## Summary **Batch B of Phase 3** of the H1 → front-matter migration (`DOCS-484`; parent `DOCS-477`), the editorial follow-up to Batch A (#28030). For the **124** hand-authored pages whose leading body H1 differed from the manifest nav label, this promotes the richer body H1 to the front-matter **page title** and drops the duplicate H1, while keeping the short manifest **label** as the sidebar entry. Policy agreed with the docs owner: - Short sidebar labels win. Duplicate sidebar labels are acceptable. - Identical **page titles** across two pages are not. On a collision, rename the non-generated page's title. ## Page-title collisions resolved Promoting the H1 created 4 page-title collisions; each is disambiguated by renaming the non-generated / secondary page (sidebar labels left unchanged): | page | sidebar label | body H1 | → page title | |------|---------------|---------|--------------| | `install/index.md` | Install | Installing Coder | **Install Coder in your infrastructure** | | `install/cli.md` | Coder CLI | Installing Coder | **Install the Coder CLI** | | `ai-gateway/clients/jetbrains.md` | JetBrains | JetBrains IDEs | **JetBrains** | | `workspace-access/web-ides.md` | Web IDEs and Coder Apps | Web IDEs | Web IDEs *(kept — primary user guide)* | | `extending-templates/web-ides.md` | Web IDEs and Coder Apps | Web IDEs | **Web IDEs in templates** | | `workspace-management.md` | Workspace Management | Workspaces | **Manage workspaces** *(vs generated `api/workspaces.md`)* | These titles are the only non-mechanical editorial calls in this PR. ## Deliberately excluded: generated pages `admin/security/audit-logs.md` and `admin/setup/configuration-reference.md` are `make gen` outputs (`auditdocgen` / `configdocgen`) that Phase 2 did **not** update, so a hand-added title would be reverted on the next generation. They're excluded here and need their generators taught to emit front matter first (Phase 2 pattern), tracked as `DOCS-631`. Batch A (#28030) had the same issue for three other generated pages; it has been corrected there too. ## Verification AI was the primary author of this PR (see disclosure below); per the [AI Contribution Guidelines](https://coder.com/docs/about/contributing/AI_CONTRIBUTING) here is the manual verification. - Promote = set front-matter `title` to the body H1 (or the disambiguated title above) and remove that one duplicate H1. No other body prose is reflowed. - Every added front-matter block parses as YAML; all files pass `pnpm check-docs` (markdownlint-cli2 + table formatter): `Summary: 0 error(s)`. - Removing the H1 orphaned one in-page fragment (`[MCP](#mcp)` in `ai-gateway/mcp.md`), now repointed. A cross-file fragment audit into the retitled pages found no real breakage. Anchor-change note Unlike Batch A (title unchanged, a rendered no-op), Batch B changes each page's effective title from the manifest label to the body H1, so the rendered H1 **anchor slug changes**. An audit of cross-file `.md#fragment` links into these pages surfaced no links that break as a result (the only hits were false positives against a still-present `## TLS & Reverse Proxy` heading). Same-file fragments are enforced by markdownlint MD051, which is green. ## Title casing (follow-up, DOCS-742) A follow-up commit puts the promoted titles into sentence case and removes leading gerunds (for example, `Managing workspace schedules` → `Manage workspace schedules`): 57 of the 120 titles changed, the other 63 were already compliant. Proper nouns and branded names (Coder Validated Architecture, JetBrains, File Browser, Dev Containers, Island), acronyms (API, CLI, IDE, MCP, OIDC, URL, UI, CI/CD), the Premium license tier, and maturity labels (Beta, Experimental) are preserved. The four `Nk-users` pages become `Reference architecture: up to N users` (lowercase, matching the CVA landing page's own usage); the CVA landing page keeps its branded title. `pnpm check-docs`: `Summary: 0 error(s)`. Linear: DOCS-484, DOCS-742 > This PR was created with AI assistance (Coder Agents).
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| nsjail on Docker |
Note
Agent Firewall is part of AI Governance, which is included with a Premium license.
This page describes the runtime and permission requirements for running Agent Firewall with the nsjail jail type on Docker.
For an overview of nsjail, see nsjail.
Runtime & Permission Requirements for Running Boundary in Docker
This section describes the Linux capabilities and runtime configurations required to run Agent Firewall with nsjail inside a Docker container. Requirements vary depending on the OCI runtime and the seccomp profile in use.
1. Default runc runtime with CAP_NET_ADMIN
When using Docker's default runc runtime, Agent Firewall requires the
container to have CAP_NET_ADMIN. This is the minimal capability needed for
configuring virtual networking inside the container.
Docker's default seccomp profile may also block certain syscalls (such as
clone) required for creating unprivileged network namespaces. If you encounter
these restrictions, you may need to update or override the seccomp profile to
allow these syscalls.
see Docker Seccomp Profile Considerations
2. Default runc runtime with CAP_SYS_ADMIN (testing only)
For development or testing environments, you may grant the container
CAP_SYS_ADMIN, which implicitly bypasses many of the restrictions in Docker's
default seccomp profile.
- Agent Firewall does not require
CAP_SYS_ADMINitself. - However, Docker's default seccomp policy commonly blocks namespace-related
syscalls unless
CAP_SYS_ADMINis present. - Granting
CAP_SYS_ADMINenables Agent Firewall to run without modifying the seccomp profile.
⚠️ Warning: CAP_SYS_ADMIN is extremely powerful and should not be used in
production unless absolutely necessary.
3. sysbox-runc runtime with CAP_NET_ADMIN
When using the sysbox-runc runtime (from Nestybox), Agent Firewall can run
with only:
CAP_NET_ADMIN
The sysbox-runc runtime provides more complete support for unprivileged user namespaces and nested containerization, which typically eliminates the need for seccomp profile modifications.
Docker Seccomp Profile Considerations
Docker's default seccomp profile frequently blocks the clone syscall, which is
required by Agent Firewall when creating unprivileged network namespaces. If
the clone syscall is denied, Agent Firewall will fail to start.
To address this, you may need to modify or override the seccomp profile used by
your container to explicitly allow the required clone variants.
You can find the default Docker seccomp profile for your Docker version here (specify your docker version):
https://github.com/moby/moby/blob/v25.0.13/profiles/seccomp/default.json#L628-L635
If the profile blocks the necessary clone syscall arguments, you can provide a
custom seccomp profile that adds an allow rule like the following:
{
"names": ["clone"],
"action": "SCMP_ACT_ALLOW"
}
This example unblocks the clone syscall entirely.
Example: Overriding the Docker Seccomp Profile
To use a custom seccomp profile, start by downloading the default profile for your Docker version:
https://github.com/moby/moby/blob/v25.0.13/profiles/seccomp/default.json#L628-L635
Save it locally as seccomp-v25.0.13.json, then insert the clone allow rule shown above (or add "clone" to the list of allowed syscalls).
Once updated, you can run the container with the custom seccomp profile:
docker run -it \
--cap-add=NET_ADMIN \
--security-opt seccomp=seccomp-v25.0.13.json \
test bash
This instructs Docker to load your modified seccomp profile while granting only
the minimal required capability (CAP_NET_ADMIN).