Adds typed AI Gateway actor identity, including the API key ID used by recording. Recorders now read the authenticated API key ID from each call context instead of capturing request identity at construction time. This allows one recorder to be reused safely across sequential and concurrent requests. Includes context helper coverage and recorder regression tests. Generated by Coder Agents on behalf of @pawbana.
217 lines
7.5 KiB
Go
217 lines
7.5 KiB
Go
package aibridged
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import (
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"fmt"
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"net/http"
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"strings"
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"github.com/google/uuid"
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"golang.org/x/xerrors"
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"cdr.dev/slog/v3"
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"github.com/coder/coder/v2/aibridge"
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agplaibridge "github.com/coder/coder/v2/coderd/aibridge"
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"github.com/coder/coder/v2/coderd/aibridged/proto"
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)
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var _ http.Handler = &Server{}
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var (
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ErrNoAuthKey = xerrors.New("no authentication key provided")
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ErrConnect = xerrors.New("could not connect to coderd")
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ErrUnauthorized = xerrors.New("unauthorized")
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ErrAcquireRequestHandler = xerrors.New("failed to acquire request handler")
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ErrBudgetCheck = xerrors.New("internal server error checking user AI budget")
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)
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// ServeHTTP is the entrypoint for requests which will be intercepted by AI Bridge.
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// This function will validate that the given API key may be used to perform the request.
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//
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// An [aibridge.RequestBridge] instance is acquired from a pool based on the API key's
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// owner (referred to as the "initiator"); this instance is responsible for the
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// AI Bridge-specific handling of the request.
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//
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// A [DRPCClient] is provided to the [aibridge.RequestBridge] instance so that data can
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// be passed up to a [DRPCServer] for persistence.
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func (s *Server) ServeHTTP(rw http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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ctx := r.Context()
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logger := s.logger.With(
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slog.F("method", r.Method),
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slog.F("path", r.URL.Path),
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)
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// Extract and strip proxy request ID for cross-service log
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// correlation. Absent for direct requests not routed through
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// aibridgeproxyd.
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if proxyReqID := r.Header.Get(agplaibridge.HeaderCoderRequestID); proxyReqID != "" {
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// Inject into context so downstream loggers include it.
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ctx = slog.With(ctx, slog.F("aibridgeproxy_id", proxyReqID))
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logger = logger.With(slog.F("aibridgeproxy_id", proxyReqID))
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}
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r.Header.Del(agplaibridge.HeaderCoderRequestID)
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byok := agplaibridge.IsBYOK(r.Header)
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authMode := "centralized"
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if byok {
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authMode = "byok"
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}
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// When the request arrived via the in-process transport, the caller
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// has placed a delegated API key ID on the context. We trust that the
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// caller already established the user's identity and only validate
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// liveness; the caller does not have (and cannot send) the key secret.
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// Delegation is orthogonal to BYOK: a delegated request still carries
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// the user's own LLM credentials in Authorization/X-Api-Key when BYOK
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// is in effect.
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var (
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authReq *proto.IsAuthorizedRequest
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)
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delegatedID, delegated := agplaibridge.DelegatedAPIKeyIDFromContext(ctx)
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key := strings.TrimSpace(agplaibridge.ExtractAuthToken(r.Header))
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// When a BYOK header is present, a key is ALWAYS required.
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// Delegated auth only requires a key when using BYOK.
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if key == "" && !delegated {
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// Some clients (e.g. Claude) send a HEAD request
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// without credentials to check connectivity.
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if r.Method == http.MethodHead {
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logger.Info(ctx, "unauthenticated HEAD request")
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} else {
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logger.Warn(ctx, "no auth key provided")
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}
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http.Error(rw, ErrNoAuthKey.Error(), http.StatusBadRequest)
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return
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}
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if delegated {
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authReq = &proto.IsAuthorizedRequest{KeyId: delegatedID}
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} else {
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authReq = &proto.IsAuthorizedRequest{Key: key}
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}
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// Strip every header that may carry the Coder token so it is never
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// forwarded to upstream providers. Runs for both header-auth and
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// delegated requests: a delegated caller may forward the user's BYOK
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// headers, and we still want to scrub any Coder-specific credentials
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// that may have leaked through. After stripping, the aibridge library
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// can treat the request as a normal LLM API call with no
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// Coder-specific information.
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if byok {
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// In BYOK mode the Coder token is in X-Coder-AI-Governance-Token;
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// Authorization and X-Api-Key carry the user's own LLM
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// credentials and must be preserved.
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r.Header.Del(agplaibridge.HeaderCoderToken)
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} else {
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// In centralized mode the Coder token may be in Authorization
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// (the documented path) or X-Api-Key (legacy clients that set
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// ANTHROPIC_API_KEY to their Coder token). Both are stripped.
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r.Header.Del("Authorization")
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r.Header.Del("X-Api-Key")
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}
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client, err := s.Client(ctx)
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if err != nil {
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logger.Warn(ctx, "failed to connect to coderd", slog.Error(err))
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http.Error(rw, ErrConnect.Error(), http.StatusServiceUnavailable)
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return
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}
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// Attach auth attributes used by all log lines below. "source" is the
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// transport origin (e.g., "agents" for in-process callers, empty for
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// network callers); "auth_delegated" distinguishes header-based from
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// context-delegated authentication.
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logger = logger.With(
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slog.F("source", string(agplaibridge.SourceFromContext(ctx))),
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slog.F("auth_mode", authMode),
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slog.F("auth_delegated", delegated),
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)
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resp, err := client.IsAuthorized(ctx, authReq)
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if err != nil {
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logger.Warn(ctx, "key authorization check failed", slog.Error(err))
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http.Error(rw, ErrUnauthorized.Error(), http.StatusForbidden)
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return
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}
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id, err := uuid.Parse(resp.GetOwnerId())
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if err != nil {
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logger.Warn(ctx, "failed to parse user ID", slog.Error(err), slog.F("id", resp.GetOwnerId()))
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http.Error(rw, ErrUnauthorized.Error(), http.StatusForbidden)
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return
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}
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logger = logger.With(slog.F("user_id", id))
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// Direct and delegated carriers are mutually exclusive and request-scoped.
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// Delegated requests carry attribution stamped by the in-process caller
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// (chatd); direct requests carry workspace attribution parsed from the
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// server-minted token name by IsAuthorized.
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var attribution agplaibridge.Attribution
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if delegated {
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attribution, _ = agplaibridge.DelegatedAttributionFromContext(ctx)
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} else {
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attribution, err = attributionFromAuthorization(resp)
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if err != nil {
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logger.Warn(ctx, "invalid authorization attribution", slog.Error(err))
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http.Error(rw, ErrUnauthorized.Error(), http.StatusForbidden)
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return
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}
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}
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ctx = agplaibridge.WithAttribution(ctx, attribution)
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budgetResp, err := client.IsBudgetExceeded(ctx, &proto.IsBudgetExceededRequest{
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UserId: id.String(),
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})
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if err != nil {
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logger.Warn(ctx, "user AI budget check failed", slog.Error(err))
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http.Error(rw, ErrBudgetCheck.Error(), http.StatusInternalServerError)
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return
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}
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if budgetResp.GetExceeded() {
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http.Error(rw, fmt.Sprintf(
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"AI budget of US$%.2f exceeded. Please contact an administrator for more details.",
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float64(budgetResp.GetSpendLimitMicros())/1_000_000,
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), http.StatusForbidden)
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return
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}
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// Attach only the verified identity. Key secrets remain outside the
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// request context.
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ctx = aibridge.AsActor(ctx, aibridge.Actor{
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ID: id,
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APIKeyID: resp.GetApiKeyId(),
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Username: resp.GetUsername(),
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Email: resp.GetEmail(),
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})
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r = r.WithContext(ctx)
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handler, err := s.GetRequestHandler(ctx, Request{
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SessionKey: key,
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APIKeyID: resp.ApiKeyId,
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InitiatorID: id,
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})
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if err != nil {
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logger.Warn(ctx, "failed to acquire request handler", slog.Error(err))
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http.Error(rw, ErrAcquireRequestHandler.Error(), http.StatusInternalServerError)
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return
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}
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handler.ServeHTTP(rw, r)
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}
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// attributionFromAuthorization extracts the workspace ID from the
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// IsAuthorizedResponse. The proto carries only workspace_id for attribution;
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// organization and workspace name are not returned.
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func attributionFromAuthorization(resp *proto.IsAuthorizedResponse) (agplaibridge.Attribution, error) {
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if resp.GetWorkspaceId() == "" {
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return agplaibridge.Attribution{}, nil
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}
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workspaceID, err := uuid.Parse(resp.GetWorkspaceId())
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if err != nil {
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return agplaibridge.Attribution{}, xerrors.Errorf("parse workspace ID: %w", err)
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}
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return agplaibridge.Attribution{WorkspaceID: workspaceID}, nil
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}
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