2.1 — on a failure that is not a bad redirection URI, the server "informs the client by adding the following parameters to the query component of the redirection URI". `invalid_scope` now goes there. #28178's interim delivery, a static error page on GET and an error body on POST, is what this replaces. - RFC 6749 §4.1.2.1 — `state` is "REQUIRED if a `state` parameter was present in the client authorization request", so it is echoed only when the client sent one, never synthesized. Pinned by `OmittedStateNotEchoed`. - RFC 6749 §3.1.2.4 and §4.1.2.1 — on a "missing, invalid, or mismatching redirection URI" the server "MUST NOT automatically redirect the user-agent to the invalid redirection URI". This is the whole ordering argument, and the file's other error paths keep their existing delivery precisely because several of them are where that validation fails. - RFC 9700 §2.1 — pre-registered redirection URIs "MUST utilize exact string matching". `extractAuthorizeParams` already did this before the stack; Half B depends on it rather than adding it. - RFC 9700 §4.11.2 — names this exact hazard: an attacker who registers a client can "intentionally send an erroneous authorization request, e.g., by using an invalid scope value, thus instructing the authorization server to redirect the user agent to its phishing site". The destination is still only ever a URI that client registered, so this is a phishing surface that costs an attacker a registration, not an open redirect. The precaution the section requires, authenticating the user first, is what `apiKeyMiddlewareRedirect` provides. - RFC 9700 §4.12 — a server redirecting a request that may carry credentials "MUST NOT use the HTTP 307 status code". 302, matching the success redirect beside it. - RFC 6749 §4.1.2.1 — `server_error` exists "because a 500 Internal Server Error HTTP status code cannot be returned to the client via an HTTP redirect". An unusable registered callback is the one case with nowhere to redirect, so it answers 500 on both verbs and logs the app and URL for an operator to correlate by. - Not yet: §1.4.1 still wants `scope` in the token response when the grant differs from the request. Tokens are untouched here, as in #28178, so that lands with enforcement. --- Split out of #28045 ([PLAT-479](https://linear.app/codercom/issue/PLAT-479)). Last of three. #28178 has merged, so this reviews against main. #28178 decided what the scope is. This PR is everything that tells someone about it. --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Steven Masley <Emyrk@users.noreply.github.com> |
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20a41c067e |
feat: reject secret creation and fix reporting for public clients (#28097)
**TL;DR** On top of #28047, closing the last two gaps in the stack split out of #27873. A public client can now register (#28046) and exchange a code (#28047), but the admin secrets API will still issue it a secret that authenticates nothing, and the registration responses still report an auth method the token endpoint will not accept. | PR | What it does | |---|---| | #27712 | Schema: `app_secret_id` becomes nullable and tokens gain an always-populated `app_id`, so ownership checks work without a secret row. | | #28041 | Accepts bare custom-scheme redirect URIs (`vscode://`, `cursor://`) that native apps actually register. | | #28043 | Derives and stores `client_type` (public vs confidential) from the requested `token_endpoint_auth_method`, and pins it across updates. | | #28046 | Registration issues no secret for a public client and returns no `client_secret`. | | #28047 | The token endpoint accepts the exchange without a `client_secret`. Discovery advertises `none`. | | **#28097 (this)** | The admin secrets API refuses to create a secret for a public client, and registration, read, and update report the auth method the token endpoint actually enforces. | A public client can only come into existence through dynamic client registration, which is off by default, so neither guard is reachable until DCR is enabled. **Where in the flow** - `POST /oauth2-provider/apps/{app}/secrets`, the admin secrets API. The rest of the secret lifecycle is untouched: `GET` and `DELETE` are unchanged, and a confidential app behaves exactly as before. - The three RFC 7591 and 7592 responses that carry `token_endpoint_auth_method`: registration (`POST`), read (`GET`), and update (`PUT`). Only what is reported changes; the stored column is left as the client sent it. - Authorize, token exchange, refresh, and revocation are untouched. **What it satisfies** - RFC 7591 §2: `none` means the client is public and "does not have a client secret", so the secrets API should not create one for it. - RFC 7591 §3.2.1: the server MUST return all registered metadata and MAY replace a requested value with a suitable one. Reporting the enforced method in place of a stored one that contradicts `client_type` is that substitution. - RFC 7592 §2.2: an update MUST include all metadata as returned by a previous registration, read, or update. Because clients echo back what Coder reports, reporting the enforced method is what lets a legacy row heal on the client's next `PUT`. - RFC 7591 §2 default: an app with no stored method reports `client_secret_basic`, which is both the RFC default and what `ApplyDefaults` substitutes on update. - OAuth 2.1 §3.2.1: the token endpoint enforces on `client_type`, so a reported method that disagrees with it tells a client to authenticate in a way the server will reject. --- - `CreateAppSecret` returns 400 for a public client before generating anything. The secret would authenticate nothing, since the token endpoint no longer checks one for a public client. Deleting it would be worse: `oauth2_provider_app_tokens.app_secret_id` is `ON DELETE CASCADE`, so removing a confidential app's secret takes its tokens with it, but a public client's tokens carry a NULL `app_secret_id` (#27712) and survive. An admin who deleted the secret would think they had cut off the client when they had not. - `reportedAuthMethod()` replaces the raw stored value in all three registration responses. It returns the stored method when it agrees with `client_type`, `none` for a public app, and `client_secret_basic` otherwise. - The rows that can disagree are clients registered before #28043 derived the type from the method: the method was stored as sent while the type was always `confidential`. Such a client holds a secret its exchange still requires, while `GET` reported `none` and told it to drop that secret. - The stored column is deliberately not rewritten, so the response can still differ from the row. That divergence is what a read-modify-write client resolves on its next update, and the test asserts the row keeps what the client sent. - Coverage: the secrets guard asserts the 400 and that no partial secret row was left behind. A table test walks `GET` then `PUT` over six stored-method and client-type pairs: the legacy mismatch in both resend shapes, the reverse mismatch that registration cannot produce but the function still handles, an empty stored method, and the single pair that already agrees and must be reported as stored. - Docs: the client type is fixed at registration and a type-changing update is rejected with `invalid_client_metadata` (behavior from #28043 that was never written down), plus what a legacy `none` client now sees. Refs https://linear.app/codercom/issue/ENG-3029/oauth2-support-public-client ## Manual Tests Verified by hand against a local dev deployment (`v2.36.3-devel+c85e4621ef`, dev Postgres), in addition to the automated suite. Both guards are reachable only through dynamic client registration, which was confirmed off by default on this deployment and enabled for the run. Two of the scenarios need a row where `client_type` and `token_endpoint_auth_method` disagree, which registration cannot produce since #28043 derives one from the other, so those rows were seeded by updating the method column directly on a purpose-built client. | # | Scenario | Result | |---|----------|--------| | 1 | Secrets API refuses a public client, with the guard's own message | Pass | | 2 | No partial secret row is left behind by the rejection | Pass | | 3 | A confidential app's secret create, list, and delete are unchanged | Pass | | 4 | Admin-created apps are always confidential, so the guard is unreachable there | Pass | | 5 | When stored method and client type agree, the stored value is reported unchanged | Pass | | 6 | A legacy confidential row storing `none` reports `client_secret_basic` | Pass | | 7 | The reported method is the one the token endpoint enforces, in both directions | Pass | | 8 | An update resending the stored value is accepted and leaves the row alone | Pass | | 9 | An update resending the reported value heals the row | Pass | | 10 | The reverse mismatch, a public row storing a secret method, reports `none` | Pass | | 11 | An empty or unrecognized stored method falls back to `client_secret_basic` | Pass | | 12 | Type-changing updates are rejected both ways, `client_secret_basic` to `client_secret_post` is allowed | Pass | | 13 | Regression sweep of the merged stack, discovery through revocation | Pass | | 14 | Every claim in the new docs paragraphs matches observed behavior | Pass | No correctness defects found. Commands and captured output for each scenario below. **Two notes for anyone re-running this.** The previous runbook for this stack asserts the opposite of scenario 12: it flips a confidential client to public with a `PUT` and records `200`. That was correct before #28043 pinned the client type. The `400` here is the fix, not a regression. Generate the PKCE verifier with enough entropy that stripping `=+/` still leaves 43 characters. The `openssl rand -base64 32 | tr -d "=+/" | cut -c -43` recipe yields 38 to 43, so most runs are rejected by the token endpoint under RFC 7636 section 4.1 with an error that looks unrelated. Same trap noted in #28045. <details> <summary>Shell helpers used throughout</summary> ```bash export BASE_URL=http://localhost:3000 export AUTH_HEADER="Coder-Session-Token: $(cat ./.coderv2/session)" export PGURL="postgres://coder@localhost:$(cat ./.coderv2/postgres/port)/coder?sslmode=disable&password=$(cat ./.coderv2/postgres/password)" # Enable DCR; both guards are unreachable without it. curl -s -X PUT "$BASE_URL/api/v2/oauth2-provider/settings" -H "$AUTH_HEADER" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"dynamic_client_registration_enabled": true}' # Print "HTTP <code>" then the body. show() { local out; out=$(curl -s -w '\n%{http_code}' "$@") echo "HTTP $(printf '%s\n' "$out" | tail -n1)" printf '%s\n' "$out" | sed '$d' | jq . 2>/dev/null || printf '%s\n' "$out" | sed '$d' } # $1=name, $2=auth method ("" to omit the field). register() { local body if [ -z "$2" ]; then body=$(jq -nc --arg n "$1" '{client_name:$n,redirect_uris:["http://localhost:9876/callback"]}') else body=$(jq -nc --arg n "$1" --arg m "$2" '{client_name:$n,redirect_uris:["http://localhost:9876/callback"],token_endpoint_auth_method:$m}') fi curl -s -X POST "$BASE_URL/oauth2/register" -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d "$body" } # The stored row, as opposed to what the API reports. stored() { psql "$PGURL" -At -c "select client_type || ' | ' || coalesce(token_endpoint_auth_method,'<NULL>') from oauth2_provider_apps where id = '$1';" } # 43 characters from the unreserved set, always. See the note above. gen_verifier() { openssl rand -base64 96 | tr -d "=+/\n" | cut -c -43; } challenge_for() { printf '%s' "$1" | openssl dgst -sha256 -binary | base64 | tr -d "=" | tr '+/' '-_'; } # Full PKCE authorize plus exchange. $1=client_id, $2=client_secret ("" for none). exchange() { local verifier challenge redirect code args verifier=$(gen_verifier); challenge=$(challenge_for "$verifier") redirect=$(curl -s -X POST \ "$BASE_URL/oauth2/authorize?client_id=$1&response_type=code&redirect_uri=http://localhost:9876/callback&state=$(openssl rand -hex 16)&code_challenge=$challenge&code_challenge_method=S256" \ -H "$AUTH_HEADER" -w '\n%{redirect_url}' -o /dev/null) code=$(printf '%s' "$redirect" | grep -oE 'code=[^&]+' | sed 's/code=//') args=(-d "grant_type=authorization_code" -d "code=$code" -d "client_id=$1" -d "redirect_uri=http://localhost:9876/callback" -d "code_verifier=$verifier") [ -n "$2" ] && args+=(-d "client_secret=$2") curl -s -X POST "$BASE_URL/oauth2/tokens" -H "Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded" "${args[@]}" } ``` </details> <details> <summary>1. Secrets API refuses a public client</summary> A bare non-`201` would also be produced by a request that failed on authentication, routing, or a malformed UUID before reaching the guard, so the status and the message are both asserted. ```bash PUB=$(register manual-28097-public none) PUB_ID=$(echo "$PUB" | jq -r '.client_id') stored "$PUB_ID" show -X POST "$BASE_URL/api/v2/oauth2-provider/apps/$PUB_ID/secrets" -H "$AUTH_HEADER" ``` ```text public | none HTTP 400 { "message": "Cannot create a client secret for a public OAuth2 app.", "detail": "Public clients authenticate with PKCE and have no client secret. The client type is fixed at registration, so register a new confidential client instead." } ``` The message is the guard's own, so execution reached `CreateAppSecret` and returned at the `IsPublic()` check. The detail points at registering a new confidential client, which scenario 12 confirms is the only remedy. </details> <details> <summary>2. No partial secret row is left behind</summary> The guard returns before `GenerateSecret()`, so nothing should exist at either layer. The count was already `0` at registration, and a confidential app is queried the same way as a control, so `0` is not merely what this query always returns. ```bash curl -s "$BASE_URL/api/v2/oauth2-provider/apps/$PUB_ID/secrets" -H "$AUTH_HEADER" | jq -c . psql "$PGURL" -At -c "select count(*) from oauth2_provider_app_secrets where app_id = '$PUB_ID';" psql "$PGURL" -At -c "select count(*) from oauth2_provider_app_secrets where app_id = '$CONF_ID';" ``` ```text [] 0 1 ``` </details> <details> <summary>3. A confidential app's secret lifecycle is unchanged</summary> ```bash CONF=$(register manual-28097-confidential "") CONF_ID=$(echo "$CONF" | jq -r '.client_id') show -X POST "$BASE_URL/api/v2/oauth2-provider/apps/$CONF_ID/secrets" -H "$AUTH_HEADER" curl -s "$BASE_URL/api/v2/oauth2-provider/apps/$CONF_ID/secrets" -H "$AUTH_HEADER" | jq -c '[.[].id]' curl -s -X DELETE "$BASE_URL/api/v2/oauth2-provider/apps/$CONF_ID/secrets/$SECRET_ID" \ -H "$AUTH_HEADER" -o /dev/null -w "delete: HTTP %{http_code}\n" ``` ```text HTTP 201 { "id": "da7a1029-47c4-435e-988a-557ffa4aeacf", "client_secret_full": "coder_POUtoElODM_<redacted>" } ["b2fc55b6-...","da7a1029-...","24f8f8c2-..."] delete: HTTP 204 ["b2fc55b6-...","da7a1029-..."] ``` Create, list, and delete all behave as before. The guard keys on `client_type` and nothing else on this path changed. Unrelated observation, not a finding against this PR: the listing returns two different `client_secret_truncated` formats. Secrets issued at registration are asterisk-padded (`***...TzqEOt`, from `createDisplaySecret`), while secrets issued through the admin API show the bare last six characters (`Rixs60`). Both write the same column and surface through the same field. Cosmetic and pre-existing, but a UI listing both kinds together would render them inconsistently. </details> <details> <summary>4. Admin-created apps are always confidential</summary> `postOAuth2ProviderApp` hardcodes the client type, so the guard is unreachable through the admin create path. ```bash ADMIN_APP=$(curl -s -X POST "$BASE_URL/api/v2/oauth2-provider/apps" -H "$AUTH_HEADER" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"name":"manual-28097-admin","callback_url":"http://localhost:9876/callback"}') ADMIN_ID=$(echo "$ADMIN_APP" | jq -r '.id') stored "$ADMIN_ID" show -X POST "$BASE_URL/api/v2/oauth2-provider/apps/$ADMIN_ID/secrets" -H "$AUTH_HEADER" ``` ```text confidential | client_secret_post HTTP 201 { "id": "a77ab276-ea74-4711-ba8b-955a8cb97951", "client_secret_full": "coder_eGlt04LhYg_<redacted>" } ``` Together with scenario 1 this brackets the guard: it fires for a dynamically registered public client and for nothing else. Note the admin API stores `client_secret_post`, not the RFC 7591 section 2 default, so every admin-created app is an agreement case for scenario 5. Such apps carry no registration access token, so they cannot reach the RFC 7592 endpoints where the reporting change applies at all. </details> <details> <summary>5. Agreement cases report the stored value unchanged</summary> The `client_secret_post` case is the one that matters. An implementation that substituted the type default on every call would still pass the public case, since `none` is the public default, but would rewrite this client to `client_secret_basic` and tell it to send its secret in the wrong place. ```bash curl -s "$BASE_URL/oauth2/clients/$PUB_ID" -H "Authorization: Bearer $PUB_RAT" \ | jq -c '{reported: .token_endpoint_auth_method}' POST_REG=$(register manual-28097-post client_secret_post) POST_ID=$(echo "$POST_REG" | jq -r '.client_id') echo "$POST_REG" | jq -c '{reported_on_register: .token_endpoint_auth_method}' curl -s "$BASE_URL/oauth2/clients/$POST_ID" -H "Authorization: Bearer $POST_RAT" \ | jq -c '.token_endpoint_auth_method' stored "$POST_ID" ``` ```text {"reported":"none"} {"reported_on_register":"client_secret_post"} "client_secret_post" confidential | client_secret_post ``` Registration and read both report the stored value. The update site is covered by scenarios 8 and 9. </details> <details> <summary>6. A legacy confidential row storing `none` reports `client_secret_basic`</summary> Seeded from a real confidential client so it genuinely holds the secret its exchange requires, with only the method column rewritten. This is the pre-#28043 shape and cannot be produced through the API any more. ```bash LEGACY=$(register manual-28097-legacy "") LEGACY_ID=$(echo "$LEGACY" | jq -r '.client_id') LEGACY_SECRET=$(echo "$LEGACY" | jq -r '.client_secret') stored "$LEGACY_ID" psql "$PGURL" -c "update oauth2_provider_apps set token_endpoint_auth_method = 'none' where id = '$LEGACY_ID';" stored "$LEGACY_ID" psql "$PGURL" -At -c "select count(*) from oauth2_provider_app_secrets where app_id = '$LEGACY_ID';" curl -s "$BASE_URL/oauth2/clients/$LEGACY_ID" -H "Authorization: Bearer $LEGACY_RAT" \ | jq -c '{reported: .token_endpoint_auth_method}' stored "$LEGACY_ID" ``` ```text confidential | client_secret_basic UPDATE 1 confidential | none 1 {"reported":"client_secret_basic"} confidential | none ``` The response substitutes and the row is deliberately not rewritten. A read has no side effects. </details> <details> <summary>7. The reported method is the one actually enforced</summary> The token endpoint enforces on `client_type`, which is still confidential, so the secret is required regardless of what the method column says. ```bash exchange "$LEGACY_ID" "$LEGACY_SECRET" | jq -c '{has_access: has("access_token"), error, error_description}' exchange "$LEGACY_ID" "" | jq -c '{has_access: has("access_token"), error, error_description}' ``` ```text {"has_access":true,"error":null,"error_description":null} {"has_access":false,"error":"invalid_request","error_description":"Missing required parameter: client_secret"} ``` The second line is the pre-fix breakage reproduced. A client that read `"token_endpoint_auth_method": "none"` from `GET` and dropped its secret accordingly, which is what RFC 7592 tells it to do, would have hit exactly this on its next exchange. The old response was not internally inconsistent, it was actionable and wrong. Scenario 10 shows the same property in the opposite direction. </details> <details> <summary>8. An update resending the stored value is accepted and changes nothing</summary> ```bash show -X PUT "$BASE_URL/oauth2/clients/$LEGACY_ID" \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $LEGACY_RAT" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"client_name":"manual-28097-legacy","redirect_uris":["http://localhost:9876/callback"],"token_endpoint_auth_method":"none"}' stored "$LEGACY_ID" ``` ```text HTTP 200 "token_endpoint_auth_method": "client_secret_basic", confidential | none ``` Three things at once. The update is accepted, which is why the type-change guard requires the auth method to actually change: the requested `none` implies a public client while the row is confidential, so a guard keyed on the type mismatch alone would reject this and lock a legacy client out of managing its own registration. The `PUT` reports the same substituted value as the `GET`, covering the third call site. The row keeps what the client sent, so the divergence persists until scenario 9. </details> <details> <summary>9. An update resending the reported value heals the row</summary> ```bash show -X PUT "$BASE_URL/oauth2/clients/$LEGACY_ID" \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $LEGACY_RAT" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"client_name":"manual-28097-legacy","redirect_uris":["http://localhost:9876/callback"],"token_endpoint_auth_method":"client_secret_basic"}' stored "$LEGACY_ID" curl -s "$BASE_URL/oauth2/clients/$LEGACY_ID" -H "Authorization: Bearer $LEGACY_RAT" \ | jq -c '{reported: .token_endpoint_auth_method}' exchange "$LEGACY_ID" "$LEGACY_SECRET" | jq -c '{has_access: has("access_token")}' ``` ```text HTTP 200 "token_endpoint_auth_method": "client_secret_basic", confidential | client_secret_basic {"reported":"client_secret_basic"} {"has_access":true} ``` The row healed through an ordinary read-modify-write cycle, with no migration, backfill, or admin action. That works only because scenario 8 keeps the door open and this response gives the client a correct value to echo back; remove either and the row stays inconsistent indefinitely. </details> <details> <summary>10. The reverse mismatch reports `none`</summary> Registration cannot produce this direction either, but `reportedAuthMethod` branches on the general disagreement rather than the one shape known to exist, so it is covered. ```bash REVERSE=$(register manual-28097-reverse none) REVERSE_ID=$(echo "$REVERSE" | jq -r '.client_id') psql "$PGURL" -c "update oauth2_provider_apps set token_endpoint_auth_method = 'client_secret_basic' where id = '$REVERSE_ID';" stored "$REVERSE_ID" curl -s "$BASE_URL/oauth2/clients/$REVERSE_ID" -H "Authorization: Bearer $REVERSE_RAT" \ | jq -c '{reported: .token_endpoint_auth_method}' exchange "$REVERSE_ID" "" | jq -c '{has_access: has("access_token"), error}' ``` ```text public | client_secret_basic {"reported":"none"} {"has_access":true,"error":null} ``` This client has no secret row at all and the token endpoint does not ask for one, so `none` is what the response should say. Reporting the stored `client_secret_basic` would have instructed it to send a secret that does not exist. Both resend shapes behave symmetrically with scenarios 8 and 9: ```text resend stored (client_secret_basic) -> reported "none", row unchanged resend reported (none) -> reported "none", row now public | none ``` </details> <details> <summary>11. Empty or unrecognized stored methods fall back to the default</summary> `NULL` and `''` are indistinguishable once read into `sql.NullString`. A third case was added because the function gates on validity rather than emptiness. ```bash for v in "null" "''" "'private_key_jwt'"; do psql "$PGURL" -At -c "update oauth2_provider_apps set token_endpoint_auth_method = $v where id = '$CONF_ID';" stored "$CONF_ID" curl -s "$BASE_URL/oauth2/clients/$CONF_ID" -H "Authorization: Bearer $CONF_RAT" \ | jq -c '.token_endpoint_auth_method' done ``` ```text confidential | <NULL> "client_secret_basic" confidential | "client_secret_basic" confidential | private_key_jwt "client_secret_basic" ``` `private_key_jwt` is a real RFC 7591 method that Coder does not implement. Reporting it back would advertise an authentication scheme the token endpoint cannot honor, which is the same class of problem as the legacy `none` report in scenario 7. </details> <details> <summary>12. Type-changing updates are rejected both ways</summary> ```bash show -X PUT "$BASE_URL/oauth2/clients/$CONF_ID" \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $CONF_RAT" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"client_name":"manual-28097-confidential","redirect_uris":["http://localhost:9876/callback"],"token_endpoint_auth_method":"none"}' stored "$CONF_ID" show -X PUT "$BASE_URL/oauth2/clients/$PUB_ID" \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $PUB_RAT" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"client_name":"manual-28097-public","redirect_uris":["http://localhost:9876/callback"],"token_endpoint_auth_method":"client_secret_basic"}' stored "$PUB_ID" show -X PUT "$BASE_URL/oauth2/clients/$CONF_ID" \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $CONF_RAT" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"client_name":"manual-28097-confidential","redirect_uris":["http://localhost:9876/callback"],"token_endpoint_auth_method":"client_secret_post"}' stored "$CONF_ID" ``` ```text HTTP 400 { "error": "invalid_client_metadata", "error_description": "token_endpoint_auth_method cannot move an existing client between public and confidential (stored \"client_secret_basic\", requested \"none\"); the client type is fixed at registration, so register a new client instead" } confidential | client_secret_basic HTTP 400 { "error": "invalid_client_metadata", "error_description": "token_endpoint_auth_method cannot move an existing client between public and confidential (stored \"none\", requested \"client_secret_basic\"); the client type is fixed at registration, so register a new client instead" } public | none HTTP 200 "token_endpoint_auth_method": "client_secret_post", confidential | client_secret_post ``` Both rejections leave the row and its secrets untouched. A partial application would be the dangerous outcome here, a client left confidential while its caller believes it went public. The third case is the control. Two `400`s alone would be equally consistent with a guard that rejects every `token_endpoint_auth_method` change, a considerably more disruptive rule than the documented one. The `200` pins the guard to the derived client type rather than the method string. The second case is also what backs scenario 1. If public to confidential were permitted, the workaround to a refused secret request would be to flip the type and ask again. The two guards close that loop, which is why the same remedy appears in both error messages. </details> <details> <summary>13. Regression sweep of the merged stack</summary> Nothing here is new in this PR, but the guards sit on top of it. ```text discovery token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported : ["client_secret_basic","client_secret_post","none"] public registration, client_secret key present : false confidential registration, secret issued : true, method defaulted to client_secret_basic PKCE-only exchange, no client_secret sent : access + refresh issued access token against /api/v2/users/me : 200 token row app_id / app_secret_id : populated / NULL RFC 7009 revoke of own refresh token : 200, access token then 401 authorized-apps listing while a token is live : [{"name":"manual-28097-public"}] bulk DELETE /oauth2/tokens : 204, listing then [] ``` The NULL `app_secret_id` is what makes the secrets guard necessary. That column is `ON DELETE CASCADE`, so deleting a confidential app's secret takes its tokens with it, while a public client's tokens would survive. An admin who deleted such a secret would believe access was cut off when it was not. PKCE failure modes were checked separately, since the token endpoint distinguishes two the previous runbook treated as one: ```text verifier omitted : invalid_request, RFC 7636 section 4.1 bounds well-formed 43 chars but wrong : invalid_grant, "The PKCE code verifier is invalid" correct verifier, replaying that code: invalid_grant, "invalid or expired" ``` The third confirms the failed check destroys the code, so a leaked code cannot absorb repeated verifier guesses. </details> <details> <summary>14. The new docs paragraphs match observed behavior</summary> `pnpm run lint-docs` reports 0 errors across 501 files, `pnpm run format-docs` rewrites nothing, and Vale reports 0 errors with 2 warnings, both on pre-existing gerund headings that the same file on `main` also produces. The new prose is one sentence per line. | Documented claim | Verified by | |---|---| | A client's type is fixed when it registers | 12 | | A type-changing update is rejected with `invalid_client_metadata` | 12, both directions | | The client either holds a secret that would stop being required or has none and no way to be issued one | 12 (2 secrets), 1 and 12 (0 secrets, issuance refused) | | Switching between `client_secret_basic` and `client_secret_post` is allowed | 12 | | To change type, register a new client | matches the remedy in both errors and in scenario 1's detail | | Legacy `none` clients are stored as confidential and still require their `client_secret` | 6, 7 | | Coder reports `client_secret_basic` for those clients | 6 | | So that what it reports matches what it enforces | 7, both directions | | The mismatch clears itself the next time the client updates its registration | 9 | One wording note. Scenario 8 shows the mismatch does not clear on an update that resends the stored value, so strictly it clears on the next update carrying the reported value. A read-modify-write client, which is what RFC 7592 section 2.2 prescribes, always carries the reported value, so the sentence holds for the client it describes. A client that hardcodes its own metadata would not self-heal, but it would also not be following RFC 7592. </details> <details> <summary>Cleanup</summary> ```bash for id in "$PUB_ID" "$CONF_ID" "$POST_ID" "$LEGACY_ID" "$REVERSE_ID" "$ADMIN_ID"; do curl -s -X DELETE "$BASE_URL/api/v2/oauth2-provider/apps/$id" -H "$AUTH_HEADER" \ -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" done curl -s -X PUT "$BASE_URL/api/v2/oauth2-provider/settings" -H "$AUTH_HEADER" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{"dynamic_client_registration_enabled": false}' show -X POST "$BASE_URL/oauth2/register" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"client_name":"should-fail","redirect_uris":["http://localhost:9876/callback"],"token_endpoint_auth_method":"none"}' ``` ```text 204 (x6) {"dynamic_client_registration_enabled":false} HTTP 403 {"error":"invalid_request","error_description":"Dynamic client registration is disabled on this deployment"} ``` All six test apps deleted with no orphaned secret or token rows. Both seeded rows had already healed to a consistent state before deletion. DCR is back off, confirmed by a registration attempt rather than by reading the flag back. </details> |
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72872c4f2c |
docs(docs/admin/templates/extending-templates): document module caching and the disable toggle (#28800)
Coder caches resolved Terraform modules per template version and reuses
them across workspace builds instead of re-fetching from origin. This is
enabled by default and can be disabled per-template with
`disable_module_cache`, but neither the caching behavior nor the toggle
were documented anywhere outside the generated API reference.
Documents module caching in the Terraform Modules guide (what gets
cached, the 20MB archive limit, and how to disable it), and cross-links
it from the existing "Module not loaded" troubleshooting entry in the
Dynamic Parameters doc, since both describe the same module archive.
Also documents a second cause of "Module not loaded" warnings: template
versions published before Coder started archiving modules for Dynamic
Parameters have no cache at all, so every module in the template shows
the warning in the workspace creation form. Workspace builds still
succeed, since Terraform fetches modules from their original sources
during the build regardless of the cache; only the form's ability to
evaluate module-backed parameter values is affected. Publishing a new
template version regenerates the archive and resolves it.
<details>
<summary>Verification notes</summary>
Behavior confirmed by reading the source, not assumed:
- `coderd/provisionerdserver/provisionerdserver.go`: skips fetching
`CachedModuleFiles` for a workspace build when
`template.DisableModuleCache` is set. The same file's comment ("Older
templates (before dynamic parameters) will not have cached module
files") confirms why some template versions have no archive at all.
- `provisioner/terraform/provision.go` + `provisionerd/runner/init.go`:
the cached archive is extracted into `.terraform/modules` before
`terraform init` runs, so modules already present are not re-downloaded;
anything missing (e.g. skipped for size, or no archive at all) is still
fetched normally by Terraform during the build.
- `provisioner/terraform/modules.go`: `MaximumModuleArchiveSize` = 20MB.
-
`coderd/database/migrations/000416_workspace_module_reuse_toggle.up.sql`:
`disable_module_cache` defaults to `false`, i.e. caching is on by
default.
- `site/.../TemplateSettingsForm.tsx`: exact dashboard label and warning
copy reused verbatim in the doc.
</details>
> Generated by Coder Agents
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9be61a0c65 |
feat: accept PKCE-only token exchange for public clients (#28047)
**TL;DR** Last of the stack, split out of #27873, that makes Coder usable by public OAuth2 clients (CLIs, IDE plugins, MCP clients), which cannot hold a secret and authenticate with PKCE alone. | PR | What it does | |---|---| | #27712 | Schema: `app_secret_id` becomes nullable and tokens gain an always-populated `app_id`, so ownership checks work without a secret row. | | #28041 | Accepts bare custom-scheme redirect URIs (`vscode://`, `cursor://`) that native apps actually register. | | #28043 | Derives and stores `client_type` (public vs confidential) from the requested `token_endpoint_auth_method`, and pins it across updates. | | #28046 | Registration issues no secret for a public client and returns no `client_secret`. | | **#28047 (this)** | The token endpoint accepts the exchange without a `client_secret`, so a public client can finally get a token. Discovery now advertises `none`. | Each of the earlier PRs is inert on its own: until this one, a registered public client still could not complete a flow. Dynamic client registration is off by default, so nothing here is user-visible until it is enabled. **Where in the flow** - Token endpoint only — the `authorization_code` exchange. Authorize, consent, and code issuance are untouched. - Refresh and revocation come along for free: both already bind by app_id, so a secretless token row works as-is. - Discovery starts advertising `none`. **What it satisfies** - OAuth 2.1 §3.2.1 — only *confidential* clients must authenticate at the token endpoint. A public client is no longer rejected for a missing secret. - OAuth 2.1 §4.1.3 — for a public client the server must instead ensure the code was issued to the request's client_id. That check already existed; here it becomes the sole binding. - OAuth 2.1 §4.1.3 — client_id is required when the client does not authenticate, and a code yields a token at most once: a failed PKCE comparison consumes the code, so a leaked one cannot be brute-forced. - OAuth 2.1 §2.1 + RFC 7591 §2 — `none` means public client with no secret. The type is derived at registration (#28043) and read here. - RFC 7636 §4.1 / §4.6 — a malformed verifier is `invalid_request`, a wrong one `invalid_grant`. PKCE was already mandatory for every code flow, so public clients inherit it. - RFC 8414 §2 — advertised auth methods now match what the token endpoint actually accepts. - RFC 7009 — a cross-app revoke of a public client's token still returns 200 without revoking. --- - The token endpoint stops requiring client_secret for a public client, in both the presence check and secret validation. PKCE was already mandatory for every authorization_code flow, so public clients inherit it with no new validation code. - The code ownership check (dbCode.AppID != app.ID) becomes the only binding between the exchange and the app named by client_id for a public client, where it was defense in depth for confidential ones. Retained, now covered with a public client on both sides. - Public client tokens carry a NULL app_secret_id rather than referencing a secret row that does not exist. Refresh and revocation already verify ownership via app_id, so they change only comments and coverage. - Discovery advertises `none` now that the token endpoint honors it. - Valid() derives from the single canonical auth method list, so what registration accepts and what discovery advertises cannot disagree. - Swagger marks client_secret confidential-only. Refs https://linear.app/codercom/issue/ENG-3029/oauth2-support-public-client |
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c73f34c35d |
feat: honor the deployment registry mirror in template builder bases (#28727)
## Summary Threads the deployment's configured module registry (`CODER_TEMPLATE_BUILDER_REGISTRY_URL`) into template-builder **base** rendering, so a base that embeds a catalog module (e.g. the quickstart base's `git-clone`) resolves its `source` through a registry mirror the same way wizard-composed modules already do. Previously base-embedded module sources hardcoded `registry.coder.com`, so on a mirror/private-registry deployment a base-embedded module reached the public registry while wizard modules used the mirror. Implements [DOCS-610](https://linear.app/codercom/issue/DOCS-610). ## What changed * `BaseRenderContext.RegistryBase` (new field), mirroring `ModuleRenderContext.RegistryBase`. `Compose` threads the deployment registry through `renderBase` into the base render context, and the four hardcoded base module sources (`quickstart` git-clone, `azure-linux`/`gcp-linux`/`gcp-windows` region modules) now use `{{ .RegistryBase }}`. Because the value defaults back to `registry.coder.com`, rendered sources stay byte-identical; the only golden change is the removal of the now-stale quickstart "follow-up" note. * **Boot-time validation.** `codersdk.ValidateTemplateBuilderRegistryURL` runs in `DeploymentValues.Validate()`, gated on the builder being enabled, matching the chat-hook precedent. A malformed value fails at server start naming the option, instead of surfacing as a per-request error to a template author who cannot fix it. It uses `net/url` in authority form to reject a scheme, path, query, fragment, trailing slash, or credentials and accept a bare `host[:port]`; it does not canonicalize the host. * `Compose` **trusts the validated value**, defaulting an unset one and defensively rejecting a malformed one for direct callers that bypass boot. ## Tests * `codersdk`: validator accept/reject matrix (incl. credentials-without-echo) and a `DeploymentValues.Validate` boundary test with a disabled-skips-validation case. * `templatebuilder`: a base honors the mirror and falls back to the default when unset, plus a defensive-reject case; existing compose tests updated to bare-host registry values. <details><summary>Design decision log</summary> This PR is a deliberately minimal reimplementation of the [DOCS-610](https://linear.app/codercom/issue/DOCS-610/template-builder-base-embedded-modules-should-honor-the-deployment) scope, started fresh from `main` rather than carrying forward an earlier, larger draft (coder/coder#28480). Key decisions: * **Scope kept to the ticket.** The ticket's fix is three bullets: add a registry field to `BaseRenderContext`, thread the deployment `RegistryURL` through `Compose` -> `renderBase`, and use it in base module sources. Independent hardening explored in the earlier draft was dropped as out of scope: `terraform-svchost`-based IDN/punycode/port canonicalization, a rendered-HCL backstop with a 500 mapping, and HCL module-source extraction helpers. Telemetry misclassification of mirror modules is tracked separately ([DOCS-712](https://linear.app/codercom/issue/DOCS-712/telemetry-misclassifies-registry-mirror-modules-as-non-coder)) and is not addressed here. * **Default lives in the render layer.** `templatebuilder.DefaultRegistryBase` holds the fallback host; `codersdk` keeps its own option-default literal. An earlier version exported the constant from `codersdk`, which only emitted a dead `typesGenerated.ts` entry that nothing in the frontend consumed, so it was moved out. The `codersdk` validator is a function, so it generates no TS type. * **Validate at the config boundary, fail fast.** The repo convention is to hard-fail structurally invalid config in `DeploymentValues.Validate()` (access URL, OAuth lifetimes, chat hook URL) and to warn only for functional-but-risky settings. A malformed registry host is structurally invalid, so it fails at boot. This also puts the error in front of the admin who set it, rather than a template author hitting a per-request error they cannot fix. * `net/url`**, not a regex.** The codebase validates identifiers/names with regexes but host/URL-shaped config with `url.Parse` (chat hook URL, OAuth redirect URIs, AI provider base URL). This value is host-shaped, so it follows that convention. `url.Parse("//" + v)` with `u.Host == v` rejects a scheme/path/query/fragment/trailing-slash in one check. </details> > This PR was created with AI assistance (Coder Agents). |
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d6b67e8e31 |
feat: enforce SSRF protection for MCP config-directed traffic (#28242)
Routes all MCP config-directed traffic from coderd and chatd through a shared SSRF-protected HTTP client, now that organization admins, not only deployment admins, control MCP server URLs (#27942 and its stack below). ## Summary - Uses the [`coder/safedial`](https://github.com/coder/safedial) library: it blocks private and special-purpose destinations at dial time (validating resolved addresses at connection time so DNS rebinding cannot bypass the check) and rejects cross-origin redirects. - Covers the complete traffic surface: OAuth2 discovery, dynamic client registration, code exchange, token refresh, revocation, and runtime MCP connections from chatd. - Deployments that intentionally host internal MCP servers opt in via the new `--mcp-allowed-private-cidrs` (`CODER_MCP_ALLOWED_PRIVATE_CIDRS`) option. - Includes the deployment configuration surface, generated docs, CLI goldens, TypeScript types, and regression coverage for each traffic path. ## Merge window This protection originally lived inside #27942 and was split out to keep that diff reviewable. Until this PR lands, the stack below ships with only main's existing discovery IP-range guard (`CODER_MCP_OAUTH2_DISCOVERY_ALLOWED_IP_RANGES`), while org admins can already point MCP configs at arbitrary URLs. This PR should merge promptly after the stack below it. Top of the MCP org-separation stack (CODAGT-711 -> CODAGT-717 audit -> CODAGT-712 ACLs -> CODAGT-806 token RBAC -> CODAGT-714 org picker -> this PR). > Mux (AI agent) authored this PR on Mike's behalf. <!-- mux-attribution: model=claude-fable-5 thinking=high --> |
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8bf271c503 |
feat: add Prometheus metrics for the usage publisher (#28368)
The Tallyman usage publisher (`enterprise/coderd/usage/publisher.go`)
had no metrics; failures were only visible in logs and the
`usage_events.failure_message` column.
This adds five metrics under `coderd_usage_events_*`:
| Metric | Type | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
| `publish_results_total{result, event_type}` | counter | Per-event
outcomes from real Tallyman responses (`accepted`,
`rejected_temporarily`, `rejected_permanently`; events missing from the
response count as temporary) |
| `publish_send_errors_total` | counter | Ingest requests that failed
entirely (HTTP error, non-200, decode error), one per request |
| `pending` | gauge | Unpublished events still inside the 30-day
publishing window |
| `pending_oldest_age_seconds` | gauge | Age of the oldest pending event
(0 when none) |
| `expired` | gauge | Unpublished events older than 30 days that will
never be published |
Send errors and per-event results never double-count: when a request
fails, the publisher fakes an all-temporarily-rejected response for the
DB update, but only `publish_send_errors_total` increments, so
`publish_results_total` reflects only real Tallyman verdicts.
The gauges are backed by a new read-only `GetUsageEventsStats` query
(authorized as `ActionRead` on `ResourceUsageEvent`) and refreshed from
the publish loop after each attempt, so they update roughly every 17
minutes.
Metrics are created with `promauto.With(reg)` where the registerer
defaults to nil, so existing callers and tests need no changes;
`enterprise/cli/server.go` wires in the deployment's
`PrometheusRegistry` via the new `PublisherWithPrometheusRegisterer`
option.
Closes
https://linear.app/codercom/issue/CODAGT-833/e3-prometheus-metrics-for-the-usage-publisher
---------
Co-authored-by: Mathias Fredriksson <mafredri@gmail.com>
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bc77c40296 |
docs: add front-matter titles to mechanical and no-H1 pages (Phase 3) (#28030)
## Summary **Batch A of Phase 3** of the H1 → front-matter migration (`DOCS-484`; parent `DOCS-477`). Adds a front-matter `title` to every navigable docs page whose title can be migrated **mechanically**, with no editorial judgment. This is the content step that Phase 1 (renderers prefer front-matter title, `DOCS-482`) and Phase 2 (tooling + generators front-matter-aware, `DOCS-483`) unblocked. Both are merged; coder.com #964/#974 are merged and live. **Rendered no-op.** The renderers already resolve the page title from the manifest and hide the leading body H1 (Phase 1), so no page changes visually. This just moves the title into front matter where Fumadocs and the migrated tooling can read it. ## What's in this batch Dry-run on `main` (464 navigable pages) splits into: | category | count | this PR | |----------|-------|---------| | already has front-matter title (Reference, from Phase 2 generators) | 196 | skipped (idempotent) | | **mechanical** — leading body H1 equals the manifest label | 138 | ✅ add front-matter `title`, drop the duplicate H1 | | **no body H1** — renders under the manifest label only | 4 | ✅ add front-matter `title` only | | **mismatch** — body H1 differs from the manifest label | 126 | ⏭️ deferred (needs an editorial decision, see below) | 142 files changed, all under `docs/`. ## Deliberately out of scope: the 126 mismatches Pages where the body H1 is richer than the short sidebar label (e.g. label **Modules** / H1 *Contributing modules*, label **Install** / H1 *Installing Coder*) need a canonical-title decision, not a script. A few even look like the body H1 is the redundant one (`install/cli.md` and `install/index.md` both carry the H1 *Installing Coder*). These will land in follow-up batches **by nav section** once the policy is set, so each gets real review. ## Verification AI was the primary author of this PR (see disclosure below); per the [AI Contribution Guidelines](https://coder.com/docs/about/contributing/AI_CONTRIBUTING) here is the manual verification. - Every added front-matter block parses as YAML and its `title` round-trips to the manifest label (checked programmatically across all 142 files). - Every removed line is a leading `# H1` that equalled the manifest title; no body prose was reflowed. Front matter is correctly hoisted above pre-existing `<!-- markdownlint-disable -->` comments on the two pages that had them. - `pnpm check-docs` (markdownlint-cli2 + table formatter) passes on the changed set: `Summary: 0 error(s)`. `MD041` stays off (re-enabled in Phase 4); `MD025` is not tripped because the duplicate body H1s are removed. ``` $ pnpm exec markdownlint-cli2 $(git diff --name-only origin/main) Linting: 142 file(s) Summary: 0 error(s) ``` Linear: DOCS-484 > This PR was created with AI assistance (Coder Agents). |
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47a77016c4 |
feat(docs/.style): enable Coder.SelectClick, use "select" over "click" (#28599)
Adds a Vale rule enforcing the existing "select, not click" style
guidance: "click" assumes the reader has a mouse, and touch, keyboard,
and assistive-technology users don't click.
`Coder.SelectClick` (warning severity) flags
`click`/`clicks`/`clicked`/`clicking` in prose, exempting:
- Literal mouse-button phrasing (`left-click`, `right-click`,
`middle-click`, `mouse click`, and combinations) — these name an actual
mouse action with no device-agnostic equivalent.
- `one-click`/`single-click` as a compound feature descriptor
("one-click install").
Reworded every existing instructional "click" in `docs/` to the matching
`select` form (`select`/`selects`/`selections`/`selected`/`selecting`)
so the rule ships with a clean baseline, per this repo's Vale-rule
doctrine.
Left alone, deliberately: two generated API reference pages
(`docs/reference/api/enterprise.md`, `schemas.md`) use "click" as an
analytics-event noun, tied to a Go source doc comment and an operation
ID (`report-a-premium-paywall-click`). Fixing those means editing
generated code and an API operation ID, which is out of scope for a
docs-style PR — see the rule's own comments for the reasoning. That
leaves 2 non-zero-baseline findings for this rule.
---
🤖 Built with AI assistance.
---------
Co-authored-by: Ian Evans <5760366+ianjevans@users.noreply.github.com>
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f208fc0c83 |
refactor: rename edit_files wire type to old_text/new_text (#28467)
The schema has advertised old_text/new_text since #25658, but the shared wire type still encoded search/replace. Decode accepts the deprecated keys only when both new fields are empty, through the pre-rename tags, so old coderd and cached MCP schemas keep working. Marshal emits both key sets so old agents keep working after a coderd upgrade. Both shims are removed in the first release after Coder Agents GA (2026-09). The Go field rename is a deliberate source break: FileEdit carries no codersdk stability guarantee. Fixes CODAGT-523 Refs CODAGT-483 |
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c9fc5b7ea1 |
fix: canonicalize API key scope aliases at ingress (#28322)
`rbac.IsExternalScope` accepts `all` and `application_connect`, neither
of which is an `api_key_scope` enum member. The plural `Scopes` field
stored the name as given, so `{"scopes":["all"]}` passed validation and
then 500'd inside `apikey.Generate` with `invalid API key scope: "all"`.
Reachable from `coder tokens create --scope all`, from the spellings
`docs/admin/users/sessions-tokens.md` taught, and from the `codersdk`
constants exported for exactly this purpose.
- Canonicalize inside `apikey.Generate`, in the loop that already
validates each name. One statement covers every caller and all three
input paths: plural `Scopes`, deprecated singular `Scope`, and the
default. Replaces two open-coded switches and the handler's own
per-element copy, so one place decides the stored spelling and the
handler only decides what may be requested.
- Deduplicate in the same pass. An alias and its canonical spelling are
two names going in and one name in the column.
- `ExternalScopeNames()` lists every name `IsExternalScope` accepts,
instead of dropping catalog entries that fail to parse. A curated entry
that cannot be stored used to pass every test and 500 at runtime; it now
fails two.
- Split the 400. A misspelled name and an internal `api_key_scope`
member need different words, since no re-spelling makes the second
requestable. Both rejection sites share one helper that names the case
and links the docs.
- Add reject-path tests for `not_a_real_scope` and `debug_info:read`.
The second is a valid enum member the rbac catalog treats as internal,
so before this both handler guards could be deleted with the suite still
green. A further case pins that plural `Scopes` wins when a caller sets
both fields.
- `TestExternalScopesAreStorable` pins the class rather than the two
known instances: every public rbac scope name must be storable.
`coderd/rbac` cannot assert this itself, since `database` imports `rbac`
and not the reverse.
- Docs use the canonical spellings, link the `codersdk.APIKeyScope`
schema, and say which scopes a token cannot request.
Egress is unchanged: `convertAPIKey` still derives a legacy singular
name on the way out. `ExternalScopeNames()` returns the same 57 names as
before, and `codersdk/apikey_scopes_gen.go` regenerates identically.
`rbac.CanonicalScopeName` merged with #28167, so this applies to `main`
and reviews on its own. The OAuth2 provider ignores scopes entirely
today (`authorize.go:237`, `tokens.go:377`, `tokens.go:520`), so it is
unaffected until those TODOs resolve.
Deferred from review: PLAT-528, PLAT-529, PLAT-530, and PLAT-532.
PLAT-532 covers `{"scopes":[]}` and `{"allow_list":[]}` defaulting open,
which predates this PR.
---------
Co-authored-by: McKayla はな <mckayla@hey.com>
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895c5c77a1 | feat: add a template parameter settings page (#27559) | ||
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29995c9ef8 | feat: add a per-template workspace rename setting (#27558) | ||
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26de6140fb | feat: add flag to disable workspace agent context sync (#28522) | ||
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76962273d8 |
feat: add coder organizations edit for default member roles (#28227)
`default_org_member_roles` was only settable through Terraform or a raw
`PATCH /api/v2/organizations/{organization}`. This adds a CLI
equivalent.
```console
coder organizations edit --org acme --default-org-member-roles organization-workspace-access,organization-template-admin
coder organizations edit --org acme --default-org-member-roles "" # grant no roles
```
- The flag replaces the organization's current list rather than adding
to it. It accepts a comma-separated list, may be repeated, and
de-duplicates. An empty value removes every role.
- Removing a role prompts for confirmation, listing the roles being
removed, unless `-y` is passed. Adding roles applies without a prompt.
- The resulting set is printed, so no follow-up command is needed to
confirm what was applied.
- The organization is chosen with `-O/--org` or `$CODER_ORGANIZATION`,
and is implicit when the caller belongs to exactly one organization.
The org update endpoint is behind `FeatureMultipleOrganizations`, so the
command is enterprise/premium only. Non-built-in roles are rejected by
the server, and `dbauthz` already prevents a caller from setting a
default they could not assign to a member individually.
<details>
<summary>Implementation notes</summary>
## Shape
`codersdk.UpdateOrganizationRequest.DefaultOrgMemberRoles *[]string` and
the enterprise `patchOrganization` handler already existed; only the CLI
was missing, and nothing in `cli/` called `UpdateOrganization` at all.
No server or SDK changes are needed.
`organizations edit` follows the partial-update pattern of `coder groups
edit`: check `ParsedFlags().Changed(...)`, populate only the fields the
user set, and leave the rest nil so the handler preserves them. Passing
no flags is an error.
Two earlier shapes were tried and dropped:
- **A `default-org-member-roles` entry in the `organizations settings`
registry.** Every sibling entry unmarshals an SDK type that maps 1:1 to
a dedicated endpoint; this field has no such endpoint. Reusing
`UpdateOrganizationRequest` for the piped JSON meant a stray `name`
field could rename the org, and the documented `show > file`, edit, `set
< file` workflow failed on the default organization, whose name is
reserved.
- **A `--default-org-member-roles` flag on `organizations create`.**
`create` cannot set display name, description, or icon either, so a
roles-only flag there is asymmetric. It would also require
`CreateOrganizationRequest` to grow the field plus server-side
validation.
## Known sharp edge
`serpent.StringArray` resets its slice when any flag value is empty, so
`--default-org-member-roles a --default-org-member-roles ""` clears the
list rather than keeping `a`. This is pinned by a test and called out in
a code comment. The confirmation prompt catches it interactively; a
script passing `-y` would not. A custom flag value that ignores empty
occurrences was prototyped and reverted as more machinery than the
behavior warranted.
## Validation
Manually verified against a local dev deployment with a premium license:
setting, adding, clearing, prompt accepted and declined, duplicate and
whitespace handling, invalid role rejection, and a plain member being
denied. Confirmed with `/authcheck` that a member loses workspace-create
access when the roles are cleared and regains it when restored, and that
the change is recorded in the audit log.
## Follow-ups worth considering
- `--name`, `--display-name`, `--description`, and `--icon` on
`organizations edit`; all already exist on `UpdateOrganizationRequest`.
Rename deserves its own discussion.
- Setting the defaults to `organization-admin` makes every member an org
admin, including the ability to edit the org further, and those users
still render as plain members in member listings. Reachable today via
the API, UI, and Terraform; a warning on privileged roles would help.
- `dbauthz.InsertOrganization` has no `canAssignRoles` check, unlike
`UpdateOrganization`. Harmless while the only caller passes the
deployment default constant.
- `docs/admin/users/organizations.md` still points users at the
dashboard or a raw `PATCH`.
</details>
---
Created by Coder Agents on behalf of @jscottmiller.
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3bdd395faa |
docs(docs/admin/templates/extending-templates): clarify coder_env merge_strategy does not include host environment (#28466)
`merge_strategy` on `coder_env` only combines values across `coder_env` resources targeting the same name. It does not know about the value already set by the workspace's image or host, such as the base `PATH`. A user hit this in #27501: appending to `PATH` with three `coder_env` resources replaced the host's `PATH` entirely, since none of them referenced the existing value. Clarify this in the docs, and update the `PATH` example to show referencing `$PATH` in one of the resources so the host's original value is kept. Refs #27501 <details> <summary>Investigation notes</summary> - `coderd/provisionerdserver/provisionerdserver.go` builds the merged env starting from an empty map (`MergeExtraEnvs`), only combining `coder_env` resources with each other. - `agent/agent.go`'s `updateCommandEnv` applies the result with `os.ExpandEnv(v)`, which expands `$VARNAME` against the agent's real process environment. - Confirmed with a standalone repro that `value = "$PATH:/usr/local/cuda/bin"` preserves the host's real `PATH` and appends the extra directory, and that this composes correctly across multiple `coder_env` resources with `merge_strategy = "append"` as long as one of them references `$PATH`. - A companion PR updates the `terraform-provider-coder` schema description and example that feed the registry docs: https://github.com/coder/terraform-provider-coder (branch `bpmct/docs-env-merge-host`). </details> --- *Opened by Coder Agents on behalf of @bpmct.* --------- Co-authored-by: Nick Vigilante <nickvigilante@users.noreply.github.com> |
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042421694f |
fix: surface duplicate AI provider hostname as warning, not error (#28208)
Two live `ai_providers` rows can share the same `base_url` hostname.
This is an intended configuration (AIGOV-97): the direct routing path
(`/api/v2/ai-gateway/{name}/...`) routes by provider name and fully
supports it. Only the MITM proxy path (`aibridgeproxyd`) cannot
disambiguate, because its `nameByHost` map is 1:1.
`classifyProviderRow` marked the second provider as
`ProviderStatusError`, which surfaced as a misleading log warning and a
`status=error` Prometheus label. The provider is not actually broken; it
is fully routable via the direct path. The error was only visible in
server logs and Prometheus, not in the API or UI.
This change:
- Extracts `BaseURLHostname` into `coderd/aibridged` and eliminates
three duplicate implementations (proxy classifier, chatprovider, and the
API layer now uses it for status checks).
- Downgrades the proxy classifier from `ProviderStatusError` to a new
`ProviderStatusProxyExcluded` status. The provider is not broken; it is
just not reachable via the MITM proxy path.
- Adds `Status *AIProviderStatus` to `codersdk.AIProvider` with
`Warnings []string`, matching the `WorkspaceProxy` precedent.
- Populates warnings on create, update, GET, and list when a provider's
hostname collides with another enabled provider.
- Adds an integration test proving that a duplicate provider is routable
via the direct path but not via the proxy path.
Refs AIGOV-596
Generated by Coder Agents
https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/bf323837-5121-4d1b-ab19-593f1d32374e
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df6a33ad37 |
docs: fix broken extending-templates examples (dynamic-parameters, docker-in-workspaces) (#28100)
## Summary Fixes broken examples on the `extending-templates` pages surfaced by the DOCS-637 runtime drift sweep, and completes the dangling `external-auth` reference. Verified against `main` and the CLI source (`coder templates init --id`, `coder templates push`). ## Changes | Page | Fix | |------|-----| | `dynamic-parameters.md` | The **Dynamic Validation** snippet referenced an undefined `show_cpu_cores` through a stray `count = data.coder_parameter.show_cpu_cores.value ? 1 : 0` line copied from the earlier Hide/Show Options example. Standalone copy failed `terraform validate`. Removed the `count` line (and its misleading "Only show this parameter" comment) so the snippet is self-contained. The valid occurrence in the Hide/Show example (where `show_cpu_cores` is defined) is untouched. | | `docker-in-workspaces.md` | The rootless Podman step used `echo "kubernetes-with-podman" \| coder templates init`, but `kubernetes-with-podman` isn't a built-in starter id, so the command scaffolds nothing. Step 4 now starts from the built-in `kubernetes` starter (`coder templates init --id kubernetes`) and shows the minimal Podman delta inline: the maintained `codercom/example-podman:ubuntu` base image, the `container.apparmor.security.beta.kubernetes.io/dev = unconfined` pod annotation, and a `github.com/fuse` device limit. The starter already runs as UID/GID 1000 with `run_as_non_root`, which rootless Podman needs. Also switches the deprecated `coder templates create` to `coder templates push`. Follow-up from review: swapped `ghcr.io/coder/podman` for the maintained `codercom/example-podman:ubuntu` image and linked its source, added a note that the AppArmor annotation is deprecated on Kubernetes 1.30+ (`securityContext.appArmorProfile`), and added an EKS Auto Mode caveat to the Bottlerocket section. | | `external-auth.md` | The **External Auth Providers** sentence dead-ended at "...in the Coder Control Plane. See" with no link. Completed it with a link to the admin External Authentication page (`../../external-auth/index.md`), the target chosen in review. | ## Dependency The `docker-in-workspaces.md` example now references `codercom/example-podman:ubuntu`, published by coder/images#339. That PR is approved but should merge (and publish the image to Docker Hub) before this PR merges, so the docs don't point at an image that doesn't exist yet. Linear: https://linear.app/codercom/issue/DOCS-645 > This PR was created with AI assistance (Coder Agents). --------- Co-authored-by: Ben Potter <me@bpmct.net> Co-authored-by: Ben Potter <ben@coder.com> |
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c275327fb7 |
feat: audit operational agent settings (#28369)
Depends on #28394. Audit changes to seven operational agent settings through a typed `chat_operational_settings` resource. Each handler serializes baseline capture and mutation with a per-setting advisory lock, keeps both operations in one transaction, and records field-specific diffs. Effective no-op requests now skip both the database upsert and the success audit, including absent rows whose effective value is already the default. The change also retains the allowlisted raw `site_configs` query, updates generated audit and API surfaces, adds failure and concurrency coverage, and reuses the existing AuditPage resource-filter story pattern. Relates to CODAGT-720. |
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a53c6e6366 |
feat: audit chat model config changes (#28439)
Adds audit logging for chat model config creates, updates, deletes, ACL changes, and automatic default-model transitions. Audit records use the config display name or ID as the target and are emitted only after successful transactions. Depends on #27960. |
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aefc761fcf |
feat!: enforce organization scope for chat models (#27959)
## Summary Move chat model management and runtime availability to organization-scoped API routes. The API now identifies the organization in every model-management operation, applies chat model RBAC and ACLs within that organization, and returns only models the caller can use there. Depends on #27958. ## Problem Chat model configurations now belong to organizations, but the existing experimental management and discovery APIs are deployment-shaped. Their routes do not identify an organization, SDK methods do not accept an organization ID, and item operations address a model configuration by ID alone. That contract cannot safely expose organization-owned model configurations. It also does not provide the organization-specific provider information, authorization behavior, ACL management, or recovery guidance needed by the settings and chat clients later in the stack. ## Fix Add organization-scoped chat model endpoints under: ```text /api/experimental/organizations/{organization}/chats/models ``` The new API provides: - Organization-scoped model listing and creation. - Model get, update, and delete operations scoped by both organization and model ID. - Model ACL read and update operations. - Organization-scoped runtime availability and provider status. - Redacted provider descriptors for model-management clients. - Chat model RBAC and row ACL enforcement for writes, runtime discovery, and Chatd model selection. - Recovery guidance when a chat's organization has no usable local model. Historical chats can retain a model reference owned by another organization, but runtime selection uses an authorized local default when one is available. Foreign, inaccessible, disabled, and otherwise unusable models are not exposed as usable selections for the organization. The existing collection and availability routes remain as default-organization compatibility endpoints in this layer: ```text GET /api/experimental/chats/model-configs POST /api/experimental/chats/model-configs GET /api/experimental/chats/models ``` These compatibility routes do not provide access to models in non-default organizations. The previous unscoped item update and delete routes are removed because item operations must include the owning organization. ## Breaking change This changes the experimental HTTP API and Go SDK contracts for chat model management. Clients must migrate model-management and availability requests to the organization-scoped routes and provide an organization identifier. In the Go SDK, the following methods now require an organization ID: - `ChatModelAvailability` - `ChatModels` - `CreateChatModel` - `UpdateChatModel` - `DeleteChatModel` `ChatModels` also changes its return value from `[]ChatModel` to `OrganizationChatModelsResponse`, which includes the organization models and the redacted provider descriptors required by management clients. New item and ACL methods likewise require both the organization ID and model ID. The default-organization compatibility routes reduce the immediate impact for collection and availability callers, but they do not preserve the previous item API or SDK method signatures. Generated clients and direct consumers of the experimental API must be updated before adopting this change. _This pull request description was generated by Coder Agents._ |
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4ce8e8ed56 |
docs: address AI Gateway documentation review feedback (#28309)
Applies the review feedback from #27794. Prose only. --------- Co-authored-by: Nick Vigilante <nickvigilante@users.noreply.github.com> |
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6348c83142 |
feat: register public clients without a secret (#28046)
Third in the stack, split out of #27873. This is where dynamic client registration first produces a public client. - A registration requesting token_endpoint_auth_method `none` issues no secret and persists the client_type derived in #28043. The response omits client_secret entirely, per RFC 7591 §3.2.1. - Discovery still advertises only the two secret-based methods. `none` is withheld until the token endpoint honors it, so a conforming client is not told to attempt an exchange that would be rejected. - The app and its secret are written in one transaction. They were two independent inserts, so a failed second one left a committed app that could never authenticate while still holding a registration access token. Pre-existing, but a public client's missing secret row makes the orphaned case unspottable by inspection. - registration_client_uri uses url.JoinPath, fixing a trailing-slash access URL producing //oauth2/clients/{id}. - Docs state both limits above, so the page does not describe a flow that returns 400 until #28047 lands. A client registered here cannot obtain a token yet; #28047 adds that. Dynamic client registration is off by default, so none of this is user-visible until then. Refs https://linear.app/codercom/issue/ENG-3029/oauth2-support-public-client |
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8203b2ebaf | feat!: hide Coder Tasks behind the enable-ai-tasks flag (#28008) | ||
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7ca7c30f40 |
feat: add group and user ACLs to MCP server configs (#27944)
Adds group and user ACLs to org-scoped MCP server configs so
organizations can restrict specific MCP servers to subsets of members,
mirroring the template ACL pattern.
## Summary
- Migration adds `group_acl`/`user_acl` JSONB columns (nested `{"<id>":
{"permissions": [...]}}` shape) and seeds every existing config with its
organization's Everyone group read entry (the Everyone group ID equals
the org ID), so member access is unchanged by default. Creation seeds
the same entry.
- The blanket org-member read grant from the base PR is replaced by ACL
evaluation: Rego requires org membership for every ACL grant, and
`GetAuthorizedMCPServerConfigs` compiles ACL-aware SQL filters.
- New `ActionShare` (org admins) gates `GET|PATCH
/api/experimental/organizations/{organization}/mcp-servers/{mcpserverconfig}/acl`
(nested under the organization like the rest of the config surface).
PATCH validates principals against the config's organization, merges
sparse updates under a row lock, stamps `updated_by`/`updated_at`, and
is audited as a Write with `Old` captured before authorization. A config
deleted concurrently between the middleware fetch and the locked
re-fetch is concealed as 404, matching the update and delete handlers.
ACL columns are tracked in the audit table.
- ACL management is available in all editions (no enterprise
entitlement), documented in the MCP servers page. Revoking an ACL does
not retro-strip already-selected configs from existing chats; new
selection is blocked at chat create.
- Force On respects the ACL: the forced set is loaded as the chat owner,
so a `force_on` server whose ACL denies the owner never attaches at
create, send, or generation time.
- No rolling-upgrade machinery: upgrades run in scheduled maintenance
downtime, so the migration only backfills existing rows; the API sets
the Everyone read grant explicitly on every insert.
Stacked on #27943. Part of the MCP org-separation stack.
Closes https://linear.app/codercom/issue/CODAGT-712
UAT: verified on a dogfood instance with two members and a custom group:
Everyone-seed default visibility, group grant with Everyone removal
(non-member loses list/fetch/selection), foreign-principal rejection,
non-admin share denial (audited 403 / concealed 404), user_acl restore,
and audited ACL diffs.
> Mux (AI agent) authored this PR on Mike's behalf.
<!-- mux-attribution: model=claude-fable-5 thinking=high -->
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299e72ad30 |
feat: audit MCP server config changes (#27943)
Adds enterprise audit logging for MCP server config create, update, and
delete, with strict secret redaction. MCP configs hold credentials
(OAuth2 client secrets, API keys, custom headers), so admin changes to
them need an audit trail.
## Summary
- `enterprise/audit/table.go` gains an `MCPServerConfig` entry
enumerating every column: `oauth2_client_secret`, `api_key_value`, and
`custom_headers` are `ActionSecret` (never appear in diffs); dbcrypt
`*_key_id` bookkeeping, IDs, and timestamps are ignored; the remaining
config fields, including the endpoint URL fields, are tracked so
auditors can see which endpoints a config points at.
- Type registration in `coderd/audit` (diff, request, resource target
with org attribution), `codersdk/audit.go`, and a `resource_type` enum
migration.
- Handlers wire `audit.InitRequest`: create records `New`; update and
delete record `Old` from the param middleware before the
write-authorization check, so a readable-but-not-writable caller
produces an audited 403 while read-denied callers stay concealed as
unaudited 404s.
- Tests: create/update/delete audit entries, write-denied and
delete-denied 403 auditing, cross-org concealment producing zero
entries, and a serializer-level regression test proving none of the
three secret classes can reach a serialized diff.
- Review round: MCP config audit entries link to
`/ai/settings/mcp-servers/{id}`, audit table comments are trimmed per
review, and a fault-injection test pins that a config row surviving a
failed post-discovery credential update still gets its creation audit
entry.
Stacked on #27942 (org-scoped MCP configs). Part of the MCP
org-separation stack.
Closes https://linear.app/codercom/issue/CODAGT-717
UAT: verified on a trial-licensed dogfood instance: audit entries for
the full CRUD lifecycle with correct actor/org/target, redacted secrets
in the update and OAuth2 create diffs, and a full plaintext scan of the
audit dump finding zero secret leaks.
> Mux (AI agent) authored this PR on Mike's behalf.
<!-- mux-attribution: model=claude-fable-5 thinking=high -->
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31e95f7096 | docs: fix prebuilt-workspaces example syntax and defaults (#28088) | ||
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821d91fabd | fix: log tailnet tunnel authorization decisions (#27819) | ||
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166d92ba73 |
fix: bound request body size on JSON API endpoints (#28168)
## Summary `httpapi.Read` decoded request bodies with no size limit, so a single request could allocate memory without bound. This adds a 4 MiB default ceiling, leaves the endpoints that legitimately need more explicitly exempted, and counts the rejections so a limit set too tight is visible. This is the first of three PRs split out of #28048, covering the endpoints that answer in `codersdk.Response` shape. The OAuth2 decode paths (RFC 6749, RFC 7591) and the SCIM ones (RFC 7644) answer in their own error shapes and follow in separate PRs, along with the lint rule that pins the invariant. Closes PLAT-463. Remediates SEC-416 (CWE-770, CVSS 7.5) and SEC-392. ## Problem `httpapi.Read` calls `json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(value)` with no ceiling, and no middleware in the chain bounds body size. The exposure is pre-authentication: login, OTP, and first-user creation all read a body before any authorization decision is reached. The existing rate limiter bounds request *rate*, which is orthogonal to the memory a single admitted request may consume. ## Fix `Read` is split into `Read` and `ReadLimit`. `ReadLimit` wraps `r.Body` in an `http.MaxBytesReader` and keeps the existing decode and validate logic; `Read` delegates to it with a new `DefaultMaxRequestBodyBytes` of 4 MiB, which covers the 124 remaining non-test callers at a single site. `http.MaxBytesReader` composes as tightest-wins, so the handlers that pre-wrapped their own bodies pass their limit to `ReadLimit` rather than wrapping, and each keeps its previous ceiling byte for byte. That matters most for the bulk secrets import at `8 * MaxSecretsFileBytes`: an unconditional wrap inside `Read` would have silently halved it to the default. `TestImportUserSecretsBodyLargerThanDefaultLimit` is the regression guard for that specific failure, and `TestMaxBytesReaderNesting` pins the composition behavior the whole requirement rests on. Every rejection site calls `httpapi.RecordRequestBodyLimit`, which names the limit that tripped on the request's existing log line and marks the request so `coderd_api_requests_too_large_total{reason="request_body"}` counts body rejections apart from the 413s coderd answers for other causes, such as agent log storage overflow. A limit set too tight for a legitimate payload therefore surfaces without waiting for a user report. The limit is a constant rather than a deployment option: an operator raising it to unblock something would reopen the vulnerability as configuration, where a security scan will not find it. A legitimate 413 is answered with a targeted `ReadLimit` on that endpoint. ## Behavior change `POST /api/v2/files` now answers 413 rather than 400 when a request body exceeds `HTTPFileMaxBytes`. It installed that bound already but reported the rejection as a read failure, which leaked the stdlib `http: request body too large` string through `Detail` and kept the largest limit in the tree off the metric. The separate 413 for an oversized expanded archive is unchanged. The task log snapshot endpoint now answers 413 rather than 400 when its 64 KiB cap is exceeded. Routing it through `ReadLimit` also changes its decode-failure message from "Failed to decode request payload." to "Request body must be valid JSON.", which is what every other endpoint answers. Its tests are updated to match both. `coderd_api_requests_too_large_total` is new, so there is no existing query to migrate. It counts the 413s coderd answers, labeled `method`, `path`, and `reason`. `reason="request_body"` is a rejection by one of the limits above; `reason="other"` is a 413 that has nothing to do with body size, such as agent log storage overflow. ## Reading this The commits are ordered to be read in sequence. Commits 1 and 2 are the security fix; commits 3 to 5 are the observability consequences, and commit 3 is the one that touches dashboards. Commit 7 documents the limit on the REST API reference index. Commits 6 and 8 add and revert an exhaustive `@Failure 413` annotation pass, which buried the fix under its regenerated swagger, and cancel out. |
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d3f08b1983 |
feat: audit chat system instructions changes (#27668)
Adds an audit record for administrative events on the deployment-wide
chat instruction settings (system prompt, the include-default toggle,
and the plan-mode instructions), per CODAGT-719 and operator decision
D5. Each endpoint records under a stable identity: resource type
`chat_instruction_settings`, a fixed resource ID and a human-readable
target ("System prompt", "Plan mode instructions"), so two changes to
one setting share an ID and history-by-setting works. A real change
exports a Write entry with the old-to-new text visible; a
value-identical PUT still upserts and still returns 204 but records
nothing.
Attempts are recorded, not only transitions. Identity is assigned before
the authorization check, so a denied PUT exports a 403 row with an empty
diff (no request content reaches it), a validation failure exports a 400
row, and a write failure exports a 500 row, each with an empty diff; an
operator can tell "nothing changed" from "something changed and capture
degraded" by the status code.
The write path stays authoritative. The advisory lock and, on plan-mode,
the transaction exist only to serve change-detection; if any of that
machinery fails (lock, begin, commit, rollback), the handler runs main's
idempotent write path directly and derives the response from it, so a
member-visible failure of audit-only infrastructure can never replace
main's successful response. Accepted consequence: when the lock cannot
be taken, two concurrent identical writes can produce two rows instead
of one. That is audit degradation, which is allowed; changing a member's
response is not. Write failures keep the exact response the endpoint
produced before this wiring (transaction error for the system prompt,
which was always transactional; the raw write error for plan mode, which
was not), and the full transaction error is logged so rollback failures
cannot vanish.
<details>
<summary>CODAGT-66 plan entry: S1 (verbatim)</summary>
**S1 `feat: audit chat system instructions changes`** (CODAGT-719; base:
main)
- Struct: `database.ChatSystemPromptSettings{ID uuid.UUID; SystemPrompt
string; IncludeDefaultSystemPrompt bool; PlanModeInstructions string}`
in `coderd/database/types.go` (ticket-sketched shape; one struct, both
endpoints).
- Registration: union entry (diff.go), table.go entry (`id`
ActionIgnore, other three ActionTrack), `AuditActionMap` Write-only;
four request.go cases (`ResourceTarget` "", `ResourceID` from struct,
`ResourceType` new enum value `chat_system_prompt_settings`,
`ResourceRequiresOrgID` false with the "Artificial ID / deployment
singleton" comment convention).
- Migration: `ALTER TYPE resource_type ADD VALUE IF NOT EXISTS
'chat_system_prompt_settings';` comment-only no-op down (000558 shape);
number picked at push per the numbering constraint.
- codersdk: constant + prose `FriendlyString` ("chat system prompt
settings"); `TestAuditDBEnumsCovered` forces both. `coderd/audit.go`
presentation switches: rely on safe defaults (no link, generic
description); no FE changes (filter label falls back to capitalized
value; acceptable per precedent).
- Wiring `putChatSystemPrompt` and `putChatPlanModeInstructions`:
InitRequest with Action Write; artificial `ID: uuid.New()` on `New` only
when a change is detected; no-op suppression by leaving both aReq sides
unset (nil resource IDs skip the log, request.go skip rule); the write
path itself stays byte-identical (upserts still run unconditionally).
- `putChatSystemPrompt` (writes two keys conditionally in one existing
tx): inside that tx, read the pair via `GetChatSystemPromptConfig` for
`Old`, perform the conditional writes exactly as today, then RE-READ the
pair for `New`. The re-read is load-bearing:
`include_default_system_prompt` is computed from the toggle row AND the
prompt, so a prompt-only write can flip the effective value without the
request carrying the pointer. `PlanModeInstructions` stays zero on both
sides.
- `putChatPlanModeInstructions` (no tx exists today): wrap its
read-upsert in `InTx` (behavior-preserving: same single write);
`Old`/`New` populate only `PlanModeInstructions`; the two system-prompt
fields stay zero on both sides; no cross-key reads.
- Change detection compares the populated payload fields only (never the
artificial ID).
- Tests: handler-level coderdtest with `audit.NewMock()` asserting Write
entry on change and NO entry on a value-identical PUT, for both
endpoints (this also exercises `ResourceRequiresOrgID` end to end); the
fallback-flip case (no explicit include-default row, nonempty prompt set
to empty, effective boolean flips: entry emitted with the boolean diff);
diff assertions (old->new prompt text tracked, not secret) in
`enterprise/audit/diff_internal_test.go`; `TestAuditableResources`
passes by construction.
- Bookkeeping at PR open: correct CODAGT-719's no-op premise ("matches
the existing 204-on-unchanged behavior" does not exist on main;
suppression is new, write path unchanged).
- Review focus: Old capture and the New re-read inside the tx (three of
four existing singletons never set Old; do not copy them; and the
computed include-default value makes a naive New construction wrong);
the skip-on-no-op mechanism; prompt text deliberately visible in diffs.
</details>
Note: the plan excerpt above predates operator decision D5 (2026-07-30),
which this PR implements: the resource type is
`chat_instruction_settings` (not `chat_system_prompt_settings`), each
setting carries a stable ID and a display-name target (not a per-write
artificial ID and an empty target), no-op suppression runs through
`InitRequestWithCancel` (not the nil-ID skip), and attempts (denied,
failed, capture-degraded) record rows with real statuses and empty
diffs. Ticket bookkeeping for CODAGT-719 was corrected on Linear at
kickoff: the ticket's "matches the existing 204-on-unchanged behavior"
premise does not exist on main; suppression is new, and the write path
is unchanged.
> 🤖 This PR was created with the help of Coder Agents, and _will be_
reviewed by a human. 🏂🏻
---------
Co-authored-by: Michael Suchacz <203725896+ibetitsmike@users.noreply.github.com>
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7724ee281a |
feat: defer MCP tool schemas behind a find_tools search (#28225)
## Summary When the `mcp-tool-search` experiment is enabled, chatd stops inlining connected MCP tool schemas into every generation. It instead exposes a built-in `find_tools` tool whose description carries a compact catalog of the deferred tools, and only ships full JSON schemas for tools the model has activated by searching or by calling them directly. Closes [CODAGT-760](https://linear.app/coder/issue/CODAGT-760). ## Problem Tool-heavy agent configurations (GitHub, Linear, Notion, and dev-tooling MCP servers) inline over 100k tokens of tool schema definitions into every generation. Initial uncached requests reached ~216k tokens with time-to-first-token close to nine minutes, while the model typically invokes only a handful of tools per turn. ## How it works - `decideMCPToolSearch` defers external and workspace `.mcp.json` MCP tools whenever the experiment is enabled. Native, dynamic, provider, skill, and transport tools are never deferred. - `find_tools` embeds a server-grouped catalog in its tool description (degrading to names-only, then counts-only, then a constant-size summary past a context-scaled size cap) and scores keyword matches across tool names, descriptions, parameter schemas, and server metadata. Queries can scope to one server with a `server:` prefix, and exact `names` arguments always activate. - Activation state is ephemeral: it is re-derived each generation from surviving chat history (`find_tools` results and direct calls to deferred tools), so activations naturally lapse when compaction summarizes them away. Aggregate activated schema weight is capped at 10% of the context window, shedding the least recently activated schemas first; `find_tools` shares that budget across parallel calls in one step. No new persistence. - Deferred tools stay registered for execution, so the model can call a cataloged tool directly without searching first; the schema is activated for subsequent steps. - Fail-open: the experiment being disabled, an empty candidate set, or an MCP tool named `find_tools` all disable deferral, leaving today's behavior byte-identical on the wire. - Prometheus counters/histograms track `find_tools` calls, matches, activations, and deferred token weight. - The conversation timeline renders `find_tools` calls with a collapsed search summary and expandable match list, falling back to the generic renderer on malformed payloads. ## Validation - Unit tests for the catalog, matcher, experiment-gated decision, and activation derivation; end-to-end chatd generation tests covering search-then-call, direct-call activation, experiment-off wire parity, compaction lapse, and subagent tool gating. - Storybook interaction tests for the timeline rendering and malformed-payload fallback. - Remote dogfood UAT on dev.coder.com passed: deferral with a real MCP server and Anthropic model, direct calls without prior search, activation persistence across turns, experiment-off parity, and clean UI/console. > Disclosure: Mux (AI agent) authored this PR on Mike's behalf. |
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119f2b1dd9 |
feat: limit concurrent chat agents with pooled admission (#27902)
Limits concurrent chat generation on capped deployments to 5 root chats and 10 delegated subagent chats. The pools are deployment-wide and independent, so delegated work can continue while root capacity is full. The default caps live in AGPL code. Enterprise contributes only a licensing unlock, so unlicensed deployments stay capped and cannot fail open. Licensed deployments are uncapped while Agent Hours usage stays below an explicit hard limit. Deployments without a hard limit remain uncapped, and reaching the Agent Hours allocation only triggers warnings. Admission happens before a worker takes chat ownership. Capped deployments serialize admission across replicas with a transaction-scoped advisory lock and derive active and queued state from current ownership plus fresh runner heartbeats, rather than persisted queue markers or per-replica state. The acquisition query returns a bounded, pool-interleaved candidate set instead of ranking the whole backlog; a migration replaces the acquisition index with a pool-aware one. Refused chats stay running but unowned, and interrupt requests bypass admission so users can stop queued or over-cap chats. The single-chat API derives `queued_for_capacity` from live pool state; list endpoints do not report it. The UI polls that value every 5 seconds while a chat is running and shows a callout when the chat is waiting for capacity. Updates the administrator documentation and deployment-wide Prometheus gauges for active and queued agents. Replica-level values must be aggregated with `max`, not `sum`. > Mux updated this PR on Mike's behalf. |
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b5d18bb9c9 | feat: add redirect URL override for external auth (#28082) | ||
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95328f1ead |
fix: label unpriced token usage metric by provider name and type (#28210)
## Problem The `provider` label was inconsistent between AI Gateway metrics. Every metric emitted by the gateway labels `provider` with the provider instance name, for example `anthropic-eu`, while `coder_ai_gateway_cost_control_unpriced_token_usage_records_total` used the provider type, for example `anthropic`. The two could not be correlated on `provider`. The metric was also inconsistent with itself: the path where a provider fails to resolve labelled by instance name, and the path where a model has no price labelled by type. The type is still worth exposing, since prices are keyed on `(provider_type, model)` and that is what an operator needs to add a price. ## Changes - Label the metric with `provider` (the instance name, consistent with the other gateway metrics) and add `provider_type` (the configured type the price is keyed on). - Use `unknown` for `provider_type` when the provider does not resolve to a configured type. - Log the unresolved-provider case at `warn` instead of `info`. A missing price is an expected steady state, but a provider that cannot be resolved is not. - Update the metrics docs and the `metricsdocgen` fixture. Closes [AIGOV-574](https://linear.app/codercom/issue/AIGOV-574) > [!NOTE] > Initially generated by Claude Opus 5, modified and reviewed by @ssncferreira |
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a005e5cd22 |
feat: add username and email user search filters (#27922)
## Summary User search can now resolve exact `email:` and `username:` terms through `GET /api/v2/users` instead of only supporting fuzzy free-text matches. The database query already had exact email and username filters; this wires the public search parser and API handler to those filters so clients can ask for a single user by email without fetching every user or depending on substring matching. This is the API half of coder/terraform-provider-coderd#403: that provider PR adds `data.coderd_user.email`, and this PR gives it an efficient exact lookup path. ## Testing - `go test ./coderd/searchquery -run '^TestSearchUsers$' -count=1` - `go test ./coderd -run '^TestGetUsersFilter$' -count=1` - Live API test: - Built local enterprise Coder from this branch. - Started Coder on `http://127.0.0.1:39991` against a clean Postgres database. - Created `lookup-target@example.com`. - Verified `GET /api/v2/users?q=email:LOOKUP-TARGET@EXAMPLE.COM&limit=2` returned exactly one user: ```json { "count": 1, "users": [ { "id": "efc6f909-ce0a-4731-bd2f-6e4df417aaa7", "username": "lookup-target", "email": "lookup-target@example.com" } ] } ``` ---   --------- Co-authored-by: Ethan Dickson <ethanndickson@gmail.com> |
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58de9ab8f8 |
docs: correct broken CLI commands and flags from drift sweep (#28098)
## Summary Corrects broken CLI commands and flags surfaced by the DOCS-637 full-corpus runtime drift sweep. Each fix was verified against the generated CLI reference (`docs/reference/cli/*`) and, where relevant, `codersdk` source. ## Changes | Page | Fix | |------|-----| | `docs/user-guides/workspace-access/index.md` | `coder port forward` → `coder port-forward` (the space form is unrecognized; the command is hyphenated). | | `docs/ai-coder/github-to-tasks.md` | Remove `coder templates list --org your-org-name` in two spots — `templates list` has no `--org` flag (`unknown flag: --org`). | | `docs/admin/infrastructure/scale-utility.md` | `--cleanup-timeout 15min` → `15m` — Go durations reject the `min` unit (`invalid duration: unknown unit "min"`). | | `docs/admin/integrations/dx-data-cloud.md` | `coder users list > users.csv` emitted a whitespace table, not CSV. Emit JSON and convert to real CSV with `jq`, mirroring the API tab on the same page and using the same columns as the default table view (`username,email,created_at,status`). | ## Notes / judgment calls - **dx-data-cloud (CSV):** the page genuinely needs CSV (the DX CSM imports a CSV, and the API tab already produces one via `jq ... @csv`). `coder users list` only supports `--output table|json`, so the CLI tab now produces real CSV via `jq` rather than switching the page to JSON. - **scale-utility `:109` left as-is:** `--target-users 0:100` is prefixed with "For dashboard traffic:", which correctly scopes it to the `scaletest dashboard` subcommand, so it is not drift. - **Excluded — sessions-tokens `--lifetime=720h`:** the sweep flagged this because the throwaway SUT capped token lifetime at 168h, but `--max-token-lifetime` defaults to `876600h` (~100 years), so the example is valid on a default deployment. The `CODER_MAX_TOKEN_LIFETIME` dependency is also already documented in the page's "Set max token length" section. No change needed. Linear: https://linear.app/codercom/issue/DOCS-641 > This PR was created with AI assistance (Coder Agents). |
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1d189cc204 |
docs: fix P2/P3 typos and syntax errors from drift sweep (#28101)
## Summary High-confidence textual subset of the DOCS-637 **P2/P3** drift batch (31 findings total). These 8 fixes are pure typo / grammar / syntax corrections verified directly against the doc source, so they carry no risk of misreconstructed command output. ## Changes (6 files) | Page | Fix | |------|-----| | `docs/admin/templates/extending-templates/variables.md` | Remove doubled word: "file in in the template directory" → "file in the template directory". | | `docs/admin/networking/port-forwarding.md` | Grammar: heading "From an coder_app resource" → "From a coder_app resource". | | `docs/user-guides/workspace-access/index.md` | Malformed heading "Through with the CLI" → "Through the CLI". | | `docs/about/contributing/modules.md` | Conventional-commit example missing the required space: `feat(git-clone):add` → `feat(git-clone): add`. | | `docs/ai-coder/tasks-migration.md` | Add missing closing double-quotes on Terraform `source`/`version` in two snippets that would fail `terraform` parsing. | | `docs/admin/users/idp-sync.md` | Role Sync section said "group sync settings" (copy-paste from the Group Sync section); remove an invalid trailing comma from a JSON output example. | ## Deferred (remaining ~23 P2/P3 items, not in this PR) The rest of the batch is stale **command-output** samples (column/schema changes, sample values) and items that need a content decision (e.g. `--psk` now deprecated in favor of `--key`; `--address` deprecated; an undocumented retention flag). Those need live-output reconstruction or a call on direction, so they're left for follow-up work, consistent with the issue's "handle after the P0/P1 fixes land" guidance. One catalog row (`reverse-proxy-nginx.md:57`, certbot `ws=apache`) is already handled by #28086 and is excluded here. Linear: https://linear.app/codercom/issue/DOCS-646 > This PR was created with AI assistance (Coder Agents). |
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5b97d99a48 |
docs: fix Helm TLS/ingress value keys in admin/setup (#28087)
## What
Fix the Helm values in the TLS setup step of
`docs/admin/setup/index.md`. The documented keys are silently ignored by
the chart, so TLS appears configured but isn't.
## Changes
- `coder.tls.secretName` (singular) → `coder.tls.secretNames` (a list).
The chart key is `secretNames`.
- `coder.ingress.secretName` / `coder.ingress.wildcardSecretName` →
nested under `coder.ingress.tls.secretName` /
`coder.ingress.tls.wildcardSecretName`, where the chart actually reads
them.
- Added `coder.ingress.tls.enable: true` so the ingress-termination
example actually enables TLS.
All keys verified against `helm/coder/values.yaml` on `main`
(`coder.tls.secretNames`,
`coder.ingress.tls.{enable,secretName,wildcardSecretName}`). Surfaced by
the runtime drift sweep. The example now parses to the correct chart
structure.
Linear:
[DOCS-643](https://linear.app/codercom/issue/DOCS-643/docs-fix-helm-tlsingress-value-keys-in-adminsetup-secretnames)
> This PR was created with AI assistance (Coder Agents).
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3145cc8386 |
docs: fix prometheus metric name and slack webhook backtick (#28085)
## What Two small monitoring-doc fixes surfaced by the runtime drift sweep. ### `docs/admin/integrations/prometheus.md` The native-histograms list showed `coderd_template_coderd_template_workspace_build_duration_seconds` (doubled `coderd_template_` prefix). The correct metric name, per the metrics table earlier on the same page and the generated metrics, is `coderd_template_workspace_build_duration_seconds`. ### `docs/admin/monitoring/notifications/slack.md` The `CODER_NOTIFICATIONS_WEBHOOK_ENDPOINT` export ended with a stray backtick: ``` export CODER_NOTIFICATIONS_WEBHOOK_ENDPOINT=http://localhost:6000/v1/webhook` ``` On paste, bash treats the trailing backtick as an unterminated command substitution and errors. Removed it. Both reproduced during the runtime drift sweep and verified against `main`. Linear: [DOCS-647](https://linear.app/codercom/issue/DOCS-647/docs-fix-monitoring-examples-prometheus-metric-name-slack-webhook) > This PR was created with AI assistance (Coder Agents). |
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f0c17291b3 |
feat: unhide --oidc-redirect-url server option (#28072)
Unhides the `--oidc-redirect-url` / `CODER_OIDC_REDIRECT_URL` server option so it appears in `coder server --help` and the deployment configuration docs. - Removed `Hidden: true` from the option in `codersdk/deployment.go` - Regenerated CLI golden files and docs via `make gen` --- > Generated with Coder Agents on behalf of @Emyrk |
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209d1ca498 |
fix: reject PKCE code_verifier below RFC 7636 length floor (#28003)
The token endpoint accepted any non-empty `code_verifier`, so a one-character verifier was enough to authenticate. RFC 7636 §4.1 requires 43 to 128 characters from the unreserved set. That fix plus the related gaps review surfaced in the same path: - Enforce the length and charset floor on the verifier before the S256 comparison runs. - Validate the challenge at the authorize endpoint too. It was only checked for non-emptiness, so a malformed challenge was stored and then failed late at token exchange, blaming the wrong parameter. - A malformed verifier now returns `invalid_request` (RFC 6749 §5.2); a well-formed but wrong one still returns `invalid_grant` (RFC 7636 §4.6). Both looked identical before, so a client had no way to tell a syntax error from a hash mismatch and would retry the same bad verifier forever. - Revoke the authorization code when a PKCE check fails. Without that, a leaked code could be replayed with unlimited verifier guesses for its remaining lifetime, and RFC 6749 §10.5 requires codes to be single use. - Fix verifier generation in `scripts/oauth2/*.sh` and the docs example. They deleted reserved base64 characters instead of translating them to the URL-safe alphabet, so most runs produced verifiers under the new floor. Also carries #28041, which merged into this branch: public clients may register bare custom schemes such as `vscode://` again, with `mailto`, `tel`, and `sms` rejected. Split out of #27873 (public OAuth2 client support). PKCE is already mandatory for every client, so this stands on its own. <details> <summary>Manual verification</summary> Ran against a local dev server on this branch, using a session token and a throwaway app from `scripts/oauth2/setup-test-app.sh`. 1. Happy path unchanged: HTTP 200, verifier length 43. 2. `code_verifier=short`, and a 43-character verifier ending in `!`: both HTTP 400 `invalid_request`, so charset is enforced and not just length. 3. `code_challenge=tooshort` at authorize: HTTP 400 `invalid_request`, no code issued. An empty challenge still hits the older "required and cannot be empty" message. 4. Well-formed but wrong verifier: HTTP 400 `invalid_grant`, distinct from the cases above. 5. Retrying that same code with the correct verifier: HTTP 400, code already revoked by the failed check. 6. `generate-pkce.sh` produces a 43-character verifier (20 out of 20 runs); the docs example produces 128. 7. `scripts/oauth2/test-mcp-oauth2.sh` passes end to end. The two bearer-token failures in its output are a pre-existing script bug (`09c50559f3`, July 2025) that reuses a resource-scoped token against the real API, not a regression here. </details> |
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e5629126b7 |
docs: document prebuilds quota group behavior (#28015)
Documents the behavior of the prebuilds quota group so admins can find it and understand why the `prebuilds` user doesn't appear in its member list. Clarifies that prebuilt workspaces are attributed to a group named `coderprebuiltworkspaces` (often referred to as the **Prebuilt Workspaces** group), which defaults to a quota allowance of 0 and should be adjusted to match the desired prebuild pool size. Adds a note that the `prebuilds` user is a system user and is hidden from group member listings in the dashboard and API. > 🤖 This change was generated by Coder Agents (https://coder.com). |
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d7953bd046 | fix(coderd): use service account wording in account notifications (#27536) | ||
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b781be0fa2 |
docs: refresh JFrog Artifactory integration guide for SaaS (#28005)
## Summary Refreshes the JFrog Artifactory integration guide to cover JFrog SaaS. The JFrog-OAuth section previously implied the module was self-hosted only and mixed the SaaS and self-hosted setup into one ambiguous step. ## Changes - **JFrog-OAuth**: State the module works with both JFrog SaaS and self-hosted (on-premises) Artifactory. - **JFrog-OAuth**: Split setup into a SaaS UI flow (**External Applications** > **Custom Integration**) and a self-hosted Helm integration-template flow. - **JFrog-OAuth**: Update the module example to `registry.coder.com/coder/jfrog-oauth/coder`, `1.2.4`. - **JFrog-Token**: Update the stale example to `registry.coder.com/coder/jfrog-token/coder`, `1.2.2`. ## Validation - `markdownlint-cli2` passes on the file. - No emdash/endash. Preview: https://coder.com/docs/@matifali/jfrog-oauth-docs-saas/admin/integrations/jfrog-artifactory#jfrog-oauth Related to the registry README refresh in coder/registry#1040. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.ai/code) > 🤖 This PR was created with the help of Coder Agents, and needs a human review. 🧑💻 |
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66b065323b |
feat: log rate-limited external auth token validation (#26754)
When `ValidateToken` keeps a token because the external auth validation
endpoint was rate-limited (a `403` with rate-limit headers or a `429`),
it returns `valid=true` without provider confirmation. Previously this
happened silently, so operators couldn't tell a provider-confirmed token
from one kept optimistically during a rate limit.
This adds a `Logger` to `externalauth.Config` and emits a `Warn` (with
`provider_id`, `provider_type`, `status_code`, and `reason`) on those
rate-limit branches. It also adds a
`coderd_oauth2_external_requests_rate_limited_total{name, source,
status_code}` counter, incremented in the instrumented round tripper
whenever a provider returns a rate-limited response. The rate-limit
detection is the shared `xhttp.IsRateLimited` (in `coderd/util/xhttp`),
used by both the tripper and `ValidateToken` so the metric and the
validation decision share one definition; no extra wiring is needed
since `ValidateToken` already routes through the instrumented client
with `source="ValidateToken"`.
One deliberate behavioral change rides along: rate-limit detection now
also recognizes the unprefixed `RateLimit-Remaining` header (GitLab, and
the IETF draft rate-limit headers), so a `403` with
`RateLimit-Remaining: 0` is treated as optimistically valid where it was
previously treated as revoked. All other valid/invalid decisions are
unchanged. `TestValidateToken` asserts the warning's fields on the
rate-limited cases and no warning for revocations, `401`, and confirmed
responses; `promoauth` and `xhttp` tests cover the detector and the new
counter.
<details>
<summary>Manual testing</summary>
The signals fire on the external-auth status check (`GET
/api/v2/external-auth/{id}`), which calls `ValidateToken`. To force a
rate-limited response, point a provider's `validate_url` at a mock that
returns the rate-limit shape:
1. Run a mock returning `429` on one path and `403` +
`X-RateLimit-Remaining: 0` on another.
2. Start `coder server` with `--prometheus-enable` and external auth
providers whose `validate_url` point at those mock paths (e.g.
`CODER_EXTERNAL_AUTH_0_VALIDATE_URL=http://127.0.0.1:5599/429`).
3. Create a stored link, either complete the OAuth flow, or insert a row
into `external_auth_links` with a future `oauth_expiry` (token contents
are irrelevant; the mock rejects regardless).
4. `curl` the status endpoint with a session token, then check:
- coderd logs for the `Warn` (`reason=status_code` for `429`,
`reason=rate_limit_headers` for `403`),
- the metrics endpoint for
`coderd_oauth2_external_requests_rate_limited_total{...,status_code="429"|"403"}`.
Notes: `scripts/testidp -429` only rate-limits `/oauth2/userinfo`, not
the `/external-auth-validate/...` path, so it does not exercise this;
use a mock `validate_url`. The default Prometheus port `2112` may
already be taken on dogfood workspaces, set `CODER_PROMETHEUS_ADDRESS`
to a free port.
</details>
🤖 Generated with the help of Coder Agents on behalf of @jscottmiller.
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50640063a2 |
feat: DEVEX-732 premium badging (#27847)
Premium badging and gating consistency as a OSS user, I want to be upsold to premium, and tastefully Summary Standardize all base-Premium full-page gates and the two named inline notices. Admins see an in-app “Learn about Premium” path; non-admins are told to contact their deployment administrator. * DEVEX-732 * updates for premium docs pages for consistency * updates for premium badging and paywall components * updates implemented uses of premium badge and premiumpaywall | Before | After | | --- | ----------- | | <img width="1271" height="564" alt="Screenshot 2026-08-04 at 3 02 32 PM" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/027d4bca-3e34-40b2-ad69-28dbaa4a004b" /> | <img width="1273" height="600" alt="Screenshot 2026-08-04 at 3 26 37 PM" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/321083c0-7a4c-4c7e-a19c-059807018d3b" /> | | Before | After | | --- | ----------- | | <img width="1084" height="672" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/741e6bd9-93b0-4ae0-97df-027e8aba5716" /> | <img width="1289" height="622" alt="Screenshot 2026-08-04 at 3 20 07 PM" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/b3a8c169-ca6e-439b-8752-9209131fc097" /> | | Before | After | | --- | ----------- | | <img width="1091" height="865" alt="image (1)" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/f7cd92dd-a975-4db0-bc2a-af092ba783ce" /> | <img width="1268" height="680" alt="Screenshot 2026-08-04 at 3 37 06 PM" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/8af8081a-0ec9-4fd3-921c-470127f2328b" /> | |
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b3485d9b3a |
chore: add agents_allowed to templates (#27284)
Relates to CODAGT-713 This adds `templates.agents_allowed` as a default-true, auditable template attribute, along with nullable database filtering. Migration `000562` translates the effective legacy `agents_template_allowlist` state for existing templates: a valid nonempty list allows matching templates and blocks the rest, missing or empty values leave templates allowed, whilst corrupt values fail closed by blocking all existing templates. As per the linear issue, new templates deliberately default to allowed under the per-template model. This is the database-only first PR in the stack. #27285 makes the field authoritative in the API and chatd whilst temporarily retaining the compatibility routes needed by the shipped frontend. Later PRs migrate the UI, remove the legacy storage, routes, SDK types, and utility, then add CLI flags. |
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4b9880afa6 |
feat: add --chat-hook-allow-insecure to allow plain HTTP chat hook URLs (#27896)
Adds a hidden `--chat-hook-allow-insecure` / `CODER_CHAT_HOOK_ALLOW_INSECURE` deployment option (default `false`) that allows the chat lifecycle hook URL to use plain HTTP for any host. The HTTPS requirement is enforced at two points, and the flag relaxes both: `DeploymentValues.Validate()` rejects `http` hook URLs at startup, and the hook dispatcher's `validateHookURL` allows `http` only for loopback hosts. With the flag set, any-host `http` is accepted; the host, fragment/userinfo, secret, and timeout checks are unchanged, and non-http(s) schemes still fail. This removes the need for an HTTPS reverse proxy when testing a hook consumer on a trusted network. Following security review feedback, the flag description and docs state that plain HTTP lets an on-path attacker forge hook responses (which control agent execution), and `coder server` logs a startup warning (with a redacted hook URL) when hooks run over plain HTTP. Docs, generated API types, and the server config golden are updated accordingly. > Mux acted on Mike's behalf to create this PR. |
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97c4031526 |
feat!: resolve agent external auth by template, not config order (#27854)
## TL;DR
**Problem.** A template can declare which external auth provider it
wants via `data "coder_external_auth" { id = "..." }`, and that
declaration is honored at every stage of the build. It was ignored at
runtime. Any git operation going through `GIT_ASKPASS` supplies only a
hostname, never a provider ID, and the handler scanned *every* provider
configured on the deployment and returned whichever matched the hostname
**last in config order**, with no reference to what the requesting
workspace's own template declared. Reordering
`CODER_EXTERNAL_AUTH_<N>_*` silently redirected a plain `git clone` from
one OAuth client's token to a completely different one.
**Fix.** For hostname-only requests, resolve the calling agent's
workspace and build *before* selecting a provider, then narrow
candidates to the providers declared by that build's template version.
Exactly one match wins regardless of config order. No matching declared
provider falls back to today's deployment-wide scan, so a template that
declares only a GitHub provider can still clone an unrelated host. Two
or more matching declared providers return `409` naming them, rather
than picking one arbitrarily: `external_auth_providers` is stored sorted
by ID, so HCL declaration order is already unavailable and no principled
tie-break exists.
Requests supplying an explicit provider ID are untouched. Server-side
only: no wire protocol, proto, manifest, or database schema change, so
already-running agents get the corrected behavior on their next askpass
call with no restart.
Refs #23718
<details>
<summary><b>Call flow</b></summary>
```mermaid
flowchart TD
subgraph Push["1. Template import: coder templates push"]
A1["Terraform extracts coder_external_auth id/optional attrs"]
A2["CompleteJob(TemplateImport) validates each id<br/>against deployment config"]
A4["template_versions.external_auth_providers persisted"]
A1 --> A2 --> A4
end
subgraph PreBuild["2. Pre-build and workspace build (unaffected)"]
B1["User authenticates declared provider(s), exact-ID lookup"]
B2["Build resolves token by exact ID<br/>(provisionerdserver.go)"]
A4 --> B1 --> B2
end
subgraph Runtime["3. Workspace running: a credential is needed"]
B2 --> C0{"Caller supplies id or match?"}
C0 -->|"id (explicit)"| D1["Exact-ID match<br/>UNCHANGED, already deterministic<br/>(coder external-auth access-token)"]
C0 -->|"match only (GIT_ASKPASS)"| C1["git needs credentials for a hostname<br/>GIT_ASKPASS invoked, unchanged"]
C1 --> C2["coder gitaskpass sends ExternalAuthRequest{Match: host}<br/>unchanged (cli/gitaskpass.go)"]
C2 --> C3["workspaceAgentsExternalAuth<br/>(coderd/workspaceagents.go)"]
C3 --> C4["CHANGED:<br/>1. resolve workspace/build BEFORE matching<br/>2. read that build's declared provider IDs<br/>3. filter: declared AND regex matches host"]
C4 --> C5{"how many candidates?"}
C5 -->|"exactly 1"| C6["use it, regardless of config order"]
C5 -->|"0"| C7["fall back to deployment-wide scan<br/>(unchanged legacy behavior)"]
C5 -->|"2 or more"| C8["409 naming every matching ID"]
end
D1 --> E1["Token returned"]
C6 --> E1
C7 --> E1
style C4 fill:#1f4d2e,stroke:#4caf50,color:#fff
style C6 fill:#1f4d2e,stroke:#4caf50,color:#fff
style C8 fill:#1f4d2e,stroke:#4caf50,color:#fff
style D1 fill:#333,stroke:#888,color:#fff
```
</details>
## Verification
Two test functions were added in `coderd/workspaceagents_test.go`, and
the behavior no unit test can reach was verified against a local dev
cluster with two real GitHub OAuth Apps whose regexes both match
`github.com`.
| Behavior | Unit | Manual |
|---|---|---|
| Declared provider wins over a colliding one | yes | yes |
| Outcome independent of deployment config order | yes | yes |
| No declared match falls back to the full scan | yes | yes |
| Host the template never declared still resolves | yes | via fallback |
| Two declared providers matching one host return `409` | yes | not run
|
| Declared but unauthenticated provider returns its auth URL | yes | not
run |
| Two templates resolve independently and concurrently | yes | no |
| Explicit-ID path unaffected | no | yes |
| Running agent corrected with no restart | **no** | **yes** |
| Declared ID since removed from config falls back | **no** | **yes** |
| Recomputed per build after a template update | **no** | **yes** |
The last three are properties a unit test cannot express: they involve
swapping the server binary underneath a live agent, removing deployment
configuration, and rebuilding a workspace against a new template
version.
<details>
<summary><b>Unit test detail</b></summary>
`TestWorkspaceAgentsExternalAuthTemplateScoped` builds a deployment with
two providers sharing a regex, a template declaring one of them, and a
seeded token for **every** provider, so a mis-selection returns a valid
token with the wrong identity rather than an error. Subtests:
- `DeclaredProviderLast` / `DeclaredProviderFirst`: the declared
provider wins in both config orders. Only the `First` arm is
discriminating, since the pre-change loop had no `break` and returned
the last regex match, which the `Last` arm happens to agree with.
- `NoDeclaredProvidersFallsBackToFullScan`: a template declaring nothing
keeps today's behavior exactly, pinning the legacy last-match rule.
- `UnrelatedHostStillResolvesViaFallback`: a template declaring only a
GitHub provider still resolves a GitLab host.
- `AmbiguousDeclaredSetReturnsError`: `409` whose message names both
colliding provider IDs.
- `OptionalUnauthenticatedDeclaredProviderReturnsAuthURL`: returns the
auth URL for the *declared* provider, not for an unrelated one the user
happens to hold a token for.
`TestWorkspaceAgentsExternalAuthMultipleTemplates` runs two workspaces
from two templates, each declaring a different provider, issuing
requests concurrently. Each resolves to its own template's provider.
</details>
<details>
<summary><b>Manual verification detail</b></summary>
Local dev cluster, two GitHub OAuth Apps both defaulting to
`^(https?://)?github\.com(/.*)?$`, both authorized by the workspace
owner so a wrong selection yields a usable token rather than an error.
Workspace built from a template declaring only `github-dotfiles`. Tokens
redacted.
**Order independence.** Same workspace, never rebuilt, config order
reversed between runs:
| Deployment config order | Token returned |
|---|---|
| `[github-broad, github-dotfiles]` | `gho_<dotfiles>` |
| `[github-dotfiles, github-broad]` | `gho_<dotfiles>` |
**A/B against the pre-fix binary.** Everything held constant except the
coderd build, with `/api/v2/buildinfo` checked on both sides so the
comparison rests on verified binary identity. The workspace was never
stopped, rebuilt, or re-authorized:
| coderd | buildinfo | Token | Honors declaration |
|---|---|---|---|
| pre-fix | `v2.35.3-devel+11e03cfb3a` | `gho_<broad>` | no |
| this branch | `v2.35.3-devel+e8b87d0333` | `gho_<dotfiles>` | yes |
This doubles as the demonstration that a coderd-only upgrade corrects
behavior on a live agent's next askpass call.
**Declared provider removed from config.** `github-dotfiles` deleted
from deployment configuration while the workspace's template still
declared it. Result: `HTTP/2 200` with `gho_<broad>` via the fallback.
No `500`, no fail-closed `404`. The orphaned `external_auth_link` row
remained in the database throughout and correctly had no effect.
**Recomputation after a template update.**
| Workspace state | Build's declared provider | Token returned |
|---|---|---|
| new version pushed, workspace not updated | `github-dotfiles` |
`gho_<dotfiles>` |
| after `coder update` | `github-broad` | `gho_<broad>` |
The pair is what makes it conclusive: the first rules out following the
template's newest version, the second rules out a cached value.
**Explicit-ID path.** `coder external-auth access-token github-broad`
returned that provider's result even though the template declared only
`github-dotfiles`, and did not substitute the declared provider's
already-valid token.
Raw traces were captured with `GIT_CURL_VERBOSE=1 git -c
credential.helper="" ls-remote <private repo>`, reading the unredacted
`== Info: Server auth using Basic with user '<token>'` line. A private
repo is required, since a public one never triggers a `401` and
therefore never invokes `GIT_ASKPASS`.
</details>
|
||
|
|
4b6104229c |
chore: regenerate configuration-reference.md for bedrock placeholder (#27898)
## What Regenerates `docs/admin/setup/configuration-reference.md` to include the backtick-wrapped `<region>` placeholder that was introduced at the source in #27399. ## Why Commit [`9dcb75cd`](https://github.com/coder/coder/commit/9dcb75cd567ab910d3fc07f22af4108a435de00e) (#27399) changed the Bedrock region description in `codersdk/deployment.go` to wrap the placeholder in backticks and added the `docshtmlcheck` linter that requires it. The sibling generated file `docs/reference/cli/server.md` was regenerated correctly in that commit, but `docs/admin/setup/configuration-reference.md` was missed. As a result, subsequent CI runs on `main` fail with: - `gen`: `check_unstaged.sh` reports a one-line diff after `make gen`: ``` -...in the form of 'https://bedrock-runtime.<region>.amazonaws.com'. +...in the form of `https://bedrock-runtime.<region>.amazonaws.com`. ``` - `lint`: `docshtmlcheck` fails at `configuration-reference.md:358` with `unknown-element: <region>`. Example failing run: https://github.com/coder/coder/actions/runs/31036417075 ## Change Ran `make gen`. Only `docs/admin/setup/configuration-reference.md` changed (1 insertion, 1 deletion). No source changes. ## Verification - `make gen` produces no further diff. - `make lint/docs-html` exits 0. ## Linear - https://linear.app/codercom/issue/DOCS-551/backtick-placeholder-syntax-in-generated-reference-docs-cli-help Created on behalf of @ibetitsmike. Co-authored-by: blink-so[bot] <211532188+blink-so[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |