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Commits
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1f1aa6ae3c |
feat: add chat project template schema and queries (#32309)
Adds the database layer for attaching workspace templates to chat projects: the schema, the queries, their authorization, and the audit type. Nothing calls the new queries yet, and the existing create and update handlers pass the new parameters unset. The API, the limit's enforcement, and the agent tools follow in the PRs above. - Attachments live in a `chat_project_templates` table (`project_id`, `template_id`, `created_by`, `created_at`), deleted with the project or the template. `chat_projects` gains `limit_templates` (default `false`), `default_template_id`, `default_template_version_preset_id`, and `default_parameters jsonb`. A project stores a default preset or default parameter values, not both. - `InsertChatProjectTemplates` needs project `update` and `use` on every template. It skips templates that are already attached, and templates outside the project's organization, so an attachment never crosses organizations. `DeleteChatProjectTemplate` needs project `update` and template `read`, and clears the project's default when it detaches the default template. Both checks are in dbauthz. - `GetChatProjectTemplatesByProjectIDs` is authorized through the project, and leaves out deleted, deprecated, and agent-disabled templates. It does not check the caller's access to each template, so callers do that before they expose one. - `UpdateChatProjectByID` changes the template settings only when the request sets them, so an update that omits them cannot write back a stale snapshot. - `AuditableChatProjectTemplates` is the audit form of a project's attached templates, logged as a write to the project. The new `chat_projects` columns are tracked in the project's own audit diff, with the default parameter values masked because they may hold credentials. **NOTE**: the migration adds one table and four columns and changes no existing rows. Existing projects keep unlimited template access. Stack (merge top to bottom): - #32309 👈 - #30754 - #32310 - #30755 - #30756 - #30898 |
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4866d0fb1f |
feat: add display names to project skill actions (#31747)
closes CODAGT-1506 Project skill action chips show the skill's slug (`deploy-bot`, `security-review`), because skill names must be kebab-case. This adds an optional display name that labels the chip instead. Project skills get a `display_name` column, set through `display_name` on the create and update requests. It is limited to project skills (the same rule as `action`), trimmed, single line, and at most 64 Unicode code points. The chip, its tooltip, and the "More" menu show the display name, sort by it, and fall back to the skill name when it is empty. When a display name is set, the tooltip and the menu item also show the `/name` slash command, so actions that share a display name stay distinguishable. Clicking an action still inserts `/name`, and the `/` menu is unchanged. The project skill editor shows a **Display name** field under **Show as action** only while that switch is on. Turning the switch off hides the field but keeps its value, and saves omit `display_name` while the action is off, so the stored value stays. The display name lives in the database rather than SKILL.md frontmatter, so downloading and re-importing a skill does not carry it. To share the code-point length check with the editor, `countCharacters` and `maxCharacters` move from `ChatProjectDialog.tsx` into `site/src/utils/formUtils.ts`. <img width="637" alt="Project skill editor with the Display name field under Show as action" src="https://raw.githubusercontent.com/coder/coder/assets/pr-skill-action-display-name/pr/edit.png" /> <img width="520" alt="Action chips labeled with display names, with the tooltip open" src="https://raw.githubusercontent.com/coder/coder/assets/pr-skill-action-display-name/pr/chips.png" /> Refs CODAGT-1506 |
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d70ce38559 |
feat: record the OAuth2 client registration method of MCP server configs (#31558)
Relates to CODAGT-779 Currently we can't tell whether the OAuth2 client of an MCP server config was entered by an admin, or registered by Coder with Dynamic Client Registration (RFC 7591). The next PR in the stack needs to know this, so it can register a new client when a config is updated. This PR adds `mcp_server_configs.oauth2_client_registration` (`manual` or `dynamic`) and returns it to admins on the API. Create stores `dynamic` when it registers the client, and `manual` otherwise. An update resets it to `manual` when it switches away from the `oauth2` auth type, or when it changes the client ID, secret, auth URL or token URL of a `dynamic` config, since the admin has replaced Coder's client. Existing rows default to `manual`, as there's nothing in the data that tells us which clients came from Dynamic Client Registration. |
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161b7233d9 |
feat(coderd): store the organization on AI Gateway interceptions (#31118)
Adds `organization_id` (FK to `organizations`, `ON DELETE RESTRICT`) and `organization_source` (new enum: `workspace`, `chatd`, `effective_group`) to `aibridge_interceptions`, with a check constraint that keeps them set or unset together. Cost and pricing run later, in `RecordTokenUsage`, so they need the organization that AIGOV-716a resolves once per request stored on the interception row. `RecordInterceptionRequest` gains `organization_id` (18) and `organization_source` (19), and the aibridged API moves to v1.5. `RecordInterception` stores a valid pair; any other combination is logged as a warning and stored as NULLs, so a gateway bug never turns into an HTTP 500 for the user. A well-formed ID for an organization that does not exist fails on the FK, like an unknown `initiator_id`. Nothing sends the fields yet, so behaviour is unchanged until AIGOV-716a. **Malformed values are stored as empty, not rejected.** A failed `RecordInterception` returns HTTP 500 to the user, so the server logs a warning and stores NULLs instead. The one exception is a well-formed ID for an organization that does not exist: the foreign key rejects it, the same as an unknown `initiator_id` today. Part of AIGOV-712 *This PR was generated by Coder Agents on behalf of @SasSwart.* |
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c4d76a4009 |
feat: add skill action and automatic-use settings (#30882)
Adds two per-skill settings that the project skills UI will expose next: - `action` marks a project skill to show as an action button above project chat composers. A `skills_action_project_only` check keeps it to project skills; the personal and organization routes reject `action` with 400. - `model_invocable` (default true, every stored source) controls automatic use. When it's false the skill is left out of `<available-skills>` and `read_skill` reports it as not found, but a structured skill invocation (a chip from the `/` menu or an action) still loads it, as long as the skill is enabled and the chat owner can read it. Workspace skills always count as model-invocable. Migration 000625 adds both columns with defaults, so existing skills keep today's behavior. The list, get, insert and update queries, `codersdk.SkillMetadata` and the create/update requests carry both fields, and the audit table tracks them. `coderd/x/chatd/ARCHITECTURE.md` gets TODO notes for the author. **NOTE**: the migration adds two columns with constant defaults and a CHECK constraint to `skills`. Stack (merge top to bottom): - #30826 - #30827 - #30838 - #30840 - #30854 - #30855 - #30856 - #30861 - #30880 - #30881 - #30882 👈 - #30884 - #31122 - #31126 --------- Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> Co-authored-by: Nick Vigilante <nickvigilante@users.noreply.github.com> |
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d14631df1a |
feat(coderd/database): add organization AI model config table (#30717)
Adds `ai_model_configs`: an organization's AI Governance configuration for one model on one configured provider. Token prices are its first settings. Migration `000630` is additive and needs no backfill. - Rows are soft deleted with a `deleted` flag. A surrogate `id` is the primary key, and a partial unique index allows one live row per `(organization_id, provider_id, model)`. Cascades on delete of the organization or provider. The organization is a column, as in other organization-scoped tables. - A check constraint rejects an empty model. - Pricing per provider ID is what lets `openai-compat` gateways be priced, and lets providers of the same type have different prices. - Site-wide prices per provider type stay in the existing `ai_model_prices` table, unchanged. Recording which price was used on each token usage record is deferred until its design settles. **Used later:** #30718 adds the queries that read and write the table, and #30719 looks prices up from it. The rest of the diff is generated. --- *This PR was generated by Coder Agents on behalf of @SasSwart.* |
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6d34557d74 |
feat: add script ordering adoption telemetry (#30860)
Count `coder_script_order` declarations and literal `rule` blocks in coderd from the existing START plan in `CompletedJob.TemplateImport.Plan`, including child modules, without multiplying counts by resource or module instances. Persist these counts per template version on successful import after START plan graph validation, without changing the provisioner API. Report a deployment-wide `script_order_summary` with the number of templates using script ordering and total declaration and rule counts. Include only active, successfully imported versions of non-deleted templates so repeated imports do not inflate adoption. Elect one reporting replica per snapshot period and report explicit zeros when no templates use ordering. The summary contains only aggregate counts, without template identifiers or rule contents. Dynamic rule blocks are not counted because Terraform omits them from configuration JSON. Configuration-decoding failures are logged and skip updating the counts without independently failing the import. Script-order summary collection failures are logged and omit that summary while allowing the rest of the snapshot to proceed. Refs: https://linear.app/codercom/issue/PLAT-551 |
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7aef110ca2 |
feat: add workspace secrets table, queries, and RBAC (#30248)
Adds the database table, queries, and permissions for workspace secrets: secrets set on a workspace build and delivered to the agent, never to Terraform. Each secret belongs to one workspace build. A new build copies the previous build's secrets, then the old copies lose their values but stay as history. |
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2b9fad8bba |
feat: add chat project sharing database layer (#30479)
Database and authorization layer for chat project sharing (experiment `chat-projects`), part 1 of 2. #30439 adds the API on top of it. Nothing here changes behavior: projects start with empty ACLs, no endpoint writes them yet, and deleting a project still detaches its chats. Project deletion is in #30683. - **Schema:** migration `000621` adds `user_acl` and `group_acl` jsonb columns to `chat_projects`, typed as `ChatACL` like chats, with GIN indexes. It also adds the `chat_project:share` API key scope. - **Queries:** - `GetChatProjectsOwnedOrSharedWithUserID`: owned projects plus projects with an ACL entry for the user directly, through a group, or through the Everyone group (whose ID is the organization ID). Entries count only for members of the project's organization. Keys match regardless of actions, so dbauthz filters the rows. - `IsChatProjectAccessibleByUserID`: whether a user owns a project or holds a `read` or `*` grant on it, for code running under a system subject. With sharing disabled, dbauthz answers owner-only. - `GetChatProjectByIDForUpdate`: lets the ACL update read, modify, and write in one transaction. - `UpdateChatProjectACLByID`. - **RBAC:** - New `share` action on `chat_project`. dbauthz requires it to update the ACL. - `ChatProject.RBACObject` attaches the project ACL. Memory objects get a derived ACL: project `read` grants memory read, and `read` with `update` grants memory create and delete. Wildcard grants count. Read sharees change memories through their chats' agents, which #30439 gates. Project instructions authorize through the same object, so a `read` grant reads them and an `update` grant edits them. - `--disable-chat-sharing` also covers projects: ACLs are ignored, the ACL update is rejected, and roles deny `chat_project:share`. The help text and chat sharing docs say so. - **Audit:** `user_acl` and `group_acl` changes are tracked. - **Tests:** - Querier tests run the access queries both raw and through dbauthz (owner, direct user, group, Everyone, wildcard grants, a member of another org, grants without read). - RBAC object and memory ACL tests, with an authorizer check, in both sharing modes. - dbauthz cases including the disabled guards, and the `chat_project:share` negation in the roles test. The generated TypeScript changes only add the new scope value. > Generated by Coder Agents. |
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b67587c875 |
feat: add the organization skills data model (#30609)
## Stack Part of [CODAGT-1341](https://linear.app/codercom/issue/CODAGT-1341/support-organization-level-skills-in-coder-agents). This stack adds organization skills to Coder Agents: admins publish a skill once per organization, share it with groups or members, and chats in that organization load it next to personal and workspace skills. It replaces the 21-PR draft stack #30584 to #30604 with five PRs, bottom to top: 1. **#30609** data model: one migration, queries, RBAC and dbauthz (this PR) 2. #30610 organization skill API routes and the scope-neutral SDK 3. #30611 sharing ACL routes 4. #30612 settings UI: shared skills table, admin page, member section 5. #30613 chats: chatd loading, `/` menu, docs ## What changes This PR adds the data model and authorization for organization skills. Personal skills keep working unchanged: `git diff origin/main -- codersdk site` shows only generated RBAC and API key scope additions (`apikey_scopes_gen.go`, `rbacresources_gen.go`, `rbacresourcesGenerated.ts`, the RBAC and scope unions in `typesGenerated.ts`) and `codersdk.ResourceTypeOrganizationSkill` with its friendly string. No personal route, SDK type or site component changes, and `coderd/userskills_test.go` changes only by mechanical constant renames. **One migration, `000621_skills`** (please review it closely): - renames `user_skills` to `skills` with its constraints, index and triggers, and recreates the cap function and `delete_deleted_user_resources`, whose PL/pgSQL bodies name the table; - adds `organization_id` and `project_id` (`ON DELETE CASCADE`), `enabled` (default true), and `group_acl` / `user_acl` (`jsonb`, default `{}`), with CHECKs for exactly one owner, ACLs that are JSON objects, and ACLs that stay empty unless an organization owns the row, plus partial unique name indexes per owner kind; - replaces the cap trigger with `enforce_skills_per_owner_limit()`: 100 rows per owner, disabled rows included, locking the owner row `FOR NO KEY UPDATE` so unrelated foreign key checks are not blocked; - adds a `BEFORE DELETE` trigger on `organization_members` that removes a departing member from `user_acl` on that organization's skills, so rejoining doesn't restore a direct grant; - adds the `organization_skill` `resource_type` and `api_key_scope` enum values last; nothing in the migration uses them. The down migration undoes the three old migrations in reverse order: it drops organization and project rows and restores `user_skills`, its names, the cap function and `user_id NOT NULL`. Authorization: a new RBAC resource `organization_skill` (create, read, update, delete, share). Owner and org admin get it; site and org auditors get read; members read only through the skill's ACL, which applies only to members of its organization. `Skill.RBACObject()` returns the organization object with both ACLs; project rows stay denied to everyone. New sqlc queries cover organization insert, get, list (SQL-filtered through `GetAuthorizedOrganizationSkillMetadata` and a `regosql` converter), update and delete, with dbauthz wrappers and the audit table entries. No routes yet. ## Commits The first commit reproduces the reviewed code from the old stack; each later commit is a labeled trim or fix. - `baa3150e3b7` feat: add the organization skills data model. Reproduction: every non-site file this commit changes equals the reviewed old `authz` head `1e16b3004c4`, except that the old stack's migrations 000615, 000616 and 000617 are merged into one migration (then `000615_skills`, now `000621_skills`) with one fixture (`testdata/fixtures/000621_skills.up.sql`) and one migration test (now `testMigration000621Skills`). At that commit, `dump.sql` was byte-identical to the old head's. - `1b84e83463a` test(coderd/database): keep only the SQL paths of the org skill matrix. `TestOrganizationSkillAuthorization` becomes `TestOrganizationSkillQueries` instead of being deleted, because coverage showed it is this PR's only run of the `GetAuthorizedOrganizationSkillMetadata` row scan (80% to 65% without it) and of the organization update and delete queries (100% to 0%). Swapping `group_acl` and `user_acl` in the converter makes `GrantedMember` fail. The removed cases are decided by `TestRolePermissions`, `TestSkillRBACObjectOrganizationACL` and the dbauthz method suite. - `e2931b412e9` test(coderd/database): fold the skill cap cases into existing coverage. The user case is covered by `TestUserSkillLimit` and `TestUserSkillLimitConcurrentCreates`; the organization case folds into `ConcurrentOrganizationInsertsHonorCap`, which now also checks that disabled rows count and another organization is unaffected (mutation checked); the project case stays. - `be62aea9021` test(coderd/rbac): drop `TestOrganizationSkillReadScope`, covered by `TestExternalScopeNames` and the generated scope file. - `0c275ba37de` merges main at `454a2fcc697`, which took 000615 to 000618: it renumbers the migration to 000619 and resolves `dump.sql`, `check_constraint.go` and the generated API docs. `8f2b4b87ee2` merges main at `ad85646164e`, which took 000619: it renumbers the migration to 000620. - `5248d56b64f` merges main at `e7b76872098`, which took 000620 (`000620_audit_chat_project_instructions_resource_type`): it renumbers the migration, fixture and migration test to `000621_skills` (step `Migration000621Skills`, version 621), and resolves `enterprise/audit/table.go` (keeping main's `AuditableChatProjectInstructions` entries and the `Skill` entry), `dump.sql` and `models.go` (the `resource_type` enum gets `chat_project_instructions`, then `organization_skill`) and the regenerated `schemas.md`. The up and down SQL are unchanged by every renumbering. ## Size Production +549/-67, tests +728/-33, generated +881/-314; total +2158/-414. This is above the 500-line reviewer-friendly limit on purpose: Mike asked for 4 to 5 PRs instead of the 21 small ones this stack replaces. ## Replaces #30584 (rename `user_skills` to `skills`), #30585 (skill owners), #30586 (organization skill authorization). ## Validation - Migration test: up keeps the existing personal row and its ID; down restores the `user_skills` names, cap function and `NOT NULL`, and drops organization rows; soft-deleting a user removes their skills after up, after down, and after re-up. - `go test` passed on `be62aea9021`, before the main merges, for `coderd` (skill tests), `coderd/database`, `dbauthz`, `migrations`, `gentest`, `coderd/rbac/...`, `coderd/x/chatd`, `coderd/x/skills`, `enterprise/audit` and `enterprise/coderd`; `make lint/check-scopes` passed; the four personal skills Vitest files pass unchanged. - On `5248d56b64f`: build, vet, `TestMigrate`, `TestMigrationChain`, the `migrations`, `database`, `dbauthz`, `gentest`, `rbac` and `enterprise/audit` packages pass; `make gen` run twice is clean, and `make pre-commit` passes. - Remote UAT round 7 through Coder Agents passed on the whole stack; see #30613's Validation for scope and findings. > Xum opened this PR on behalf of @ibetitsmike. |
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ad85646164 |
feat(coderd): add chat project instructions storage and prompt injection (#30367)
Adds storage for project-level instructions in Coder Agents chat projects and injects them into every chat in the project. This is the first of four stacked PRs that replace #30349. A new `chat_project_instructions` table (migration 000613) holds at most one row per project, scoped to the project's organization. It records `updated_by` and cascades on project delete. The dbauthz wrappers authorize against the parent project: read access to get the instructions, update access to upsert or delete them. No new RBAC resource is added; project RBAC comes in a later PR. chatd loads the instructions on every turn, so edits reach existing chats on their next turn. They are added to the system prompt as a `<project-instructions>` block after the memory guidance and before personal instructions, so a user's personal instructions still win a conflict. Subagent chats carry no `project_id`, so they use their root chat's project. A load error other than no rows is logged, and the turn continues without instructions. **What to scrutinize:** the prompt ordering in `buildSystemPrompt`, and the choice to inject per turn rather than snapshot at chat creation. Per-turn injection costs one prompt-cache miss after each edit; the org instructions in #30272 use a creation-time snapshot instead. **Generated** (`make gen` from the migration and `queries/chatprojectinstructions.sql`): `dump.sql`, `models.go`, `querier.go`, `queries.sql.go`, `dbmetrics/querymetrics.go`, `dbmock/dbmock.go`, and the `*_constraint.go` files. `coderd/x/chatd/ARCHITECTURE.md` gets two TODOs for the PR author to replace with the real description, per AGENTS.md. **Validation:** `make gen` leaves no diff. `go test ./coderd/database/dbauthz -run TestMethodTestSuite/TestChats`, `go test ./coderd/x/chatd -run 'SystemPrompt|ProjectInstructions|Memory'`, and `go test ./coderd/database/migrations/...` pass. --- Stack (merge top to bottom). #30377 through #29583 are f0ssel's split of the original #29583, and this stack sits on #29583: - #30377 data layer and project dialog (f0ssel) - #30378 new-chat form locked to a project (f0ssel) - #30379 project page route (f0ssel) - #29583 sidebar folders (f0ssel), the base of this stack - #30291 composer frame - #30292 project chat list caches - #30293 project page header - #30294 project chats list - #30367 instructions storage and prompt injection 👈 - #30368 instructions API - #30369 instructions editor dialog - #30370 instructions Details panel --------- Co-authored-by: Garrett Delfosse <delfossegarrett@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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dae7967bd1 |
feat: persist script resource addresses and dependencies (#30625)
feat(coderd): persist workspace agent script dependencies Persist Terraform resource addresses and script dependencies supplied by the provisioner (#30451, #30491), and expose them through the SDK and REST API. - Add migration 000618 with `resource_address` and `dependencies` columns, empty defaults, and a JSON-array constraint. API responses always include the address and omit empty dependency lists. - Preserve `success` and `completion` requirements, including scripts on devcontainer subagents. Legacy scripts and older provisioners remain compatible through empty defaults. - Reject empty prerequisite addresses and unsupported requirements, rolling back the entire job. Invalid stored dependencies return HTTP 500 rather than silently dropping ordering. - Add persistence, validation, rollback, devcontainer, API, and migration coverage; regenerate API docs and TypeScript types. Unordered templates retain their existing execution behavior. Dependency lists remain empty until #30556. Agent manifest wiring and the agent API version bump are deferred to a follow-up. Refs PLAT-548. |
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f923f4a525 |
chore!: remove the chat automations experiment (#30412)
Removes the experimental Chat Automations feature (`chat-automations` experiment) from main. This reverts the 16-PR stack that added it and adds two forward migrations that undo its schema and credential changes.
> [!WARNING]
> **Upgrade consequences**
>
> - **Automation data is deleted.** Migration 000615 drops the `chat_automations` table and deletes every queued message an automation delivered. Chats, their messages and ordinary queued messages stay. Messages lose their automation provenance (`automation_id`, `input_id`).
> - **Automation-only credentials are revoked.** Migration 000616 deletes API keys, OAuth2 codes and OAuth2 tokens whose only scopes (or allow-list entries) were `chat_automation:*`. Mixed credentials keep their other scopes. Custom roles lose their `chat_automation` permissions. OAuth2 apps that allowed only `chat_automation` scopes get the whitespace allowlist that grants nothing, as in 000595.
> - **A coordinated restart is required.** Stop all old replicas before the new version runs the migrations. Old replicas read the dropped table and columns, so a rolling deploy is not supported.
> - **Remove `--chat-max-automations-per-owner` before upgrading.** The flag, the YAML key `chat.maxAutomationsPerOwner` and the env var `CODER_CHAT_MAX_AUTOMATIONS_PER_OWNER` are removed. A deployment that still sets the flag or the YAML key will not start (`unknown flag` / `unknown option`). The env var is ignored. This includes dogfood. No release or tag contains the flag.
> - **Down migrations restore the schema only.** 000616 down and 000615 down recreate the 000611 schema with empty tables. They do not restore deleted automations, webhook secrets, provenance, queued deliveries, revoked credentials, stripped permissions or the deleted experiment rule.
## What is removed
- The `chat-automations` experiment and its stored runtime rule (`experiment_rule:chat-automations`).
- The `--chat-max-automations-per-owner` deployment option.
- The `chat_automation` RBAC resource, its member and chatd grants, and the `chat_automation:*` API key scopes.
- The automation sqlc queries, dbauthz wrappers and audit table entries.
- The management routes under `/api/experimental/organizations/{organization}/chat-automations`, and the webhook route `POST /api/experimental/chat-automations/{automation}/events` with its rate limiter.
- The chatd management service, webhook publish, schedule loop, the `manage_automations` tool, and the chatstate admission seam and queue promotion guard that only automations used.
- The Agents Automations page, editor, nav entry, chat labels, the Manage automations toggle and the API client.
- The `archived:any` chat search value that the automations "View chats" dialog added.
- `docs/ai-coder/agents/automations.md`, its manifest entry, the glossary entry and the related rows.
Reverted PRs: #30085, #30096, #30112, #30117, #30127, #30134, #30160, #30166, #30167, #30171, #30187, #30207, #30214, #30217, #30219, #30220.
## What stays, and why
- Migrations 000609, 000610 and 000611, their fixture, and the #30297 lock fix with `migration000609_test.go` stay unchanged. Deployments such as dogfood already ran them.
- New migration **000615** reverses the schema changes of 000609 and 000611 against the current schema. It uses the same short-wait lock-and-retry block as 000609, and it rebuilds `chats_expanded` from main's current definition minus the two automation columns. New migration **000616** follows the 000595 Tasks removal for credentials and recreates `api_key_scope` without the five `chat_automation:*` values. It keeps the `chat_project_memory:*` values from 000612.
- The `chat_automation` value stays in the `resource_type` enum, and `codersdk.ResourceTypeChatAutomation` stays. Old audit log rows stay readable, as with `task` after the Tasks removal.
- The 000615 delete fires the existing queue-version trigger, so `queue_version` moves to `snapshot_version` for each affected chat. `snapshot_version` is not bumped: the coordinated restart restarts every stream loop from an empty state, and the site does not read the version fields.
- `coderd/x/chatd/ARCHITECTURE.md` drops the sections the stack added and gets back its pre-stack wording, merged with the later main edits to the same file.
## Notes for reviewers
- #30379 (chat project page) merged while this PR was in progress. It passed `manageAutomationsEnabled` in `AgentCreatePage.test.tsx` and listed an `automations` route in `AgentsPageLayout.test.tsx`. Later main commits also added automation props in `ConversationTimeline.test.tsx` and `ConversationTimelineWorkingBlocks.stories.tsx`. This PR removes all of them.
- Remaining `automation` matches under `coderd`, `codersdk`, `enterprise`, `site/src` and `docs` are intended:
- migrations 000609 to 000611, their fixture and `migration000609_test.go`;
- the new 000615 and 000616 migrations and `migration000615_test.go`;
- the `chat_automation` resource type in `dump.sql`, `models.go`, `codersdk/audit.go`, the generated API docs, `swagger.json` and `typesGenerated.ts`;
- unrelated uses of the word "automation" (docs, `chatlabels_test.go`, `ratelimit.go`, `autostop.go`, `subagent_catalog.go`, `WorkspaceSharingSection.tsx`, `AgentChatPage.stories.tsx`).
Remote UAT on an isolated dev deployment passed. It upgraded a populated pre-removal database, then checked chats, queued messages, tokens, the 404 routes, the removed page and nav entry, and the experiments list.
---
_Generated with [`xum`](https://github.com/coder/xum) • Model: `anthropic:claude-opus-5-5` • Thinking: `high`_

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a08ba6a70c |
feat: add shared project memory API for chats in a project (#29301)
- Experiment, stacked on #29242. UI is in #29583. - Adds **project memory**: `chat_project_memories` rows with a name (lowercase slug, unique per project), a one-line description (150 characters) and a body (8KB). Up to 200 per project, shared by every root chat in the project. Chats outside a project and subagents have no memory. - Memories are immutable: they are created and deleted, never edited. Agent tools are `read_memory`, `save_memory`, `delete_memory` and `consolidate_memory`. Saving an existing name fails and points the agent at `consolidate_memory` to replace it. - **Consolidation is agent-driven, in the turn**, modeled on how Claude Code compacts its memory index when warned it is near its limit. From 160 memories (80%), save results ask the agent to get under 140 (70%) with `consolidate_memory`, choosing what to merge and drop. That tool deletes and saves memories in one transaction under the per-project advisory lock, and rolls back entirely if a delete is missing, a name is taken, or the result exceeds 200. There is no background extraction or consolidation. - **The memory index reaches the model as model-only conversation messages**, not in a tool description or the system prompt. At turn start the chat gets a full `<project-memory-index>` snapshot when its prompt has none (first turn, or after compaction), otherwise a `<project-memory-index-update>` listing only what changed. Tool definitions and the system prompt carry no memory state, so memory writes never invalidate the provider's cached prompt prefix. Writes by other chats, or by this chat mid-turn, reach the model at its next turn. - REST API (create, list, get, delete) under `/api/experimental/organizations/{organization}/chats/projects/{project}/memories`. Memory permissions follow projects onto the `agents-access` role. - **Every memory change is audited** as `ChatProjectMemory` create or delete. REST changes are attributed to the caller. Tool changes (`save_memory`, `delete_memory`, `consolidate_memory`) are attributed to the chat owner, carry the `chat_id`, and record one entry per memory after the change commits, so a rolled-back consolidation records nothing. ### Examples **What the model sees.** The system prompt gets a fixed guidance block with no memory state: ```text <memory> Memory is durable context shared by every chat in the project "platform". Save facts that will matter in future chats: … The memory index is in the conversation: a <project-memory-index> message lists every saved memory, and <project-memory-index-update> messages at the start of later turns list what changed. Changes made during a turn, including your own, appear in the next turn's update. … Memories cannot be edited: replace one that no longer holds with consolidate_memory, or delete it. </memory> ``` On the first turn, after the user's message, the chat gets a model-only row with the full index (hidden in the UI): ```text <project-memory-index> - deploy-day: Deploys happen on Tuesdays - release-owner: Alice owns releases; ping her before tagging </project-memory-index> ``` On a later turn where memories changed, it gets only the difference: ```text <project-memory-index-update> Added or changed: - deploy-day: Deploys happen on Wednesdays (changed 2026-09-30) - staging-url: Staging lives at staging.example.com Removed: - old-ci-notes </project-memory-index-update> ``` Resulting request layout, with the provider's cached prefix unchanged by memory writes: ```text [tools: fixed] [system: fixed <memory> guidance] [turn 1 user] [index snapshot] [assistant/tools …] [turn 2 user] [index update] [assistant …] ``` **Tool calls and results** (produced by the tools in this PR): ```text save_memory {"name":"staging-url","description":"Staging lives at staging.example.com","body":"Staging is https://staging.example.com; deploys from main."} → {"count":3,"saved":"staging-url"} save_memory {"name":"deploy-day", …} // name already exists → error: a memory named "deploy-day" already exists; read it, then replace it with consolidate_memory by deleting "deploy-day" and saving the new version in one call consolidate_memory {"delete":["deploy-day"],"save":[{"name":"deploy-day","description":"Deploys happen on Wednesdays (changed 2026-09-30)","body":"The team deploys every Wednesday since 2026-09-30."}]} → {"count":3,"deleted":["deploy-day"],"saved":["deploy-day"]} read_memory {"name":"deploy-day"} → {"name":"deploy-day","description":"…","body":"…","created_at":"2026-09-30T15:04:05Z","created_by":"alice"} ``` Near and at the cap: ```text save_memory … → {"count":160,"saved":"one-more","warning":"memory is 160/200, approaching the limit. Consolidate it to under 140 memories now with consolidate_memory: merge overlapping memories into one, and drop stale, wrong, or superseded ones."} save_memory … → error: memory is full (200/200); use consolidate_memory to merge overlapping memories and drop stale ones, and include this memory in its save list ``` **REST memory object** (`GET .../chats/projects/{project}/memories`): ```json { "id": "59500000-0000-4000-8000-000000000001", "project_id": "7c0e4a3e-5b1f-4f7d-9a51-2f3c8f6d2b10", "organization_id": "bb640d07-ca8a-4869-b6bc-ae61ebb2fda1", "name": "deploy-day", "description": "Deploys happen on Wednesdays (changed 2026-09-30)", "body": "The team deploys every Wednesday since 2026-09-30.", "created_by": "0ed9befc-4911-4ccf-a8e2-559bf72daa94", "created_by_username": "alice", "created_at": "2026-09-30T15:04:05Z" } ``` Create takes `{"name", "description", "body"}` and answers 409 on a duplicate name or at the cap. <details> <summary>Screenshots (predate the immutable-memory rework; tool output shape has since changed)</summary>    </details> --- Generated with Coder Agents on behalf of @f0ssel. --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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f55aa6c50d |
feat: add chat automations schema, RBAC resource, and audit entries (#30085)
Adds the storage and authorization pieces for Automations for Coder Agents. No route, SDK request type, or chatd code uses them yet, so nothing is exposed. This is the bottom PR of the Automations stack (RFC step 1). Later PRs add the chatd acceptance seam, management routes, webhooks, and schedules on top of these names and constraints. **Schema** (migrations 000609, 000610) - `chat_automations` table with enums `chat_automation_kind`, `chat_automation_target_mode`, `chat_automation_webhook_use`, and `chat_automation_when_busy`. It includes `created_by_chat_id`, the webhook secret hash and version, the single-use `webhook_consumed_at` marker, the schedule cursor and revision, and `queue_generation`. Named CHECKs enforce the target and kind shapes from the RFC. A composite foreign key keeps `new_chat_model_config_id` in the automation's organization, the same pattern the model override tables use. A trigger (`chat_automations_chat_organization`) keeps `target_chat_id` and `created_by_chat_id` in that organization too. A composite foreign key cannot do that while keeping `ON DELETE SET NULL` on PostgreSQL 13. The trigger validates a reference only on insert or when it changes, so chat deletion can still clear both references. Indexes cover the owner and both chat references for cascades and `SET NULL`. - Provenance columns with partial indexes and no foreign key to `chat_automations`: `automation_id`, `input_id`, `queue_generation` on `chat_queued_messages` (all set or all null), `automation_id` and `input_id` on `chat_messages`, and `chats.automation_id`. `chats_expanded` is recreated to include `automation_id`. - `chat_automation` values for `api_key_scope` and `resource_type`. The down migration is a no-op because enum values cannot be dropped. **Authorization** - New organization-scoped RBAC resource `chat_automation` (create, read, update, delete). The `agents-access` role grants it for the member's own automations. It is excluded from the member role's user-level permissions, so a member without `agents-access` gets nothing. Site owners and organization admins get it through their existing all-permissions lists. The owner-only update, enable, and run rule from the RFC belongs to the management service in a later PR. - The generated scopes stay out of `externalLowLevel`, so API keys gain no user-requestable scopes. - `dbauthz` wrappers for the three queries this PR adds: `InsertChatAutomation`, `GetChatAutomationByID`, and `DeleteChatAutomationByID`. `InsertChatAutomation` also requires update on the target chat, read on the creating chat, and read on the new-chat model config (its user and group ACL). There is also a `dbgen.ChatAutomation` helper. **Audit** - `enterprise/audit/table.go` entries for `ChatAutomation`, with `webhook_secret_hash` and `prompt` marked `ActionSecret`. The prompt is treated as chat content, like chat titles. The schedule cursor, revision, and queue generation are ignored as internal bookkeeping. `Chat.automation_id` is tracked. **Required checks from the ticket** - Migrations apply and roll back: `TestMigrate` and `TestMigrateUpWithFixtures` (new fixture for 000609). Dogfood UAT also applied the migrations on a dev instance, rolled them back, re-applied them, and compared schema dumps. After rollback, the only differences from main were the enum values that cannot be dropped and develop.sh's own `_develop` schema. After re-applying, the only difference from this branch's `dump.sql` was the `_develop` schema. - Secret hash marked secret: `Test_chatAutomationSecretFieldsRedacted` checks the table entries and that an audit diff contains neither the raw hash, its base64 form, nor the prompt text. Also covered: `TestRolePermissions` cases for own, other owner, other organization, and a member without `agents-access`. `TestChatAutomationShapeConstraints` covers the named CHECKs, the cross-organization foreign key and trigger, a cross-organization retarget, and deleting referenced chats. Under `site/`, only generated files changed (`typesGenerated.ts`, `rbacresourcesGenerated.ts`). Closes CODAGT-1207 Part of CODAGT-1135 --- _Generated with [`xum`](https://github.com/coder/xum) • Model: `anthropic:claude-opus-5-5` • Thinking: `high`_ --------- Signed-off-by: Thomas Kosiewski <tk@coder.com> |
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7cd1b2040b |
feat: add chat projects API (#29242)
- Experiment, behind `chat-projects` (off by default). First of three stacked PRs: #29301 (memory), #29583 (UI). This PR is API only; the screenshots below are from the UI in #29583. - CRUD under `/api/experimental/organizations/{organization}/chats/projects/{project}`. `GET /api/experimental/chats/projects` lists the caller's projects across all organizations. - `project_id` on chat create and as a chat list filter. A chat joins a project only at creation; there is no move. - Projects are identified by ID. Names are display labels (64 characters, description 1024) with no uniqueness constraint. An optional `icon` URL (usually an emoji image under `/emojis`) is capped at 256 characters and audited. - A user can own at most 100 projects across all organizations; creating another answers 409. Creates count and insert under a per-owner advisory lock so concurrent requests cannot overshoot. - Projects are private to their `owner_id`. Members may only create their own, and a chat can only be bound to a project its owner owns. An unreadable or foreign project on chat create answers 404 so IDs cannot be probed; a project from another organization answers 400. - Permissions ride on the `agents-access` role next to chats (after #30004), so whoever can use Coder Agents can use projects. Owners and org admins reach every project. ### Examples Create a project in an organization: ```http POST /api/experimental/organizations/{organization}/chats/projects {"name": "Platform", "description": "Infra and deploy work", "icon": "/emojis/1f680.png"} ``` ```json { "id": "7c0e4a3e-5b1f-4f7d-9a51-2f3c8f6d2b10", "organization_id": "bb640d07-ca8a-4869-b6bc-ae61ebb2fda1", "owner_id": "0ed9befc-4911-4ccf-a8e2-559bf72daa94", "name": "Platform", "description": "Infra and deploy work", "icon": "/emojis/1f680.png", "created_at": "2026-09-30T15:04:05Z", "updated_at": "2026-09-30T15:04:05Z" } ``` List the caller's projects across organizations with `GET /api/experimental/chats/projects` (an array of the object above). Update with `PATCH .../chats/projects/{project}` and any of `name`, `description`, `icon`; delete with `DELETE`, which detaches its chats. Create a chat in the project, and list only its chats: ```http POST /api/v2/chats {"organization_id": "bb640d07-…", "project_id": "7c0e4a3e-…", "content": [{"type": "text", "text": "Plan the deploy"}]} GET /api/v2/chats?project_id=7c0e4a3e-… ``` At the limit: ```json 409 {"message": "You can have at most 100 chat projects. Delete a project to create another."} ``` <details> <summary>Screenshots (UI from #29583)</summary>      </details> --- Generated with Coder Agents on behalf of @f0ssel. --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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957aefa475 |
feat: add client_session_id to connection_logs table (#29686)
The client session ID is not populated yet; this just adds the ability for agents to send a client session ID with the rest of the connection data, once it gets piped through. |
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b957e66ccc |
feat!: drop the Coder Tasks tables and queries (#29086)
Drops the `tasks`, `task_workspace_apps` and `task_snapshots` tables, the `tasks_with_status` view and the `task_status` enum, and recreates `workspaces_expanded` without the `tasks` join and `task_id` column. Deletes `queries/tasks.sql` and every wrapper, fixture and test that existed only for those queries (dbauthz, dbmock, dbmetrics, dbfake, dbgen, querier_test), plus the `task_id` projection in `GetWorkspaceAgentAndWorkspaceByAuthToken`. **Breaking change:** migration 000594 deletes all task rows. The down migration restores the schema (tables, constraints, indexes, views), not the data. **Review changes:** the schema-only migration test was removed per review (`TestMigrate/UpDownUp` still exercises the down path), the test file no longer reorders existing tests, and the migration moved from 000593 to 000594. The `dump.sql` reorder is pg_dump dependency ordering: `tasks_with_status` pulled its four workspace tables ahead of it, and without the view they return to alphabetical positions. **Stack context:** Coder Tasks removal stack (CODAGT-642): #28743 frontend → #28788 CLI → #28789 API → #28790 provisioner → #29084 notifications → #29085 build reasons → **#29086 tables** → #28750 permissions. The last four PRs replace the single data-drop migration that used to live in #28750; each carries one concern and its own migration number. > Created by Xum (AI agent) on behalf of @ibetitsmike. ## Delivery record **Decision (2026-09-11 ~14:40Z): merge** through the stack merge endpoint, squash, pinned to head `f1d236a0c82f123b8a0d6878799c227ef9bd5776` (merge SHA appended below once landed). **Independent substantive reviews on this PR (3):** | # | Kind | Reviewed commit | Findings and disposition | Source | |---|---|---|---|---| | 1 | Codex code review (bot), PR opened | `24535f8410` | No findings, no threads | [summary](https://github.com/coder/coder/pull/29086#issuecomment-5583877627) | | 2 | Human review, spikecurtis (COMMENTED) | `24535f8410` | 4 findings: dump.sql reorder question (answered: pg_dump dependency hoisting by `tasks_with_status`); two moved tests (undone, the test file is no longer touched); schema-only migration test (deleted). All resolved. | [review](https://github.com/coder/coder/pull/29086#pullrequestreview-5142045164) | | 3 | Human review, spikecurtis (APPROVED) | `f1d236a0c8` (this head) | Approval on the exact final head | [review](https://github.com/coder/coder/pull/29086#pullrequestreview-5179353695) | The four COMMENTED reviews by @ibetitsmike on `f35688f40b` are thread-reply wrappers and are not counted. **Pre-split history relevant to this diff:** this layer's content lived in the monolithic #28750 until 2026-09-08, which received 10 completed Codex code reviews (2026-08-28 to 2026-09-01) and spikecurtis's CHANGES_REQUESTED review of 2026-09-04 that asked for the split. Counting those, the completed-review total relevant to this diff exceeds the six-review budget, so no further discretionary review or fresh final advisory was commissioned. The usable final recommendation for the final diff is review 3 above: the reviewer who authored every finding on this layer approved the exact head. **Exact-head checks:** `required` SUCCESS in [run 34580949353](https://github.com/coder/coder/actions/runs/34580949353/job/103205933212); rollup 15 success, 8 skipped, 1 failure. The failure is the non-required `Analyze PR for Documentation Updates Needed` job ([103204101137](https://github.com/coder/coder/actions/runs/34580949071/job/103204101137)), caused by the dormant `doc-check-pr-29086` review workspace (CODAGT-1025), not a code finding; GitHub flags only `required` as required for this PR. Merge-ref freshness: `refs/pull/29086/merge` has the exact head as second parent and `25af21b5d5d` (the #29085 squash) as first parent; main has since gained #29231, #28639 and #29218 (12 files, none overlapping this PR). The composed tree (`git merge-tree` of current main and this head) builds (`go build ./...`) and vets (`go vet` on `coderd`, `coderd/database/...`, `coderd/wsrelated/...`) cleanly. Layer diff parity with the previously pushed layer verified by numstat after both GitHub restacks. `gh stack push` did not run the local pre-push suite; CI is the validation evidence. **Deferred:** the dormant doc-check workspace (CODAGT-1025) is outside this PR. Next in the stack, #28750, stays blocked: CHANGES_REQUESTED, its approval and CI predate the restack, and its review budget is exhausted. |
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0ef331fcd0 |
feat!: scope chat model override settings to organizations (#28442)
Moves chat model override settings from deployment scope to organization scope, following the org-scoping of chat model configs in #28440. Depends on #28440 (based on `ethan/chat-models-availability-consolidation`). Remote dogfood UAT passed on this change, including multi-organization scenarios on a licensed deployment with real models. ## Problem Chat model configs are now owned by organizations, but the override settings that reference them stayed deployment-wide: admin subagent/title/compaction overrides in `site_configs`, personal overrides in `user_configs`, and the advisor model embedded in the advisor runtime JSON. A single deployment-level override can only point at one organization's model config, so overrides effectively worked for the default organization only, and title generation had to soften its hard-failure contract to tolerate unusable overrides. ## Fix Admin overrides (general, explore, title generation, compaction, advisor) and personal overrides (root, general, explore) become organization-scoped rows in two new typed tables, `chat_organization_model_overrides` and `chat_user_model_overrides`. Composite foreign keys on `(organization_id, model_config_id)` make cross-organization model references unrepresentable. The migration deletes the legacy serialized `site_configs`/`user_configs` override keys instead of migrating them; admins and users re-select models in the new organization-scoped settings. New endpoints live under `/api/experimental/organizations/{organization}/chats/model-overrides` (admin defaults) and `/api/experimental/organizations/{organization}/members/{user}/chats/model-overrides` (personal overrides); the legacy deployment-level routes are removed. chatd resolves overrides via the chat's organization, restoring the hard-failure contract for configured-but-unusable title generation overrides. The deployment-level `AllowUsers` switch and advisor runtime limits stay deployment-scoped. The Coder Agents settings UI gains a per-organization "Defaults & overrides" page under AI Settings > Models, and the personal overrides page gains an organization selector for users in multiple organizations. Advisor telemetry now reports per-organization override rows. **BREAKING CHANGE**: Existing deployment-level overrides are dropped, not migrated. Every organization starts with no overrides after upgrade, and model selections must be re-applied in the new settings. The legacy deployment-level override endpoints are removed. Closes https://linear.app/coder/issue/CODAGT-872 > [!NOTE] > Xum (AI agent) authored this PR on behalf of @ibetitsmike. <!-- xum-attribution: model=claude-opus-4-6 thinking=high --> --------- Co-authored-by: Ethan Dickson <ethan@coder.com> |
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f32592ec6b |
feat!: scope chat model configs to organizations (#27955)
## Summary Scope chat model configurations and runtime model resolution to organizations. Each model configuration now belongs to exactly one organization, each organization can have its own default model, and Chatd only uses models that belong to the chat's organization. Depends on #27968. ## Problem Chat model configurations are currently deployment-wide even though chats belong to organizations. A default model, explicitly selected model, or configured model override can therefore reference the same model configuration from every organization. This prevents model catalogs and defaults from being isolated by organization and allows a chat to retain or select a model that its organization does not own. Existing model configurations also have no organization ownership or organization-scoped ACL data, and the database enforces a single live default across the entire deployment. ## Fix Add required organization ownership and ACL storage to chat model configurations. The migration assigns every existing configuration to the default organization, seeds organization-wide read access, and replaces the deployment-wide default constraint with a per-organization constraint. Scope Chatd lookup, admission, fallback, and queue-promotion behavior to the chat's organization: - New chats use the usable default model from their organization. - Explicit model selections from another organization are rejected. - Deployment or personal overrides that point to a foreign model are not used for the chat. - Historical cross-organization model references remain unchanged in the database, but runtime generation falls back to a usable local default. - Queue promotion resolves unavailable, disabled, missing, or foreign stored models to the usable local default and fails when no usable local default exists. The existing model configuration management and availability routes remain compatibility routes for the default organization in this layer. A later layer in the stack adds organization-scoped management routes and updates clients to use them. ## Breaking change This changes chat model behavior from deployment-wide to organization-scoped. Existing configurations are migrated only to the default organization; they are not copied into every organization. As a result: - A non-default organization no longer inherits the deployment's existing default model. - Creating a chat in an organization without a usable local default fails with `400: No default chat model config is configured.` - Explicitly selecting a configuration owned by another organization fails with `400: Model config does not belong to the specified organization.` - Existing chats whose stored model belongs to another organization can generate only if a usable local default is available; otherwise generation fails. Deployments using Agents in non-default organizations must configure a usable default chat model separately for each organization after the organization-scoped management layers in this stack are available. _This pull request description was generated by Coder Agents._ |
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7ca7c30f40 |
feat: add group and user ACLs to MCP server configs (#27944)
Adds group and user ACLs to org-scoped MCP server configs so
organizations can restrict specific MCP servers to subsets of members,
mirroring the template ACL pattern.
## Summary
- Migration adds `group_acl`/`user_acl` JSONB columns (nested `{"<id>":
{"permissions": [...]}}` shape) and seeds every existing config with its
organization's Everyone group read entry (the Everyone group ID equals
the org ID), so member access is unchanged by default. Creation seeds
the same entry.
- The blanket org-member read grant from the base PR is replaced by ACL
evaluation: Rego requires org membership for every ACL grant, and
`GetAuthorizedMCPServerConfigs` compiles ACL-aware SQL filters.
- New `ActionShare` (org admins) gates `GET|PATCH
/api/experimental/organizations/{organization}/mcp-servers/{mcpserverconfig}/acl`
(nested under the organization like the rest of the config surface).
PATCH validates principals against the config's organization, merges
sparse updates under a row lock, stamps `updated_by`/`updated_at`, and
is audited as a Write with `Old` captured before authorization. A config
deleted concurrently between the middleware fetch and the locked
re-fetch is concealed as 404, matching the update and delete handlers.
ACL columns are tracked in the audit table.
- ACL management is available in all editions (no enterprise
entitlement), documented in the MCP servers page. Revoking an ACL does
not retro-strip already-selected configs from existing chats; new
selection is blocked at chat create.
- Force On respects the ACL: the forced set is loaded as the chat owner,
so a `force_on` server whose ACL denies the owner never attaches at
create, send, or generation time.
- No rolling-upgrade machinery: upgrades run in scheduled maintenance
downtime, so the migration only backfills existing rows; the API sets
the Everyone read grant explicitly on every insert.
Stacked on #27943. Part of the MCP org-separation stack.
Closes https://linear.app/codercom/issue/CODAGT-712
UAT: verified on a dogfood instance with two members and a custom group:
Everyone-seed default visibility, group grant with Everyone removal
(non-member loses list/fetch/selection), foreign-principal rejection,
non-admin share denial (audited 403 / concealed 404), user_acl restore,
and audited ACL diffs.
> Mux (AI agent) authored this PR on Mike's behalf.
<!-- mux-attribution: model=claude-fable-5 thinking=high -->
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20c376a575 |
fix: enforce uniqueness and hour alignment for agent runtime usage events (#27983)
The usage generator writes `hb_agent_runtime_v1` rows with `created_at` at the UTC hourly bucket start and exactly one row per bucket, but nothing in the schema enforced either invariant. A duplicate bucket row under a different id would be double-counted by any consumer summing `runtime_ms`, and a misaligned `created_at` would skew which usage period a bucket is attributed to. This replaces the non-unique partial index `idx_usage_events_agent_runtime` (from migration 000561) with a unique index of the same shape and adds an hour-alignment `CHECK` constraint. Both statements validate existing rows: every supported writer has always produced conforming data, so a pre-existing violator is anomalous and failing the migration loudly beats silently rewriting usage rows. `generateBucket` treats a unique violation on the bucket index as another replica having won the race, mirroring the existing `ON CONFLICT (id)` no-op for committed rows. The `coderd/notifications` sync commit and its revert cancel out (the drift they addressed was fixed on main by #27979); the PR's net diff is only the usage-event changes. Part 1 of a 3-PR stack splitting up #27796 (see there for review history). Stack: this PR → #27984 → #27985. |
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990d24dc42 |
feat: add oauth2 scope columns and single-use delete queries (#28007)
OAuth2 tokens issued by Coder ignore scope entirely. The authorize endpoint parses the `scope` parameter and then discards it, and both grant paths mint API keys with full API access regardless of what the client requested or what the app's allowlist permits. There is also nowhere to put a negotiated scope: nothing carries one from the authorize step to the token it produces. Schema and query groundwork for that pipeline. No behavior change on its own. - Migration `000569` adds a `scope` column to `oauth2_provider_app_codes` and `oauth2_provider_app_tokens`, so a negotiated scope can travel from a code to the token it is exchanged for, and from a token to its refreshed successor. - Existing rows are backfilled to `coder:all`, then both columns become NOT NULL with a non-empty CHECK. Every OAuth2 key is unrestricted in fact today, so the backfill only writes that down, and a caller that omits the column now fails instead of silently issuing full access. - Adds `DeleteOAuth2ProviderAppCodeByIDReturningRow` and `DeleteAPIKeyByIDReturningRow`, which return `sql.ErrNoRows` when the row is already gone. Postgres serializes concurrent deletes on the row lock, so exactly one caller gets a row back, which is what will let the grant paths enforce single use of a code or refresh token without a read-then-write race. - No callers yet. The existing blind deletes and all of their call sites are untouched, and codes and tokens record `coder:all` until a later phase negotiates a real value. Phase 1 of [PLAT-470](https://linear.app/codercom/issue/PLAT-470), tracked as [PLAT-478](https://linear.app/codercom/issue/PLAT-478/phase-1-schema-and-queries). Scope validation at authorize, applying the negotiated scope in the code grant, and refresh narrowing follow as separate PRs. Verified locally: `make gen` and `make lint` clean, the migrations suite passes both up and down, and dbauthz's `TestMethodTestSuite` passes. <details> <summary>End-to-end scope enforcement flow (green marks what this PR touches)</summary> ```mermaid flowchart TD subgraph authorize["/oauth2/authorize"] AZ1["ShowAuthorizePage (GET)<br/>renders consent page"] AZ2["ProcessAuthorize (POST)<br/>scope parsed, then discarded"] Q1["InsertOAuth2ProviderAppCode<br/>gains a Scope param"] AZ1 --> AZ2 --> Q1 end Q1 --> CODES[("oauth2_provider_app_codes<br/>new column: scope text NOT NULL")] subgraph codegrant["POST /oauth2/token, grant_type=authorization_code"] G1["authorizationCodeGrant"] Q2["GetOAuth2ProviderAppCodeByPrefix<br/>now returns Scope"] Q4["DeleteOAuth2ProviderAppCodeByIDReturningRow<br/>added, no caller yet"] G2["apikey.Generate + UserRBACSubject<br/>hardcoded to full access"] G1 --> Q2 --> G2 G1 -.-> Q4 end CODES --> G1 G2 --> Q3 Q3["InsertOAuth2ProviderAppToken<br/>gains a Scope param"] Q3 --> TOKENS[("oauth2_provider_app_tokens<br/>new column: scope text NOT NULL")] subgraph refresh["POST /oauth2/token, grant_type=refresh_token"] G3["refreshTokenGrant"] Q5["GetOAuth2ProviderAppTokenByPrefix<br/>now returns Scope"] Q6["DeleteAPIKeyByIDReturningRow<br/>added, no caller yet"] G3 --> Q5 G3 -.-> Q6 end TOKENS --> G3 Q5 --> Q3 subgraph enforce["Every authenticated API request"] E1["httpmw ExtractAPIKey"] --> E2["APIKey.ScopeSet()"] --> E3["UserRBACSubject"] --> E4["dbauthz authorize"] end TOKENS --> E1 classDef changed fill:#c8e6c9,stroke:#2e7d32,stroke-width:2px,color:#1b3c1e classDef dormant fill:#c8e6c9,stroke:#2e7d32,stroke-width:2px,stroke-dasharray:5 3,color:#1b3c1e class Q1,Q2,Q3,Q5,CODES,TOKENS changed class Q4,Q6 dormant ``` Solid green is added or changed here. Dashed green exists but has no caller yet. Everything else is unchanged, including the enforcement engine at the bottom, which already reads a key's scopes correctly and only needs real data fed into it. </details> <details> <summary>Suggested reading order</summary> Most of the diff is generated. `dump.sql`, `models.go`, `querier.go`, `queries.sql.go`, `check_constraint.go`, and the dbmock and dbmetrics packages all come from `make gen`. 1. `migrations/000569_oauth2_scope_columns.{up,down}.sql`: additive column, backfill, NOT NULL, CHECK, and a `COMMENT ON COLUMN` on each. 2. `queries/oauth2.sql` and `queries/apikeys.sql`: `scope` added to both insert column lists, plus the two new returning-row deletes alongside the untouched originals. The `Get...ByPrefix` selects needed no edit, since they are `SELECT *`. 3. `dbauthz/dbauthz.go`: hand-written wrappers for the two new queries, each fetching by ID, authorizing delete against the fetched object, then delegating. The generic `deleteQ` helper does not fit, since it requires the delete to return only `error`. 4. `oauth2provider/authorize.go` and `oauth2provider/tokens.go`: the only production changes, all behavior-neutral. 5. `dbgen/dbgen.go` and `dbauthz/dbauthz_test.go`: seed threading, plus a case per new query. `MethodTestSuite` fails with "Method never called" for anything untested. Neither type needs to become auditable, which `make lint` confirms by not erroring on `enterprise/audit/table.go`. </details> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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16c58770f8 |
feat: constrain the OAuth2 client type column (#27931)
Extracted from #27873 so the schema change can be reviewed for migration safety on its own. #27873 will rebase onto this. `client_type` decides whether the token endpoint validates a client secret at all, and the column accepts any text: nullable, no `CHECK`, no enum. No Go path can write a bad value today, and `IsPublic` fails closed on anything unrecognized, so the read side is safe. What the schema still permits is the problem: a future migration writing `'public'` onto a row that holds a secret turns off client authentication for that app with nothing to catch it, no constraint, no log, no audit entry, no test. `000565` adds `CHECK (client_type IN ('confidential', 'public'))` and `NOT NULL`. The `UPDATE` ahead of it should touch zero rows, since migration `000344` added the column with a default of `'confidential'` and backfilled with `COALESCE`; it is there so `SET NOT NULL` cannot fail on an unexpected row. Both `ALTER`s take `ACCESS EXCLUSIVE` and scan a table holding one row per registered OAuth2 client, so the lock is brief. ## The second migration, and why it aligns the way it does Two columns describe the same fact and can currently contradict each other. `token_endpoint_auth_method` is the client's own declaration: registered client metadata under RFC 7591 §2, where `"none"` is defined to mean the client is public and has no secret. `client_type` is Coder's derived copy, and it is what the token endpoint enforces on. RFC 7591 defines no `client_type` metadata field; the column exists only as a denormalization. Registration used to persist the declaration verbatim while hardcoding `client_type` to `'confidential'`, so rows exist declaring `"none"` on a client stored confidential that was issued, and still requires, a real secret. A client that reads its own metadata and believes it is public will drop that secret and stop being able to exchange codes. `000566` aligns the declaration to what is enforced, not the reverse. Deriving enforcement from the declaration would reclassify every such client as public and stop requiring the secret it holds, which is a silent authentication downgrade. The down migration is deliberately empty: the previous values are not recorded, and restoring them would only reinstate metadata that tells a client to authenticate in a way the server rejects. ## Application changes `SET NOT NULL` changes the generated field from `sql.NullString` to `string`, so the three write sites are updated to match. That is the entire application diff and no behavior depends on it. Refs https://linear.app/codercom/issue/ENG-3029/oauth2-support-public-client --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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85984ff142 |
feat: add enable/disable support for user secrets (#27537)
Users can now disable a secret to stop it from being injected into workspaces without deleting it, and re-enable it later. Disabled secrets stay visible and editable everywhere they already appear. An enabled secret must have at least one injection target; a secret with no target can be stored only while disabled. Existing target-less secrets are migrated to disabled to preserve current behavior. Support spans the REST API, SDK, CLI, dashboard, and audit log. |
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6af0f4d698 |
feat: add workspace restart functionality to API (#25757)
This models restart as durable orchestration of existing stop and start workspace builds instead of adding a new restart transition. Keeping restart as two existing transitions preserves the current build/provisioner model. The child start build is created only after the parent stop build succeeds, rather than being inserted immediately in a pending state. That keeps `workspace_builds` aligned with actual provisioner-ready work and avoids introducing a second pending-build lifecycle that the provisioner and build acquisition paths would need to understand. Refs: https://linear.app/codercom/issue/PLAT-143 |
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fcdd029d74 |
feat: add ai_user_daily_spend table and queries (#26562)
## Description Adds the spend tracking table and queries needed by [AIGOV-427](https://linear.app/codercom/issue/AIGOV-427/add-post-response-spend-accumulation) (post-response accumulation) and [AIGOV-428](https://linear.app/codercom/issue/AIGOV-428/add-pre-request-budget-enforcement) (pre-request enforcement). ## Changes - Add `ai_user_daily_spend` table to aggregate per-user, per-effective-group AI spend by UTC day. - Add `UpsertUserAIDailySpend` and `GetUserAISpendSince` queries. Closes https://linear.app/codercom/issue/AIGOV-426/add-daily-spend-table-and-queries > [!NOTE] > Initially generated by Claude Opus 4.7, modified and reviewed by @ssncferreira |
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e8bd5004a2 |
chore: add replica_host and nats_port to replicas table (#26665)
relates to GRU-69 Adds cluster_host and nats_port to replicas table, to explicitly track NATS routes in the cluster. I decided to make the NATS support explicit and transport the port number over the replicasync so that different Coder Servers can run on different ports. This is not something customers will typically care about, but is very useful for testing, so that they can all run on localhost within one machine. I've also gone with a design where the NATS pubsub directly tells replicasync the port number _after_ it opens the socket. This is also very useful for testing because it allows us to have the OS assign the port number at runtime, avoiding races where we fail to bind to a free port. |
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b6fcb9a30a |
feat: record cost on aibridge token usages (#26229)
Implements https://linear.app/codercom/issue/AIGOV-286/add-interception-cost-calculation-to-aibridge-token-usages Adds spend attribution to AI Gateway. After the upstream response, each token-usage record now captures the user's effective group, the per-token prices in effect at that moment, and a computed cost — so spend is recorded as an immutable, point-in-time snapshot. Concretely, `aibridge_token_usages` gains `effective_group_id`, `input_price_micros`, `output_price_micros`, `cache_read_price_micros`, `cache_write_price_micros`, and `cost_micros`. When a usage record is written, the effective group is resolved (per-user override, else the deployment budget policy), the `(provider, model)` price is looked up and snapshotted onto the row, and cost is computed from the provider-reported token counts. A model that isn't in the price table records its tokens with a `NULL` cost; any *other* resolution failure fails the write, so a `NULL` cost unambiguously means "model not priced" rather than "lookup errored." All values are stored in micro-units (1 unit = 1,000,000 micro-units; Phase 1 assumes USD, so 1 micro-unit = $0.000001). Prices are quoted per million tokens. This also grants the AI Bridge RBAC subject `read` on `ai_model_prices` (the per-interception price lookup needs it; it previously only had `update` for the startup seeder). ## Cost precision Cost is computed per token category as `tokens × price / 1_000_000` with integer division, then the four categories are summed. The division is done **per category** (not once over the summed numerator) on purpose: it keeps the per-category line items summing exactly to the stored total — no "the parts don't add up to the whole" in reporting). Integer division truncates sub-micro-unit fractions. For example, a cheap model at $0.10 per million tokens is a price of `100_000`; 9 tokens cost `9 × 100_000 / 1_000_000 = 900_000 / 1_000_000 = 0` (the true 0.9 micro-units floors to 0). At real list prices this rarely bites — $3/M input is a price of `3_000_000`, so even a single token is 3 micro-units. The per-record under-count is bounded below 1 micro-unit per category, so under $0.000004 total across the four categories, which is acceptable for list-price-based cost approximation. ## Overflow safety `cost_micros` is a `BIGINT` (int64), and the largest intermediate value is a single category's `tokens × price` before division. int64's ceiling is ≈ `9.223e18`. - At a steep $75/M model (price `75_000_000`), overflow would require ~123 billion tokens in one response: `123e9 × 75e6 = 9.225e18`, just over the limit. `122e9` stays under at `9.15e18`. - A realistically maxed-out Opus 4.8 response (≈1M input + 128K output at list prices) costs about $15, with a numerator around `1.5e13` — roughly six orders of magnitude below the ceiling. So overflow is unreachable from real token counts. ### Multi-currency support In the future, we may encounter issues with multi-currency support, especially when dealing with currencies that have very large exchange rates relative to USD, for example: IRR: ~1,300,000 IRR ≈ 1 USD VND: ~26,000 VND ≈ 1 USD For currencies with such large denominations, numeric overflow is technically possible, considering that we have only about six orders of magnitude of headroom before reaching the limit (see above). ## `effective_group_id` has no foreign key `effective_group_id` records the group a spend was attributed to, as an immutable historical fact. It is intentionally **not** a foreign key, so the record survives deletion of the group. Alternatives were considered and rejected: - **`ON DELETE SET NULL`** would mutate an "immutable" record — deleting a group silently erases that interception's attribution and under-counts the group's historical spend. - **`RESTRICT` / `NO ACTION`** would block group deletion entirely (groups are hard-deleted). - **`CASCADE`** would delete spend history when a group is deleted — the worst outcome for an audit record. There is also no insert-time check that the group still exists: the id comes from a budget that was just resolved, meaning it was valid at some point. ## Open question: group name snapshotting Should we also snapshot the group *name* onto each record? Two options: - **Denormalize it now** — readable in historical reports even after a group is deleted, but the snapshot can drift from the current name on rename, raising a "show point-in-time vs. current name" question. - **Postpone until needed** — it's a purely additive column later, and the name is display-only (not correctness-bearing like the price). The cost: names of groups deleted before the column is added can't be backfilled. Leaning toward postponing until a concrete reporting need settles the drift question. |
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a1330e3a8c |
refactor: rename Ai* database identifiers to AI* (AIGOV-369) (#26327)
Adds `ai` to sqlc's `gen.go.initialisms` in `coderd/database/sqlc.yaml` so the generated DB code follows Go's initialism convention. Adds the matching `ai` -> `AI` case to the dbgen PascalCase helper (`scripts/dbgen/main.go`) so the corresponding `dbmem` / mock identifiers stay in sync. `make gen` regenerates the rest; hand-written call sites that consume DB-generated identifiers (`enterprise/audit/table.go`, `coderd/database/modelmethods.go`, `enterprise/coderd/aigatewaykeys.go`, `coderd/database/dbauthz/*`, etc.) are updated to match. Scope is deliberately limited to the database layer: - `coderd/rbac/*` (resource and scope generators) is untouched — `ResourceAi*` / `ScopeAi*` constants stay on main's casing. - `codersdk/*` (Go SDK) is untouched — `codersdk.ResourceAi*` / `codersdk.APIKeyScopeAi*` constants stay on main's casing, so external Go SDK consumers see no source-level break. - `Aibridge*` identifiers (one SQL token `aibridge`, not `ai_bridge`) are out of scope. On-the-wire values are unchanged: enum strings, RBAC resource type strings, API key scope strings, and JSON tags all stay the same. The HTTP/JSON surface is unaffected. Refs: [AIGOV-369](https://linear.app/codercom/issue/AIGOV-369/change-ai-references-in-coderddatabasemodelsgo-to-ai) 🤖 Generated with [Coder Agents](https://coder.com) |
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f22d4e2cbb |
feat: add ai_gateway_keys table and related RBAC (#25563)
Adds table to store keys that AI Gateway standalone replicas will use to authenticate into Coderd. Also adds RBAC and audit boilerplate. |
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1a91d31793 |
feat: add user AI budget override endpoints (#25439)
Implements https://linear.app/codercom/issue/AIGOV-285 Follow the structure established in https://github.com/coder/coder/pull/25203 ## Summary Adds the `user_ai_budget_overrides` table and CRUD API at `/api/v2/users/{user}/ai/budget`. An override sets a custom per-user spend cap that supersedes group-budget resolution, attributing spend to a specific group. ## Schema ```sql CREATE TABLE user_ai_budget_overrides ( user_id UUID PRIMARY KEY REFERENCES users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE, group_id UUID NOT NULL REFERENCES groups(id) ON DELETE CASCADE, spend_limit_micros BIGINT NOT NULL CHECK (spend_limit_micros >= 0), created_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW(), updated_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW() ); ``` ## Membership lifecycle The membership invariant — a user must be a member of the attributed group, including when that group is "Everyone" — would naturally be expressed as a composite FK on `(user_id, group_id) → group_members_expanded(user_id, group_id)`. PostgreSQL doesn't allow foreign keys to reference views, so enforcement is split across two mechanisms: - **Write-time check.** A CHECK constraint on the table (`user_ai_budget_overrides_must_be_group_member`) calls a `STABLE` function `is_group_member(user_id, group_id)` that queries `group_members_expanded`. The view surfaces both regular group memberships and the implicit "Everyone" group memberships from `organization_members`. Any INSERT or UPDATE that violates the predicate is rejected with a Postgres `check_violation`, which the handler maps to a 400. `is_group_member` is defined as a general predicate, reusable by any future table that needs the same check. - **Cascade on removal.** Two `BEFORE DELETE` triggers handle membership loss: - `trigger_delete_user_ai_budget_overrides_on_group_member_delete` on `group_members` — covers regular group removals (admin action, OIDC sync). - `trigger_delete_user_ai_budget_overrides_on_org_member_delete` on `organization_members` — covers the "Everyone" group, whose membership lives in `organization_members`. The single-column FKs on `users(id)` and `groups(id)` remain to cascade on user or group deletion (those paths don't pass through `group_members`). ## Authorization The dbauthz layer gates each operation against the `User` and (for writes) `Group` resources: | Operation | User resource | Group resource | |-----------|----------------|----------------| | `GET` | `ActionRead` | — | | `PUT` | `ActionUpdate` | `ActionUpdate` | | `DELETE` | `ActionUpdate` | `ActionUpdate` | For `DELETE`, the dbauthz layer fetches the existing override first to learn the attributed `group_id`, then runs both checks. ### Role matrix | Role | GET | PUT | DELETE | |--------------|-----|-----|--------| | Owner | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | | UserAdmin | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | | OrgAdmin | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ | | OrgUserAdmin | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ | Internal discussion: https://codercom.slack.com/archives/C096PFVBZKN/p1779392747885359 ## Audit logs Audit logs will be addressed in a follow-up PR. |
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3bf5f80277 |
feat(coderd/database): add boundary_sessions and boundary_logs tables (#25441)
RFC: [Bridge ↔ Boundaries Correlation RFC](https://www.notion.so/coderhq/Gateway-and-Firewall-Correlation-RFC-31ad579be592803aa8b3d48348ccdde9) Add up/down migrations and matching sqlc queries for persisting Boundary audit events, as specified in the Bridge/Boundaries Correlation RFC. **Tables:** - `boundary_sessions`: session metadata with `workspace_agent_id` FK, `confined_process_name`, and timestamps (`started_at`, `updated_at`). ID is externally supplied by the Boundary process (no DB-side default). Created lazily when the first log for a session arrives. - `boundary_logs`: individual audit events with `session_id` FK, `sequence_number` (INT, primary ordering key), protocol/method/detail fields, and `matched_rule` (nullable; non-NULL implies allowed). **Indexes (per RFC):** - `(session_id, sequence_number)` for the ordering query path - `(captured_at)` for the retention purge path **Queries:** - `InsertBoundarySession` / `GetBoundarySessionByID` - `InsertBoundaryLog` / `GetBoundaryLogByID` - `ListBoundaryLogsBySessionID` with nullable `seq_after`/`seq_before` exclusive bounds for fetching events between two known interception sequence numbers - `DeleteOldBoundaryLogs` with row limit to avoid long-running transactions **Also includes:** dbgen helpers (`BoundarySession`, `BoundaryLog`), dbauthz implementations (reads gated on `ResourceAuditLog`, deletes on `ResourceSystem`), and all generated wrappers (dbmock, dbmetrics). No callers yet. A follow-up PR will add the dedicated `boundary_log` RBAC resource type. > Generated by Coder Agents |
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ca1f6b19a2 | feat: remove legacy chat provider tables (#25416) | ||
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40878eeba4 | feat: add AI provider schema expansion (#25412) | ||
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5a8d0016a5 |
feat: add personal skill storage, API, and SDK (#25363)
> Mux updated this PR on behalf of Mike. ## Stack Context This PR is the storage, permissions, API, and SDK layer for experimental personal skills. #25362 has landed on `main`, so this branch is restacked directly on `main`. Stack order: 1. #25363 storage, permissions, API, and SDK 2. #25365 API test coverage 3. #25366 chattool and chatd integration 4. #25066 settings UI and docs 5. #25386 personal skills slash menu ## What? Adds the `user_skills` database table, generated queries, RBAC resources and scopes, audit resource handling, experimental user-scoped CRUD endpoints, SDK types, and generated API/site types. Follow-up review and restack fixes: - Enforce a bounded personal skill description in parser and database constraints. - Return `403 Forbidden` for unauthorized create and update attempts. - Return explicit conflict responses when soft-deleted users are targeted. - Keep user admins out of personal skills, while site owners can read and delete but not create or update. - Document trigger-raised constraint names and keep schema constants covered by tests. - Reuse `UserSkillMetadata` in the full `UserSkill` SDK response type. - Generate user skill IDs in Go instead of relying on a database default. - Rebase on latest `main` and renumber the user skills migration to `000502_user_skills`. ## Why? Personal skills need durable user-owned storage with owner authorization, limited site-owner moderation, and a hidden API surface before chatd can consume them. ## Validation - `make gen` - `go test ./coderd/database -run '^TestUserSkillSchemaConstants$' -count=1` - `go test ./coderd/database/dbauthz -run '^TestMethodTestSuite/TestUserSkills$' -count=1` - `go test ./coderd -run '^TestPatchUserSkill$' -count=1` - `go test ./codersdk ./coderd/database/db2sdk` - `make lint` - pre-commit hook on `97fd58108d` |
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170a6e1fe9 | feat: add chat sharing foundation (#25041) | ||
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238968cfa0 |
feat: add per-group AI budget table and endpoints (#25203)
Closes https://linear.app/codercom/issue/AIGOV-284/add-group-budgets-table-and-crud-api ## Summary Adds the `group_ai_budgets` table and the following endpoints: - `GET /api/v2/groups/{group}/ai/budget` - `PUT /api/v2/groups/{group}/ai/budget` - `DELETE /api/v2/groups/{group}/ai/budget` Each group may have at most one budget row. If no row exists, no budget is enforced. ### Feature gate Added `RequireFeatureMW(FeatureAIBridge)` on the `/ai/budget` sub-route. ## RBAC Authorization reuses `rbac.ResourceGroup` with the existing `.InOrganization(...).WithID(...)` scoping model. The `dbauthz` wrappers load the parent `groups` row and authorize against it. No new resource type is introduced. As a result, anyone with `group:update` permissions (Owner, OrgAdmin, or UserAdmin within the organization) can manage AI budgets for that group. ## Read access for group members `database.Group.RBACObject()` grants `policy.ActionRead` to all members of the group through the group ACL: ```go func (g Group) RBACObject() rbac.Object { return rbac.ResourceGroup.WithID(g.ID). InOrg(g.OrganizationID). // Group members can read the group. WithGroupACL(map[string][]policy.Action{ g.ID.String(): { policy.ActionRead, }, }) } ``` Because the `GET` endpoint authorizes against the same loaded `Group` object, any group member can call: ```text GET /api/v2/groups/{group}/ai/budget ``` `PUT` and `DELETE` remain admin-only. The group ACL grants only `ActionRead`, so write operations continue to require role-based `group:update` permissions. ## Alternative considered A dedicated `rbac.ResourceGroupAiBudget` resource would allow budget management to be separated from general group administration. We decided not to add that complexity for now. |
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9ddfafe2b1 | feat: add chat ACL database foundation (#25080) | ||
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841b777ccd | feat: add ai_providers table, queries, dbauthz, audit, RBAC (#24892) | ||
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4124d1137d |
feat: add ai_model_prices table (#24932)
# Summary Implements https://linear.app/codercom/issue/AIGOV-282/add-ai-model-price-table-and-seed-generator This PR lays the groundwork for AI Bridge cost controls (per the AI Governance RFC). It adds the foundation needed for future cost tracking: a place to store per-model token prices, a way to keep those prices in sync with upstream pricing data, and a startup mechanism that ensures every deployment has prices loaded before AI Bridge starts processing requests. The price data comes from [models.dev](https://models.dev/), a community-maintained catalogue of AI provider pricing. A generator script fetches the latest prices, filters to Anthropic and OpenAI for now, and produces a seed file checked into the repository. On every server startup the seed is applied to the database, so new releases automatically pick up any price corrections that landed since the previous one. Existing rows are overwritten with the latest prices; rows for models no longer in the seed are left untouched. # Batching the AI model price seed: three approaches Context: at server startup we seed the `ai_model_prices` table from an embedded JSON price book (~70 rows today, will grow as we add providers, potentially 4000+). Each row is: ```text (provider, model, input_price, output_price, cache_read_price, cache_write_price) ``` Any of the four price columns can be: - `NULL` → “price unknown for this dimension” - explicit `0` → “free” The batch must be an UPSERT so re-running is idempotent and existing rows pick up new prices. We considered three implementations. --- ## Approach 1 — Per-row UPSERT in a Go loop ```go for _, row := range rows { if err := db.UpsertAIModelPrice(ctx, database.UpsertAIModelPriceParams{ Provider: row.Provider, Model: row.Model, InputPrice: nullInt64(row.InputPrice), // ... }); err != nil { return err } } ``` ### Pros - Trivial. - NULL handling falls out naturally from `sql.NullInt64`. ### Cons - `N` round-trips per seed. - With ~70 rows that means ~70 statement executions on every startup, even inside a transaction. - Doesn't scale gracefully as the price book grows, potentially 4000+. --- ## Approach 2 — `UNNEST` with parallel arrays Pass each column as a separate Go slice. Postgres unnests them in parallel into a virtual table, then `INSERT ... SELECT`. ```sql INSERT INTO ai_model_prices ( provider, model, input_price, output_price, cache_read_price, cache_write_price ) SELECT UNNEST(@providers::text[]), UNNEST(@models::text[]), NULLIF(UNNEST(@input_prices::bigint[]), -1), NULLIF(UNNEST(@output_prices::bigint[]), -1), NULLIF(UNNEST(@cache_read_prices::bigint[]), -1), NULLIF(UNNEST(@cache_write_prices::bigint[]), -1) ON CONFLICT (provider, model) DO UPDATE SET input_price = EXCLUDED.input_price, output_price = EXCLUDED.output_price, cache_read_price = EXCLUDED.cache_read_price, cache_write_price = EXCLUDED.cache_write_price, updated_at = NOW(); ``` Go side: flatten rows into six parallel slices. Use a sentinel (`-1`) for “missing”, since `lib/pq` can't encode `NULL` into a `bigint[]` element. ```go providers := make([]string, len(rows)) models := make([]string, len(rows)) inputs := make([]int64, len(rows)) outputs := make([]int64, len(rows)) cacheR := make([]int64, len(rows)) cacheW := make([]int64, len(rows)) for i, r := range rows { providers[i] = r.Provider models[i] = r.Model inputs[i] = -1 if r.InputPrice != nil { inputs[i] = *r.InputPrice } outputs[i] = -1 if r.OutputPrice != nil { outputs[i] = *r.OutputPrice } cacheR[i] = -1 if r.CacheReadPrice != nil { cacheR[i] = *r.CacheReadPrice } cacheW[i] = -1 if r.CacheWritePrice != nil { cacheW[i] = *r.CacheWritePrice } } return db.UpsertAIModelPrices(ctx, database.UpsertAIModelPricesParams{ Providers: providers, Models: models, InputPrices: inputs, OutputPrices: outputs, CacheReadPrices: cacheR, CacheWritePrices: cacheW, }) ``` ### Pros - Single round-trip. ### Cons - The generated `sqlc` params become plain `[]int64`, which can't represent `NULL`. --- ## Approach 3 — `jsonb_array_elements` over a single `@seed::jsonb` (chosen) Pass the raw seed JSON as one parameter; let Postgres expand and parse it. ```sql INSERT INTO ai_model_prices ( provider, model, input_price, output_price, cache_read_price, cache_write_price ) SELECT elem->>'provider', elem->>'model', (elem->>'input_price')::bigint, (elem->>'output_price')::bigint, (elem->>'cache_read_price')::bigint, (elem->>'cache_write_price')::bigint FROM jsonb_array_elements(@seed::jsonb) AS elem ON CONFLICT (provider, model) DO UPDATE SET input_price = EXCLUDED.input_price, output_price = EXCLUDED.output_price, cache_read_price = EXCLUDED.cache_read_price, cache_write_price = EXCLUDED.cache_write_price, updated_at = NOW(); ``` Go side reduces to: ```go return db.UpsertAIModelPrices(ctx, seedJSON) ``` ### Pros - Single round-trip. - NULLs fall out naturally: - `(elem->>'cache_write_price')::bigint` becomes `NULL` - no sentinels - The seed is already JSON: - Existing precedent: - `jsonb_array_elements` is already used elsewhere in the codebase ### Cons - Less type-safe at the SQL boundary than `UNNEST` - Slightly less standard than `UNNEST` - Readers need familiarity with: - `jsonb_array_elements` - `->>` extraction syntax - Postgres pays JSON parse cost - negligible at our scale --- --- # Decision We picked Approach 3. It collapses the round-trips like `UNNEST` does, but without: - nullable-array workarounds - sentinel values |
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c602a31856 |
fix(coderd): reject pinning child chats in patchChat handler (#24669)
The UI already prevents child (delegated/subagent) chats from being
pinned, but the `PATCH /api/experimental/chats/{chat}` endpoint did not
enforce this. A direct API call could pin a child chat.
- Add a `400 Bad Request` guard in `patchChat` when `pinOrder > 0` and
the chat has a `ParentChatID`
- Add `TestChatPinOrder/RejectsChildChat` test
> 🤖
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7d0a0c6495 | feat: provider key policies and user provider settings (#23751) | ||
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d8ff67fb68 |
feat: add MCP server configuration backend for chats (#23227)
## Summary
Adds the database schema, API endpoints, SDK types, and encryption
wrappers for admin-managed MCP (Model Context Protocol) server
configurations that chatd can consume. This is the backend foundation
for allowing external MCP tools (Sentry, Linear, GitHub, etc.) to be
used during AI chat sessions.
## Database
Two new tables:
- **`mcp_server_configs`**: Admin-managed server definitions with URL,
transport (Streamable HTTP / SSE), auth config (none / OAuth2 / API key
/ custom headers), tool allow/deny lists, and an availability policy
(`force_on` / `default_on` / `default_off`). Includes CHECK constraints
on transport, auth_type, and availability values.
- **`mcp_server_user_tokens`**: Per-user OAuth2 tokens for servers
requiring individual authentication. Cascades on user/config deletion.
New column on `chats` table:
- **`mcp_server_ids UUID[]`**: Per-chat MCP server selection, following
the same pattern as `model_config_id` — passed at chat creation,
changeable per-message with nil-means-no-change semantics.
## API Endpoints
All routes are under `/api/experimental/mcp/servers/` and gated behind
the `agents` experiment.
**Admin endpoints** (`ResourceDeploymentConfig` auth):
- `POST /` — Create MCP server config
- `PATCH /{id}` — Update MCP server config (full-replace)
- `DELETE /{id}` — Delete MCP server config
**Authenticated endpoints** (all users, enabled servers only for
non-admins):
- `GET /` — List configs (admins see all, members see enabled-only with
admin fields redacted)
- `GET /{id}` — Get config by ID (with `auth_connected` populated
per-user)
**OAuth2 per-user auth flow:**
- `GET /{id}/oauth2/connect` — Initiate OAuth2 flow (state cookie CSRF
protection)
- `GET /{id}/oauth2/callback` — Handle OAuth2 callback, store tokens
- `DELETE /{id}/oauth2/disconnect` — Remove stored OAuth2 tokens
## Security
- **Secrets never returned**: `OAuth2ClientSecret`, `APIKeyValue`, and
`CustomHeaders` are never in API responses — only boolean indicators
(`has_oauth2_secret`, `has_api_key`, `has_custom_headers`).
- **Field redaction for non-admins**: `convertMCPServerConfigRedacted`
strips `OAuth2ClientID`, auth URLs, scopes, and `APIKeyHeader` from
non-admin responses.
- **dbcrypt encryption at rest**: All 5 secret fields use `dbcrypt_keys`
encryption with full encrypt-on-write / decrypt-on-read wrappers (11
dbcrypt method overrides + 2 helpers), following the same pattern as
`chat_providers.api_key`.
- **OAuth2 CSRF protection**: State parameter stored in `HttpOnly`
cookie with `HTTPCookies.Apply()` for correct `Secure`/`SameSite` behind
TLS-terminating proxies.
- **dbauthz authorization**: All 18 querier methods have authorization
wrappers. Read operations use `ActionRead`, write operations use
`ActionUpdate` on `ResourceDeploymentConfig`.
## Governance Model
| Control | Implementation |
|---------|---------------|
| **Global kill switch** | `enabled` defaults to `false` |
| **Availability policy** | `force_on` (always injected), `default_on`
(pre-selected), `default_off` (opt-in) |
| **Per-chat selection** | `mcp_server_ids` on `CreateChatRequest` /
`CreateChatMessageRequest` |
| **Auth gate** | OAuth2 servers require per-user auth before tools are
injected |
| **Tool-level allow/deny** | Arrays on `mcp_server_configs` for
granular tool filtering |
| **Secrets encrypted at rest** | Uses `dbcrypt_keys` (same pattern as
`chat_providers.api_key`) |
## Tests
8 test functions covering:
- Full CRUD lifecycle (create, list, update, delete)
- Non-admin visibility filtering (enabled-only, field redaction)
- `auth_connected` population for OAuth2 vs non-OAuth2 servers
- Availability policy validation (valid values + invalid rejection)
- Unique slug enforcement (409 Conflict)
- OAuth2 disconnect idempotency
- Chat creation with `mcp_server_ids` persistence
## Known Limitations (Deferred)
These are documented and intentional for an experimental feature:
- **Audit logging** not yet wired — will add when feature stabilizes
- **Cross-field validation** (e.g., OAuth2 fields required when
`auth_type=oauth2`) — admin-only endpoint, will add when stabilizing
- **`force_on` auto-injection** — query exists but not yet wired into
chatd tool injection (follow-up)
- **Additional test coverage** — 403 auth tests, GET-by-ID tests,
callback CSRF tests planned for follow-up
## What's NOT in this PR
- Frontend UI (admin panel + chat picker)
- Actual MCP client connections (`chatd/chatmcp/` manager)
- Tool injection into `chatloop/`
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1031da9738 |
feat: add agent chat spend limiting (backend) (#23071)
Introduces deployment-scoped spend limiting for Coder Agents, enabling administrators to control LLM costs at global, group, and individual user levels. ## Changes - **Database migration (000437)**: `chat_usage_limit_config` (singleton), `chat_usage_limit_overrides` (per-user), `chat_usage_limit_group_overrides` (per-group) - **Single-query limit resolution**: individual override > min(group) > global default via `ResolveUserChatSpendLimit` - **Fail-open enforcement** in chatd with documented TOCTOU trade-off - **Experimental API** under `/api/experimental/chats/usage-limits` for CRUD on limits - **`AsChatd` RBAC subject** for narrowly-scoped daemon access (replaces `AsSystemRestricted`) - **Generated TypeScript types** for the frontend SDK ## Hierarchy 1. Individual user override (highest) 2. Minimum of group limits 3. Global default 4. Disabled / unlimited Currency stored as micro-dollars (`1,000,000` = $1.00). Frontend PR: #23072 |
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e5c19d0af4 |
feat: backend support for creating and storing service accounts (#22698)
Add is_service_account column to users table with CHECK constraints enforcing login_type='none' and empty email for service accounts. Update user creation API to validate service account constraints. Related to: https://linear.app/codercom/issue/PLAT-27/feat-backend-support-for-creating-and-storing-service-accounts |
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56bdea73b8 |
feat: add workspace acls to task rbac objects (#22311)
To allow tasks to be shareable, we need to share both the `task` resource and the `workspace` resource, and their sharing state needs to be kept in sync. We've already implemented all of the necessary ACL functionality for workspaces, so we can just sort of proxy those ACLs back to the task as well. |
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edee917d88 |
feat: add experimental agents support (#22290)
feat: add AI chat system with agent tools and chat UI Introduce the chatd subsystem and Agents UI for AI-powered chat within Coder workspaces. - Add chatd package with chat loop, message compaction, prompt management, and LLM provider integration (OpenAI, Anthropic) - Add agent tools: create workspace, list/read templates, read/write/ edit files, execute commands - Add chat API endpoints with streaming, message editing, and durable reconnection - Add database schema and migrations for chats, chat messages, chat providers, and chat model configs - Add RBAC policies and dbauthz enforcement for chat resources - Add Agents UI pages with conversation timeline, queued messages list, diff viewer, and model configuration panel - Add comprehensive test coverage including coderd integration tests, chatd unit tests, and Storybook stories - Gate feature behind experiments flag --------- Co-authored-by: Cian Johnston <cian@coder.com> Co-authored-by: Danielle Maywood <danielle@themaywoods.com> Co-authored-by: Jeremy Ruppel <jeremy@coder.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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be94af386c |
chore(coderd/database): enforce workspace ACL JSON object constraints (#22019)
The constraints prevent faulty code from saving 'null' as JSON and breaking the `workspaces_expanded` view. |
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e10fceb23c |
fix(coderd/database): allow same custom role name for different orgs (#21312)
Previously the `idx_custom_roles_name_lower` index prevented that. A check constraint was also added to ensure the `organization_id` column cannot be set to the all-zero UUID. |