Files
vastsa 031d300cae fix: keep Docker as root, close s3_hostname SSRF, unbreak 404 tests
Revert gosu/non-root entrypoint so NAS and root-owned volumes keep
working. Reject @/userinfo in s3_hostname. Theme-less checkouts no
longer crash the HTML 404 handler.
2026-09-20 02:05:57 +08:00

173 lines
6.0 KiB
Python
Raw Permalink Blame History

This file contains ambiguous Unicode characters
This file contains Unicode characters that might be confused with other characters. If you think that this is intentional, you can safely ignore this warning. Use the Escape button to reveal them.
import copy
import ipaddress
import os
import secrets
import socket
from dataclasses import dataclass
from typing import Any
from urllib.parse import urlsplit
from core.utils import hash_password, is_password_hashed, verify_password
JWT_SECRET_MIN_LENGTH = 32
INTERNAL_CONFIG_KEYS = {"jwt_secret"}
LEGACY_DEFAULT_ADMIN_TOKEN = "FileCodeBox" + "2023"
@dataclass
class SecurityConfigResult:
config: dict[str, Any]
changed: bool = False
password_hashed: bool = False
jwt_secret_rotated: bool = False
setup_required: bool = False
def generate_jwt_secret() -> str:
return secrets.token_urlsafe(48)
def is_valid_jwt_secret(secret: Any) -> bool:
return isinstance(secret, str) and len(secret) >= JWT_SECRET_MIN_LENGTH
def is_config_initialized(config: dict[str, Any]) -> bool:
"""Cheap initialization probe — runs on EVERY request via the middleware.
Must never run a slow hash: a scrypt-stored token cannot be the legacy
default (which only ever existed as plaintext or sha256), so those tokens
are initialized without any verification. Only plaintext/sha256 tokens go
through the legacy-default comparison, which is microseconds.
"""
admin_token = str(config.get("admin_token") or "")
if not admin_token:
return False
if is_password_hashed(admin_token) and admin_token.startswith("scrypt$"):
return True
return not verify_password(LEGACY_DEFAULT_ADMIN_TOKEN, admin_token)
def prepare_security_config(config: dict[str, Any]) -> SecurityConfigResult:
next_config = copy.deepcopy(config)
result = SecurityConfigResult(config=next_config)
admin_token = str(next_config.get("admin_token") or "")
if not admin_token:
result.setup_required = True
elif verify_password(LEGACY_DEFAULT_ADMIN_TOKEN, admin_token):
next_config["admin_token"] = ""
result.setup_required = True
result.changed = True
elif not is_password_hashed(admin_token):
next_config["admin_token"] = hash_password(admin_token)
result.password_hashed = True
result.changed = True
jwt_secret = next_config.get("jwt_secret")
if not is_valid_jwt_secret(jwt_secret):
next_config["jwt_secret"] = generate_jwt_secret()
result.jwt_secret_rotated = True
result.changed = True
return result
# 出站端点白名单/黑名单(SSRF 防护)。
# 这些配置项会被服务器直接当作上游地址访问:被劫持的管理员会话可以把实例
# 变成内网代理跳板,或把数据发往任意地址。校验只在写入入口(update_config),
# 已存值不受影响;APP_ENV 非 production(本地开发,如 minio/webdav)时放行。
OUTBOUND_ENDPOINT_CONFIG_KEYS = ("s3_endpoint_url", "s3_hostname", "webdav_url")
_ENDPOINT_SCHEME_WHITELIST = {"http", "https"}
_ENDPOINT_HOST_DENY_SUFFIXES = (
".local",
".internal",
".lan",
".home.arpa",
".corp",
".localhost",
)
def _endpoint_ip_is_denied(ip_str: str) -> bool:
try:
ip = ipaddress.ip_address(ip_str)
except ValueError:
return False
return (
ip.is_private
or ip.is_loopback
or ip.is_link_local
or ip.is_reserved
or ip.is_multicast
or ip.is_unspecified
)
def _endpoint_host_is_denied(host: str) -> bool:
host = host.strip("[]").lower()
if host in {"localhost"} or host.endswith(_ENDPOINT_HOST_DENY_SUFFIXES):
return True
# 字面 IP 直接判;非字面形态(速记 "127.1"、十进制 2130706433、十六进制、
# *.localhost、nip.io 类 DNS 映射)交给解析后逐 IP 复判——静态字符串
# 黑名单对它们全部失效,这是探测中实测确认的绕过面。
if _endpoint_ip_is_denied(host):
return True
try:
infos = socket.getaddrinfo(host, None)
except (socket.gaierror, UnicodeError, OSError):
return False
for info in infos:
# getaddrinfo 的 sockaddr 首元素在 IPv4/IPv6 下均为 str(int 仅出现在
# AF_UNIX 等异形族)——显式 str() 让类型检查器与运行时一致。
if _endpoint_ip_is_denied(str(info[4][0])):
return True
return False
def validate_outbound_endpoint(value: Any) -> str:
"""校验完整 URL 形态的出站端点(s3_endpoint_url / webdav_url)。"""
endpoint = str(value or "").strip()
if not endpoint:
return ""
if os.environ.get("APP_ENV", "development") != "production":
return endpoint
parts = urlsplit(endpoint)
if parts.scheme.lower() not in _ENDPOINT_SCHEME_WHITELIST:
raise ValueError(f"端点协议必须是 http(s):{endpoint}")
host = parts.hostname or ""
if not host:
raise ValueError(f"端点缺少主机名:{endpoint}")
if _endpoint_host_is_denied(host):
raise ValueError(f"端点不允许指向内网/保留地址:{endpoint}")
return endpoint
def validate_outbound_hostname(value: Any) -> str:
"""校验裸主机名形态的出站端点(s3_hostname,存储层拼接 https://{hostname})。"""
hostname = str(value or "").strip()
if not hostname:
return ""
if os.environ.get("APP_ENV", "development") != "production":
return hostname
if "://" in hostname or "/" in hostname or "@" in hostname:
raise ValueError(f"s3_hostname 应为裸主机名,不含协议、路径或 userinfo:{hostname}")
# 取主机部分:[v6] 形态取括号内;host:port 取冒号前;裸 IPv6(多个冒号)整体
if "[" in hostname:
host = hostname.split("[", 1)[1].split("]", 1)[0]
rest = hostname.split("]", 1)[1] if "]" in hostname else ""
if rest and not rest.startswith(":"):
raise ValueError(f"s3_hostname 的 IPv6 括号后只允许端口:{hostname}")
elif hostname.count(":") == 1:
host = hostname.split(":")[0]
else:
host = hostname
if not host or _endpoint_host_is_denied(host):
raise ValueError(f"端点不允许指向内网/保留地址:{hostname}")
return hostname