Commit Graph
57 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Jaayden Halko 1f1aa6ae3c feat: add chat project template schema and queries (#32309)
Adds the database layer for attaching workspace templates to chat
projects: the schema, the queries, their authorization, and the audit
type. Nothing calls the new queries yet, and the existing create and
update handlers pass the new parameters unset. The API, the limit's
enforcement, and the agent tools follow in the PRs above.

- Attachments live in a `chat_project_templates` table (`project_id`,
`template_id`, `created_by`, `created_at`), deleted with the project or
the template. `chat_projects` gains `limit_templates` (default `false`),
`default_template_id`, `default_template_version_preset_id`, and
`default_parameters jsonb`. A project stores a default preset or default
parameter values, not both.
- `InsertChatProjectTemplates` needs project `update` and `use` on every
template. It skips templates that are already attached, and templates
outside the project's organization, so an attachment never crosses
organizations. `DeleteChatProjectTemplate` needs project `update` and
template `read`, and clears the project's default when it detaches the
default template. Both checks are in dbauthz.
- `GetChatProjectTemplatesByProjectIDs` is authorized through the
project, and leaves out deleted, deprecated, and agent-disabled
templates. It does not check the caller's access to each template, so
callers do that before they expose one.
- `UpdateChatProjectByID` changes the template settings only when the
request sets them, so an update that omits them cannot write back a
stale snapshot.
- `AuditableChatProjectTemplates` is the audit form of a project's
attached templates, logged as a write to the project. The new
`chat_projects` columns are tracked in the project's own audit diff,
with the default parameter values masked because they may hold
credentials.

**NOTE**: the migration adds one table and four columns and changes no
existing rows. Existing projects keep unlimited template access.

Stack (merge top to bottom):
- #32309 👈
- #30754
- #32310
- #30755
- #30756
- #30898
2026-11-17 21:59:01 +07:00
Jaayden Halko 4866d0fb1f feat: add display names to project skill actions (#31747)
closes CODAGT-1506

Project skill action chips show the skill's slug (`deploy-bot`,
`security-review`), because skill names must be kebab-case. This adds an
optional display name that labels the chip instead.

Project skills get a `display_name` column, set through `display_name`
on the create and update requests. It is limited to project skills (the
same rule as `action`), trimmed, single line, and at most 64 Unicode
code points. The chip, its tooltip, and the "More" menu show the display
name, sort by it, and fall back to the skill name when it is empty. When
a display name is set, the tooltip and the menu item also show the
`/name` slash command, so actions that share a display name stay
distinguishable. Clicking an action still inserts `/name`, and the `/`
menu is unchanged.

The project skill editor shows a **Display name** field under **Show as
action** only while that switch is on. Turning the switch off hides the
field but keeps its value, and saves omit `display_name` while the
action is off, so the stored value stays. The display name lives in the
database rather than SKILL.md frontmatter, so downloading and
re-importing a skill does not carry it.

To share the code-point length check with the editor, `countCharacters`
and `maxCharacters` move from `ChatProjectDialog.tsx` into
`site/src/utils/formUtils.ts`.

<img width="637" alt="Project skill editor with the Display name field
under Show as action"
src="https://raw.githubusercontent.com/coder/coder/assets/pr-skill-action-display-name/pr/edit.png"
/>

<img width="520" alt="Action chips labeled with display names, with the
tooltip open"
src="https://raw.githubusercontent.com/coder/coder/assets/pr-skill-action-display-name/pr/chips.png"
/>

Refs CODAGT-1506
2026-11-17 17:55:35 +07:00
Ethan d70ce38559 feat: record the OAuth2 client registration method of MCP server configs (#31558)
Relates to CODAGT-779

Currently we can't tell whether the OAuth2 client of an MCP server
config was entered by an admin, or registered by Coder with Dynamic
Client Registration (RFC 7591). The next PR in the stack needs to know
this, so it can register a new client when a config is updated.

This PR adds `mcp_server_configs.oauth2_client_registration` (`manual`
or `dynamic`) and returns it to admins on the API. Create stores
`dynamic` when it registers the client, and `manual` otherwise. An
update resets it to `manual` when it switches away from the `oauth2`
auth type, or when it changes the client ID, secret, auth URL or token
URL of a `dynamic` config, since the admin has replaced Coder's client.

Existing rows default to `manual`, as there's nothing in the data that
tells us which clients came from Dynamic Client Registration.
2026-11-03 12:39:30 +11:00
Sas Swart 161b7233d9 feat(coderd): store the organization on AI Gateway interceptions (#31118)
Adds `organization_id` (FK to `organizations`, `ON DELETE RESTRICT`) and
`organization_source` (new enum: `workspace`, `chatd`,
`effective_group`) to `aibridge_interceptions`, with a check constraint
that keeps them set or unset together. Cost and pricing run later, in
`RecordTokenUsage`, so they need the organization that AIGOV-716a
resolves once per request stored on the interception row.

`RecordInterceptionRequest` gains `organization_id` (18) and
`organization_source` (19), and the aibridged API moves to v1.5.
`RecordInterception` stores a valid pair; any other combination is
logged as a warning and stored as NULLs, so a gateway bug never turns
into an HTTP 500 for the user. A well-formed ID for an organization that
does not exist fails on the FK, like an unknown `initiator_id`. Nothing
sends the fields yet, so behaviour is unchanged until AIGOV-716a.

**Malformed values are stored as empty, not rejected.** A failed
`RecordInterception` returns HTTP 500 to the user, so the server logs a
warning and stores NULLs instead. The one exception is a well-formed ID
for an organization that does not exist: the foreign key rejects it, the
same as an unknown `initiator_id` today.

Part of AIGOV-712

*This PR was generated by Coder Agents on behalf of @SasSwart.*
2026-10-28 10:52:35 +02:00
c4d76a4009 feat: add skill action and automatic-use settings (#30882)
Adds two per-skill settings that the project skills UI will expose next:

- `action` marks a project skill to show as an action button above
project chat composers. A `skills_action_project_only` check keeps it to
project skills; the personal and organization routes reject `action`
with 400.
- `model_invocable` (default true, every stored source) controls
automatic use. When it's false the skill is left out of
`<available-skills>` and `read_skill` reports it as not found, but a
structured skill invocation (a chip from the `/` menu or an action)
still loads it, as long as the skill is enabled and the chat owner can
read it. Workspace skills always count as model-invocable.

Migration 000625 adds both columns with defaults, so existing skills
keep today's behavior. The list, get, insert and update queries,
`codersdk.SkillMetadata` and the create/update requests carry both
fields, and the audit table tracks them.
`coderd/x/chatd/ARCHITECTURE.md` gets TODO notes for the author.

**NOTE**: the migration adds two columns with constant defaults and a
CHECK constraint to `skills`.

Stack (merge top to bottom):
- #30826
- #30827
- #30838
- #30840
- #30854
- #30855
- #30856
- #30861
- #30880
- #30881
- #30882 👈
- #30884
- #31122
- #31126

---------

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Co-authored-by: Nick Vigilante <nickvigilante@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-10-23 19:32:08 +07:00
Sas Swart d14631df1a feat(coderd/database): add organization AI model config table (#30717)
Adds `ai_model_configs`: an organization's AI Governance configuration
for one model on one configured provider. Token prices are its first
settings. Migration `000630` is additive and needs no backfill.

- Rows are soft deleted with a `deleted` flag. A surrogate `id` is the
primary key, and a partial unique index allows one live row per
`(organization_id, provider_id, model)`. Cascades on delete of the
organization or provider. The organization is a column, as in other
organization-scoped tables.
- A check constraint rejects an empty model.
- Pricing per provider ID is what lets `openai-compat` gateways be
priced, and lets providers of the same type have different prices.
- Site-wide prices per provider type stay in the existing
`ai_model_prices` table, unchanged.

Recording which price was used on each token usage record is deferred
until its design settles.

**Used later:** #30718 adds the queries that read and write the table,
and #30719 looks prices up from it. The rest of the diff is generated.

---

*This PR was generated by Coder Agents on behalf of @SasSwart.*
2026-10-21 06:17:12 +00:00
George K 6d34557d74 feat: add script ordering adoption telemetry (#30860)
Count `coder_script_order` declarations and literal `rule` blocks in
coderd from the existing START plan in
`CompletedJob.TemplateImport.Plan`,
including child modules, without multiplying counts by resource or
module instances. Persist these counts per template version on
successful import after START plan graph validation, without changing
the provisioner API.

Report a deployment-wide `script_order_summary` with the number of
templates using script ordering and total declaration and rule
counts. Include only active, successfully imported versions of
non-deleted templates so repeated imports do not inflate
adoption. Elect one reporting replica per snapshot period and report
explicit zeros when no templates use ordering.

The summary contains only aggregate counts, without template
identifiers or rule contents. Dynamic rule blocks are not counted
because Terraform omits them from configuration JSON.

Configuration-decoding failures are logged and skip updating the
counts without independently failing the import. Script-order summary
collection failures are logged and omit that summary while allowing
the rest of the snapshot to proceed.

Refs: https://linear.app/codercom/issue/PLAT-551
2026-10-15 15:42:33 -07:00
Steven Masley 7aef110ca2 feat: add workspace secrets table, queries, and RBAC (#30248)
Adds the database table, queries, and permissions for workspace secrets: secrets set on a workspace build and delivered to the agent, never to Terraform. 

Each secret belongs to one workspace build. A new build copies the previous build's secrets, then the old copies lose their values but stay as history.
2026-10-15 13:32:40 -05:00
Garrett Delfosse 2b9fad8bba feat: add chat project sharing database layer (#30479)
Database and authorization layer for chat project sharing (experiment
`chat-projects`), part 1 of 2. #30439 adds the API on top of it. Nothing
here changes behavior: projects start with empty ACLs, no endpoint
writes them yet, and deleting a project still detaches its chats.
Project deletion is in #30683.

- **Schema:** migration `000621` adds `user_acl` and `group_acl` jsonb
columns to `chat_projects`, typed as `ChatACL` like chats, with GIN
indexes. It also adds the `chat_project:share` API key scope.
- **Queries:**
- `GetChatProjectsOwnedOrSharedWithUserID`: owned projects plus projects
with an ACL entry for the user directly, through a group, or through the
Everyone group (whose ID is the organization ID). Entries count only for
members of the project's organization. Keys match regardless of actions,
so dbauthz filters the rows.
- `IsChatProjectAccessibleByUserID`: whether a user owns a project or
holds a `read` or `*` grant on it, for code running under a system
subject. With sharing disabled, dbauthz answers owner-only.
- `GetChatProjectByIDForUpdate`: lets the ACL update read, modify, and
write in one transaction.
  - `UpdateChatProjectACLByID`.
- **RBAC:**
- New `share` action on `chat_project`. dbauthz requires it to update
the ACL.
- `ChatProject.RBACObject` attaches the project ACL. Memory objects get
a derived ACL: project `read` grants memory read, and `read` with
`update` grants memory create and delete. Wildcard grants count. Read
sharees change memories through their chats' agents, which #30439 gates.
Project instructions authorize through the same object, so a `read`
grant reads them and an `update` grant edits them.
- `--disable-chat-sharing` also covers projects: ACLs are ignored, the
ACL update is rejected, and roles deny `chat_project:share`. The help
text and chat sharing docs say so.
- **Audit:** `user_acl` and `group_acl` changes are tracked.
- **Tests:**
- Querier tests run the access queries both raw and through dbauthz
(owner, direct user, group, Everyone, wildcard grants, a member of
another org, grants without read).
- RBAC object and memory ACL tests, with an authorizer check, in both
sharing modes.
- dbauthz cases including the disabled guards, and the
`chat_project:share` negation in the roles test.

The generated TypeScript changes only add the new scope value.

> Generated by Coder Agents.
2026-10-14 10:42:00 -04:00
Michael Suchacz b67587c875 feat: add the organization skills data model (#30609)
## Stack

Part of
[CODAGT-1341](https://linear.app/codercom/issue/CODAGT-1341/support-organization-level-skills-in-coder-agents).
This stack adds organization skills to Coder Agents: admins publish a
skill once per organization, share it with groups or members, and chats
in that organization load it next to personal and workspace skills. It
replaces the 21-PR draft stack #30584 to #30604 with five PRs, bottom to
top:

1. **#30609** data model: one migration, queries, RBAC and dbauthz (this
PR)
2. #30610 organization skill API routes and the scope-neutral SDK
3. #30611 sharing ACL routes
4. #30612 settings UI: shared skills table, admin page, member section
5. #30613 chats: chatd loading, `/` menu, docs

## What changes

This PR adds the data model and authorization for organization skills.
Personal skills keep working unchanged: `git diff origin/main --
codersdk site` shows only generated RBAC and API key scope additions
(`apikey_scopes_gen.go`, `rbacresources_gen.go`,
`rbacresourcesGenerated.ts`, the RBAC and scope unions in
`typesGenerated.ts`) and `codersdk.ResourceTypeOrganizationSkill` with
its friendly string. No personal route, SDK type or site component
changes, and `coderd/userskills_test.go` changes only by mechanical
constant renames.

**One migration, `000621_skills`** (please review it closely):

- renames `user_skills` to `skills` with its constraints, index and
triggers, and recreates the cap function and
`delete_deleted_user_resources`, whose PL/pgSQL bodies name the table;
- adds `organization_id` and `project_id` (`ON DELETE CASCADE`),
`enabled` (default true), and `group_acl` / `user_acl` (`jsonb`, default
`{}`), with CHECKs for exactly one owner, ACLs that are JSON objects,
and ACLs that stay empty unless an organization owns the row, plus
partial unique name indexes per owner kind;
- replaces the cap trigger with `enforce_skills_per_owner_limit()`: 100
rows per owner, disabled rows included, locking the owner row `FOR NO
KEY UPDATE` so unrelated foreign key checks are not blocked;
- adds a `BEFORE DELETE` trigger on `organization_members` that removes
a departing member from `user_acl` on that organization's skills, so
rejoining doesn't restore a direct grant;
- adds the `organization_skill` `resource_type` and `api_key_scope` enum
values last; nothing in the migration uses them.

The down migration undoes the three old migrations in reverse order: it
drops organization and project rows and restores `user_skills`, its
names, the cap function and `user_id NOT NULL`.

Authorization: a new RBAC resource `organization_skill` (create, read,
update, delete, share). Owner and org admin get it; site and org
auditors get read; members read only through the skill's ACL, which
applies only to members of its organization. `Skill.RBACObject()`
returns the organization object with both ACLs; project rows stay denied
to everyone. New sqlc queries cover organization insert, get, list
(SQL-filtered through `GetAuthorizedOrganizationSkillMetadata` and a
`regosql` converter), update and delete, with dbauthz wrappers and the
audit table entries. No routes yet.

## Commits

The first commit reproduces the reviewed code from the old stack; each
later commit is a labeled trim or fix.

- `baa3150e3b7` feat: add the organization skills data model.
Reproduction: every non-site file this commit changes equals the
reviewed old `authz` head `1e16b3004c4`, except that the old stack's
migrations 000615, 000616 and 000617 are merged into one migration (then
`000615_skills`, now `000621_skills`) with one fixture
(`testdata/fixtures/000621_skills.up.sql`) and one migration test (now
`testMigration000621Skills`). At that commit, `dump.sql` was
byte-identical to the old head's.
- `1b84e83463a` test(coderd/database): keep only the SQL paths of the
org skill matrix. `TestOrganizationSkillAuthorization` becomes
`TestOrganizationSkillQueries` instead of being deleted, because
coverage showed it is this PR's only run of the
`GetAuthorizedOrganizationSkillMetadata` row scan (80% to 65% without
it) and of the organization update and delete queries (100% to 0%).
Swapping `group_acl` and `user_acl` in the converter makes
`GrantedMember` fail. The removed cases are decided by
`TestRolePermissions`, `TestSkillRBACObjectOrganizationACL` and the
dbauthz method suite.
- `e2931b412e9` test(coderd/database): fold the skill cap cases into
existing coverage. The user case is covered by `TestUserSkillLimit` and
`TestUserSkillLimitConcurrentCreates`; the organization case folds into
`ConcurrentOrganizationInsertsHonorCap`, which now also checks that
disabled rows count and another organization is unaffected (mutation
checked); the project case stays.
- `be62aea9021` test(coderd/rbac): drop
`TestOrganizationSkillReadScope`, covered by `TestExternalScopeNames`
and the generated scope file.
- `0c275ba37de` merges main at `454a2fcc697`, which took 000615 to
000618: it renumbers the migration to 000619 and resolves `dump.sql`,
`check_constraint.go` and the generated API docs. `8f2b4b87ee2` merges
main at `ad85646164e`, which took 000619: it renumbers the migration to
000620.
- `5248d56b64f` merges main at `e7b76872098`, which took 000620
(`000620_audit_chat_project_instructions_resource_type`): it renumbers
the migration, fixture and migration test to `000621_skills` (step
`Migration000621Skills`, version 621), and resolves
`enterprise/audit/table.go` (keeping main's
`AuditableChatProjectInstructions` entries and the `Skill` entry),
`dump.sql` and `models.go` (the `resource_type` enum gets
`chat_project_instructions`, then `organization_skill`) and the
regenerated `schemas.md`. The up and down SQL are unchanged by every
renumbering.

## Size

Production +549/-67, tests +728/-33, generated +881/-314; total
+2158/-414. This is above the 500-line reviewer-friendly limit on
purpose: Mike asked for 4 to 5 PRs instead of the 21 small ones this
stack replaces.

## Replaces

#30584 (rename `user_skills` to `skills`), #30585 (skill owners), #30586
(organization skill authorization).

## Validation

- Migration test: up keeps the existing personal row and its ID; down
restores the `user_skills` names, cap function and `NOT NULL`, and drops
organization rows; soft-deleting a user removes their skills after up,
after down, and after re-up.
- `go test` passed on `be62aea9021`, before the main merges, for
`coderd` (skill tests), `coderd/database`, `dbauthz`, `migrations`,
`gentest`, `coderd/rbac/...`, `coderd/x/chatd`, `coderd/x/skills`,
`enterprise/audit` and `enterprise/coderd`; `make lint/check-scopes`
passed; the four personal skills Vitest files pass unchanged.
- On `5248d56b64f`: build, vet, `TestMigrate`, `TestMigrationChain`, the
`migrations`, `database`, `dbauthz`, `gentest`, `rbac` and
`enterprise/audit` packages pass; `make gen` run twice is clean, and
`make pre-commit` passes.
- Remote UAT round 7 through Coder Agents passed on the whole stack; see
#30613's Validation for scope and findings.

> Xum opened this PR on behalf of @ibetitsmike.
2026-10-13 15:51:31 +00:00
ad85646164 feat(coderd): add chat project instructions storage and prompt injection (#30367)
Adds storage for project-level instructions in Coder Agents chat
projects and injects them into every chat in the project. This is the
first of four stacked PRs that replace #30349.

A new `chat_project_instructions` table (migration 000613) holds at most
one row per project, scoped to the project's organization. It records
`updated_by` and cascades on project delete. The dbauthz wrappers
authorize against the parent project: read access to get the
instructions, update access to upsert or delete them. No new RBAC
resource is added; project RBAC comes in a later PR.

chatd loads the instructions on every turn, so edits reach existing
chats on their next turn. They are added to the system prompt as a
`<project-instructions>` block after the memory guidance and before
personal instructions, so a user's personal instructions still win a
conflict. Subagent chats carry no `project_id`, so they use their root
chat's project. A load error other than no rows is logged, and the turn
continues without instructions.

**What to scrutinize:** the prompt ordering in `buildSystemPrompt`, and
the choice to inject per turn rather than snapshot at chat creation.
Per-turn injection costs one prompt-cache miss after each edit; the org
instructions in #30272 use a creation-time snapshot instead.

**Generated** (`make gen` from the migration and
`queries/chatprojectinstructions.sql`): `dump.sql`, `models.go`,
`querier.go`, `queries.sql.go`, `dbmetrics/querymetrics.go`,
`dbmock/dbmock.go`, and the `*_constraint.go` files.

`coderd/x/chatd/ARCHITECTURE.md` gets two TODOs for the PR author to
replace with the real description, per AGENTS.md.

**Validation:** `make gen` leaves no diff. `go test
./coderd/database/dbauthz -run TestMethodTestSuite/TestChats`, `go test
./coderd/x/chatd -run 'SystemPrompt|ProjectInstructions|Memory'`, and
`go test ./coderd/database/migrations/...` pass.

---

Stack (merge top to bottom). #30377 through #29583 are f0ssel's split of
the original #29583, and this stack sits on #29583:
- #30377 data layer and project dialog (f0ssel)
- #30378 new-chat form locked to a project (f0ssel)
- #30379 project page route (f0ssel)
- #29583 sidebar folders (f0ssel), the base of this stack
- #30291 composer frame
- #30292 project chat list caches
- #30293 project page header
- #30294 project chats list
- #30367 instructions storage and prompt injection 👈
- #30368 instructions API
- #30369 instructions editor dialog
- #30370 instructions Details panel

---------

Co-authored-by: Garrett Delfosse <delfossegarrett@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-13 16:45:44 +07:00
Bobby Ho dae7967bd1 feat: persist script resource addresses and dependencies (#30625)
feat(coderd): persist workspace agent script dependencies

Persist Terraform resource addresses and script dependencies supplied by
the provisioner (#30451, #30491), and expose them through the SDK and
REST API.

- Add migration 000618 with `resource_address` and `dependencies`
  columns, empty defaults, and a JSON-array constraint. API responses
  always include the address and omit empty dependency lists.
- Preserve `success` and `completion` requirements, including scripts
  on devcontainer subagents. Legacy scripts and older provisioners
  remain compatible through empty defaults.
- Reject empty prerequisite addresses and unsupported requirements,
  rolling back the entire job. Invalid stored dependencies return HTTP
  500 rather than silently dropping ordering.
- Add persistence, validation, rollback, devcontainer, API, and migration
  coverage; regenerate API docs and TypeScript types.

Unordered templates retain their existing execution behavior.
Dependency lists remain empty until #30556. Agent manifest wiring and
the agent API version bump are deferred to a follow-up.

Refs PLAT-548.
2026-10-13 03:43:55 +00:00
Thomas Kosiewski f923f4a525 chore!: remove the chat automations experiment (#30412)
Removes the experimental Chat Automations feature (`chat-automations` experiment) from main. This reverts the 16-PR stack that added it and adds two forward migrations that undo its schema and credential changes.

> [!WARNING]
> **Upgrade consequences**
>
> - **Automation data is deleted.** Migration 000615 drops the `chat_automations` table and deletes every queued message an automation delivered. Chats, their messages and ordinary queued messages stay. Messages lose their automation provenance (`automation_id`, `input_id`).
> - **Automation-only credentials are revoked.** Migration 000616 deletes API keys, OAuth2 codes and OAuth2 tokens whose only scopes (or allow-list entries) were `chat_automation:*`. Mixed credentials keep their other scopes. Custom roles lose their `chat_automation` permissions. OAuth2 apps that allowed only `chat_automation` scopes get the whitespace allowlist that grants nothing, as in 000595.
> - **A coordinated restart is required.** Stop all old replicas before the new version runs the migrations. Old replicas read the dropped table and columns, so a rolling deploy is not supported.
> - **Remove `--chat-max-automations-per-owner` before upgrading.** The flag, the YAML key `chat.maxAutomationsPerOwner` and the env var `CODER_CHAT_MAX_AUTOMATIONS_PER_OWNER` are removed. A deployment that still sets the flag or the YAML key will not start (`unknown flag` / `unknown option`). The env var is ignored. This includes dogfood. No release or tag contains the flag.
> - **Down migrations restore the schema only.** 000616 down and 000615 down recreate the 000611 schema with empty tables. They do not restore deleted automations, webhook secrets, provenance, queued deliveries, revoked credentials, stripped permissions or the deleted experiment rule.

## What is removed

- The `chat-automations` experiment and its stored runtime rule (`experiment_rule:chat-automations`).
- The `--chat-max-automations-per-owner` deployment option.
- The `chat_automation` RBAC resource, its member and chatd grants, and the `chat_automation:*` API key scopes.
- The automation sqlc queries, dbauthz wrappers and audit table entries.
- The management routes under `/api/experimental/organizations/{organization}/chat-automations`, and the webhook route `POST /api/experimental/chat-automations/{automation}/events` with its rate limiter.
- The chatd management service, webhook publish, schedule loop, the `manage_automations` tool, and the chatstate admission seam and queue promotion guard that only automations used.
- The Agents Automations page, editor, nav entry, chat labels, the Manage automations toggle and the API client.
- The `archived:any` chat search value that the automations "View chats" dialog added.
- `docs/ai-coder/agents/automations.md`, its manifest entry, the glossary entry and the related rows.

Reverted PRs: #30085, #30096, #30112, #30117, #30127, #30134, #30160, #30166, #30167, #30171, #30187, #30207, #30214, #30217, #30219, #30220.

## What stays, and why

- Migrations 000609, 000610 and 000611, their fixture, and the #30297 lock fix with `migration000609_test.go` stay unchanged. Deployments such as dogfood already ran them.
- New migration **000615** reverses the schema changes of 000609 and 000611 against the current schema. It uses the same short-wait lock-and-retry block as 000609, and it rebuilds `chats_expanded` from main's current definition minus the two automation columns. New migration **000616** follows the 000595 Tasks removal for credentials and recreates `api_key_scope` without the five `chat_automation:*` values. It keeps the `chat_project_memory:*` values from 000612.
- The `chat_automation` value stays in the `resource_type` enum, and `codersdk.ResourceTypeChatAutomation` stays. Old audit log rows stay readable, as with `task` after the Tasks removal.
- The 000615 delete fires the existing queue-version trigger, so `queue_version` moves to `snapshot_version` for each affected chat. `snapshot_version` is not bumped: the coordinated restart restarts every stream loop from an empty state, and the site does not read the version fields.
- `coderd/x/chatd/ARCHITECTURE.md` drops the sections the stack added and gets back its pre-stack wording, merged with the later main edits to the same file.

## Notes for reviewers

- #30379 (chat project page) merged while this PR was in progress. It passed `manageAutomationsEnabled` in `AgentCreatePage.test.tsx` and listed an `automations` route in `AgentsPageLayout.test.tsx`. Later main commits also added automation props in `ConversationTimeline.test.tsx` and `ConversationTimelineWorkingBlocks.stories.tsx`. This PR removes all of them.
- Remaining `automation` matches under `coderd`, `codersdk`, `enterprise`, `site/src` and `docs` are intended:
  - migrations 000609 to 000611, their fixture and `migration000609_test.go`;
  - the new 000615 and 000616 migrations and `migration000615_test.go`;
  - the `chat_automation` resource type in `dump.sql`, `models.go`, `codersdk/audit.go`, the generated API docs, `swagger.json` and `typesGenerated.ts`;
  - unrelated uses of the word "automation" (docs, `chatlabels_test.go`, `ratelimit.go`, `autostop.go`, `subagent_catalog.go`, `WorkspaceSharingSection.tsx`, `AgentChatPage.stories.tsx`).

Remote UAT on an isolated dev deployment passed. It upgraded a populated pre-removal database, then checked chats, queued messages, tokens, the 404 routes, the removed page and nav entry, and the experiments list.

---
_Generated with [`xum`](https://github.com/coder/xum) • Model: `anthropic:claude-opus-5-5` • Thinking: `high`_

![Agents sidebar after the upgrade, with no Automations entry](https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/bd446035-7fc8-4ca4-a735-3a4f36380738)
2026-10-11 19:57:49 +02:00
Garrett DelfosseandClaude Opus 5.5 a08ba6a70c feat: add shared project memory API for chats in a project (#29301)
- Experiment, stacked on #29242. UI is in #29583.
- Adds **project memory**: `chat_project_memories` rows with a name
(lowercase slug, unique per project), a one-line description (150
characters) and a body (8KB). Up to 200 per project, shared by every
root chat in the project. Chats outside a project and subagents have no
memory.
- Memories are immutable: they are created and deleted, never edited.
Agent tools are `read_memory`, `save_memory`, `delete_memory` and
`consolidate_memory`. Saving an existing name fails and points the agent
at `consolidate_memory` to replace it.
- **Consolidation is agent-driven, in the turn**, modeled on how Claude
Code compacts its memory index when warned it is near its limit. From
160 memories (80%), save results ask the agent to get under 140 (70%)
with `consolidate_memory`, choosing what to merge and drop. That tool
deletes and saves memories in one transaction under the per-project
advisory lock, and rolls back entirely if a delete is missing, a name is
taken, or the result exceeds 200. There is no background extraction or
consolidation.
- **The memory index reaches the model as model-only conversation
messages**, not in a tool description or the system prompt. At turn
start the chat gets a full `<project-memory-index>` snapshot when its
prompt has none (first turn, or after compaction), otherwise a
`<project-memory-index-update>` listing only what changed. Tool
definitions and the system prompt carry no memory state, so memory
writes never invalidate the provider's cached prompt prefix. Writes by
other chats, or by this chat mid-turn, reach the model at its next turn.
- REST API (create, list, get, delete) under
`/api/experimental/organizations/{organization}/chats/projects/{project}/memories`.
Memory permissions follow projects onto the `agents-access` role.
- **Every memory change is audited** as `ChatProjectMemory` create or
delete. REST changes are attributed to the caller. Tool changes
(`save_memory`, `delete_memory`, `consolidate_memory`) are attributed to
the chat owner, carry the `chat_id`, and record one entry per memory
after the change commits, so a rolled-back consolidation records
nothing.

### Examples

**What the model sees.** The system prompt gets a fixed guidance block
with no memory state:

```text
<memory>
Memory is durable context shared by every chat in the project "platform".
Save facts that will matter in future chats: … The memory index is in the conversation: a <project-memory-index> message lists every saved memory, and <project-memory-index-update> messages at the start of later turns list what changed. Changes made during a turn, including your own, appear in the next turn's update. … Memories cannot be edited: replace one that no longer holds with consolidate_memory, or delete it.
</memory>
```

On the first turn, after the user's message, the chat gets a model-only
row with the full index (hidden in the UI):

```text
<project-memory-index>
- deploy-day: Deploys happen on Tuesdays
- release-owner: Alice owns releases; ping her before tagging
</project-memory-index>
```

On a later turn where memories changed, it gets only the difference:

```text
<project-memory-index-update>
Added or changed:
- deploy-day: Deploys happen on Wednesdays (changed 2026-09-30)
- staging-url: Staging lives at staging.example.com
Removed:
- old-ci-notes
</project-memory-index-update>
```

Resulting request layout, with the provider's cached prefix unchanged by
memory writes:

```text
[tools: fixed]  [system: fixed <memory> guidance]  [turn 1 user] [index snapshot] [assistant/tools …]  [turn 2 user] [index update] [assistant …]
```

**Tool calls and results** (produced by the tools in this PR):

```text
save_memory {"name":"staging-url","description":"Staging lives at staging.example.com","body":"Staging is https://staging.example.com; deploys from main."}
→ {"count":3,"saved":"staging-url"}

save_memory {"name":"deploy-day", …}   // name already exists
→ error: a memory named "deploy-day" already exists; read it, then replace it with consolidate_memory by deleting "deploy-day" and saving the new version in one call

consolidate_memory {"delete":["deploy-day"],"save":[{"name":"deploy-day","description":"Deploys happen on Wednesdays (changed 2026-09-30)","body":"The team deploys every Wednesday since 2026-09-30."}]}
→ {"count":3,"deleted":["deploy-day"],"saved":["deploy-day"]}

read_memory {"name":"deploy-day"}
→ {"name":"deploy-day","description":"…","body":"…","created_at":"2026-09-30T15:04:05Z","created_by":"alice"}
```

Near and at the cap:

```text
save_memory … → {"count":160,"saved":"one-more","warning":"memory is 160/200, approaching the limit. Consolidate it to under 140 memories now with consolidate_memory: merge overlapping memories into one, and drop stale, wrong, or superseded ones."}

save_memory … → error: memory is full (200/200); use consolidate_memory to merge overlapping memories and drop stale ones, and include this memory in its save list
```

**REST memory object** (`GET .../chats/projects/{project}/memories`):

```json
{
  "id": "59500000-0000-4000-8000-000000000001",
  "project_id": "7c0e4a3e-5b1f-4f7d-9a51-2f3c8f6d2b10",
  "organization_id": "bb640d07-ca8a-4869-b6bc-ae61ebb2fda1",
  "name": "deploy-day",
  "description": "Deploys happen on Wednesdays (changed 2026-09-30)",
  "body": "The team deploys every Wednesday since 2026-09-30.",
  "created_by": "0ed9befc-4911-4ccf-a8e2-559bf72daa94",
  "created_by_username": "alice",
  "created_at": "2026-09-30T15:04:05Z"
}
```

Create takes `{"name", "description", "body"}` and answers 409 on a
duplicate name or at the cap.

<details>
<summary>Screenshots (predate the immutable-memory rework; tool output
shape has since changed)</summary>


![save_memory](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/coder/coder/f0ssel/chat-projects-assets/v3/pr2-01-chat-saves-memory-raw.png)

![read_memory](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/coder/coder/f0ssel/chat-projects-assets/v3/pr2-02-chat-reads-memory-raw.png)
![Agent reads every
memory](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/coder/coder/f0ssel/chat-projects-assets/v3/pr2-agent-lists-memories-raw.png)

</details>

---
Generated with Coder Agents on behalf of @f0ssel.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-05 12:52:10 -04:00
Thomas Kosiewski f55aa6c50d feat: add chat automations schema, RBAC resource, and audit entries (#30085)
Adds the storage and authorization pieces for Automations for Coder
Agents. No route, SDK request type, or chatd code uses them yet, so
nothing is exposed.

This is the bottom PR of the Automations stack (RFC step 1). Later PRs
add the chatd acceptance seam, management routes, webhooks, and
schedules on top of these names and constraints.

**Schema** (migrations 000609, 000610)

- `chat_automations` table with enums `chat_automation_kind`,
`chat_automation_target_mode`, `chat_automation_webhook_use`, and
`chat_automation_when_busy`. It includes `created_by_chat_id`, the
webhook secret hash and version, the single-use `webhook_consumed_at`
marker, the schedule cursor and revision, and `queue_generation`. Named
CHECKs enforce the target and kind shapes from the RFC. A composite
foreign key keeps `new_chat_model_config_id` in the automation's
organization, the same pattern the model override tables use. A trigger
(`chat_automations_chat_organization`) keeps `target_chat_id` and
`created_by_chat_id` in that organization too. A composite foreign key
cannot do that while keeping `ON DELETE SET NULL` on PostgreSQL 13. The
trigger validates a reference only on insert or when it changes, so chat
deletion can still clear both references. Indexes cover the owner and
both chat references for cascades and `SET NULL`.
- Provenance columns with partial indexes and no foreign key to
`chat_automations`: `automation_id`, `input_id`, `queue_generation` on
`chat_queued_messages` (all set or all null), `automation_id` and
`input_id` on `chat_messages`, and `chats.automation_id`.
`chats_expanded` is recreated to include `automation_id`.
- `chat_automation` values for `api_key_scope` and `resource_type`. The
down migration is a no-op because enum values cannot be dropped.

**Authorization**

- New organization-scoped RBAC resource `chat_automation` (create, read,
update, delete). The `agents-access` role grants it for the member's own
automations. It is excluded from the member role's user-level
permissions, so a member without `agents-access` gets nothing. Site
owners and organization admins get it through their existing
all-permissions lists. The owner-only update, enable, and run rule from
the RFC belongs to the management service in a later PR.
- The generated scopes stay out of `externalLowLevel`, so API keys gain
no user-requestable scopes.
- `dbauthz` wrappers for the three queries this PR adds:
`InsertChatAutomation`, `GetChatAutomationByID`, and
`DeleteChatAutomationByID`. `InsertChatAutomation` also requires update
on the target chat, read on the creating chat, and read on the new-chat
model config (its user and group ACL). There is also a
`dbgen.ChatAutomation` helper.

**Audit**

- `enterprise/audit/table.go` entries for `ChatAutomation`, with
`webhook_secret_hash` and `prompt` marked `ActionSecret`. The prompt is
treated as chat content, like chat titles. The schedule cursor,
revision, and queue generation are ignored as internal bookkeeping.
`Chat.automation_id` is tracked.

**Required checks from the ticket**

- Migrations apply and roll back: `TestMigrate` and
`TestMigrateUpWithFixtures` (new fixture for 000609). Dogfood UAT also
applied the migrations on a dev instance, rolled them back, re-applied
them, and compared schema dumps. After rollback, the only differences
from main were the enum values that cannot be dropped and develop.sh's
own `_develop` schema. After re-applying, the only difference from this
branch's `dump.sql` was the `_develop` schema.
- Secret hash marked secret: `Test_chatAutomationSecretFieldsRedacted`
checks the table entries and that an audit diff contains neither the raw
hash, its base64 form, nor the prompt text.

Also covered: `TestRolePermissions` cases for own, other owner, other
organization, and a member without `agents-access`.
`TestChatAutomationShapeConstraints` covers the named CHECKs, the
cross-organization foreign key and trigger, a cross-organization
retarget, and deleting referenced chats. Under `site/`, only generated
files changed (`typesGenerated.ts`, `rbacresourcesGenerated.ts`).

Closes CODAGT-1207
Part of CODAGT-1135

---
_Generated with [`xum`](https://github.com/coder/xum) • Model:
`anthropic:claude-opus-5-5` • Thinking: `high`_

---------

Signed-off-by: Thomas Kosiewski <tk@coder.com>
2026-10-02 15:54:48 +00:00
Garrett DelfosseandClaude Opus 5.5 7cd1b2040b feat: add chat projects API (#29242)
- Experiment, behind `chat-projects` (off by default). First of three
stacked PRs: #29301 (memory), #29583 (UI). This PR is API only; the
screenshots below are from the UI in #29583.
- CRUD under
`/api/experimental/organizations/{organization}/chats/projects/{project}`.
`GET /api/experimental/chats/projects` lists the caller's projects
across all organizations.
- `project_id` on chat create and as a chat list filter. A chat joins a
project only at creation; there is no move.
- Projects are identified by ID. Names are display labels (64
characters, description 1024) with no uniqueness constraint. An optional
`icon` URL (usually an emoji image under `/emojis`) is capped at 256
characters and audited.
- A user can own at most 100 projects across all organizations; creating
another answers 409. Creates count and insert under a per-owner advisory
lock so concurrent requests cannot overshoot.
- Projects are private to their `owner_id`. Members may only create
their own, and a chat can only be bound to a project its owner owns. An
unreadable or foreign project on chat create answers 404 so IDs cannot
be probed; a project from another organization answers 400.
- Permissions ride on the `agents-access` role next to chats (after
#30004), so whoever can use Coder Agents can use projects. Owners and
org admins reach every project.

### Examples

Create a project in an organization:

```http
POST /api/experimental/organizations/{organization}/chats/projects
{"name": "Platform", "description": "Infra and deploy work", "icon": "/emojis/1f680.png"}
```

```json
{
  "id": "7c0e4a3e-5b1f-4f7d-9a51-2f3c8f6d2b10",
  "organization_id": "bb640d07-ca8a-4869-b6bc-ae61ebb2fda1",
  "owner_id": "0ed9befc-4911-4ccf-a8e2-559bf72daa94",
  "name": "Platform",
  "description": "Infra and deploy work",
  "icon": "/emojis/1f680.png",
  "created_at": "2026-09-30T15:04:05Z",
  "updated_at": "2026-09-30T15:04:05Z"
}
```

List the caller's projects across organizations with `GET
/api/experimental/chats/projects` (an array of the object above). Update
with `PATCH .../chats/projects/{project}` and any of `name`,
`description`, `icon`; delete with `DELETE`, which detaches its chats.

Create a chat in the project, and list only its chats:

```http
POST /api/v2/chats
{"organization_id": "bb640d07-…", "project_id": "7c0e4a3e-…", "content": [{"type": "text", "text": "Plan the deploy"}]}

GET /api/v2/chats?project_id=7c0e4a3e-…
```

At the limit:

```json
409 {"message": "You can have at most 100 chat projects. Delete a project to create another."}
```

<details>
<summary>Screenshots (UI from #29583)</summary>

![Create
project](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/coder/coder/f0ssel/chat-projects-assets/v3/pr1-01-create-project-dialog.png)
![Sidebar
folders](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/coder/coder/f0ssel/chat-projects-assets/v3/pr1-02-sidebar-folders.png)
![Project
page](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/coder/coder/f0ssel/chat-projects-assets/v3/pr1-03-project-page.png)
![Folder
menu](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/coder/coder/f0ssel/chat-projects-assets/v3/pr1-05-folder-menu.png)
![Another member sees no
projects](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/coder/coder/f0ssel/chat-projects-assets/v3/pr5-member-sees-no-projects.png)

</details>

---
Generated with Coder Agents on behalf of @f0ssel.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-01 11:49:21 -04:00
Asher 957aefa475 feat: add client_session_id to connection_logs table (#29686)
The client session ID is not populated yet; this just adds the ability
for agents to send a client session ID with the rest of the connection
data, once it gets piped through.
2026-09-27 22:38:36 -08:00
Michael Suchacz b957e66ccc feat!: drop the Coder Tasks tables and queries (#29086)
Drops the `tasks`, `task_workspace_apps` and `task_snapshots` tables,
the `tasks_with_status` view and the `task_status` enum, and recreates
`workspaces_expanded` without the `tasks` join and `task_id` column.
Deletes `queries/tasks.sql` and every wrapper, fixture and test that
existed only for those queries (dbauthz, dbmock, dbmetrics, dbfake,
dbgen, querier_test), plus the `task_id` projection in
`GetWorkspaceAgentAndWorkspaceByAuthToken`.

**Breaking change:** migration 000594 deletes all task rows. The down
migration restores the schema (tables, constraints, indexes, views), not
the data.

**Review changes:** the schema-only migration test was removed per
review (`TestMigrate/UpDownUp` still exercises the down path), the test
file no longer reorders existing tests, and the migration moved from
000593 to 000594. The `dump.sql` reorder is pg_dump dependency ordering:
`tasks_with_status` pulled its four workspace tables ahead of it, and
without the view they return to alphabetical positions.

**Stack context:** Coder Tasks removal stack (CODAGT-642): #28743
frontend → #28788 CLI → #28789 API → #28790 provisioner → #29084
notifications → #29085 build reasons → **#29086 tables** → #28750
permissions. The last four PRs replace the single data-drop migration
that used to live in #28750; each carries one concern and its own
migration number.

> Created by Xum (AI agent) on behalf of @ibetitsmike.


## Delivery record

**Decision (2026-09-11 ~14:40Z): merge** through the stack merge
endpoint, squash, pinned to head
`f1d236a0c82f123b8a0d6878799c227ef9bd5776` (merge SHA appended below
once landed).

**Independent substantive reviews on this PR (3):**

| # | Kind | Reviewed commit | Findings and disposition | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Codex code review (bot), PR opened | `24535f8410` | No findings,
no threads |
[summary](https://github.com/coder/coder/pull/29086#issuecomment-5583877627)
|
| 2 | Human review, spikecurtis (COMMENTED) | `24535f8410` | 4 findings:
dump.sql reorder question (answered: pg_dump dependency hoisting by
`tasks_with_status`); two moved tests (undone, the test file is no
longer touched); schema-only migration test (deleted). All resolved. |
[review](https://github.com/coder/coder/pull/29086#pullrequestreview-5142045164)
|
| 3 | Human review, spikecurtis (APPROVED) | `f1d236a0c8` (this head) |
Approval on the exact final head |
[review](https://github.com/coder/coder/pull/29086#pullrequestreview-5179353695)
|

The four COMMENTED reviews by @ibetitsmike on `f35688f40b` are
thread-reply wrappers and are not counted.

**Pre-split history relevant to this diff:** this layer's content lived
in the monolithic #28750 until 2026-09-08, which received 10 completed
Codex code reviews (2026-08-28 to 2026-09-01) and spikecurtis's
CHANGES_REQUESTED review of 2026-09-04 that asked for the split.
Counting those, the completed-review total relevant to this diff exceeds
the six-review budget, so no further discretionary review or fresh final
advisory was commissioned. The usable final recommendation for the final
diff is review 3 above: the reviewer who authored every finding on this
layer approved the exact head.

**Exact-head checks:** `required` SUCCESS in [run
34580949353](https://github.com/coder/coder/actions/runs/34580949353/job/103205933212);
rollup 15 success, 8 skipped, 1 failure. The failure is the non-required
`Analyze PR for Documentation Updates Needed` job
([103204101137](https://github.com/coder/coder/actions/runs/34580949071/job/103204101137)),
caused by the dormant `doc-check-pr-29086` review workspace
(CODAGT-1025), not a code finding; GitHub flags only `required` as
required for this PR. Merge-ref freshness: `refs/pull/29086/merge` has
the exact head as second parent and `25af21b5d5d` (the #29085 squash) as
first parent; main has since gained #29231, #28639 and #29218 (12 files,
none overlapping this PR). The composed tree (`git merge-tree` of
current main and this head) builds (`go build ./...`) and vets (`go vet`
on `coderd`, `coderd/database/...`, `coderd/wsrelated/...`) cleanly.
Layer diff parity with the previously pushed layer verified by numstat
after both GitHub restacks. `gh stack push` did not run the local
pre-push suite; CI is the validation evidence.

**Deferred:** the dormant doc-check workspace (CODAGT-1025) is outside
this PR. Next in the stack, #28750, stays blocked: CHANGES_REQUESTED,
its approval and CI predate the restack, and its review budget is
exhausted.
2026-09-11 14:24:32 +00:00
Michael SuchaczandEthan Dickson 0ef331fcd0 feat!: scope chat model override settings to organizations (#28442)
Moves chat model override settings from deployment scope to organization
scope, following the org-scoping of chat model configs in #28440.

Depends on #28440 (based on
`ethan/chat-models-availability-consolidation`).

Remote dogfood UAT passed on this change, including multi-organization
scenarios on a licensed deployment with real models.

## Problem

Chat model configs are now owned by organizations, but the override
settings that reference them stayed deployment-wide: admin
subagent/title/compaction overrides in `site_configs`, personal
overrides in `user_configs`, and the advisor model embedded in the
advisor runtime JSON. A single deployment-level override can only point
at one organization's model config, so overrides effectively worked for
the default organization only, and title generation had to soften its
hard-failure contract to tolerate unusable overrides.

## Fix

Admin overrides (general, explore, title generation, compaction,
advisor) and personal overrides (root, general, explore) become
organization-scoped rows in two new typed tables,
`chat_organization_model_overrides` and `chat_user_model_overrides`.
Composite foreign keys on `(organization_id, model_config_id)` make
cross-organization model references unrepresentable. The migration
deletes the legacy serialized `site_configs`/`user_configs` override
keys instead of migrating them; admins and users re-select models in the
new organization-scoped settings.

New endpoints live under
`/api/experimental/organizations/{organization}/chats/model-overrides`
(admin defaults) and
`/api/experimental/organizations/{organization}/members/{user}/chats/model-overrides`
(personal overrides); the legacy deployment-level routes are removed.
chatd resolves overrides via the chat's organization, restoring the
hard-failure contract for configured-but-unusable title generation
overrides. The deployment-level `AllowUsers` switch and advisor runtime
limits stay deployment-scoped.

The Coder Agents settings UI gains a per-organization "Defaults &
overrides" page under AI Settings > Models, and the personal overrides
page gains an organization selector for users in multiple organizations.
Advisor telemetry now reports per-organization override rows.

**BREAKING CHANGE**: Existing deployment-level overrides are dropped,
not migrated. Every organization starts with no overrides after upgrade,
and model selections must be re-applied in the new settings. The legacy
deployment-level override endpoints are removed.

Closes https://linear.app/coder/issue/CODAGT-872

> [!NOTE]
> Xum (AI agent) authored this PR on behalf of @ibetitsmike.

<!-- xum-attribution: model=claude-opus-4-6 thinking=high -->

---------

Co-authored-by: Ethan Dickson <ethan@coder.com>
2026-08-24 11:20:26 +01:00
Ethan f32592ec6b feat!: scope chat model configs to organizations (#27955)
## Summary

Scope chat model configurations and runtime model resolution to
organizations. Each model configuration now belongs to exactly one
organization, each organization can have its own default model, and
Chatd only uses models that belong to the chat's organization.

Depends on #27968.

## Problem

Chat model configurations are currently deployment-wide even though
chats belong to organizations. A default model, explicitly selected
model, or configured model override can therefore reference the same
model configuration from every organization. This prevents model
catalogs and defaults from being isolated by organization and allows a
chat to retain or select a model that its organization does not own.

Existing model configurations also have no organization ownership or
organization-scoped ACL data, and the database enforces a single live
default across the entire deployment.

## Fix

Add required organization ownership and ACL storage to chat model
configurations. The migration assigns every existing configuration to
the default organization, seeds organization-wide read access, and
replaces the deployment-wide default constraint with a per-organization
constraint.

Scope Chatd lookup, admission, fallback, and queue-promotion behavior to
the chat's organization:

- New chats use the usable default model from their organization.
- Explicit model selections from another organization are rejected.
- Deployment or personal overrides that point to a foreign model are not
used for the chat.
- Historical cross-organization model references remain unchanged in the
database, but runtime generation falls back to a usable local default.
- Queue promotion resolves unavailable, disabled, missing, or foreign
stored models to the usable local default and fails when no usable local
default exists.

The existing model configuration management and availability routes
remain compatibility routes for the default organization in this layer.
A later layer in the stack adds organization-scoped management routes
and updates clients to use them.

## Breaking change

This changes chat model behavior from deployment-wide to
organization-scoped. Existing configurations are migrated only to the
default organization; they are not copied into every organization.

As a result:

- A non-default organization no longer inherits the deployment's
existing default model.
- Creating a chat in an organization without a usable local default
fails with `400: No default chat model config is configured.`
- Explicitly selecting a configuration owned by another organization
fails with `400: Model config does not belong to the specified
organization.`
- Existing chats whose stored model belongs to another organization can
generate only if a usable local default is available; otherwise
generation fails.

Deployments using Agents in non-default organizations must configure a
usable default chat model separately for each organization after the
organization-scoped management layers in this stack are available.

_This pull request description was generated by Coder Agents._
2026-08-24 09:30:01 +00:00
Michael Suchacz 7ca7c30f40 feat: add group and user ACLs to MCP server configs (#27944)
Adds group and user ACLs to org-scoped MCP server configs so
organizations can restrict specific MCP servers to subsets of members,
mirroring the template ACL pattern.

## Summary

- Migration adds `group_acl`/`user_acl` JSONB columns (nested `{"<id>":
{"permissions": [...]}}` shape) and seeds every existing config with its
organization's Everyone group read entry (the Everyone group ID equals
the org ID), so member access is unchanged by default. Creation seeds
the same entry.
- The blanket org-member read grant from the base PR is replaced by ACL
evaluation: Rego requires org membership for every ACL grant, and
`GetAuthorizedMCPServerConfigs` compiles ACL-aware SQL filters.
- New `ActionShare` (org admins) gates `GET|PATCH
/api/experimental/organizations/{organization}/mcp-servers/{mcpserverconfig}/acl`
(nested under the organization like the rest of the config surface).
PATCH validates principals against the config's organization, merges
sparse updates under a row lock, stamps `updated_by`/`updated_at`, and
is audited as a Write with `Old` captured before authorization. A config
deleted concurrently between the middleware fetch and the locked
re-fetch is concealed as 404, matching the update and delete handlers.
ACL columns are tracked in the audit table.
- ACL management is available in all editions (no enterprise
entitlement), documented in the MCP servers page. Revoking an ACL does
not retro-strip already-selected configs from existing chats; new
selection is blocked at chat create.
- Force On respects the ACL: the forced set is loaded as the chat owner,
so a `force_on` server whose ACL denies the owner never attaches at
create, send, or generation time.
- No rolling-upgrade machinery: upgrades run in scheduled maintenance
downtime, so the migration only backfills existing rows; the API sets
the Everyone read grant explicitly on every insert.

Stacked on #27943. Part of the MCP org-separation stack.

Closes https://linear.app/codercom/issue/CODAGT-712

UAT: verified on a dogfood instance with two members and a custom group:
Everyone-seed default visibility, group grant with Everyone removal
(non-member loses list/fetch/selection), foreign-principal rejection,
non-admin share denial (audited 403 / concealed 404), user_acl restore,
and audited ACL diffs.

> Mux (AI agent) authored this PR on Mike's behalf.

<!-- mux-attribution: model=claude-fable-5 thinking=high -->
2026-08-19 19:25:18 +00:00
Jaayden Halko 20c376a575 fix: enforce uniqueness and hour alignment for agent runtime usage events (#27983)
The usage generator writes `hb_agent_runtime_v1` rows with `created_at`
at the UTC hourly bucket start and exactly one row per bucket, but
nothing in the schema enforced either invariant. A duplicate bucket row
under a different id would be double-counted by any consumer summing
`runtime_ms`, and a misaligned `created_at` would skew which usage
period a bucket is attributed to.

This replaces the non-unique partial index
`idx_usage_events_agent_runtime` (from migration 000561) with a unique
index of the same shape and adds an hour-alignment `CHECK` constraint.
Both statements validate existing rows: every supported writer has
always produced conforming data, so a pre-existing violator is anomalous
and failing the migration loudly beats silently rewriting usage rows.
`generateBucket` treats a unique violation on the bucket index as
another replica having won the race, mirroring the existing `ON CONFLICT
(id)` no-op for committed rows.

The `coderd/notifications` sync commit and its revert cancel out (the
drift they addressed was fixed on main by #27979); the PR's net diff is
only the usage-event changes.

Part 1 of a 3-PR stack splitting up #27796 (see there for review
history). Stack: this PR → #27984 → #27985.
2026-08-17 16:23:45 +07:00
Bobby HoandClaude Opus 5 990d24dc42 feat: add oauth2 scope columns and single-use delete queries (#28007)
OAuth2 tokens issued by Coder ignore scope entirely. The authorize
endpoint parses the `scope` parameter and then discards it, and both
grant paths mint API keys with full API access regardless of what the
client requested or what the app's allowlist permits. There is also
nowhere to put a negotiated scope: nothing carries one from the
authorize step to the token it produces.

Schema and query groundwork for that pipeline. No behavior change on its
own.

- Migration `000569` adds a `scope` column to
`oauth2_provider_app_codes` and `oauth2_provider_app_tokens`, so a
negotiated scope can travel from a code to the token it is exchanged
for, and from a token to its refreshed successor.
- Existing rows are backfilled to `coder:all`, then both columns become
NOT NULL with a non-empty CHECK. Every OAuth2 key is unrestricted in
fact today, so the backfill only writes that down, and a caller that
omits the column now fails instead of silently issuing full access.
- Adds `DeleteOAuth2ProviderAppCodeByIDReturningRow` and
`DeleteAPIKeyByIDReturningRow`, which return `sql.ErrNoRows` when the
row is already gone. Postgres serializes concurrent deletes on the row
lock, so exactly one caller gets a row back, which is what will let the
grant paths enforce single use of a code or refresh token without a
read-then-write race.
- No callers yet. The existing blind deletes and all of their call sites
are untouched, and codes and tokens record `coder:all` until a later
phase negotiates a real value.

Phase 1 of [PLAT-470](https://linear.app/codercom/issue/PLAT-470),
tracked as
[PLAT-478](https://linear.app/codercom/issue/PLAT-478/phase-1-schema-and-queries).
Scope validation at authorize, applying the negotiated scope in the code
grant, and refresh narrowing follow as separate PRs.

Verified locally: `make gen` and `make lint` clean, the migrations suite
passes both up and down, and dbauthz's `TestMethodTestSuite` passes.

<details>
<summary>End-to-end scope enforcement flow (green marks what this PR
touches)</summary>

```mermaid
flowchart TD
    subgraph authorize["/oauth2/authorize"]
        AZ1["ShowAuthorizePage (GET)<br/>renders consent page"]
        AZ2["ProcessAuthorize (POST)<br/>scope parsed, then discarded"]
        Q1["InsertOAuth2ProviderAppCode<br/>gains a Scope param"]
        AZ1 --> AZ2 --> Q1
    end

    Q1 --> CODES[("oauth2_provider_app_codes<br/>new column: scope text NOT NULL")]

    subgraph codegrant["POST /oauth2/token, grant_type=authorization_code"]
        G1["authorizationCodeGrant"]
        Q2["GetOAuth2ProviderAppCodeByPrefix<br/>now returns Scope"]
        Q4["DeleteOAuth2ProviderAppCodeByIDReturningRow<br/>added, no caller yet"]
        G2["apikey.Generate + UserRBACSubject<br/>hardcoded to full access"]
        G1 --> Q2 --> G2
        G1 -.-> Q4
    end

    CODES --> G1
    G2 --> Q3

    Q3["InsertOAuth2ProviderAppToken<br/>gains a Scope param"]
    Q3 --> TOKENS[("oauth2_provider_app_tokens<br/>new column: scope text NOT NULL")]

    subgraph refresh["POST /oauth2/token, grant_type=refresh_token"]
        G3["refreshTokenGrant"]
        Q5["GetOAuth2ProviderAppTokenByPrefix<br/>now returns Scope"]
        Q6["DeleteAPIKeyByIDReturningRow<br/>added, no caller yet"]
        G3 --> Q5
        G3 -.-> Q6
    end

    TOKENS --> G3
    Q5 --> Q3

    subgraph enforce["Every authenticated API request"]
        E1["httpmw ExtractAPIKey"] --> E2["APIKey.ScopeSet()"] --> E3["UserRBACSubject"] --> E4["dbauthz authorize"]
    end

    TOKENS --> E1

    classDef changed fill:#c8e6c9,stroke:#2e7d32,stroke-width:2px,color:#1b3c1e
    classDef dormant fill:#c8e6c9,stroke:#2e7d32,stroke-width:2px,stroke-dasharray:5 3,color:#1b3c1e
    class Q1,Q2,Q3,Q5,CODES,TOKENS changed
    class Q4,Q6 dormant
```

Solid green is added or changed here. Dashed green exists but has no
caller yet. Everything else is unchanged, including the enforcement
engine at the bottom, which already reads a key's scopes correctly and
only needs real data fed into it.

</details>

<details>
<summary>Suggested reading order</summary>

Most of the diff is generated. `dump.sql`, `models.go`, `querier.go`,
`queries.sql.go`, `check_constraint.go`, and the dbmock and dbmetrics
packages all come from `make gen`.

1. `migrations/000569_oauth2_scope_columns.{up,down}.sql`: additive
column, backfill, NOT NULL, CHECK, and a `COMMENT ON COLUMN` on each.
2. `queries/oauth2.sql` and `queries/apikeys.sql`: `scope` added to both
insert column lists, plus the two new returning-row deletes alongside
the untouched originals. The `Get...ByPrefix` selects needed no edit,
since they are `SELECT *`.
3. `dbauthz/dbauthz.go`: hand-written wrappers for the two new queries,
each fetching by ID, authorizing delete against the fetched object, then
delegating. The generic `deleteQ` helper does not fit, since it requires
the delete to return only `error`.
4. `oauth2provider/authorize.go` and `oauth2provider/tokens.go`: the
only production changes, all behavior-neutral.
5. `dbgen/dbgen.go` and `dbauthz/dbauthz_test.go`: seed threading, plus
a case per new query. `MethodTestSuite` fails with "Method never called"
for anything untested.

Neither type needs to become auditable, which `make lint` confirms by
not erroring on `enterprise/audit/table.go`.

</details>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-13 09:58:51 -07:00
Bobby HoandClaude Opus 5 16c58770f8 feat: constrain the OAuth2 client type column (#27931)
Extracted from #27873 so the schema change can be reviewed for migration
safety on its own. #27873 will rebase onto this.

`client_type` decides whether the token endpoint validates a client
secret at all, and the column accepts any text: nullable, no `CHECK`, no
enum. No Go path can write a bad value today, and `IsPublic` fails
closed on anything unrecognized, so the read side is safe. What the
schema still permits is the problem: a future migration writing
`'public'` onto a row that holds a secret turns off client
authentication for that app with nothing to catch it, no constraint, no
log, no audit entry, no test.

`000565` adds `CHECK (client_type IN ('confidential', 'public'))` and
`NOT NULL`. The `UPDATE` ahead of it should touch zero rows, since
migration `000344` added the column with a default of `'confidential'`
and backfilled with `COALESCE`; it is there so `SET NOT NULL` cannot
fail on an unexpected row. Both `ALTER`s take `ACCESS EXCLUSIVE` and
scan a table holding one row per registered OAuth2 client, so the lock
is brief.

## The second migration, and why it aligns the way it does

Two columns describe the same fact and can currently contradict each
other.

`token_endpoint_auth_method` is the client's own declaration: registered
client metadata under RFC 7591 §2, where `"none"` is defined to mean the
client is public and has no secret. `client_type` is Coder's derived
copy, and it is what the token endpoint enforces on. RFC 7591 defines no
`client_type` metadata field; the column exists only as a
denormalization.

Registration used to persist the declaration verbatim while hardcoding
`client_type` to `'confidential'`, so rows exist declaring `"none"` on a
client stored confidential that was issued, and still requires, a real
secret. A client that reads its own metadata and believes it is public
will drop that secret and stop being able to exchange codes.

`000566` aligns the declaration to what is enforced, not the reverse.
Deriving enforcement from the declaration would reclassify every such
client as public and stop requiring the secret it holds, which is a
silent authentication downgrade. The down migration is deliberately
empty: the previous values are not recorded, and restoring them would
only reinstate metadata that tells a client to authenticate in a way the
server rejects.

## Application changes

`SET NOT NULL` changes the generated field from `sql.NullString` to
`string`, so the three write sites are updated to match. That is the
entire application diff and no behavior depends on it.

Refs
https://linear.app/codercom/issue/ENG-3029/oauth2-support-public-client

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-10 10:49:02 -07:00
Zach 85984ff142 feat: add enable/disable support for user secrets (#27537)
Users can now disable a secret to stop it from being injected into
workspaces without deleting it, and re-enable it later. Disabled secrets
stay visible and editable everywhere they already appear.

An enabled secret must have at least one injection target; a secret with
no target can be stored only while disabled. Existing target-less secrets
are migrated to disabled to preserve current behavior.

Support spans the REST API, SDK, CLI, dashboard, and audit log.
2026-07-28 09:58:33 -06:00
George K 6af0f4d698 feat: add workspace restart functionality to API (#25757)
This models restart as durable orchestration of existing stop and
start workspace builds instead of adding a new restart transition.
Keeping restart as two existing transitions preserves the current
build/provisioner model.

The child start build is created only after the parent stop build
succeeds, rather than being inserted immediately in a pending
state. That keeps `workspace_builds` aligned with actual
provisioner-ready work and avoids introducing a second
pending-build lifecycle that the provisioner and build acquisition
paths would need to understand.

Refs: https://linear.app/codercom/issue/PLAT-143
2026-07-07 09:18:30 -07:00
Susana Ferreira fcdd029d74 feat: add ai_user_daily_spend table and queries (#26562)
## Description

Adds the spend tracking table and queries needed by [AIGOV-427](https://linear.app/codercom/issue/AIGOV-427/add-post-response-spend-accumulation) (post-response accumulation) and [AIGOV-428](https://linear.app/codercom/issue/AIGOV-428/add-pre-request-budget-enforcement) (pre-request enforcement).

## Changes

- Add `ai_user_daily_spend` table to aggregate per-user, per-effective-group AI spend by UTC day.
- Add `UpsertUserAIDailySpend` and `GetUserAISpendSince` queries.

Closes https://linear.app/codercom/issue/AIGOV-426/add-daily-spend-table-and-queries

> [!NOTE]
> Initially generated by Claude Opus 4.7, modified and reviewed by @ssncferreira
2026-07-02 16:29:25 +01:00
Spike Curtis e8bd5004a2 chore: add replica_host and nats_port to replicas table (#26665)
relates to GRU-69

Adds cluster_host and nats_port to replicas table, to explicitly track NATS routes in the cluster.

I decided to make the NATS support explicit and transport the port number over the replicasync so that different Coder Servers can run on different ports. This is not something customers will typically care about, but is very useful for testing, so that they can all run on localhost within one machine.

I've also gone with a design where the NATS pubsub directly tells replicasync the port number _after_ it opens the socket. This is also very useful for testing because it allows us to have the OS assign the port number at runtime, avoiding races where we fail to bind to a free port.
2026-06-24 15:04:04 -04:00
Yevhenii Shcherbina b6fcb9a30a feat: record cost on aibridge token usages (#26229)
Implements
https://linear.app/codercom/issue/AIGOV-286/add-interception-cost-calculation-to-aibridge-token-usages

Adds spend attribution to AI Gateway. After the upstream response, each
token-usage record now captures the user's effective group, the
per-token prices in effect at that moment, and a computed cost — so
spend is recorded as an immutable, point-in-time snapshot.

Concretely, `aibridge_token_usages` gains `effective_group_id`,
`input_price_micros`, `output_price_micros`, `cache_read_price_micros`,
`cache_write_price_micros`, and `cost_micros`. When a usage record is
written, the effective group is resolved (per-user override, else the
deployment budget policy), the `(provider, model)` price is looked up
and snapshotted onto the row, and cost is computed from the
provider-reported token counts. A model that isn't in the price table
records its tokens with a `NULL` cost; any *other* resolution failure
fails the write, so a `NULL` cost unambiguously means "model not priced"
rather than "lookup errored."

All values are stored in micro-units (1 unit = 1,000,000 micro-units;
Phase 1 assumes USD, so 1 micro-unit = $0.000001). Prices are quoted per
million tokens.

This also grants the AI Bridge RBAC subject `read` on `ai_model_prices`
(the per-interception price lookup needs it; it previously only had
`update` for the startup seeder).

## Cost precision

Cost is computed per token category as `tokens × price / 1_000_000` with
integer division, then the four categories are summed. The division is
done **per category** (not once over the summed numerator) on purpose:
it keeps the per-category line items summing exactly to the stored total
— no "the parts don't add up to the whole" in reporting).

Integer division truncates sub-micro-unit fractions. For example, a
cheap model at $0.10 per million tokens is a price of `100_000`; 9
tokens cost `9 × 100_000 / 1_000_000 = 900_000 / 1_000_000 = 0` (the
true 0.9 micro-units floors to 0). At real list prices this rarely bites
— $3/M input is a price of `3_000_000`, so even a single token is 3
micro-units. The per-record under-count is bounded below 1 micro-unit
per category, so under $0.000004 total across the four categories, which
is acceptable for list-price-based cost approximation.

## Overflow safety

`cost_micros` is a `BIGINT` (int64), and the largest intermediate value
is a single category's `tokens × price` before division. int64's ceiling
is ≈ `9.223e18`.

- At a steep $75/M model (price `75_000_000`), overflow would require
~123 billion tokens in one response: `123e9 × 75e6 = 9.225e18`, just
over the limit. `122e9` stays under at `9.15e18`.
- A realistically maxed-out Opus 4.8 response (≈1M input + 128K output
at list prices) costs about $15, with a numerator around `1.5e13` —
roughly six orders of magnitude below the ceiling.

So overflow is unreachable from real token counts.

### Multi-currency support

In the future, we may encounter issues with multi-currency support,
especially when dealing with currencies that have very large exchange
rates relative to USD, for example:

IRR: ~1,300,000 IRR ≈ 1 USD
VND: ~26,000 VND ≈ 1 USD

For currencies with such large denominations, numeric overflow is
technically possible, considering that we have only about six orders of
magnitude of headroom before reaching the limit (see above).

## `effective_group_id` has no foreign key

`effective_group_id` records the group a spend was attributed to, as an
immutable historical fact. It is intentionally **not** a foreign key, so
the record survives deletion of the group.

Alternatives were considered and rejected:

- **`ON DELETE SET NULL`** would mutate an "immutable" record — deleting
a group silently erases that interception's attribution and under-counts
the group's historical spend.
- **`RESTRICT` / `NO ACTION`** would block group deletion entirely
(groups are hard-deleted).
- **`CASCADE`** would delete spend history when a group is deleted — the
worst outcome for an audit record.

There is also no insert-time check that the group still exists: the id
comes from a budget that was just resolved, meaning it was valid at some
point.

## Open question: group name snapshotting

Should we also snapshot the group *name* onto each record? Two options:

- **Denormalize it now** — readable in historical reports even after a
group is deleted, but the snapshot can drift from the current name on
rename, raising a "show point-in-time vs. current name" question.
- **Postpone until needed** — it's a purely additive column later, and
the name is display-only (not correctness-bearing like the price). The
cost: names of groups deleted before the column is added can't be
backfilled.

Leaning toward postponing until a concrete reporting need settles the
drift question.
2026-06-16 20:09:00 +00:00
Danny Kopping a1330e3a8c refactor: rename Ai* database identifiers to AI* (AIGOV-369) (#26327)
Adds `ai` to sqlc's `gen.go.initialisms` in `coderd/database/sqlc.yaml`
so the generated DB code follows Go's initialism convention. Adds the
matching `ai` -> `AI` case to the dbgen PascalCase helper
(`scripts/dbgen/main.go`) so the corresponding `dbmem` / mock
identifiers stay in sync. `make gen` regenerates the rest; hand-written
call sites that consume DB-generated identifiers
(`enterprise/audit/table.go`, `coderd/database/modelmethods.go`,
`enterprise/coderd/aigatewaykeys.go`, `coderd/database/dbauthz/*`, etc.)
are updated to match.

Scope is deliberately limited to the database layer:

- `coderd/rbac/*` (resource and scope generators) is untouched —
`ResourceAi*` / `ScopeAi*` constants stay on main's casing.
- `codersdk/*` (Go SDK) is untouched — `codersdk.ResourceAi*` /
`codersdk.APIKeyScopeAi*` constants stay on main's casing, so external
Go SDK consumers see no source-level break.
- `Aibridge*` identifiers (one SQL token `aibridge`, not `ai_bridge`)
are out of scope.

On-the-wire values are unchanged: enum strings, RBAC resource type
strings, API key scope strings, and JSON tags all stay the same. The
HTTP/JSON surface is unaffected.

Refs:
[AIGOV-369](https://linear.app/codercom/issue/AIGOV-369/change-ai-references-in-coderddatabasemodelsgo-to-ai)

🤖 Generated with [Coder Agents](https://coder.com)
2026-06-16 09:01:43 +00:00
Paweł Banaszewski f22d4e2cbb feat: add ai_gateway_keys table and related RBAC (#25563)
Adds table to store keys that AI Gateway standalone replicas will use
to authenticate into Coderd.
Also adds RBAC and audit boilerplate.
2026-06-02 09:28:43 +02:00
Yevhenii Shcherbina 1a91d31793 feat: add user AI budget override endpoints (#25439)
Implements https://linear.app/codercom/issue/AIGOV-285
Follow the structure established in
https://github.com/coder/coder/pull/25203

## Summary

Adds the `user_ai_budget_overrides` table and CRUD API at
`/api/v2/users/{user}/ai/budget`. An override sets a custom per-user
spend cap that supersedes group-budget resolution, attributing spend to
a specific group.

## Schema

```sql
CREATE TABLE user_ai_budget_overrides (
    user_id            UUID        PRIMARY KEY REFERENCES users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
    group_id           UUID        NOT NULL REFERENCES groups(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
    spend_limit_micros BIGINT      NOT NULL CHECK (spend_limit_micros >= 0),
    created_at         TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW(),
    updated_at         TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW()
);
```

## Membership lifecycle

The membership invariant — a user must be a member of the attributed
group, including when that group is "Everyone" — would naturally be
expressed as a composite FK on `(user_id, group_id) →
group_members_expanded(user_id, group_id)`. PostgreSQL doesn't allow
foreign keys to reference views, so enforcement is split across two
mechanisms:

- **Write-time check.** A CHECK constraint on the table
(`user_ai_budget_overrides_must_be_group_member`) calls a `STABLE`
function `is_group_member(user_id, group_id)` that queries
`group_members_expanded`. The view surfaces both regular group
memberships and the implicit "Everyone" group memberships from
`organization_members`. Any INSERT or UPDATE that violates the predicate
is rejected with a Postgres `check_violation`, which the handler maps to
a 400. `is_group_member` is defined as a general predicate, reusable by
any future table that needs the same check.

- **Cascade on removal.** Two `BEFORE DELETE` triggers handle membership
loss:
- `trigger_delete_user_ai_budget_overrides_on_group_member_delete` on
`group_members` — covers regular group removals (admin action, OIDC
sync).
- `trigger_delete_user_ai_budget_overrides_on_org_member_delete` on
`organization_members` — covers the "Everyone" group, whose membership
lives in `organization_members`.

The single-column FKs on `users(id)` and `groups(id)` remain to cascade
on user or group deletion (those paths don't pass through
`group_members`).

## Authorization

The dbauthz layer gates each operation against the `User` and (for
writes) `Group` resources:

| Operation | User resource  | Group resource |
|-----------|----------------|----------------|
| `GET`     | `ActionRead`   | —              |
| `PUT`     | `ActionUpdate` | `ActionUpdate` |
| `DELETE`  | `ActionUpdate` | `ActionUpdate` |

For `DELETE`, the dbauthz layer fetches the existing override first to
learn the attributed `group_id`, then runs both checks.

### Role matrix

| Role         | GET | PUT | DELETE |
|--------------|-----|-----|--------|
| Owner        | ✅   | ✅   | ✅      |
| UserAdmin    | ✅   | ✅   | ✅      |
| OrgAdmin     | ✅   | ❌   | ❌      |
| OrgUserAdmin | ✅   | ❌   | ❌      |

Internal discussion:
https://codercom.slack.com/archives/C096PFVBZKN/p1779392747885359

## Audit logs
Audit logs will be addressed in a follow-up PR.
2026-05-29 10:08:25 -04:00
Sas Swart 3bf5f80277 feat(coderd/database): add boundary_sessions and boundary_logs tables (#25441)
RFC: [Bridge ↔ Boundaries Correlation
RFC](https://www.notion.so/coderhq/Gateway-and-Firewall-Correlation-RFC-31ad579be592803aa8b3d48348ccdde9)

Add up/down migrations and matching sqlc queries for persisting Boundary
audit events, as specified in the Bridge/Boundaries Correlation RFC.

**Tables:**
- `boundary_sessions`: session metadata with `workspace_agent_id` FK,
`confined_process_name`, and timestamps (`started_at`, `updated_at`). ID
is externally supplied by the Boundary process (no DB-side default).
Created lazily when the first log for a session arrives.
- `boundary_logs`: individual audit events with `session_id` FK,
`sequence_number` (INT, primary ordering key), protocol/method/detail
fields, and `matched_rule` (nullable; non-NULL implies allowed).

**Indexes (per RFC):**
- `(session_id, sequence_number)` for the ordering query path
- `(captured_at)` for the retention purge path

**Queries:**
- `InsertBoundarySession` / `GetBoundarySessionByID`
- `InsertBoundaryLog` / `GetBoundaryLogByID`
- `ListBoundaryLogsBySessionID` with nullable `seq_after`/`seq_before`
exclusive bounds for fetching events between two known interception
sequence numbers
- `DeleteOldBoundaryLogs` with row limit to avoid long-running
transactions

**Also includes:** dbgen helpers (`BoundarySession`, `BoundaryLog`),
dbauthz implementations (reads gated on `ResourceAuditLog`, deletes on
`ResourceSystem`), and all generated wrappers (dbmock, dbmetrics).

No callers yet. A follow-up PR will add the dedicated `boundary_log`
RBAC resource type.

> Generated by Coder Agents
2026-05-25 11:14:36 +02:00
Michael Suchacz ca1f6b19a2 feat: remove legacy chat provider tables (#25416) 2026-05-22 09:50:01 +02:00
Michael Suchacz 40878eeba4 feat: add AI provider schema expansion (#25412) 2026-05-22 02:16:01 +02:00
Michael Suchacz 5a8d0016a5 feat: add personal skill storage, API, and SDK (#25363)
> Mux updated this PR on behalf of Mike.

## Stack Context

This PR is the storage, permissions, API, and SDK layer for experimental
personal skills. #25362 has landed on `main`, so this branch is
restacked directly on `main`.

Stack order:
1. #25363 storage, permissions, API, and SDK
2. #25365 API test coverage
3. #25366 chattool and chatd integration
4. #25066 settings UI and docs
5. #25386 personal skills slash menu

## What?

Adds the `user_skills` database table, generated queries, RBAC resources
and scopes, audit resource handling, experimental user-scoped CRUD
endpoints, SDK types, and generated API/site types.

Follow-up review and restack fixes:
- Enforce a bounded personal skill description in parser and database
constraints.
- Return `403 Forbidden` for unauthorized create and update attempts.
- Return explicit conflict responses when soft-deleted users are
targeted.
- Keep user admins out of personal skills, while site owners can read
and delete but not create or update.
- Document trigger-raised constraint names and keep schema constants
covered by tests.
- Reuse `UserSkillMetadata` in the full `UserSkill` SDK response type.
- Generate user skill IDs in Go instead of relying on a database
default.
- Rebase on latest `main` and renumber the user skills migration to
`000502_user_skills`.

## Why?

Personal skills need durable user-owned storage with owner
authorization, limited site-owner moderation, and a hidden API surface
before chatd can consume them.

## Validation

- `make gen`
- `go test ./coderd/database -run '^TestUserSkillSchemaConstants$'
-count=1`
- `go test ./coderd/database/dbauthz -run
'^TestMethodTestSuite/TestUserSkills$' -count=1`
- `go test ./coderd -run '^TestPatchUserSkill$' -count=1`
- `go test ./codersdk ./coderd/database/db2sdk`
- `make lint`
- pre-commit hook on `97fd58108d`
2026-05-20 00:09:09 +02:00
Danielle Maywood 170a6e1fe9 feat: add chat sharing foundation (#25041) 2026-05-18 22:32:05 +01:00
Yevhenii Shcherbina 238968cfa0 feat: add per-group AI budget table and endpoints (#25203)
Closes
https://linear.app/codercom/issue/AIGOV-284/add-group-budgets-table-and-crud-api

## Summary

Adds the `group_ai_budgets` table and the following endpoints:

- `GET /api/v2/groups/{group}/ai/budget`
- `PUT /api/v2/groups/{group}/ai/budget`
- `DELETE /api/v2/groups/{group}/ai/budget`

Each group may have at most one budget row. If no row exists, no budget
is enforced.

### Feature gate
  
Added `RequireFeatureMW(FeatureAIBridge)` on the `/ai/budget` sub-route.

## RBAC

Authorization reuses `rbac.ResourceGroup` with the existing
`.InOrganization(...).WithID(...)` scoping model.

The `dbauthz` wrappers load the parent `groups` row and authorize
against it.

No new resource type is introduced. As a result, anyone with
`group:update` permissions (Owner, OrgAdmin, or UserAdmin within the
organization) can manage AI budgets for that group.

## Read access for group members

`database.Group.RBACObject()` grants `policy.ActionRead` to all members
of the group through the group ACL:

```go
func (g Group) RBACObject() rbac.Object {
	return rbac.ResourceGroup.WithID(g.ID).
		InOrg(g.OrganizationID).
		// Group members can read the group.
		WithGroupACL(map[string][]policy.Action{
			g.ID.String(): {
				policy.ActionRead,
			},
		})
}
```

Because the `GET` endpoint authorizes against the same loaded `Group`
object, any group member can call:

```text
GET /api/v2/groups/{group}/ai/budget
```

`PUT` and `DELETE` remain admin-only. The group ACL grants only
`ActionRead`, so write operations continue to require role-based
`group:update` permissions.

## Alternative considered

A dedicated `rbac.ResourceGroupAiBudget` resource would allow budget
management to be separated from general group administration.

We decided not to add that complexity for now.
2026-05-14 15:54:37 -04:00
Danielle Maywood 9ddfafe2b1 feat: add chat ACL database foundation (#25080) 2026-05-14 17:18:50 +01:00
Danny Kopping 841b777ccd feat: add ai_providers table, queries, dbauthz, audit, RBAC (#24892) 2026-05-14 16:10:46 +02:00
Yevhenii Shcherbina 4124d1137d feat: add ai_model_prices table (#24932)
# Summary

Implements
https://linear.app/codercom/issue/AIGOV-282/add-ai-model-price-table-and-seed-generator

This PR lays the groundwork for AI Bridge cost controls (per the AI
Governance RFC). It adds the foundation needed for future cost tracking:
a place to store per-model token prices, a way to keep those prices in
sync with upstream pricing data, and a startup mechanism that ensures
every deployment has prices loaded before AI Bridge starts processing
requests.

The price data comes from [models.dev](https://models.dev/), a
community-maintained catalogue of AI provider pricing. A generator
script fetches the latest prices, filters to Anthropic and OpenAI for
now, and produces a seed file checked into the repository.

On every server startup the seed is applied to the database, so new
releases automatically pick up any price corrections that landed since
the previous one. Existing rows are overwritten with the latest prices;
rows for models no longer in the seed are left untouched.

# Batching the AI model price seed: three approaches

Context: at server startup we seed the `ai_model_prices` table from an
embedded JSON price book (~70 rows today, will grow as we add providers,
potentially 4000+).

Each row is:

```text
(provider, model, input_price, output_price, cache_read_price, cache_write_price)
```

Any of the four price columns can be:

- `NULL` → “price unknown for this dimension”
- explicit `0` → “free”

The batch must be an UPSERT so re-running is idempotent and existing
rows pick up new prices.

We considered three implementations.

---

## Approach 1 — Per-row UPSERT in a Go loop

```go
for _, row := range rows {
    if err := db.UpsertAIModelPrice(ctx, database.UpsertAIModelPriceParams{
        Provider:   row.Provider,
        Model:      row.Model,
        InputPrice: nullInt64(row.InputPrice),
        // ...
    }); err != nil {
        return err
    }
}
```

### Pros

- Trivial.
- NULL handling falls out naturally from `sql.NullInt64`.

### Cons

- `N` round-trips per seed.
- With ~70 rows that means ~70 statement executions on every startup,
even inside a transaction.
- Doesn't scale gracefully as the price book grows, potentially 4000+.

---

## Approach 2 — `UNNEST` with parallel arrays

Pass each column as a separate Go slice. Postgres unnests them in
parallel into a virtual table, then `INSERT ... SELECT`.

```sql
INSERT INTO ai_model_prices (
    provider,
    model,
    input_price,
    output_price,
    cache_read_price,
    cache_write_price
)
SELECT
    UNNEST(@providers::text[]),
    UNNEST(@models::text[]),
    NULLIF(UNNEST(@input_prices::bigint[]), -1),
    NULLIF(UNNEST(@output_prices::bigint[]), -1),
    NULLIF(UNNEST(@cache_read_prices::bigint[]), -1),
    NULLIF(UNNEST(@cache_write_prices::bigint[]), -1)
ON CONFLICT (provider, model) DO UPDATE SET
    input_price       = EXCLUDED.input_price,
    output_price      = EXCLUDED.output_price,
    cache_read_price  = EXCLUDED.cache_read_price,
    cache_write_price = EXCLUDED.cache_write_price,
    updated_at        = NOW();
```

Go side: flatten rows into six parallel slices.

Use a sentinel (`-1`) for “missing”, since `lib/pq` can't encode `NULL`
into a `bigint[]` element.

```go
providers := make([]string, len(rows))
models    := make([]string, len(rows))
inputs    := make([]int64,  len(rows))
outputs   := make([]int64,  len(rows))
cacheR    := make([]int64,  len(rows))
cacheW    := make([]int64,  len(rows))

for i, r := range rows {
    providers[i] = r.Provider
    models[i]    = r.Model

    inputs[i] = -1
    if r.InputPrice != nil {
        inputs[i] = *r.InputPrice
    }

    outputs[i] = -1
    if r.OutputPrice != nil {
        outputs[i] = *r.OutputPrice
    }

    cacheR[i] = -1
    if r.CacheReadPrice != nil {
        cacheR[i] = *r.CacheReadPrice
    }

    cacheW[i] = -1
    if r.CacheWritePrice != nil {
        cacheW[i] = *r.CacheWritePrice
    }
}

return db.UpsertAIModelPrices(ctx, database.UpsertAIModelPricesParams{
    Providers:        providers,
    Models:           models,
    InputPrices:      inputs,
    OutputPrices:     outputs,
    CacheReadPrices:  cacheR,
    CacheWritePrices: cacheW,
})
```

### Pros

- Single round-trip.

### Cons

- The generated `sqlc` params become plain `[]int64`, which can't
represent `NULL`.

---

## Approach 3 — `jsonb_array_elements` over a single `@seed::jsonb`
(chosen)

Pass the raw seed JSON as one parameter; let Postgres expand and parse
it.

```sql
INSERT INTO ai_model_prices (
    provider,
    model,
    input_price,
    output_price,
    cache_read_price,
    cache_write_price
)
SELECT
    elem->>'provider',
    elem->>'model',
    (elem->>'input_price')::bigint,
    (elem->>'output_price')::bigint,
    (elem->>'cache_read_price')::bigint,
    (elem->>'cache_write_price')::bigint
FROM jsonb_array_elements(@seed::jsonb) AS elem
ON CONFLICT (provider, model) DO UPDATE SET
    input_price       = EXCLUDED.input_price,
    output_price      = EXCLUDED.output_price,
    cache_read_price  = EXCLUDED.cache_read_price,
    cache_write_price = EXCLUDED.cache_write_price,
    updated_at        = NOW();
```

Go side reduces to:

```go
return db.UpsertAIModelPrices(ctx, seedJSON)
```

### Pros

- Single round-trip.
- NULLs fall out naturally:
  - `(elem->>'cache_write_price')::bigint` becomes `NULL`
  - no sentinels
- The seed is already JSON:
- Existing precedent:
  - `jsonb_array_elements` is already used elsewhere in the codebase

### Cons

- Less type-safe at the SQL boundary than `UNNEST`
- Slightly less standard than `UNNEST`
- Readers need familiarity with:
  - `jsonb_array_elements`
  - `->>` extraction syntax
- Postgres pays JSON parse cost
  - negligible at our scale

---

---

# Decision

We picked Approach 3.

It collapses the round-trips like `UNNEST` does, but without:

- nullable-array workarounds
- sentinel values
2026-05-08 16:45:14 -04:00
Cian Johnston c602a31856 fix(coderd): reject pinning child chats in patchChat handler (#24669)
The UI already prevents child (delegated/subagent) chats from being
pinned, but the `PATCH /api/experimental/chats/{chat}` endpoint did not
enforce this. A direct API call could pin a child chat.

- Add a `400 Bad Request` guard in `patchChat` when `pinOrder > 0` and
the chat has a `ParentChatID`
- Add `TestChatPinOrder/RejectsChildChat` test

> 🤖
2026-04-23 18:36:20 +01:00
Michael Suchacz 7d0a0c6495 feat: provider key policies and user provider settings (#23751) 2026-04-02 19:46:42 +02:00
Kyle Carberry d8ff67fb68 feat: add MCP server configuration backend for chats (#23227)
## Summary

Adds the database schema, API endpoints, SDK types, and encryption
wrappers for admin-managed MCP (Model Context Protocol) server
configurations that chatd can consume. This is the backend foundation
for allowing external MCP tools (Sentry, Linear, GitHub, etc.) to be
used during AI chat sessions.

## Database

Two new tables:
- **`mcp_server_configs`**: Admin-managed server definitions with URL,
transport (Streamable HTTP / SSE), auth config (none / OAuth2 / API key
/ custom headers), tool allow/deny lists, and an availability policy
(`force_on` / `default_on` / `default_off`). Includes CHECK constraints
on transport, auth_type, and availability values.
- **`mcp_server_user_tokens`**: Per-user OAuth2 tokens for servers
requiring individual authentication. Cascades on user/config deletion.

New column on `chats` table:
- **`mcp_server_ids UUID[]`**: Per-chat MCP server selection, following
the same pattern as `model_config_id` — passed at chat creation,
changeable per-message with nil-means-no-change semantics.

## API Endpoints

All routes are under `/api/experimental/mcp/servers/` and gated behind
the `agents` experiment.

**Admin endpoints** (`ResourceDeploymentConfig` auth):
- `POST /` — Create MCP server config
- `PATCH /{id}` — Update MCP server config (full-replace)
- `DELETE /{id}` — Delete MCP server config

**Authenticated endpoints** (all users, enabled servers only for
non-admins):
- `GET /` — List configs (admins see all, members see enabled-only with
admin fields redacted)
- `GET /{id}` — Get config by ID (with `auth_connected` populated
per-user)

**OAuth2 per-user auth flow:**
- `GET /{id}/oauth2/connect` — Initiate OAuth2 flow (state cookie CSRF
protection)
- `GET /{id}/oauth2/callback` — Handle OAuth2 callback, store tokens
- `DELETE /{id}/oauth2/disconnect` — Remove stored OAuth2 tokens

## Security

- **Secrets never returned**: `OAuth2ClientSecret`, `APIKeyValue`, and
`CustomHeaders` are never in API responses — only boolean indicators
(`has_oauth2_secret`, `has_api_key`, `has_custom_headers`).
- **Field redaction for non-admins**: `convertMCPServerConfigRedacted`
strips `OAuth2ClientID`, auth URLs, scopes, and `APIKeyHeader` from
non-admin responses.
- **dbcrypt encryption at rest**: All 5 secret fields use `dbcrypt_keys`
encryption with full encrypt-on-write / decrypt-on-read wrappers (11
dbcrypt method overrides + 2 helpers), following the same pattern as
`chat_providers.api_key`.
- **OAuth2 CSRF protection**: State parameter stored in `HttpOnly`
cookie with `HTTPCookies.Apply()` for correct `Secure`/`SameSite` behind
TLS-terminating proxies.
- **dbauthz authorization**: All 18 querier methods have authorization
wrappers. Read operations use `ActionRead`, write operations use
`ActionUpdate` on `ResourceDeploymentConfig`.

## Governance Model

| Control | Implementation |
|---------|---------------|
| **Global kill switch** | `enabled` defaults to `false` |
| **Availability policy** | `force_on` (always injected), `default_on`
(pre-selected), `default_off` (opt-in) |
| **Per-chat selection** | `mcp_server_ids` on `CreateChatRequest` /
`CreateChatMessageRequest` |
| **Auth gate** | OAuth2 servers require per-user auth before tools are
injected |
| **Tool-level allow/deny** | Arrays on `mcp_server_configs` for
granular tool filtering |
| **Secrets encrypted at rest** | Uses `dbcrypt_keys` (same pattern as
`chat_providers.api_key`) |

## Tests

8 test functions covering:
- Full CRUD lifecycle (create, list, update, delete)
- Non-admin visibility filtering (enabled-only, field redaction)
- `auth_connected` population for OAuth2 vs non-OAuth2 servers
- Availability policy validation (valid values + invalid rejection)
- Unique slug enforcement (409 Conflict)
- OAuth2 disconnect idempotency
- Chat creation with `mcp_server_ids` persistence

## Known Limitations (Deferred)

These are documented and intentional for an experimental feature:
- **Audit logging** not yet wired — will add when feature stabilizes
- **Cross-field validation** (e.g., OAuth2 fields required when
`auth_type=oauth2`) — admin-only endpoint, will add when stabilizing
- **`force_on` auto-injection** — query exists but not yet wired into
chatd tool injection (follow-up)
- **Additional test coverage** — 403 auth tests, GET-by-ID tests,
callback CSRF tests planned for follow-up

## What's NOT in this PR

- Frontend UI (admin panel + chat picker)
- Actual MCP client connections (`chatd/chatmcp/` manager)
- Tool injection into `chatloop/`
2026-03-19 14:07:36 +00:00
Michael Suchacz 1031da9738 feat: add agent chat spend limiting (backend) (#23071)
Introduces deployment-scoped spend limiting for Coder Agents, enabling
administrators to control LLM costs at global, group, and individual
user levels.

## Changes

- **Database migration (000437)**: `chat_usage_limit_config`
(singleton), `chat_usage_limit_overrides` (per-user),
`chat_usage_limit_group_overrides` (per-group)
- **Single-query limit resolution**: individual override > min(group) >
global default via `ResolveUserChatSpendLimit`
- **Fail-open enforcement** in chatd with documented TOCTOU trade-off
- **Experimental API** under `/api/experimental/chats/usage-limits` for
CRUD on limits
- **`AsChatd` RBAC subject** for narrowly-scoped daemon access (replaces
`AsSystemRestricted`)
- **Generated TypeScript types** for the frontend SDK

## Hierarchy

1. Individual user override (highest)
2. Minimum of group limits
3. Global default
4. Disabled / unlimited

Currency stored as micro-dollars (`1,000,000` = $1.00).

Frontend PR: #23072
2026-03-17 01:24:03 +01:00
George K e5c19d0af4 feat: backend support for creating and storing service accounts (#22698)
Add is_service_account column to users table with CHECK constraints
enforcing login_type='none' and empty email for service accounts.
Update user creation API to validate service account constraints.

Related to:
https://linear.app/codercom/issue/PLAT-27/feat-backend-support-for-creating-and-storing-service-accounts
2026-03-11 10:19:08 -07:00
Kayla はな 56bdea73b8 feat: add workspace acls to task rbac objects (#22311)
To allow tasks to be shareable, we need to share both the `task`
resource and the `workspace` resource, and their sharing state needs to
be kept in sync. We've already implemented all of the necessary ACL
functionality for workspaces, so we can just sort of proxy those ACLs
back to the task as well.
2026-03-05 13:40:53 -07:00
edee917d88 feat: add experimental agents support (#22290)
feat: add AI chat system with agent tools and chat UI

Introduce the chatd subsystem and Agents UI for AI-powered chat
within Coder workspaces.

- Add chatd package with chat loop, message compaction, prompt
  management, and LLM provider integration (OpenAI, Anthropic)
- Add agent tools: create workspace, list/read templates, read/write/
  edit files, execute commands
- Add chat API endpoints with streaming, message editing, and
  durable reconnection
- Add database schema and migrations for chats, chat messages, chat
  providers, and chat model configs
- Add RBAC policies and dbauthz enforcement for chat resources
- Add Agents UI pages with conversation timeline, queued messages
  list, diff viewer, and model configuration panel
- Add comprehensive test coverage including coderd integration tests,
  chatd unit tests, and Storybook stories
- Gate feature behind experiments flag

---------

Co-authored-by: Cian Johnston <cian@coder.com>
Co-authored-by: Danielle Maywood <danielle@themaywoods.com>
Co-authored-by: Jeremy Ruppel <jeremy@coder.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-02-27 16:50:56 +00:00
George K be94af386c chore(coderd/database): enforce workspace ACL JSON object constraints (#22019)
The constraints prevent faulty code from saving 'null' as JSON and breaking the `workspaces_expanded` view.
2026-02-10 16:17:29 -08:00
George K e10fceb23c fix(coderd/database): allow same custom role name for different orgs (#21312)
Previously the `idx_custom_roles_name_lower` index prevented that.

A check constraint was also added to ensure the `organization_id` column cannot be set to the all-zero UUID.
2026-01-05 07:43:08 -08:00