fix: patch CVE dependencies and path traversal risks

Upgrade aiohttp and related packages, harden local file and storage path checks, tighten password/JWT comparisons, and default Docker forwarded IP trust to empty.
This commit is contained in:
vastsa committed 2026-07-21 14:49:30 +08:00
1 parent c676458370
commit 605eec43f3
7 files changed
+199 -36

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+12 -4
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@@ -57,16 +57,24 @@ RUN ln -sf /usr/share/zoneinfo/Asia/Shanghai /etc/localtime && \
COPY --from=frontend-builder /build/fronted-2024/dist ./themes/2024
COPY --from=frontend-builder /build/fronted-2023/dist ./themes/2023
# 安装 Python 依赖
RUN pip install --no-cache-dir -r requirements.txt
# 安装系统安全更新 + Python 依赖
# 清理 apt 缓存,降低镜像噪音与扫描面
RUN apt-get update \
&& apt-get upgrade -y --no-install-recommends \
&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/* \
&& pip install --no-cache-dir -r requirements.txt \
&& pip cache purge || true
# 环境变量配置
ENV HOST="0.0.0.0" \
PORT=12345 \
WORKERS=1 \
LOG_LEVEL="info"
LOG_LEVEL="info" \
FORWARDED_ALLOW_IPS=""
EXPOSE 12345
# 生产环境启动命令
CMD ["sh", "-c", "exec uvicorn main:app --host \"$HOST\" --port \"$PORT\" --workers \"$WORKERS\" --log-level \"$LOG_LEVEL\" --proxy-headers --forwarded-allow-ips '*'"]
# FORWARDED_ALLOW_IPS 默认为空:仅信任直连 IP,避免任意客户端伪造 X-Forwarded-*。
# 若前面有反向代理,请显式设置为代理网段,例如 "10.0.0.0/8,172.16.0.0/12"。
CMD ["sh", "-c", "exec uvicorn main:app --host \"$HOST\" --port \"$PORT\" --workers \"$WORKERS\" --log-level \"$LOG_LEVEL\" --proxy-headers --forwarded-allow-ips \"${FORWARDED_ALLOW_IPS:-}\""]
+23 -11
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@@ -48,15 +48,20 @@ def create_token(data: dict, expires_in: int | None = None) -> str:
token_lifetime = (
get_admin_session_expire_seconds() if expires_in is None else expires_in
)
header = base64.b64encode(
json.dumps({"alg": "HS256", "typ": "JWT"}).encode()
).decode()
payload = base64.b64encode(
json.dumps({**data, "exp": int(time.time()) + token_lifetime}).encode()
).decode()
header = base64.urlsafe_b64encode(
json.dumps({"alg": "HS256", "typ": "JWT"}, separators=(",", ":")).encode()
).decode().rstrip("=")
payload = base64.urlsafe_b64encode(
json.dumps(
{**data, "exp": int(time.time()) + token_lifetime},
separators=(",", ":"),
).encode()
).decode().rstrip("=")
signature = hmac.new(_get_jwt_secret(), f"{header}.{payload}".encode(), "sha256").digest()
signature = base64.b64encode(signature).decode()
signature = hmac.new(
_get_jwt_secret(), f"{header}.{payload}".encode(), "sha256"
).digest()
signature = base64.urlsafe_b64encode(signature).decode().rstrip("=")
return f"{header}.{payload}.{signature}"
@@ -76,13 +81,20 @@ def verify_token(token: str) -> dict:
f"{header_b64}.{payload_b64}".encode(),
"sha256",
).digest()
expected_signature_b64 = base64.b64encode(expected_signature).decode()
expected_signature_b64 = (
base64.urlsafe_b64encode(expected_signature).decode().rstrip("=")
)
if not hmac.compare_digest(signature_b64, expected_signature_b64):
raise ValueError("无效的签名")
# 解码payload
payload = json.loads(base64.b64decode(payload_b64))
# 解码payload(兼容历史标准 base64 与 urlsafe base64)
padded = payload_b64 + "=" * (-len(payload_b64) % 4)
try:
payload_bytes = base64.urlsafe_b64decode(padded)
except Exception:
payload_bytes = base64.b64decode(padded)
payload = json.loads(payload_bytes)
# 检查是否过期
if payload.get("exp", 0) < time.time():
+31 -4
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@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
import hashlib
from pathlib import Path
import os
import time
import uuid
@@ -1627,9 +1628,35 @@ class LocalFileService:
class LocalFileClass:
def __init__(self, file):
self.file = file
self.path = data_root / "local" / file
if os.path.exists(self.path):
# 仅允许 data/local 目录下的单层文件名,阻断路径穿越与绝对路径访问。
raw_name = str(file or "")
normalized = Path(raw_name).as_posix()
# 输入本身不得包含路径分隔符或绝对路径形态。
if (
not raw_name
or raw_name in {".", ".."}
or normalized in {".", ".."}
or "/" in normalized
or normalized.startswith("~")
or Path(raw_name).is_absolute()
or Path(raw_name).name != raw_name
):
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="非法文件名")
safe_name = Path(raw_name).name
if not safe_name or safe_name in {".", ".."}:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="非法文件名")
local_root = (data_root / "local").resolve()
candidate = (local_root / safe_name).resolve()
try:
candidate.relative_to(local_root)
except ValueError:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="非法文件路径")
self.file = safe_name
self.path = candidate
if self.path.is_file():
self.ctime = time.strftime(
"%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S", time.localtime(os.path.getctime(self.path))
)
@@ -1649,4 +1676,4 @@ class LocalFileClass:
os.remove(self.path)
async def exists(self):
return os.path.exists(self.path)
return self.path.is_file()
+32 -11
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@@ -111,6 +111,17 @@ class SystemFileStorage(FileStorageInterface):
self.chunk_size = 256 * 1024
self.root_path = data_root
def _resolve_safe_path(self, relative_path: str) -> Path:
"""将相对路径解析到数据根目录内,阻止路径穿越。"""
root = self.root_path.resolve()
raw = str(relative_path or "").replace("\\", "/").lstrip("/")
candidate = (root / raw).resolve()
try:
candidate.relative_to(root)
except ValueError as exc:
raise ValueError("非法文件路径") from exc
return candidate
def _save(self, file, save_path):
with open(save_path, "wb") as f:
chunk = file.read(self.chunk_size)
@@ -119,19 +130,19 @@ class SystemFileStorage(FileStorageInterface):
chunk = file.read(self.chunk_size)
async def save_file(self, file: UploadFile, save_path: str):
path_obj = Path(save_path)
directory = str(path_obj.parent)
path_obj = Path(str(save_path).replace("\\", "/"))
directory = str(path_obj.parent).replace("\\", "/").lstrip("/")
# 提取原始文件名并进行清理
filename = await sanitize_filename(path_obj.name)
# 构建安全的完整保存路径
safe_save_path = self.root_path / directory / filename
safe_save_path = self._resolve_safe_path(f"{directory}/{filename}" if directory not in {"", "."} else filename)
# 确保目录存在
if not safe_save_path.parent.exists():
safe_save_path.parent.mkdir(parents=True)
await asyncio.to_thread(self._save, file.file, safe_save_path)
async def delete_file(self, file_code: FileCodes):
save_path = self.root_path / await file_code.get_file_path()
save_path = self._resolve_safe_path(await file_code.get_file_path())
if save_path.exists():
save_path.unlink()
@@ -139,7 +150,7 @@ class SystemFileStorage(FileStorageInterface):
return await get_file_url(file_code.code)
async def get_file_response(self, file_code: FileCodes):
file_path = self.root_path / await file_code.get_file_path()
file_path = self._resolve_safe_path(await file_code.get_file_path())
if not file_path.exists():
return APIResponse(code=404, detail="文件已过期删除")
filename = f"{file_code.prefix}{file_code.suffix}"
@@ -171,8 +182,11 @@ class SystemFileStorage(FileStorageInterface):
:param chunk_hash: 分片哈希值
:param save_path: 文件保存路径
"""
chunk_dir = self.root_path / save_path
chunk_path = chunk_dir.parent / 'chunks' / upload_id / f"{chunk_index}.part"
# 先校验目标文件路径合法,再将分片落到同级 chunks 目录。
self._resolve_safe_path(save_path)
chunk_path = self._resolve_safe_path(
str(Path(save_path).parent / "chunks" / upload_id / f"{chunk_index}.part")
)
if not chunk_path.parent.exists():
chunk_path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
# 使用临时文件写入,确保原子性
@@ -195,9 +209,11 @@ class SystemFileStorage(FileStorageInterface):
:param save_path: 文件保存路径
:return: (文件路径, 文件哈希值)
"""
output_path = self.root_path / save_path
output_path = self._resolve_safe_path(save_path)
output_path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
chunk_base_dir = output_path.parent / 'chunks' / upload_id
chunk_base_dir = self._resolve_safe_path(
str(Path(save_path).parent / "chunks" / upload_id)
)
file_sha256 = hashlib.sha256()
# 使用临时文件写入,确保原子性
@@ -233,7 +249,9 @@ class SystemFileStorage(FileStorageInterface):
:param upload_id: 上传会话ID
:param save_path: 文件保存路径
"""
chunk_dir = (self.root_path / save_path).parent / 'chunks' / upload_id
chunk_dir = self._resolve_safe_path(
str(Path(save_path).parent / "chunks" / upload_id)
)
if chunk_dir.exists():
try:
shutil.rmtree(chunk_dir)
@@ -253,7 +271,10 @@ class SystemFileStorage(FileStorageInterface):
:param save_path: 文件路径
:return: 文件是否存在
"""
file_path = self.root_path / save_path
try:
file_path = self._resolve_safe_path(save_path)
except ValueError:
return False
return file_path.exists()
+3 -2
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@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
# @Software: PyCharm
import datetime
import hashlib
import hmac
import os
import re
import secrets
@@ -124,10 +125,10 @@ def verify_password(password: str, hashed: str) -> bool:
return False
_, salt, stored_hash = parts
password_hash = hashlib.sha256(f"{salt}{password}".encode()).hexdigest()
return password_hash == stored_hash
return hmac.compare_digest(password_hash, stored_hash)
# 旧格式: 明文比较 (兼容迁移前的数据)
return password == hashed
return hmac.compare_digest(str(password), str(hashed))
def is_password_hashed(password: str) -> bool:
+5 -4
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@@ -1,8 +1,9 @@
aioboto3==15.5.0
aiohttp==3.13.3
aiohttp==3.14.2
aiofiles==25.1.0
fastapi==0.128.0
fastapi==0.139.2
starlette==1.3.1
pydantic==2.12.5
uvicorn==0.40.0
uvicorn==0.51.0
tortoise-orm==0.25.3
python-multipart==0.0.21
python-multipart==0.0.32
+93
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@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
import asyncio
import os
import tempfile
import unittest
from pathlib import Path
from unittest.mock import patch
from fastapi import HTTPException
from apps.admin import dependencies as admin_dependencies
from apps.admin.dependencies import create_token, verify_token
from apps.admin.services import LocalFileClass
from core.settings import data_root, settings
from core.storage import SystemFileStorage
from core.utils import hash_password, verify_password
class PasswordCompareTests(unittest.TestCase):
def test_verify_password_accepts_valid_hash(self):
hashed = hash_password("s3cret-pass")
self.assertTrue(verify_password("s3cret-pass", hashed))
self.assertFalse(verify_password("wrong-pass", hashed))
def test_verify_password_supports_legacy_plaintext(self):
self.assertTrue(verify_password("legacy", "legacy"))
self.assertFalse(verify_password("legacy", "other"))
class LocalFilePathTraversalTests(unittest.TestCase):
def setUp(self):
self._tmpdir = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
self.local_root = Path(self._tmpdir.name) / "local"
self.local_root.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
(self.local_root / "safe.txt").write_text("ok", encoding="utf-8")
self._data_root_patch = patch(
"apps.admin.services.data_root", Path(self._tmpdir.name)
)
self._data_root_patch.start()
def tearDown(self):
self._data_root_patch.stop()
self._tmpdir.cleanup()
def test_rejects_dotdot_filename(self):
with self.assertRaises(HTTPException) as ctx:
LocalFileClass("../etc/passwd")
self.assertEqual(ctx.exception.status_code, 400)
def test_rejects_absolute_filename(self):
with self.assertRaises(HTTPException) as ctx:
LocalFileClass("/etc/passwd")
self.assertEqual(ctx.exception.status_code, 400)
def test_allows_basename_inside_local(self):
local_file = LocalFileClass("safe.txt")
self.assertTrue(asyncio.run(local_file.exists()))
self.assertEqual(local_file.file, "safe.txt")
self.assertEqual(local_file.path, (self.local_root / "safe.txt").resolve())
class SystemStoragePathTests(unittest.TestCase):
def setUp(self):
self._tmpdir = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
self.storage = SystemFileStorage()
self.storage.root_path = Path(self._tmpdir.name)
def tearDown(self):
self._tmpdir.cleanup()
def test_resolve_safe_path_blocks_escape(self):
with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
self.storage._resolve_safe_path("../etc/passwd")
def test_resolve_safe_path_allows_nested(self):
target = self.storage._resolve_safe_path("share/data/a/b.txt")
self.assertTrue(str(target).startswith(str(Path(self._tmpdir.name).resolve())))
class AdminJwtUrlSafeTests(unittest.TestCase):
def setUp(self):
settings.jwt_secret = "j" * 48
def test_create_and_verify_roundtrip(self):
token = create_token({"is_admin": True}, expires_in=60)
# urlsafe token 不应依赖标准 base64 填充字符
self.assertNotIn("+", token)
self.assertNotIn("/", token)
payload = verify_token(token)
self.assertTrue(payload["is_admin"])
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()