Commit Graph
707 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Thomas Kosiewski 60cc826f2b feat: sign forwarded MCP identity headers (#29669) 2026-09-22 11:11:08 +02:00
Michael Suchacz af0ef00f91 feat: add owner_id to CreateChatRequest to create chats for another user (#29581)
Owners and owner-level service accounts can now start a Coder Agents
chat on behalf of another user by setting `owner_id` on `POST
/api/v2/chats`. The field is optional and defaults to the caller, so
existing clients are unaffected. A delegated owner must be an active,
non-system member of the requested organization; anything else returns
400 `Chat owner must be an active member of the organization.` once the
caller has passed the authorization gates below.

A chat runs entirely with its owner's credentials (synthetic API key,
workspace access, OIDC and provider tokens), so creating one for someone
else is acting as that user. On top of org-scoped `chat:create` for the
owner, the caller must hold the authority to create API keys for that
user, which is what the token endpoint demands to mint their session.
Org admins therefore cannot use it; site owners and owner-role service
accounts can. For the same reason the workspace binding, model config,
and MCP server IDs are validated as the owner rather than the caller,
and the owner must themselves hold `chat:create` (organization service
accounts do not). The initial user message is attributed to the caller
through `chatd.CreateOptions.CreatedBy`.

An earlier revision of this PR exposed the same behavior as `POST
/api/v2/users/{user}/chats`; that route and
`codersdk.Client.CreateUserChat` were removed in `62a8be3dd32` in favor
of the request field. An explicit zero `owner_id` is rejected with 400
rather than silently defaulting to the caller. Coverage lives in
`TestPostChats_OwnerID`.

<details>
<summary>Review record (path-based revision, gates unchanged)</summary>

- Two-axis code review (Standards, Spec) plus a simplicity audit ran as
Xum sub-agents on `1f3189898f0`. The Spec axis found the workspace
binding was authorized as the caller, fixed in `363d45281d8` with
red-green coverage in `WorkspaceNotAccessibleToOwner`. The additional
API-key gate and the `CreatedBy` attribution go beyond the workspaces
pattern and were kept deliberately for the reasons above.
- Codex review on `363d45281d8`: one P2, suspended, dormant, or system
users could be targeted and would get a chat that can never run because
AI Bridge refuses to authorize them. Fixed in `c065437e359` with
`OwnerSuspended` (red on the old head); thread replied to and resolved.
- Codex review on `c065437e359`: one P2, an explicit or
personal-override model config the caller can read but the owner cannot
was accepted and chatd would silently fall back to the default model at
run time. Fixed in `aa88b608182` by resolving the model config and MCP
server IDs under the owner's context, with
`ModelConfigNotAccessibleToOwner` (red on the old head); thread replied
to and resolved.
- Codex review on `aa88b608182`: one P2, an organization service account
(which deliberately holds no chat permissions) could be targeted because
the chat permission check ran as the caller. Fixed in `a6fe8075c30` by
also requiring the owner subject to hold `chat:create`, with
`OwnerWithoutChatPermission` (red on the old head); thread replied to
and resolved.
- Codex review on `a6fe8075c30`: one P2, the active/non-system check was
skipped when the caller could not read the owner's user object. Fixed in
`0dd8bb4dd44` by moving the check behind the authorization gates with a
system-restricted lookup; thread replied to and resolved. In
`62a8be3dd32` that lookup became a single `OrganizationMembers` query,
which also covers membership and excludes system and deleted users.
- Codex review on `62a8be3dd32` (the `owner_id` revision): two P2s. An
explicit zero `owner_id` was treated as omitted and created the chat for
the caller; fixed in `f54b4f33d36` with a 400 and `OwnerIDNil` (red on
the old head). Creation and the read-back still ran as the caller while
the preflight ran as the owner; fixed in the same commit by passing
`ownerCtx` to `CreateChat`, `GetChatByID`, title generation, and the
file-metadata fetch. That second scenario is unreachable today (only the
built-in `owner` role holds `api_key:create` for others, and site-wide
custom roles are refused by both the API and dbauthz), so it has no
dedicated red test. Both threads replied to and resolved.
</details>

<details>
<summary>Remote UAT record (path-based revision)</summary>

Remote UAT on dogfood (chat `d7442df3-693f-4403-805f-2de52f7bdbed`, Xum
sub-agent as critical runner) tested head `21ed6b389cc`, the last
path-based revision. Licensed dev server, real Haiku 4.5 model, 77
logged API requests, 23 inspected screenshots. Endorsed verdict:
**PASS**. Site owner creates a chat for member X: X sees it, gets real
answers to the admin prompt and to follow-ups, and state survives reload
and mid-response refresh. The creating admin gets `403 Only the chat
owner may send messages.` and a read-only view; an unrelated member gets
404. Org admin, member, user-admin, and template-admin callers get 403;
owner-role service account 201. Suspended, dormant, and service-account
targets 400; owner-inaccessible workspace, model config, or MCP server
400; 300 KiB body 413. The `owner_id` revision changes only how the
owner is supplied and the non-member response (400 instead of 404); the
authorization and eligibility gates it exercised are unchanged and
covered by `TestPostChats_OwnerID`.

Non-blocking findings for the author's judgment, none of them
regressions of this PR:
1. X's UI shows no author on the admin-written first message and offers
X "Edit" on it; `created_by` carries the admin but the frontend does not
surface it.
2. A site owner who is not a member of the organization can still create
a chat for its members (201), while a self-owned `POST /chats` returns
403 for the same organization; same asymmetry as `postUserWorkspaces`.
3. The creating admin can archive, rename, and interrupt X's chat
although it cannot message it (pre-existing chat authz).
4. Owner-inaccessible model config or MCP server is reported as "not
found or disabled" with no hint that the owner, not the caller, lacks
access.
5. Dormant (never logged in) targets are refused because AI Bridge
rejects non-active users; a new hire cannot be given a chat until first
login.
6. The endpoint docs list only 201 and 413.
</details>

> Xum (an AI agent) acted on behalf of @ibetitsmike for this PR.
2026-09-21 20:49:10 +02:00
Michael Suchacz 2bf0f567d8 feat: add OpenAI Pro reasoning mode to chat model configs (#29584)
Adds `provider_options.openai.reasoning_mode` (`pro`) to chat model
configs so admins can turn on OpenAI's Pro reasoning mode for a model,
alongside the other OpenAI request options on the model form such as
`service_tier`. The field is offered for any model on an OpenAI
provider; the field description says Pro is supported from the GPT-5.6
Sol generation and that requests fail when Pro is set on a model that
does not support it. There is deliberately no supported-model list
anywhere: a newly released model that supports Pro works with no code
change, and OpenAI rejects the request when the model does not.
Validation rejects only values other than `pro`, non-OpenAI providers,
and configs that explicitly force plain sampling
(`reasoning_model=false`) or Chat Completions
(`use_responses_api=false`), including partial updates that move a
configured model onto such a provider or transport.

A configured mode implies the Responses API and reasoning-model
treatment when `openai_config` leaves those unset
(`chatprovider.effectiveOpenAIConfig`), so an alias the pinned SDK has
never seen, such as `gpt-daybreak-blue-latest`, still gets `effort` and
`summary` and drops `temperature`. The same effective config feeds the
client options and the recorded transport, so the two cannot disagree.

The pinned fantasy OpenAI provider options do not carry
`reasoning.mode`, so the mode is applied as a client-scoped `openai-go`
request option when the model client is built rather than per call. The
SDK merges pre-serialization `WithJSONSet` overlays by top-level key, so
the key is escaped (`reasoning\.mode`) to add `mode` to the existing
`reasoning` object instead of replacing `effort` and `summary`.
`TestResolveModelCallReasoningModeWire` pins the resulting request body
for streaming and non-streaming calls and checks that the fixed
computer-use model does not inherit the mode; AI Gateway forwarding of
the `reasoning` object is covered in `aibridge`. Because the option is
bound to the model client, every call made through a Pro model config
carries it, including title generation and quick generation when those
fall back to the chat's model; deployments that want cheaper auxiliary
calls should point the title generation override at another model.

Frontend: the field renders through the existing schema-driven provider
options with no hand-written field logic. Two generic changes:
`visible_for_providers` is now honored for provider fields the way it
already was for general fields (render and payload), so the
OpenAI-scoped select does not appear or serialize for Azure, which
shares the OpenAI field group; and the add/update model save toasts now
carry the server's error detail, so a rejected combination such as Pro
with Use Responses API at Off tells the admin which field to change.

Docs: `docs/ai-coder/agents/models.md` gains a Reasoning Mode row in the
OpenAI provider-specific options table (from the documentation check
comment
https://github.com/coder/coder/pull/29584#issuecomment-5752457808), and
its Azure note now says Azure OpenAI lacks that one option.

Not changed: `coderd/x/chatd/ARCHITECTURE.md`. Its OpenAI transport
selection table needs a `reasoning_mode` row (client-applied, neither
transport) to match `TestProviderOptionsTransportParity`; left for the
human author.

<details>
<summary>Delivery record</summary>

- Local validation on every pushed head: targeted Go tests (chatopenai,
chatprovider, chatd wire test, aibridge integration test, coderd DB
tests for persistence, invalid input, and partial updates), red/green on
the wire test (injection removed, and unescaped key), Vitest
(`modelConfigFormLogic`, `ModelForm`), Storybook tests for
`ModelFormProviderConfig`, biome, tsc, oxlint, golangci-lint on touched
packages, pre-commit hook.
- Codex round 1 on `e7dbaefeafc`: 3 findings (Storybook assertions,
ARCHITECTURE.md TODO, `gpt-daybreak-blue-latest` alias). Disposition:
assertions moved to Vitest and alias accepted in `8fccf111111`;
ARCHITECTURE.md left untouched by author instruction. Threads replied to
and resolved.
- Codex round 2 on `8fccf111111`: 1 finding (fixture naming, FE9),
renamed in `23449e92317`. Round 3 on `23449e92317`: 1 finding (fixture
location, FE9), moved to `testHelpers/chatModels.ts` in `c3bd5aa370f`.
Round 4 on `c3bd5aa370f`: "Didn't find any major issues"
(https://github.com/coder/coder/pull/29584#issuecomment-5735119236). All
threads resolved.
- Remote UAT round 1 (chat
https://dogfood.cdr.dev/agents/f5ed1d16-be1d-4d39-952b-126a6a829ef1)
exercised `e7dbaefeafc`: endorsed PASS. Real `gpt-5.6-sol` turns showed
`"mode": "pro"` / `"standard"` / no key in the Debug tab with effort and
summary intact; 14 POST and 6 PATCH rejections captured; UI select
visibility, persistence, reload, and clearing verified. Low,
non-blocking notes: the `gpt-5.6` alias revert in the model identifier
field is pre-existing; Pro is dropped silently when a model or transport
change makes it unsupported; Pro applies to auxiliary calls (see above).
- Remote UAT round 2 on `c3bd5aa370f` (same chat, alias and core
re-verify): core PASS, alias FAIL. With `gpt-daybreak-blue-latest` the
request carried `{"mode": "pro"}` without the configured effort and
summary and kept sending `temperature` (provider 400 then retry on quick
generation and title calls), because the SDK does not classify the alias
as a reasoning model. Fixed in `d4c338de767`: a configured mode now
implies a reasoning model unless `openai_config.reasoning_model` is set,
and a mode on a config that forces plain sampling is rejected. Alias
UI/API behavior, rejections, and known-model Pro/Default turns all
passed on `c3bd5aa370f`.
- Codex round 5 on `d4c338de767`: "Didn't find any major issues"
(https://github.com/coder/coder/pull/29584#issuecomment-5736190356).
Zero unresolved threads. CI green on `d4c338de767`.
- Remote UAT round 3 on `d4c338de767` (same chat): endorsed PASS. Alias
runs are single-attempt 200s with `{"effort", "summary", "mode": "pro"}`
and no `temperature` (quick generation and title calls no longer retry);
`reasoning_model=false` plus a mode is rejected by POST and PATCH with
the stored config unchanged; the Reasoning Model override at Off hides
the select and drops the mode on save; `gpt-5.6-sol` Pro turn unchanged.
Remaining low notes, none introduced here: rejection detail for a
non-OpenAI provider names the model rather than the provider; Pro is
dropped silently when an override makes it unsupported; `PATCH
model_config` replaces the whole object (pre-existing on main).

- coder-frontend-review on `d4c338de767` (8 role reviewers, 3 passes):
13 failing checkpoints, chiefly a TS mirror of the Go model regex, the
`json_name === "reasoning_mode"` gate duplicated in the render filter
and payload builder, a defaulted `model` parameter, and comment and type
nits. Fixed in `554c90d5fd9`: the pattern and provider scope are
generated onto the field schema, one predicate is shared by both call
sites, `buildModelConfigFromForm(provider, model, form)` requires the
model, and the ModelForm test also asserts the select disappears for an
unsupported model. Red/green: stripping `supported_models` or
`visible_for_providers` from the generated schema fails 21 and 1 Vitest
cases respectively. Declined with rationale: RO4 (move the fixture to
`ModelsPage/testFixtures.ts`; FE9 in `FRONTEND_PATTERNS.md` names
`testHelpers/chatModels.ts`, and Codex round 3 required it) and a DF5
nit to gate on the committed identifier and warn when a saved mode is
dropped (behavior change, separate follow-up). Final pass: all
checkpoints PASS or N/A.
- Remote UAT round 4 on `554c90d5fd9` (same chat, focused regression
after the frontend-review refactor): endorsed PASS. All six claims held
(Pro round trip with effort and tier intact; unsupported identifiers
hide the select and a save drops the stale mode while keeping the other
options; Azure never shows or saves it; the alias shows it only with the
Responses override On; Reasoning Model Off hides it and drops it; three
real `gpt-5.6-sol` Pro turns were single-attempt 200s with
`{"effort","summary","mode":"pro"}` and no `temperature`). Probes aimed
at the refactor also passed: `gpt-5X6-sol` is rejected (dot escaping
survived the JSON round trip), whitespace-padded identifiers still
match, the other 11 OpenAI fields and the Anthropic section still
render. Remaining low notes are carried over from round 3 plus one
naming note ("Reasoning Mode" versus "Reasoning Model"). The final head
`abb58df77d8` differs from `554c90d5fd9` only in `ModelForm.test.tsx`,
so it ships the same production code.
- Codex round 6 on `554c90d5fd9`: 1 finding
(https://github.com/coder/coder/pull/29584#pullrequestreview-5260492465):
the two `toBeInTheDocument` assertions added in the frontend-review
round violate FE1. Confirmed against `site/AGENTS.md`; removed in
`abb58df77d8` (test-only, 7 deletions; the payload assertion keeps the
behavior coverage and the `ProviderConfigOpenAI` story captures the
hidden state). Thread replied to and resolved.
- Codex round 7 on `abb58df77d8`: "Didn't find any major issues"
(https://github.com/coder/coder/pull/29584#issuecomment-5749626071).
Zero unresolved threads. CI green on `abb58df77d8` (23 success, 8
skipped, `required` pass).

- Design change on `e99152e5c57` (owner direction: no model gating;
"none or pro" for any model; tooltip states the GPT-5.6 Sol constraint
and that requests fail on unsupported models). Removed
`codersdk.ChatModelReasoningModeModels`, the generated
`supported_models`, `isFieldApplicableToModel`, the
`gpt-daybreak-blue-latest` special case, and the `standard` enum value;
`ValidateReasoningMode(provider, config)` no longer takes the model;
`effectiveOpenAIConfig` makes a mode imply Responses and reasoning-model
treatment. PR footprint went from +1130/-22 to +769/-18. Local
validation: `go test` for chatopenai, chatprovider, chatd wire test, and
the coderd API tests (persistence now covers `gpt-5.6-sol`, `gpt-4o`,
`gpt-daybreak-blue-latest`, `gpt-7-nova`; invalid input now rejects
`standard`), golangci-lint on touched packages, Vitest (187 tests across
`modules/aiModels` and `ModelsPage`), biome, tsc, pre-commit hook.
- coder-frontend-review on `e99152e5c57` (8 roles, 1 pass plus a TS and
CD confirmation pass): 9 failing checkpoints (SD4, CD1, CD3, CD4, TS3,
TS7 x2, RO3, RO5, TN4, DF5). Fixed in `e06bfbe4299`: the ModelForm test
edits `mockGPT5` so its provider matches the selected provider state,
types the update mock like the sibling story, and drops an unused route;
the story spreads `mockGPT5` with a saved mode instead of a dedicated
shared fixture (`MockGPT56Pro` removed, `testHelpers/chatModels.ts` back
to base); a `ProviderConfigAzure` story captures the panel without
`reasoning_mode`; comment nits. Left as a nit with justification: RO3
(the one-line `!hidden && isFieldVisibleForProvider` predicate now
appears in both `getVisibleProviderFields` and
`getVisibleGeneralFields`; hoisting a helper for two call sites is not
worth it). Confirmation pass: TS all PASS; CD flagged one wording nit,
fixed before commit.
- CI green on `e06bfbe4299` (23 success, 8 skipped, `required` pass).
- Codex round 8 on `e06bfbe4299`: 1 P2 finding
(https://github.com/coder/coder/pull/29584#discussion_r4057659673): the
form still offers Pro with Use Responses API or Reasoning Model at Off,
a combination the server rejects, and the failure was not actionable.
Disposition: the select stays visible by owner direction (no client-side
gating of this field beyond the provider scope; an explicit rejection is
preferred over the earlier silent drop), and `e2b43c3aee7` makes the
add/update save toasts show the server detail so the admin sees which
field to change. Thread replied to and resolved; zero unresolved
threads.
- Remote UAT round 5 on `e06bfbe4299` (same chat): endorsed PASS with
two UI issues to land before release. All seven probes passed: the
select offers only Default and Pro for `gpt-5.6-sol` and `gpt-4o` with
the tooltip text verbatim; Pro saves on `gpt-4o` and the real turn fails
visibly with the provider's "reasoning.mode is not supported with this
model" after a single 400 attempt, and works again once Pro is cleared;
`gpt-daybreak-blue-latest` with Pro and no overrides is a single 200 to
`/v1/responses` with `{effort, summary, mode: "pro"}` and no
`temperature`; the `gpt-5.6-sol` Pro turn is unchanged; POST and PATCH
reject `standard`, `PRO`, empty, Responses Off, Reasoning Model Off, and
Azure, openai-compat, and Anthropic providers with the stored config
unchanged, while a model-only PATCH to `gpt-4o` now succeeds; the Azure
form shows no Reasoning Mode; the alias with an explicit Responses
override still works. Reservations: (1) medium, the UI conflict path
only showed "Invalid model config." without the detail (fixed in
`e2b43c3aee7`, not yet UAT-exercised); (2) low-medium, a dev-DB row
still holding `standard` from round 2 renders an empty red select whose
message is the whole field description plus "has an invalid value." and
blocks saving unrelated fields (pre-existing generic behavior of
`yupTestForField` using the description as the label; no released data
can hold `standard`, so no migration); (3) low, no hint next to older
identifiers (documented design); (4) low, a chat on such a stored row
fails with a generic headline (pre-existing).
- Final head `e2b43c3aee7` differs from `e06bfbe4299` only in the two
save-toast handlers (`AddModelPage.tsx`, `UpdateModelPage.tsx`, 8
insertions). CI is green on `e2b43c3aee7` (skipped=8, success=23,
`required` success). Codex has not run on `e2b43c3aee7`.
- Remote UAT round 6 on `e2b43c3aee7` (same chat,
https://dogfood.cdr.dev/agents/f5ed1d16-be1d-4d39-952b-126a6a829ef1,
settled 2026-09-20T19:02Z): endorsed PASS on the exact final head. Build
proven by `/api/v2/buildinfo` (`v2.37.2-devel+e2b43c3aee`,
`external_url` at the full SHA) and the UI badge. The round 5 toast
issue is resolved: Add and Update saves with Pro plus Use Responses API
Off or Reasoning Model Off show "Invalid model config." with the server
detail as the description, one 400 each, nothing stored. Compact
regression of every round 5 probe held (dropdown and tooltip; Pro on
`gpt-4o` fails visibly with the provider's `reasoning.mode is not
supported with this model` and works after clearing; alias with and
without the Responses override and `gpt-5.6-sol` all send `{effort,
summary, mode: "pro"}` with no `temperature` in a single 200; POST and
PATCH rejection matrices with stored config unchanged; Azure form
without the field). Legacy `standard` row: fails closed on chat, and
re-picking Pro or Default saves. Remaining notes, none blocking: the
malformed validation copy for an invalid stored enum (pre-existing
`yupTestForField` label choice, dev-DB rows only), Pro offered for
models that cannot accept it (documented design), and a pre-existing
`quickgen` status quirk on `gpt-4o` unrelated to this field. Secret scan
clean.
- Final head `4f3c6106dfe` adds one docs-only commit on top of
`e2b43c3aee7` (`docs/ai-coder/agents/models.md`, 9 insertions, 8
deletions, no code). Remote UAT round 6 exercised `e2b43c3aee7`; the
docs commit is not UAT-relevant. Validated with
`markdown-table-formatter`, `markdownlint-cli2`, and the pre-commit hook
(`fmt/markdown`, `lint/markdown`, `lint/emdash`, `lint/typos`). CI is
green on `4f3c6106dfe` (success=24, skipped=7, `required` success) and
the documentation check re-run marked its item addressed
(https://github.com/coder/coder/pull/29584#issuecomment-5752457808).
- Review tally for this PR: Codex 8 completed rounds;
coder-frontend-review 34 role passes (24 on `d4c338de767`, 10 on
`e99152e5c57`); remote UAT 5 rounds; no human review yet. This is far
past the six-review guardrail, so no further Codex or agent review has
been requested. Whether to spend another Codex pass on `e2b43c3aee7` is
an owner decision; human review is still required before merge.

</details>

> Xum acted on behalf of @ibetitsmike.
2026-09-21 15:58:18 +02:00
Spike Curtis 29ae50d9c9 feat: accept include_related query param on get workspace by ID (#29539)
Part of the lite `codersdk.Workspace` work
([GRU-82](https://linear.app/codercom/issue/GRU-82),
[RFC](https://app.notion.com/p/coderhq/Lite-Workspace-API-Requests-3aad579be5928060b5e7cc65c539717f)).
Follows #28639, which added the `wsrelated` package and parser.

Wires the `include_related` query parameter into `GET
/api/v2/workspaces/{workspace}`, the first endpoint to accept it. When
present, the value is parsed with `wsrelated.Parse` and the resulting
selection is threaded into `workspaceData`, so only the requested
related data is queried. Omitting the parameter is backward compatible
and returns everything (`wsrelated.All`). An invalid value returns
`400`.

Because related data can now be omitted, the handler no longer assumes
the build and template are present: it uses zero values when they are
absent, and only enforces the template read-authorization check (`403`)
when the template was actually requested.

### Partial-build conversion

`convertWorkspaceBuilds` now tolerates a build whose provisioner job or
template version was deliberately omitted from the selection, so
selections such as `latest_build` (build only) or
`latest_build.resources.*` (resources without the job) convert correctly
instead of erroring. The omitted fields are left zero (empty `Job`,
empty `TemplateVersionName`). Resources are keyed by the build's `JobID`
rather than the fetched job row, so they load independently of whether
the job is selected. The integrity error is preserved for full-data
callers: when a job or template version is requested but missing,
conversion still fails. The selection config (`wsrelated.LatestBuild`)
is threaded into `convertWorkspaceBuilds` to distinguish "not requested"
from "missing".

Only this endpoint is wired; the other endpoints that produce
`codersdk.Workspace` objects, and the codersdk client functions, come in
later PRs.

---

*Generated by Coder Agents on behalf of @spikecurtis.*
2026-09-21 10:50:01 +02:00
Ehab Younes 9974294ca9 feat: report arbitrary workspace agent session types (#28338)
Report session counts as a dynamic app-name map from the agent, the SSH CLI, and the workspace usage API, so a new IDE flows end to end without a schema, proto, or server change.

- Report through `Stats.session_counts` on Agent API v2.11. Older agents keep reporting through the deprecated count fields.
- Accept arbitrary names from `coder ssh --usage-app` and the workspace usage API. A name the registry does not recognize keeps its identity and is attributed to the `unknown` family.
- Add reconnecting PTY counts to the map without overwriting the counts SSH reported.
- Normalize and merge names before applying the deterministic 64-name cap, ordered by known apps, then count, then name. Overflow sums into `unknown`, and non-positive counts cannot cancel valid activity.
- Strip control characters, treat whitespace-only HTTP app names as absent, and require the exact environment variable prefix when you extract an SSH session type.
- Count overflow entries in `coderd_agentstats_session_counts_overflow_total` and keep raw payloads out of logs.
- Change the usage API's `app_name` to a string, and update the SDK types and API reference.

closes #27410
2026-09-19 00:32:51 +02:00
Bobby Ho 55da502938 feat: allow admins to configure an OAuth2 app's scope allowlist (#29313)
Add backend support for scope allowlists on admin-created OAuth2 apps, previously available only through DCR.

- Add optional, space-separated `scope` to create/update requests and return canonicalized, deduplicated scopes in app responses.
- On create, omitted or empty `scope` means unrestricted. On update, `scope` replaces the allowlist; omission preserves it, and an empty string clears it to unrestricted.
- Keep scope enforcement unchanged. Add tests for scope round-trips, DCR canonicalization parity, and authorization narrowing.
- Include generated SDK and docs updates. The UI scope picker follows in a separate PR.

Part of [PLAT-475](https://linear.app/codercom/issue/PLAT-475).
2026-09-18 11:58:49 -07:00
McKayla はな 8e159a8053 chore: remove stale TODO shims and dead code (#29252) 2026-09-18 10:27:26 -06:00
Paweł Banaszewski c47eb47393 feat: add stateless AI Gateway proxy mode (#29349)
Adds proxy mode to the AI Gateway. No AI provider is supported in this
mode yet.
2026-09-18 16:47:16 +02:00
Susana Ferreira c8b22a9d80 feat: add filters to the AI spend CSV endpoint (#29414)
## Description

Update the existing CSV export endpoint and SDK to accept user,
effective group, provider name, and model filters.

## Changes

- Pass the requested filters to the database query.
- Validate filters alongside the existing time window.
- Continue downloading all matching rows without pagination.

> [!NOTE]
> Generated by Coder Agents on behalf of @ssncferreira.
2026-09-18 15:26:24 +01:00
Cian Johnston 19076beb8d feat: attribute AI Gateway usage to workspaces (#29235)
- Adds nullable `workspace_id` to AI Gateway interceptions without a
foreign key or index.
- Derives direct attribution from strictly parsed server-minted workspace
session-token names, excluding user-created tokens and validating the
embedded owner.
- Derives delegated Coder Agents attribution from the persisted chat
workspace ID.
- Records `workspace_id` through the additive v1.3 gateway protocol and
structured interception logs.
- Exposes attribution in session details through
`interception_attributions`, including tool-less interceptions and null
values for unknown attribution.

Closes AIGOV-637

Generated by Coder Agents.
2026-09-18 15:22:02 +01:00
Spike Curtis aae145bdc9 feat: make NATS pubsub opt-out via no_nats_pubsub experiment (#29283)
Makes the embedded NATS pubsub an opt-out feature instead of opt-in. The
`nats_pubsub` experiment is removed and replaced with a `no_nats_pubsub`
experiment, so NATS pubsub is now the default and can be disabled to
fall back to PostgreSQL pubsub.

NATS clustering requires this replica's routable address, resolved into
`clusterHost` from either `--cluster-host` (`CODER_CLUSTER_HOST`) or the
DERP relay URL. When neither is set (allowed when DERP is disabled on
the primary), NATS cannot form a cluster, so startup logs a big error
and falls back to PostgreSQL pubsub. The NATS cluster CA is only
minted/rotated when NATS clustering is actually active (experiment not
set and a cluster host is present).

<details>
<summary>Implementation notes</summary>

- `codersdk/deployment.go`: removed `ExperimentNATSPubsub`
(`nats_pubsub`), added `ExperimentNoNATSPubsub` (`no_nats_pubsub`,
display name "No NATS Pubsub").
- `cli/server.go`: NATS is used by default unless `no_nats_pubsub` is
enabled; if `clusterHost` is empty, log an error and keep the PostgreSQL
pubsub.
- `coderd/coderd.go`: gate NATS CA minting/rotation on
`!ExperimentNoNATSPubsub && ClusterHost != ""` (i.e. only when NATS
clustering is active).
- `enterprise/coderd/licenses.go`: updated a stale comment.
- `enterprise/coderd/coderd_test.go`: `TestMultiReplica_NATSPubsubPeers`
no longer sets the removed experiment.
- Regenerated `coderd/apidoc/docs.go`, `coderd/apidoc/swagger.json`,
`docs/reference/api/schemas.md`, `site/src/api/typesGenerated.ts`.

</details>

---
*This PR was generated by Coder Agents on behalf of @spikecurtis.*
2026-09-18 12:58:06 +00:00
Ethan 77479408b4 feat: make the Coder Agents stream silence timeout configurable (#29394)
The `chatloop` stream silence guard cancels and retries a model attempt
after `10m` of silence, and it was hard-coded. It's armed before the
request opens, so it also bounds time to first token, and slow local
models (e.g. `llama-server` on a large prompt) can spend longer than
that on prompt processing alone, meaning every attempt just gets
cancelled and retried.

This PR adds `--chat-stream-silence-timeout` /
`CODER_CHAT_STREAM_SILENCE_TIMEOUT` (default `10m`) and passes it to
both the main loop and the advisor. Setting it to `0` disables the guard
entirely, and anything above `24h` is rejected, which also keeps the
watchdog arithmetic below from overflowing.

Whilst doing this I ran into the runner's `15m` task watchdog, which
kept counting during an open stream. That silently cancelled any healthy
stream longer than `15m`, and would've stopped a silence timeout above
`15m` from ever firing. To fix, the silence guard now kicks the watchdog
out to `max(15m, silence + 5m)` whenever it arms or sees a part. Silent
streams still fail through the guard, healthy streams can run for as
long as they like, and hang detection is unchanged everywhere else. With
the guard disabled there's nothing to kick against, so arming it just
stops the watchdog for the rest of the attempt. That does mean the DB
write after the stream isn't bounded either when `0` is set; I think
that's fine for an opt-in setting, and a user can still stop the chat
from the UI if it wedges there.

I did consider removing the guard entirely, but the provider HTTP
clients have no timeout, so a provider that holds the connection open
would only ever be caught as a generic task hang, which is what #25782
was fixing.
2026-09-18 15:24:15 +10:00
Steven Masley a90ad83af3 feat!: add a hidden flag to disable dynamic parameter closure evaluation (#29356)
**What changed**
Dynamic parameter rendering now evaluates only the coder parameter blocks and what they reference. Other root-module resources are skipped. Parameter, preset, and tag values are unchanged; optimizing rendering on large templates.

**How to revert**
Set `CODER_DYNAMIC_PARAMETERS_FULL_EVALUATION=true` (or `--dynamic-parameters-full-evaluation`) on `coder server` to restore full evaluation. The flag is hidden and needs no restart of workspaces. If you need it, please [open an issue](https://github.com/coder/coder/issues/new) with the template so we can fix the root cause.

**Troubleshooting**
Symptoms would be a parameter default, option list, preset value, or workspace tag that shows as unknown or empty after upgrading, when it was populated before. Confirm by setting the flag above; if the value comes back, report it. Templates written in `.tf.json` are not affected (they always use full evaluation).

**Why**
Rendering re-ran the entire template graph on every parameter change in the workspace form, which dominated latency on large templates. Resources a workspace would create cannot feed a parameter, so evaluating them is wasted work. The optimization lives in coder/preview#226 (coder/trivy#74); this PR adds the deployment-level escape hatch.

---

- `CODER_DYNAMIC_PARAMETERS_FULL_EVALUATION` / `--dynamic-parameters-full-evaluation` (hidden, default `false`) on `DeploymentValues`.
- `dynamicparameters.PreviewOptions(dv)` maps it to `preview.OptionFullEvaluation()`; `dynamicparameters.WithPreviewOptions` threads it through the loader to `preview.Preview`.
- Wired at the three render paths that hold deployment values: the template version tags extractor, the dynamic parameters websocket, and `wsbuilder` builds created from `coderd` (which call `.DeploymentValues(...)`).

Not covered: the autobuild lifecycle executor and the enterprise prebuilds reconciler construct `wsbuilder` without deployment values, so builds started from those paths use preview's default regardless of the flag. Those only re-render for builds, not the keystroke websocket path the optimization targets.

Prepared with Coder Agents assistance.
2026-09-17 14:33:37 -05:00
Jake Howell dd4f5ae48a fix: load AI Gateway session provider filter without AIProvider read (#28966)
> 🤖 This PR was modified by Coder Agents on behalf of Jake Howell.

The Provider filter on `/ai-gateway` called the owner-only
provider-config API (`GET /api/v2/ai/providers`). Site auditors can read
sessions but not that config, so the dropdown was empty, and typing
`provider_name:…` failed the whole sessions list because search looked
up the name with the same permission.

- Add `GET /api/v2/ai-gateway/providers`, returning display metadata
only (`name`, `type`, `display_name`, `icon`) from `ai_providers`,
including disabled and soft-deleted rows that past sessions still
reference. When a name was reused, the live row wins.
- Authorize it in `dbauthz` on `aibridge_interception` read rather than
`ai_provider` read, so owners and auditors get labels and icons without
access to configuration. Members get 404.
- Match `provider_name` as a plain string in session search instead of
looking up `ai_providers`. Unknown names return an empty page, not a
validation error.
- Point the Provider dropdown at the new endpoint; filter by name, show
`display_name`, and render the icon from `type`/`icon`.

The endpoint reads the small `ai_providers` table instead of grouping
`aibridge_interceptions`, so it needs no new index and does not inherit
the scan cost noted for the models/clients lists. It is registered only
under `/ai-gateway`, not the legacy `/aibridge` alias.
2026-09-17 15:29:21 +00:00
Paweł Banaszewski 263f2c207e feat: register AI Gateway proxy experiment and share provider helpers (#29347)
- Add `ai-gateway-reverse-proxy` experiment and update generated API
types and documentation. The experiment has no runtime effect yet.
- Extract shared (will be used by next PRs in stack) provider routing
and key-pool enumeration helpers.
- Log unsupported routes at Debug level.
2026-09-17 10:27:48 +02:00
Michael Suchacz 9d97337277 feat: list organization AI spend by user (#29129)
Third of a four-PR stack that reworks the AI spend page onto the
released organization spend export, `GET
/api/v2/organizations/{organization}/ai/spend/export`, and a sibling
per-user endpoint, `GET
/api/v2/organizations/{organization}/ai/spend/users`, instead of the
deployment-wide `/api/v2/ai-gateway/spend/*` endpoints this stack
previously proposed. Every PR in the stack was rewritten in place from
current main; the head branch name predates the rework. The export's
accounting rules are unchanged: token usage by `created_at` in
`[period_start, period_end)`, attributed to the organization through the
effective budget group, so the page reconciles with the CSV and with
daily budget accounting.

Adds `GET /api/v2/organizations/{organization}/ai/spend/users`, a
paginated per-user report beside the CSV export. It accepts the export's
period parameters and the optional `provider_name`, `model`, and
`client` filters (`client` matches after `COALESCE(client, 'Unknown')`,
as the AI Gateway sessions listing does), and it authorizes identically
through `ResourceGroupMember` in the organization. The response is
`OrganizationAISpendReport`: the applied period bounds,
`retention_start` when retention is enabled (so the page can bound its
date picker), the user count, a `totals` object over every matching
user, and one page of users (`limit` default 10, max 100; `offset` >=
0), each with cost, unpriced usage count, providers, and clients. Each
user row also lists the sorted distinct models they spent through
(e73049f, added on request after the review round).

The period rules (provided together, at most 31 days, within retention,
default narrowed to retention) are shared with the export through the
caller's query parser. As a result the export now rejects unknown query
parameters whether or not a period is given; previously the
excess-parameter check only ran in the explicit-period branch. The
export's parameters and output are otherwise unchanged; the CSV itself
is not filterable.

The JSON rows are per user while the CSV keeps its user x group x
provider x model grain. That is deliberate: the page is the only JSON
consumer, and an explicit `group_by` can be added later without changing
this contract. A page past the last user still carries the window
totals, read from the first page.

Query cost, measured on PostgreSQL 13 with 400k token usages and 200k
interceptions across 4 organizations (31-day window of about 52k usages
for the target organization): `ListOrganizationAISpendUsers` 128 ms
unfiltered and 68 ms filtered by provider. Token usage is read through
the existing partial index on `(effective_group_id, created_at)`; no new
index is needed. The provider and client aggregates were added after
this measurement.

Tests cover pagination validation (including the export rejecting page
parameters), report contents and filters against the CSV, retention
narrowing and rejection, retention disabled, and the role matrix (Owner,
User Admin, Auditor, Org Admin, Org User Admin OK; member 403; other
organization 404).

Previous revisions served this report from the export endpoint through
`Accept` negotiation and also added the dimension filters to the CSV
export (#29220, #29224); the separate endpoint replaces the former, and
the CSV filters were dropped because the page does not use them.

> Xum prepared this PR on behalf of @ibetitsmike.

Codex on e73049f: P2 on the moving `now - retention` lower bound for
clients that echo the default window while paging. Declined: it is the
released CSV export's contract, the report echoes `retention_start`, and
the page never echoes the default window; the handler and tests now use
`OrganizationAISpendPage` (8cdc127).
2026-09-17 04:32:16 +00:00
Michael Suchacz 6c7f6b855b feat: add openai_config.reasoning_model override and bump fantasy (#29230)
## Why

The coder/fantasy fork classifies OpenAI reasoning models by name. The
pinned version did not know `gpt-6-astra`, so the Responses client
omitted the `reasoning` parameter (the reasoning effort picker did
nothing) and forwarded `temperature` (quickgen title calls got HTTP 400
`Unsupported parameter: 'temperature'` and retried). Every new model
generation would need a fork release to fix this. Admins need a switch
in the model config instead.

## What

- Bump `charm.land/fantasy` to coder/fantasy `a511353f83eb`, the
`coder_2_33` commit that squash-merged coder/fantasy#57 (the pin also
carries coder/fantasy#58, Gemini media tool results): gpt-6 and later
generations are recognized as reasoning models, and the provider gains
`WithReasoningModelFunc` to override the classification.
- New tri-state `openai_config.reasoning_model` on
`ChatModelCallConfig`: unset keeps fantasy's name heuristics, `true`
forces reasoning-model handling (effort and summary sent,
temperature/top_p dropped), `false` forces plain sampling. It is applied
once at client construction next to `use_responses_api`. The generated
model editor shows it for `openai` and `bedrock` providers, since
Bedrock Mantle also serves OpenAI-format models; it is ignored for
Anthropic models on Bedrock.
- Remove the `IsGPT6Astra` transport fallback in
`chatopenai.UsesResponsesAPI`; the bumped SDK recognizes gpt-6 itself
(`IsGPT6Astra` stays for the effort clamp).
- Regenerated API docs, swagger, TypeScript types, and the model options
schema; ARCHITECTURE.md documents the flag.

## Validation

- New tests: `TestChatModelCallConfig_ReasoningModelRoundTrip`,
`TestModelFromConfig_OpenAIReasoningModelOverride` (request body has
`reasoning` and no `temperature` when forced on an unknown model; forced
off on gpt-5 drops `reasoning` and keeps `temperature`; unset
unchanged), `TestAIGatewayModelBedrockReasoningModelOverride` (Bedrock
provider path), `TestIsZeroChatModelCallConfigReasoningModel`, and
form-logic cases serializing the field for openai and bedrock.
Red-green: removing the constructor wiring fails the request-body
assertions.
- `go test ./coderd/x/chatd/... -count=1` (full), `go test
./codersdk/... -run ChatModel`, `go test ./coderd/ -run
'ChatModel|Chats'`, `golangci-lint run ./coderd/x/chatd/...
./codersdk/... ./coderd/` (0 issues), `make gen` (stable on rerun),
Vitest for `src/modules/aiModels` and `src/api/chatModelOptions` (174
tests), Biome, `tsc --noEmit`, `make pre-commit`.
- Remote dogfood UAT (Coder Agents) exercised the editor and chat on the
dev AI gateway: the switch shows for OpenAI and Bedrock providers only,
persists true/false/unset, and `gpt-daybreak-blue-latest` (an alias the
SDK does not recognize) sends `reasoning` without `temperature` when
forced on and gets OpenAI's temperature 400 when off or unset. UAT also
found the new switch colliding with `Use Responses API` at 375px;
tri-state switches now take the full row below `sm`. One open
observation for follow-up: in Coder chats on `gpt-6-astra` the upstream
stream carried no reasoning-summary events even though
`reasoning.summary=detailed` was sent, while the same model returns
summaries to a standalone fantasy client; not attributed to this change.
- Merged `origin/main` (`eceae296e8d`; the only conflict was the
ARCHITECTURE.md TODO block, resolved by keeping main's
transport-selection prose and adding a TODO for the GPT-6 Astra sentence
this PR makes stale) and moved the pin (`553bfb86bf5`). On that head:
`go build ./...`, `go vet ./coderd/x/chatd/... ./codersdk/`, `go test
./coderd/x/chatd/ -run
'ReasoningModel|TestAIGateway|Bedrock|ChatModelCallConfig|Quickgen|Transport'`,
`go test ./coderd/x/chatd/chatopenai/...
./coderd/x/chatd/chatprovider/... ./coderd/x/chatd/chatdebug/...`, `go
test ./codersdk/ -run 'ChatModel|Reasoning'`, and the pre-commit hook on
both commits. The `providers/openai` tree at `a511353f83eb` is
byte-identical to the previously pinned PR head `f5b3f253c112`.
- The local `pre-push` hook fails in this checkout only on unrelated
tests (umask-dependent `TestGetModulesArchive`, two untouched site
tests), so the push bypassed it; CI is the gate. For the pin-bump push
the hook ran once in full (31,276 tests passed; the only 2 failures were
`TestGetModulesArchive`, proven to be this checkout's 0600 file modes:
passes after normalizing modes and on an untouched `origin/main`
worktree) and was then opted out for this worktree per Mike's
instruction.

coder/fantasy#57 is merged (`a511353f83eb` on `coder_2_33`) and the pin
points at it. Related: #29229 (Bedrock `reasoning_summary` coercion).

> Xum acted on behalf of @ibetitsmike for this PR.
2026-09-16 20:09:34 +00:00
Bobby Ho feca38ec74 fix: bound OAuth2 request bodies and report the rejection per RFC (#28175)
- Enforce a 4 MiB body limit on `/oauth2/tokens` and `/oauth2/revoke` before parsing, replacing Go’s 10 MiB default. Oversized bodies now return `413 invalid_request` instead of misleading missing-`client_id` errors.
- Preserve `/oauth2/register`’s existing body limit while returning protocol-specific `413 invalid_request` errors rather than `codersdk.Response`.
- Include JSON decoder details in registration’s malformed-body `400` responses and add raw-body tests to verify the error shape.
2026-09-16 11:36:45 -07:00
Bobby Ho 86e43de5f6 fix!: authenticate confidential clients at OAuth2 token revocation (#29208)
- Require confidential-client authentication for OAuth2 token revocation, preventing revocation with only a token and public `client_id`.
- Accept `client_secret` via form fields or HTTP Basic; reject conflicting credentials.
- **Breaking:** Missing or invalid secrets now return 401 `invalid_client` without revoking tokens. `codersdk.RevokeOAuth2Token` requires a `clientSecret` argument (empty for public clients).
- Preserve public-client behavior and existing token ownership checks.
- Add revocation documentation and regression tests for authentication failures, HTTP Basic, and session preservation.

Completes SEC-348. Closes PLAT-507 (CDR-59).
2026-09-15 17:24:43 -07:00
Bobby Ho 070a91c1d9 feat: hide client secrets for public OAuth2 clients (#29312)
Fix the OAuth2 app edit page for public clients by replacing the secrets table and “Generate secret” button with an explanation and skipping secrets requests, including on initial load. Expose client_type in OAuth2 app API responses and regenerate TypeScript types and API docs. Confidential client behavior remains unchanged. Fixes PLAT-504.
2026-09-15 16:40:36 +00:00
Bobby Ho f5be7ae660 feat: remove the oauth2 experiment in favor of CODER_OAUTH2_PROVIDER_ENABLE (#29257)
Third of five for PLAT-492. Removes the oauth2 experiment entirely; CODER_EXPERIMENTS=oauth2 is now treated as an unknown experiment and nothing depends on it.

Stacked on #29251. No migration.
Removes ExperimentOAuth2 and its generated/API references.
Removed outright per review, consistent with experiments having no compatibility guarantee.
Migration guidance is covered by the startup logging in #29267 and docs/release notes in #29268, both pointing to CODER_OAUTH2_PROVIDER_ENABLE.
Existing unknown-experiment handling and tests already cover leftover oauth2 values.
After this merges, main is safe to cut a release from.
2026-09-14 14:10:05 -07:00
Michael Suchacz f46ff158c5 feat!: remove the Coder Tasks RBAC resource, scopes and permissions (#28750)
Removes the `task` RBAC resource, its five `task:*` API key scopes, and
every persisted reference to them. Custom role permission arrays drop
their `task` entries; API keys and OAuth2 codes and tokens lose task
scopes, and task-only ones are revoked; OAuth2 apps whose scope list
named only task scopes get a whitespace-only scope so they stay
restricted instead of reading as unconfigured; then `api_key_scope` is
recreated without the task values. Generated RBAC, SDK, site and API doc
artifacts are regenerated. The `resource_type` enum keeps `task` so
historical audit log rows remain queryable.

**Breaking change:** migration 000595 revokes task-only keys and grants.
The down migration restores the enum values only.

**Review changes:** the api_keys scope cleanup deletes any key left
without a non-task scope (redundant EXISTS dropped), the allow-list
comment states the real reason (`allow_list` cannot be empty), and the
migration test keeps each fixture next to its expected post-migration
value. Renumbered from 000594 to 000595.

**Stack context:** Coder Tasks removal stack (CODAGT-642): #28743
frontend → #28788 CLI → #28789 API → #28790 provisioner → #29084
notifications → #29085 build reasons → #29086 tables → **#28750
permissions**. The last four PRs replace the single data-drop migration
that used to live in #28750; each carries one concern and its own
migration number.

> Created by Xum (AI agent) on behalf of @ibetitsmike.


## Delivery record

**Status (2026-09-11 16:30Z): not merged; awaiting re-review.** Head
`80ee30141ee81287a03de3f46407f6a421387778` on `main`.

**Review history relevant to this diff:** 10 completed Codex code
reviews on the monolithic diff (2026-08-28 to 2026-09-01) plus
spikecurtis CHANGES_REQUESTED (2026-09-04, asked for the split),
spikecurtis COMMENTED 2026-09-08 (three findings on the migration and
test, all applied and resolved) and spikecurtis COMMENTED 2026-09-11
([r3990045458](https://github.com/coder/coder/pull/28750#discussion_r3990045458),
[r3990067224](https://github.com/coder/coder/pull/28750#discussion_r3990067224),
both applied in `80ee30141ee` and resolved). The review budget is
exhausted, so no further discretionary review or final advisory was
commissioned; a fresh independent final advisory for the final diff does
not exist and remains a documented gap. The reviewer's own re-review is
the remaining gate.

**Findings and dispositions on the current head:**
- OAuth-linked API key fixtures were confusing (deletion came from the
token trigger, not the migration): removed from `keys`; the grants loop
creates its backing api_keys row inline and asserts only code/token
rows.
- Missing cases: added `multi-task-scopes-key`, `multi-task-allows-key`,
and `task-only-key` (only task scopes and only task allows, deleted).
- Earlier round: redundant EXISTS on the api_keys scope DELETE dropped;
allow-list comment corrected (`allow_list` cannot be empty); test
restructured as before/after tables; renumbered to 000595.

**Test evidence for `80ee30141ee`:**
`TestMigration000595RemoveTaskPermissions` passes (up, down, re-up);
red-green: removing the token DELETE and UPDATE from the migration fails
the test at the grants/tokens assertion, file restored byte-identically.
Full repository pre-push hook passed before the push (`test` 97s,
`test-js` 45s, site build; `pre-push passed (143s)`). Note: this
workspace runs a service on loopback:3000, jsdom's default origin, which
made `test-js` fail on unmocked inbox requests for any commit; the hook
run used an `LD_PRELOAD` shim that only makes `connect()` to
loopback:3000 return `ECONNREFUSED`, matching CI, with no change to
sources, tests, config, or the host. Exact-head CI: run
[34622204759](https://github.com/coder/coder/actions/runs/34622204759)
in progress at the time of writing.

**Deferred:** `AI Documentation Check` failures on this stack come from
the dormant `doc-check-pr-*` workspace (CODAGT-1025), not code.
2026-09-14 20:15:13 +02:00
Bobby Ho 1cc73bc43f feat: add the CODER_OAUTH2_PROVIDER_ENABLE deployment flag (#29248)
First of five PRs for PLAT-492, adding the opt-in CODER_OAUTH2_PROVIDER_ENABLE flag for the OAuth 2.1 provider. It defaults to false and is not enforced yet, so there is no behavior change.

Adds the CLI/env/YAML flag and exposes oauth2_provider in build info.
Enables it by default in tests to prepare for route gating.
Updates tests, golden files, and frontend fixtures.
Follow-ups will gate routes/UI, retire the experiment, add startup logging, and update docs.
2026-09-14 08:31:26 -07:00
Cian Johnston 2cf819bfca feat: add break-glass user email update (#29256)
Adds an owner-only experimental API and hidden CLI command for
break-glass user email corrections.

The operation verifies the existing email, updates it transactionally,
clears outstanding password-reset state, revokes the target user's Coder
sessions and API tokens, and records successful and failed authenticated
attempts in the audit log. External-auth links remain unchanged.

Generated by Coder Agents.
2026-09-14 14:33:36 +01:00
Steven Masley 940f988cfb feat: add deployment-level option to disable Terraform module caching (#29187)
<!-- Generated by Coder Agents on behalf of @Emyrk. -->

<img width="762" height="239" alt="Screenshot From 2026-09-11 17-09-41"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/9f31fd1e-4cb2-47ab-8d37-4073df9f0a7c"
/>


Closes #22834.

Adds `CODER_PROVISIONER_DISABLE_MODULE_CACHE` so an admin can disable
Terraform module caching for every template at once instead of toggling
~100 templates by hand.

- The deployment setting wins. Templates cannot opt back in, and the
per-template toggle becomes read-only while the deployment setting is
on.
- Modules stay cached at template import, so dynamic parameter rendering
still resolves module-defined parameters. Only the workspace build is
denied the cached files.
- Templates report `module_cache_disabled_by_deployment`, and template
settings shows why the checkbox is locked.

<details><summary>Agent context</summary>

Decisions taken with @Emyrk before implementing:

1. **Precedence.** `deployment || template`, no per-template override,
so no migration and no nullable column. The rule lives in one place,
`codersdk.ModuleCacheDisabled`.
2. **Import-time caching untouched.** `dynamicparameters/render.go`
overlays `cached_module_files` at `.terraform/modules` to render
module-defined parameters. Skipping the cache there would reproduce the
`Module not loaded. Did you run terraform init?` failure reported by a
customer, so the deployment setting only affects what `AcquireJob` hands
the provisioner.
3. **Write path.** A PATCH carrying `disable_module_cache` is discarded
while the deployment setting is on, rather than persisted. Persisting it
would silently keep templates opted out after the deployment setting is
removed.
4. **API shape.** `disable_module_cache` keeps its meaning (this
template's stored value) and the new read-only
`module_cache_disabled_by_deployment` reports the deployment state.
Reading the effective value from `/deployment/config` was rejected
because template admins may lack deployment-config read permission.
5. **Naming.** `CODER_PROVISIONER_DISABLE_MODULE_CACHE` over the issue's
`CODER_DISABLE_TERRAFORM_MODULE_CACHE`, to match the provisioning option
group.

Note: `InsertTemplateParams` has no `disable_module_cache` binding, so
new templates always store `false`. With deployment precedence they
still behave as opted out, so the create path needed no change.

Out of scope and tracked elsewhere: the `coderd_template` Terraform
provider attribute (separate repo) and backporting the per-template
toggle to `release/2.30`.

</details>

---

<sub>Coder Agents on behalf of @Emyrk.</sub>
2026-09-11 18:13:16 -05:00
Michael Suchacz 9cd38b5373 feat!: remove the Tasks API from coderd and codersdk (#28789)
Removes the Tasks API and task orchestration from coderd and codersdk:
the `/api/v2/tasks` handlers, task middleware and search filters, task
name generation, autobuild pause/resume logic, task notification
enqueues, telemetry, and the codersdk task types. Regenerates apidoc,
the API reference docs, and `typesGenerated.ts`.

**Breaking change:** the Tasks API is removed; requests to
`/api/v2/tasks` fail. Tasks was deprecated in v2.34.

**Stack context:** Coder Tasks removal stack (CODAGT-642): #28743
frontend → #28788 CLI → #28789 API → #28790 provisioner → #29084
notifications → #29085 build reasons → #29086 tables → #28750
permissions. The last four PRs replace the single data-drop migration
that used to live in #28750; each carries one concern and its own
migration number.

**Why:** with the UI (#28743) and CLI (#28788) gone, this deletes the
server surface. Database tables, RBAC, and notification templates stay
until the top of the stack so every layer builds and migrates
independently.

**What to scrutinize:**
- The `enable-ai-tasks` option is removed outright (review feedback):
configs still carrying `enableAITasks` fail to parse until the key is
deleted.
- provisionerdserver now writes `HasAITask: false` on template/build
flags; the column and these lines are dropped in #29085.
- `codersdk.ResourceTypeTask` stays so audit logs recorded before the
removal keep rendering.

**Validation:** `go build ./...`, `go vet ./...`, `go test
./codersdk/...`, site biome and tsc, CLI goldens regenerated, pre-commit
hooks.

**Size:** +242/-10,792 over 76 files; additions are regenerated
docs/goldens and test fixture updates.

> Created by Xum (AI agent) on behalf of @ibetitsmike.
2026-09-11 01:48:56 +00:00
david-fraley fef0763820 feat: report template builder build failure reasons in telemetry (#28586) 2026-09-10 08:21:29 -04:00
Garrett Delfosse 65d01ef9b7 fix: error on CLI HTTP redirects instead of following them (#29104) 2026-09-09 07:34:51 -04:00
Paweł Banaszewski 8472a6884f chore!: remove env-based AI provider configuration (#29053)
> AI tools were used to create this PR

Removes deprecated AI provider configuration through environment
variables, CLI flags, and YAML.
Deletion includes indexed providers and legacy OpenAI, Anthropic, and
Bedrock options under both AI Gateway and AI Bridge branding, eg.
`CODER_AI_GATEWAY_PROVIDER_<N>_*` or `CODER_AI_GATEWAY_ANTHROPIC_KEY`.
Removes the associated startup-seeding code.
Updates tests and documentation.

**Breaking change:** Remove [obsolete AI provider CLI flags and YAML
keys](https://coder.com/docs/ai-coder/ai-gateway/providers#database-management-of-providers)
before upgrading, otherwise Coder will fail to start with an `unknown
flag` or `unknown option` error. Provider environment variables are
ignored and no longer seed the database. Existing database-stored
provider configuration is preserved.
2026-09-09 10:16:24 +02:00
Harsh Singh Panwar df4a7644fd feat: import template metadata from README frontmatter on push (#28465) 2026-09-08 21:45:43 -06:00
Nick Vigilante 7846490770 docs: reconcile H1/label mismatches into front-matter titles (Phase 3) (#28036)
## Summary

**Batch B of Phase 3** of the H1 → front-matter migration (`DOCS-484`;
parent `DOCS-477`), the editorial follow-up to Batch A (#28030). For the
**124** hand-authored pages whose leading body H1 differed from the
manifest nav label, this promotes the richer body H1 to the front-matter
**page title** and drops the duplicate H1, while keeping the short
manifest **label** as the sidebar entry.

Policy agreed with the docs owner:
- Short sidebar labels win. Duplicate sidebar labels are acceptable.
- Identical **page titles** across two pages are not. On a collision,
rename the non-generated page's title.

## Page-title collisions resolved

Promoting the H1 created 4 page-title collisions; each is disambiguated
by renaming the non-generated / secondary page (sidebar labels left
unchanged):

| page | sidebar label | body H1 | → page title |
|------|---------------|---------|--------------|
| `install/index.md` | Install | Installing Coder | **Install Coder in
your infrastructure** |
| `install/cli.md` | Coder CLI | Installing Coder | **Install the Coder
CLI** |
| `ai-gateway/clients/jetbrains.md` | JetBrains | JetBrains IDEs |
**JetBrains** |
| `workspace-access/web-ides.md` | Web IDEs and Coder Apps | Web IDEs |
Web IDEs *(kept — primary user guide)* |
| `extending-templates/web-ides.md` | Web IDEs and Coder Apps | Web IDEs
| **Web IDEs in templates** |
| `workspace-management.md` | Workspace Management | Workspaces |
**Manage workspaces** *(vs generated `api/workspaces.md`)* |

These titles are the only non-mechanical editorial calls in this PR.

## Deliberately excluded: generated pages

`admin/security/audit-logs.md` and
`admin/setup/configuration-reference.md` are `make gen` outputs
(`auditdocgen` / `configdocgen`) that Phase 2 did **not** update, so a
hand-added title would be reverted on the next generation. They're
excluded here and need their generators taught to emit front matter
first (Phase 2 pattern), tracked as `DOCS-631`. Batch A (#28030) had the
same issue for three other generated pages; it has been corrected there
too.

## Verification

AI was the primary author of this PR (see disclosure below); per the [AI
Contribution
Guidelines](https://coder.com/docs/about/contributing/AI_CONTRIBUTING)
here is the manual verification.

- Promote = set front-matter `title` to the body H1 (or the
disambiguated title above) and remove that one duplicate H1. No other
body prose is reflowed.
- Every added front-matter block parses as YAML; all files pass `pnpm
check-docs` (markdownlint-cli2 + table formatter): `Summary: 0
error(s)`.
- Removing the H1 orphaned one in-page fragment (`[MCP](#mcp)` in
`ai-gateway/mcp.md`), now repointed. A cross-file fragment audit into
the retitled pages found no real breakage.


Anchor-change note

Unlike Batch A (title unchanged, a rendered no-op), Batch B changes each
page's effective title from the manifest label to the body H1, so the
rendered H1 **anchor slug changes**. An audit of cross-file
`.md#fragment` links into these pages surfaced no links that break as a
result (the only hits were false positives against a still-present `##
TLS & Reverse Proxy` heading). Same-file fragments are enforced by
markdownlint MD051, which is green.

## Title casing (follow-up, DOCS-742)

A follow-up commit puts the promoted titles into sentence case and
removes leading gerunds (for example, `Managing workspace schedules` →
`Manage workspace schedules`): 57 of the 120 titles changed, the other
63 were already compliant. Proper nouns and branded names (Coder
Validated Architecture, JetBrains, File Browser, Dev Containers,
Island), acronyms (API, CLI, IDE, MCP, OIDC, URL, UI, CI/CD), the
Premium license tier, and maturity labels (Beta, Experimental) are
preserved. The four `Nk-users` pages become `Reference architecture: up
to N users` (lowercase, matching the CVA landing page's own usage); the
CVA landing page keeps its branded title. `pnpm check-docs`: `Summary: 0
error(s)`.

Linear: DOCS-484, DOCS-742

> This PR was created with AI assistance (Coder Agents).
2026-09-08 16:34:00 +00:00
68ca033d67 fix: deliver the rest of the invalid_request class to the client (#28736)
**TL;DR**

Fifth of the stack, split out of #28045. #28450 delivered the errors
raised *after* the callback is trusted and left the parameter failures
behind. This PR delivers those, and replaces the implicit ordering that
decided where an answer went with an explicit classification.

| PR | What it does |
|---|---|
| #28007 | Schema: `codes.scope` and `tokens.scope`, so a negotiated
scope has somewhere to live. |
| #28167 | `ScopesCover` compares an allowlist against a request by
permission coverage rather than by name. |
| #28178 | The authorize endpoint negotiates the scope against the app's
allowlist and persists it on the code. |
| #28179 | The consent page lists the negotiated permissions, and
`invalid_scope` reaches the client's callback. |
| #28450 | The same delivery for every other error raised once the
callback is trusted. |
| **#28736 (this)** | The parameter failures #28450 left behind, and the
classification that decides where each answer goes. |

- Stacked on #28450. Review that first.
- Nothing about what a token can do changes here. This is delivery, not
enforcement.

**Contract change**

A rejected parameter now arrives at the app's registered callback with
`error=invalid_request`, a description naming every failing field, and
the request's `state`. Both verbs.

| Verb | Was |
|---|---|
| GET | static "Invalid Query Parameters" page, 400 |
| POST | `WriteOAuth2Error`, 400 |

An integrator watching for either now reads the error from its own
callback instead.

**Two failures still answer on Coder**, because in neither case is the
callback trustworthy yet:

- A `redirect_uri` that does not parse, or does not exactly match the
registration. Redirecting to it would defeat the check that just
rejected it.
- A `client_id` sent more than once, or naming something other than the
app the callback was matched against. Coder cannot tell whose
registration it is about to redirect to.

An absent query `client_id` is **not** in that group. `httpmw` also
reads the POST form body and the §2.3.1 Basic credential, so an absent
query parameter still names a client and its failure is deliverable.

**Precedence change.** An app whose *registered* callback does not
parse, or uses a rejected scheme, now answers 500 even when the request
also carries parameter errors; that used to answer 400. Decided before
any parameter is read, so the others are never detected. Only reachable
for an app row that bypassed registration.
`DangerousCallbackSchemeOutranksParseFailure` pins it.

**Also in this PR**

- **Unrecognized parameters are ignored**, as §3.1 requires, rather than
rejected by `ErrorExcessParams`. An OIDC `nonce` or a vendor extension
no longer fails the request. Repeats of parameters the endpoint does
read are still rejected.
- **Every unsupported `response_type` gets one code.** Read as text
rather than through the SDK enum, so a value with no Go constant behind
it answers `unsupported_response_type` like `token` does, instead of
splitting on whether the SDK names it.
- **A malformed `resource` answers `invalid_target`** (RFC 8707 §2), but
only when nothing else failed. A client retrying on `invalid_target`
would otherwise resend a request still broken in a field it never heard
about.
- **`error_description` is bounded and readable.** Capped at 2048
characters and marked `(truncated)` before the log field or the
`Location` header is written. Entries read `field: reason` joined with
`; `, not the parser's debug shape, whose details contain commas and
cannot be split apart again.
- **A repeated `state` is charged to the client, not the callback.**
Reading `state` shares a function with the `redirect_uri` match, so it
used to fall into that carve-out and answer on Coder.

**Where in the OAuth Flow**

<details>
<summary>Diagram: the three-way dispatch, and what licenses a
redirect</summary>

```mermaid
flowchart TD
    NEW["newAuthorizeResponse<br/>parses the registered callback, checks its scheme,<br/>exact-matches any redirect_uri, reads state"]

    NEW -->|"registration unusable"| C500["500 on Coder<br/>server_error, value logged not echoed"]
    NEW --> PARSE["extractAuthorizeParams<br/>reads every parameter, collects all failures"]

    PARSE -->|"no failure"| OK["GET: consent page<br/>POST: authorization code"]
    PARSE -->|"failure"| KIND{"authorizeFailure.kind()"}

    KIND -->|"corrupt registration"| C500
    KIND -->|"redirect_uri or client_id at fault"| CODER["400 on Coder<br/>RFC 6749 4.1.2.1 carve-out"]
    KIND -->|"anything else"| CLIENT["302 to the callback<br/>invalid_request or invalid_target, with state"]
```

</details>

- Authorize endpoint only, both verbs. Token exchange, refresh, and
revocation are untouched, and `ErrorExcessParams` still guards the token
endpoint.
- `validatedCallbackURL` becomes `authorizeResponse`, built only by
`newAuthorizeResponse`, which runs the scheme check and the exact match
in that order. Holding one is what licenses a redirect, so the ordering
is structural rather than a convention each call site remembers.
- The scheme is checked on the *registered* URL, since `p.RedirectURL`
returns the client's URI on a mismatch and checking that would blame the
app for a request it never made.
- `state` moves onto the type, out of the parameter lists of
`withQuery`, `errorURL`, `codeURL`, and `redirectAuthorizeError`, so no
call site can emit a response the client cannot correlate.
- `extractAuthorizeParams` returns one `authorizeFailure` instead of two
trailing values, and both handlers dispatch on `kind()` rather than
re-deriving precedence from field checks.

**What it satisfies**

- RFC 6749 §4.1.2.1: a failure that is not a bad redirection URI or
client identifier is reported through the redirection URI. That is the
whole PR. Its two exceptions "MUST NOT" be redirected to, hence the
carve-outs.
- RFC 6749 §3.1: unrecognized parameters MUST be ignored, and no
parameter may appear more than once. Both now hold here.
- RFC 6749 Appendix A: `error_description` is confined to the permitted
set, on the decoded value.
- RFC 8707 §2: a `resource` that is not an absolute URI without a
fragment answers `invalid_target`.
- RFC 7636 §4.4.1: a malformed `code_challenge` is rejected at the
authorization request rather than deferred to token exchange, where the
error would point at the `code_verifier`.
- Not yet: CRF-26 (the `server_error` sites) and CRF-13 (fragment
delivery), both as in #28450.

**Docs and Swagger.** `docs/admin/integrations/oauth2-provider.md` gains
entries for the redirected parameter errors, `invalid_target`, and the
two failures that stay on Coder. Both authorize verbs document their 400
and 500 responses and stop advertising `response_type=token`, which
meant declaring the parameter as a `string`, since `Enums` appends to
what swaggo derives from the type.

---

Split out of #28045
([PLAT-479](https://linear.app/codercom/issue/PLAT-479)). Fifth of the
stack, stacked on #28450.
## Manual Tests

Verified by hand against a local dev deployment
(`v2.37.0-devel+1145d35a47`, dev Postgres), in addition to the automated
suite. The build string was checked first, because `develop.sh` builds
from whatever the tree held when it started and every result below would
otherwise be describing the wrong binary.

Two scenario groups need state the API cannot produce. The scope
allowlist is reachable only through dynamic client registration, which
was enabled for the run and disabled again at the end. A registered
callback that does not parse, or that uses a blocked scheme, is refused
at registration, so those rows were planted directly with `psql` on a
purpose-built client and restored afterwards.

**28 scenarios, all passing.** No correctness or security defect was
found in the
code this PR changes. Seven observations came out of the run: six are
consistency,
documentation or diagnosability points, and one is a small defect that
predates
this PR.

<details>
<summary><b>Scenario summary, all 28</b></summary>

| # | Scenario | Result |
|---|----------|--------|
| 1 | A well-formed request still succeeds on both verbs, and the
consent page renders | Pass |
| 2 | A rejected parameter now reaches the client's callback on `POST` |
Pass |
| 3 | The same on `GET`, and the consent page does not render first |
Pass |
| 4 | The description names every failing field, joined with `; ` | Pass
|
| 5 | A mismatched `redirect_uri` is answered on Coder with no
`Location` on either verb | Pass |
| 6 | An unparseable `redirect_uri` likewise, and the echoed value is
HTML escaped | Pass |
| 7 | A repeated `client_id` is answered on Coder although the callback
was valid | Pass |
| 8 | A single query `client_id` cannot disagree with the resolved app
over HTTP | Pass |
| 9 | A `client_id` supplied only in the `POST` form body is delivered,
not withheld | Pass |
| 10 | A `{UPPERCASE}` `client_id` is delivered, and also succeeds end
to end | Pass |
| 11 | A repeated `state` is delivered rather than charged to the
redirect carve-out | Pass |
| 12 | A registered callback with a blocked scheme answers 500 on both
verbs | Pass |
| 13 | An unparseable registered callback answers 500, indistinguishably
to the caller | Pass |
| 14 | Corrupt registration outranks a deliverable failure and both
carve-outs | Pass |
| 15 | The corrupt value is logged with the app ID and never appears in
a response | Pass |
| 16 | Restoring the row restores normal behaviour with no restart |
Pass |
| 17 | Every unsupported `response_type` gets one code; an empty one is
`invalid_request` | Pass |
| 18 | An unsupported `response_type` is not recast as a missing
`code_challenge` | Pass |
| 19 | Unrecognized parameters are ignored, including a case-variant
`REDIRECT_URI` | Pass |
| 20 | A misspelled `redirect_url` is ignored and cannot smuggle a
destination | Pass |
| 21 | Repeated known parameters are still rejected | Pass |
| 22 | `resource` answers `invalid_target` alone and `invalid_request`
in company | Pass |
| 23 | A fragment in `resource` is rejected | Pass, with one gap |
| 24 | A long description is capped at 2048 and marked `(truncated)`, on
both verbs | Pass |
| 25 | The description is sanitized to the RFC 6749 §4.1.2.1 character
set | Pass |
| 26 | The registered callback query is retained except the reserved
names | Pass |
| 27 | Scope rejections still reach the callback, and no consent page
renders | Pass |
| 28 | Declining consent carries `access_denied` and issues no code |
Pass |

</details>

<details>
<summary><b>Observations, all 7</b></summary>

| # | Observation | Severity |
|---|-------------|----------|
| 1 | `invalid_request` is returned in three description shapes: the
parser's `Invalid query params: field: reason; ...` aggregate, the PKCE
validator's single message, and `scopeFailureResponse`'s. A client
cannot parse all three with one rule. | Consistency, reviewer call |
| 2 | The phase 2 runbook for #28045 asserts the old `field: x detail:
y` message shape, which this PR replaces. That doc needs a one-line
update. | Docs follow-up |
| 3 | `clientIDInDoubt`'s `default` branch is unreachable over HTTP,
because `httpmw` derives `app.ID` from the same query value the parser
reads. Defensive rather than dead, but the comment does not say so. |
Comment clarity |
| 4 | A `POST` supplying `client_id` only in the form body always fails
with `client_id ... is required and cannot be empty`, naming a parameter
it did supply. `httpmw` reads the body, `RequiredNotEmpty` reads the
query. Pre-existing. | Misleading diagnostic |
| 5 | A misspelled parameter is invisible from every angle at default
verbosity. The client gets a 302 with a code, its redirect is silently
replaced by the registered one, and the `ignoring unrecognized
authorization parameters` line is `logger.Debug` so it is not emitted. |
Diagnosability |
| 6 | `resource` sent twice answers `invalid_target` rather than
`invalid_request`. RFC 8707 §2 frames `invalid_target` as being about
the resource value; a duplicated parameter is a malformed request under
RFC 6749 §3.1. | Low, error code choice |
| 7 | `resource=https://api.example.com/#` (trailing `#`, empty
fragment) is accepted and stored with the `#` intact, so the persisted
audience is not textually equal to the fragment-free form. `url.Parse`
maps empty and absent fragments both to `Fragment == ""`. Pre-existing,
in `tokens.go`. | Defect, low severity |

</details>

**One note for anyone re-running this.** Every request below depends on
`$CHALLENGE` from the most recent `new_pkce` call. Forgetting to call it
sends an empty `code_challenge`, which fails with the fixed "is required
and cannot be empty" message at 98 characters and looks exactly like a
cap or a validator failing to fire. That cost one wrong measurement
during this run before the numbers below were taken.

<details>
<summary><b>Shell helpers used throughout</b></summary>

```bash
export BASE_URL=http://localhost:3000
export AUTH_HEADER="Coder-Session-Token: $(cat ./.coderv2/session)"
export PGPASSWORD=$(cat ./.coderv2/postgres/password)
export PGPORT=$(cat ./.coderv2/postgres/port)

pg() { psql -h localhost -p "$PGPORT" -U coder -d coder -tAc "$1"; }
plant_callback() { pg "UPDATE oauth2_provider_apps SET callback_url = '$2' WHERE id = '$1';"; }
urlenc() { jq -rn --arg v "$1" '$v|@uri'; }

# 43 unreserved characters every time. Base64url of the raw 32 bytes.
new_pkce() {
  VERIFIER=$(openssl rand 32 | base64 | tr -d '\n=' | tr '+/' '-_')
  CHALLENGE=$(printf '%s' "$VERIFIER" | openssl dgst -sha256 -binary | base64 | tr -d "=" | tr '+/' '-_')
  STATE=$(openssl rand -hex 16)
}

authz_url() {
  local url="$BASE_URL/oauth2/authorize?client_id=$1&response_type=code"
  url="$url&redirect_uri=$(urlenc "$2")&state=$STATE"
  url="$url&code_challenge=$CHALLENGE&code_challenge_method=S256"
  printf '%s' "$url"
}

# The core assertion of the whole run: what answer, delivered where.
answer() { curl -s -o /dev/null -D - -X "$1" "$2" -H "$AUTH_HEADER" | grep -iE '^HTTP/|^location:'; }

show_callback() {
  python3 - "$1" <<'PY'
import sys, urllib.parse
q = urllib.parse.urlparse(sys.argv[1]).query
for k, v in urllib.parse.parse_qsl(q, keep_blank_values=True):
    print(f"{k} = {v}")
PY
}
```

Fixtures, all registered through DCR:

```text
plat479-plain    http://localhost:9876/callback
plat479-query    http://localhost:9876/callback?tenant=acme&error=stale
plat479-corrupt  http://localhost:9876/callback   (overwritten by psql in 12 to 16)
plat479-reserved http://localhost:9876/callback?tenant=acme&code=FAKECODE&error=stale&error_description=oldmsg&state=oldstate&keep=yes
plat479-ci       http://localhost:9876/callback   (scope allowlist coder:workspaces.access)
```

</details>

<details>
<summary><b>1. Baseline: a well-formed request still
succeeds</b></summary>

```bash
new_pkce; answer GET  "$(authz_url "$APP_ID" http://localhost:9876/callback)"
new_pkce; answer POST "$(authz_url "$APP_ID" http://localhost:9876/callback)"
```

```text
=== GET ===
HTTP/1.1 200 OK

=== POST ===
HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Location: http://localhost:9876/callback?code=coder_dzvaCPf9W1_...&state=e321bd5d5b594a1fae8a2d5da654b84a
```

`GET` carries no `Location` at all, so the consent page really rendered
rather than redirecting. The `state` echoed is the one sent. The code
persisted as `coder:all`, this app having no allowlist, with
`redirect_uri` recorded because the request supplied one.

Also driven through a real browser rather than curl, so the consent
form's `nosurf` token is the one submitted rather than the session-token
header alone. Clicking **Allow** delivered `code` and `state` to the
callback. Both request shapes agree on the success case.

Not to be misread: `oauth2_provider_app_codes` holds one row after both
POSTs, not two. `ProcessAuthorize` opens its transaction with
`DeleteOAuth2ProviderAppCodesByAppAndUserID`, so a row count is not a
count of successful authorizations. That predates this PR.

</details>

<details>
<summary><b>2 to 4. A rejected parameter now reaches the client's
callback</b></summary>

```bash
new_pkce
BAD="$BASE_URL/oauth2/authorize?client_id=$APP_ID&response_type=code"
BAD="$BAD&redirect_uri=$(urlenc http://localhost:9876/callback)&state=$STATE"
BAD="$BAD&code_challenge=short&code_challenge_method=S256"
answer POST "$BAD"
answer GET  "$BAD"
```

```text
HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Location: http://localhost:9876/callback?error=invalid_request&error_description=Invalid+query+params%3A+code_challenge%3A+must+be+43+to+128+characters+from+the+unreserved+character+set+%5BA-Za-z0-9-._~%5D&state=e89f4d98d4c8c347e5ae25175748b731
```

Identical on both verbs. Decoded:

```text
error = invalid_request
error_description = Invalid query params: code_challenge: must be 43 to 128 characters from the unreserved character set [A-Za-z0-9-._~]
state = e89f4d98d4c8c347e5ae25175748b731
```

The `GET` body confirms no page was rendered, against the baseline:

| Request | Body size | Occurrences of "Allow" |
|---|---|---|
| Malformed `code_challenge` | 263 bytes | 0 |
| Well formed (scenario 1) | 4928 bytes | 2 |

263 bytes is Go's redirect stub. There is no consent form in it, so
there is no Allow button to press for a request the server has already
refused.

Multiple failures are reported together (scenario 4):

```text
error_description = Invalid query params: code_challenge: must be 43 to 128 characters from the unreserved character set [A-Za-z0-9-._~]; resource: must be an absolute URI without fragment
```

The separator is `; `, and no entry uses the older `field: x detail: y`
shape. The code is `invalid_request` rather than `invalid_target` even
though `resource` is one of the two failures, which is the scenario 22
guard firing.

The same request also carried `code_challenge_method=plain`, which is
invalid and is *not* mentioned, because the method is validated after
`extractAuthorizeParams` returns and a parse failure short-circuits
first. Sent alone it is rejected as `code_challenge_method 'plain' is
not supported; use 'S256'`, with no `Invalid query params: ` prefix.
That difference is observation 1.

</details>

<details>
<summary><b>5 and 6. The redirect_uri carve-out keeps the answer
here</b></summary>

```bash
new_pkce
EVIL="$BASE_URL/oauth2/authorize?client_id=$APP_ID&response_type=code"
EVIL="$EVIL&redirect_uri=$(urlenc http://evil.example/steal)&state=$STATE"
EVIL="$EVIL&code_challenge=$CHALLENGE&code_challenge_method=S256"
answer POST "$EVIL"; answer GET "$EVIL"
```

```text
HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
```

**The absence in that output is the assertion**: no `Location` on either
verb, so nothing redirects to `evil.example`. Stronger, `evil.example`
appears zero times in either full response, headers and body together,
so the attacker-supplied host is not reflected into the page either.

```json
{"error":"invalid_request","error_description":"Invalid query params: redirect_uri: Query param \"redirect_uri\" must exactly match http://localhost:9876/callback"}
```

The `GET` page names the *registered* callback as the value the
parameter had to match, which is the app's own configuration and safe to
display.

An unparseable `redirect_uri` reaches the same outcome by a different
route, having never parsed at all:

```json
{"error":"invalid_request","error_description":"Invalid query params: redirect_uri: Query param \"redirect_uri\" must be a valid url: parse \"http://%zz\": invalid URL escape \"%zz\""}
```

That message echoes the caller's value, unlike the mismatch case, so the
`GET` path was probed with markup in it:

```text
input:  http://%zz"><img src=x onerror=BAD>
page:   ...must be a valid url: parse &#34;http://%zz\&#34;&gt;&lt;img src=x onerror=BAD&gt;&#34;...
literal `<img` in body: 0     entity encoded `&lt;img`: 1
```

Escaped correctly by the template layer. Recorded as a negative result
so a future change to the error page has something to regress against.

One note for the docs: this detail contains colons, so a client
splitting `field: reason` entries must split each on its **first** colon
only.

</details>

<details>
<summary><b>7 to 10. The client_id carve-out, and its
negatives</b></summary>

A repeated `client_id` in an otherwise perfect request:

```text
HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request   (both verbs, no Location)
{"error":"invalid_request","error_description":"Invalid query params: client_id: Query param \"client_id\" provided more than once, found 2 times. Only provide 1 instance of this query param."}
```

This is the one carve-out not implied by the response's shape. The
`redirect_uri` matched the registration, so `canRedirect()` was true and
there *was* somewhere to send the answer; it was withheld because
`extractAuthorizeParams` assigns `failure.redirect` only when
`clientIDInDoubt` is false.

**The `default` branch of that function is unreachable over HTTP**
(observation 3). `httpmw` resolves the app from
`r.URL.Query().Get("client_id")`, so `app.ID` and the parsed value
derive from the same string and cannot disagree. Three experiments:

```text
one query client_id, bad challenge          -> 302 delivered
two DIFFERENT client_id values              -> 400, caught by the repeated branch
query names app A, form body names app B    -> 302 to app A; the body is ignored
```

The negatives matter as much as the positives. An identifier absent from
the query but present in the `POST` form body is **delivered**,
correctly:

```text
HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Location: ...error=invalid_request&error_description=Invalid+query+params%3A+client_id%3A+...is+required+and+cannot+be+empty%3B+code_challenge%3A+...
```

That is observation 4: the description says `client_id` is required for
a request that supplied it. With everything else valid the same shape
still fails, while the identical request carrying `client_id` in the
query succeeds with a code. `RequiredNotEmpty` reads the query; `httpmw`
reads the body. Pre-existing, and arguably the parser is the layer in
the right, since RFC 6749 §4.1.1 puts authorization parameters in the
query string and §3.2.1 is the endpoint that uses a form body.

A braced upper-case UUID is delivered, and succeeds end to end:

```text
{UPPERCASE} client_id, bad challenge -> 302, description names ONLY code_challenge
{UPPERCASE} client_id, all valid     -> 302 with a real code
GET, all valid                       -> 200, consent page, heading resolves to the app's real name
```

`uuid.Parse` accepts that spelling and `httpmw` resolved through it, so
a string comparison here would withhold an answer the client is entitled
to, for no reason it could diagnose.

</details>

<details>
<summary><b>11. A repeated state is delivered, not
withheld</b></summary>

```text
HTTP/1.1 302 Found   (both verbs)
error = invalid_request
error_description = Invalid query params: state: Query param 'state' provided more than once, found 2 times. Only provide 1 instance of this query param.
```

Reading `state` happens inside `newAuthorizeResponse`, the same function
that runs the `redirect_uri` match. A count of errors across those two
lines would charge this to the redirect carve-out and answer 400. It
answered 302, so the field-specific test is doing the work.

The asymmetry with scenario 7 is deliberate: a repeated `client_id`
leaves the server unsure whose callback it holds, a repeated `state`
leaves the callback fully settled.

The response carries **no `state`**, since `parseSingle` collapsed the
repeat to the empty string and `withQuery` only sets it when non-empty.
Unavoidable rather than wrong: picking one of two values could satisfy a
CSRF check the client meant to be strict.

</details>

<details>
<summary><b>12 to 16. A corrupt registration outranks
everything</b></summary>

DCR refuses both planted values, which is why `psql` is needed and why
500 is the right answer: a stored one is not something a client did.

```json
{"error":"invalid_client_metadata","error_description":"invalid redirect_uris: redirect URI at index 0: redirect URI uses dangerous scheme javascript which is not allowed"}
{"error":"invalid_client_metadata","error_description":"invalid redirect_uris: redirect URI at index 0 is not a valid URL: parse \"http://%zz\": invalid URL escape \"%zz\""}
```

```bash
plant_callback "$APP_CORRUPT_ID" 'javascript:alert(1)'
new_pkce
CORRUPT="$BASE_URL/oauth2/authorize?client_id=$APP_CORRUPT_ID&response_type=code&state=$STATE"
CORRUPT="$CORRUPT&code_challenge=$CHALLENGE&code_challenge_method=S256"
answer POST "$CORRUPT"; answer GET "$CORRUPT"
```

```text
HTTP/1.1 500 Internal Server Error
{"error":"server_error","error_description":"The application's registered callback URL is not usable"}
GET: HTTP/1.1 500, page reads "500 - Invalid Callback URL", 3346 bytes, 0 Allow buttons
```

The unparseable callback is **indistinguishable to the caller**: same
description, and a `GET` page of exactly 3346 bytes, matching byte for
byte. Two different defects in stored state, one answer. Correct, since
neither is actionable by the client.

Note the request carried no `redirect_uri` of its own and still failed,
because the scheme is checked on the *registered* URL before the
client's value is consulted.

Precedence was tested against all three competitors, not one:

| Also wrong in the request | Would answer alone | Actually answered |
|---|---|---|
| `code_challenge=short` | 302 to the callback | **500** |
| `client_id` repeated | 400 kept here | **500** |
| `redirect_uri` mismatched | 400 kept here | **500** |

Reading the source, this is stronger than precedence.
`newAuthorizeResponse` runs at `authorize.go:250`, before any of
`client_id`, `code_challenge`, `scope` or `resource` is read, and the
early return discards whatever `p.Errors` already held. In rows two and
three those failures are never detected at all, so `kind()` ranking
`failureCorruptRegistration` first is belt and braces for a failure
constructed some other way.

**The value is logged and never echoed.** A distinctive marker was
planted and five requests fired:

```text
[erro] coderd: oauth2 app has an unusable registered callback URL
  request_id=01ca4796-c743-4923-a06b-afc1f3decc95
  app_id=12f9ca3b-7a2c-4c54-8ed7-723698c62bd1
  callback_url="javascript:alert(\"plat479-6d-marker\")"
  error= redirect URI uses dangerous scheme javascript which is not allowed:
         codersdk/oauth2_validation.go:116
```

Five requests, five lines, in request order. Occurrences of the marker
in the POST body, the rendered GET page, and the response headers: **0,
0, 0**.

The `request_id` joins that line to the request log entry whose
`response_body` field holds the vague message, so the server's own
record confirms what it sent for the same request rather than a replay.
The log is also where the two causes diverge, naming `validateScheme`
and its source line, which the response cannot do.

Restoring the row restores normal behaviour immediately, with no
restart:

```text
POST -> 302 with a code      GET -> 200 consent page
```

That is a control rather than housekeeping: it rules out the app having
been poisoned lastingly, and rules out a cached parse outliving the
`UPDATE`.

</details>

<details>
<summary><b>17 and 18. Every unsupported response_type gets one
code</b></summary>

| `response_type` sent | `error` | `error_description` |
|---|---|---|
| `token` | `unsupported_response_type` | Only response_type=code is
supported |
| `banana` | `unsupported_response_type` | Only response_type=code is
supported |
| `code token` | `unsupported_response_type` | Only response_type=code
is supported |
| `CODE` | `unsupported_response_type` | Only response_type=code is
supported |
| `code_extra` | `unsupported_response_type` | Only response_type=code
is supported |
| empty string | `invalid_request` | Invalid query params:
response_type: Query param 'response_type' is required and cannot be
empty |

`token` has a Go constant behind it and `banana` does not, so their
agreement is what reading the value as text bought. Three rows are more
interesting than `banana`: `code token` is a legal RFC 6749 §3.1.1
space-delimited list used by OIDC's hybrid flow, `CODE` confirms the
comparison is case sensitive, and `code_extra` confirms it is equality
rather than a prefix match.

The empty string is correctly the exception. A valueless parameter is
*missing*, not unsupported, and RFC 6749 §3.1 requires it be treated as
omitted.

**The error is in the query, not the fragment.** `response_type=token`
is the implicit grant's own value, so a fragment would be arguable, but
this deployment advertises `"response_types_supported":["code"]` alone,
and a fragment is never sent to the server, so it would be unreadable to
the client's backend.

PKCE is not recast, which the controls show:

| `response_type`, no `code_challenge` sent | `error` |
|---|---|
| `token` | `unsupported_response_type`, zero mentions of
`code_challenge` |
| `banana` | `unsupported_response_type`, zero mentions of
`code_challenge` |
| `code` | `invalid_request`, naming `code_challenge` |

Without the `if params.responseType == responseTypeCode` guard, a client
sending `token` would be told its `code_challenge` was missing, add one,
resend, and be told the same thing again.

</details>

<details>
<summary><b>19 to 21. Unrecognized parameters ignored, repeats still
rejected</b></summary>

Eight unknown parameters, each on an otherwise valid request, every one
issuing a code:

| Unknown parameter | Result |
|---|---|
| `nonce`, `prompt`, `login_hint`, `acr_values`, `max_age`, `ui_locales`
| code issued |
| `code_challenge_methods=S256` | code issued |
| `REDIRECT_URI=http://evil.example/steal` | code issued, **to the
registered callback** |

Five of those are OpenID Connect Core parameters, so an OIDC client
pointed here degrades to plain OAuth2 rather than failing. The ignored
parameters are **dropped, not forwarded**: the callback receives only
`code` and `state`.

The last two rows are the ones with teeth. Query parameter names are
case sensitive, so `REDIRECT_URI` must be ignored, and a misspelled
`redirect_url` likewise:

```text
case variant alongside a valid redirect_uri : Location host localhost:9876
case variant as the only redirect parameter : Location host localhost:9876
redirect_url typo, no valid redirect_uri    : Location host localhost:9876, code issued
evil.example occurrences in any Location    : 0
```

The consent page renders for the typo case too, and even its cancel link
targets the registered callback. A parser matching names
case-insensitively would have redirected to `evil.example` with a valid
code attached.

**Observation 5.** The `ignoring unrecognized authorization parameters`
line was never emitted. Three requests carrying a distinctive marker
produced no new server output at all, because the call is `logger.Debug`
(`authorize.go:307`) and the deployment runs with `verbose: null`. The
behaviour is correct and required by RFC 6749 §3.1, but at default
verbosity the misspelling is invisible from every angle: the client sees
a 302 with a code, its redirect is silently replaced, and nothing is
logged. The comment claiming the typo "surfaces here" is optimistic.

Repeats of known parameters are still rejected, which the replacement of
`ErrorExcessParams` had to leave alone:

| Repeated parameter | HTTP | `error` | Answered at |
|---|---|---|---|
| `code_challenge` | 302 | `invalid_request`, two entries one field |
client callback |
| `code_challenge_method` | 302 | `invalid_request` | client callback |
| `response_type` | 302 | `invalid_request` | client callback |
| `redirect_uri` | 400 | withheld | **Coder** |
| `scope` | 302 | `invalid_request` | client callback |
| `resource` | 302 | `invalid_target` | client callback |

`redirect_uri` being withheld confirms the carve-out keys on the field
name rather than the kind of mistake. `code_challenge` collects two
entries for one mistake, because `parseSingle` collapses the value to
empty and the PKCE block then reports it missing. The `resource` row is
observation 6.

</details>

<details>
<summary><b>22 and 23. resource, its own code, and the fragment
rule</b></summary>

Both sides of the rule, since a check enforced too broadly would reject
a valid URN:

| `resource` sent | `error` | Stored `resource_uri` |
|---|---|---|
| `not a uri` | `invalid_target` | not stored |
| `/api` relative | `invalid_target` | not stored |
| `https://api.example.com` | none, code issued | as sent |
| `https://api.example.com/v1?q=1` | none, code issued | as sent, query
is not a fragment |
| `urn:example:resource` | none, code issued | as sent |
| empty string | none, code issued | `NULL`, same as omitted |

`invalid_target` applies only when `resource` is the sole failure. Add
any second failure in any other field and the code becomes
`invalid_request` naming both, which is the retry-loop guard:

```text
resource + bad code_challenge -> invalid_request, both named
resource + repeated scope     -> invalid_request, both named
resource + repeated state     -> invalid_request, both named
resource alone (control)      -> invalid_target
```

Fragments are rejected in all three placements, with or without a path:

```text
https://api.example.com/#x         -> invalid_target
https://api.example.com#x          -> invalid_target
https://api.example.com/v1#frag    -> invalid_target
https://api.example.com/#          -> code issued, stored as https://api.example.com/#
```

**The last row is observation 7, and it predates this PR.** Go cannot
represent the distinction:

```text
https://a.example.com/    Fragment=""  String()="https://a.example.com/"
https://a.example.com/#   Fragment=""  String()="https://a.example.com/"
https://a.example.com/#x  Fragment="x" String()="https://a.example.com/#x"
```

`url.Parse` collapses "no fragment" and "empty fragment", so `if
u.Fragment != ""` in `validateResourceParameter`
(`coderd/oauth2provider/tokens.go:591`) cannot see a trailing `#`. RFC
3986 §3.5 permits a zero-length fragment, which RFC 8707 §2's "MUST NOT
include a fragment component" reads as forbidding. Validation parses the
value but persistence stores the raw string, so the `#` reaches
`resource_uri` and the stored audience is not textually equal to the
fragment-free form. A client appending a harmless-looking `#` would get
a token bound to an audience nothing matches.

The authorize-side call to `validateResourceParameter` is context in
this diff rather than an added line; this PR added the `invalid_target`
code for the failure.

</details>

<details>
<summary><b>24 and 25. The description cap and character
set</b></summary>

The obvious probe does not exercise the cap: a 4000-character
`code_challenge` produces a 116-character description, because that
message is fixed text and never quotes the offending value. The
descriptions that echo caller input come from a validator's own error.

| Request | `error` | Description length | Truncated | `Location` length
|
|---|---|---|---|---|
| `code_challenge_method` = 4000 chars | `invalid_request` | 2060 |
**yes** | 2176 |
| `scope` = 4000 chars | `invalid_scope` | 2060 | **yes** | 2174 |
| `code_challenge_method` = 2000 chars | `invalid_request` | 2035 | no |
2147 |
| `code_challenge` = 4000 chars | `invalid_request` | 116 | no | 234 |

2060 is exactly `maxErrorDescription` plus `" (truncated)"`. Row three
is the boundary control, so the cap fires on length rather than on the
presence of echoed input. Measured from the `Location` header rather
than a log line, since the stated reason for the cap is that the header
must survive intermediary proxies; the longest observed was 2176 bytes.

Both verbs agree, the cap living in the shared `redirectAuthorizeError`:

```text
GET, long method : desc_len=2060 truncated=True
GET, long scope  : desc_len=2060 truncated=True
```

The character set is enforced independently, later, in `errorURL`:

```text
input:       pl"ain\back<newline>tab<tab>end~unicode
description: unsupported code_challenge_method: pl'ainback tab end~ nicode
chars outside the RFC 6749 §4.1.2.1 set: []
```

`"` becomes `'`, `\` is dropped so it cannot escape the rewritten quote,
and anything below 0x20 or above 0x7E becomes a space. Checked
programmatically rather than by eye. The RFC sets no length limit, so
the 2048 cap is policy; the character set is conformance.

</details>

<details>
<summary><b>26. The registered callback query, retained except reserved
names</b></summary>

`plat479-reserved` registers a callback carrying all four reserved names
plus two ordinary ones, and DCR stores it unchanged:

```text
http://localhost:9876/callback?tenant=acme&code=FAKECODE&error=stale&error_description=oldmsg&state=oldstate&keep=yes
```

Success response, no `redirect_uri` sent:

```text
code  = coder_WXwBpvYR5u_...
keep  = yes
state = 516abeea9976119eb33ddc10f0ca04ed
tenant = acme
```

Failure response, same app:

```text
error = invalid_request
error_description = Invalid query params: code_challenge: must be 43 to 128 characters...
keep  = yes
state = 3a17bdd75dfcf740bda36124cd161fb7
tenant = acme
```

Stale registered values in either response: `FAKECODE` 0, `stale` 0,
`oldmsg` 0, `oldstate` 0.

Without the deletion step a registered `error=stale` would ride out on
the **success** response, and a client reading `error` before `code`,
the conventional order, would discard a valid authorization code.
`FAKECODE` is the mirror image on a failure response.

The cancel link obeys the same rule, being built by the same `withQuery`
path:

```text
http://localhost:9876/callback?error=access_denied&error_description=The+resource+owner...&keep=yes&state=e15b5f0f...&tenant=acme
```

RFC 6749 §3.1.2 requires the registered query be retained when adding
parameters, which is the `tenant` and `keep` half. It does not say what
to do when the registered query collides with the response parameters
§4.1.2 adds, so dropping the registered copies is the resolution that
keeps the client's read unambiguous.

</details>

<details>
<summary><b>27 and 28. Scope rejections, and declining
consent</b></summary>

`plat479-ci` carries the allowlist `coder:workspaces.access`.

```text
scope=template:update (outside)  -> error = invalid_scope
                                    'template:update': scope requests permissions beyond this app's allowed scopes
GET, same request                -> 302, 225 bytes, 0 Allow buttons, no consent page
scope=workspace:ssh (covered)    -> code issued, persisted scope workspace:ssh
GET, same request                -> 200, 5182 bytes, consent page naming the scope
```

`workspace:ssh` is granted although the allowlist names the composite
rather than that scope, which is the coverage-not-spelling rule from
#28045. This run only checks that the changes here left it delivering
the same answers.

The consent page for a narrow scope reads differently from the
unrestricted one: "to access your **admin** account with these
permissions?", the scope as `<li role="listitem">workspace:ssh`, and the
caution "These are technical permission names. Grant them only to an
application you trust."

The scope description shape differs from the parser's, coming from
`scopeFailureResponse` rather than the field join, which is the third
producer behind observation 1.

Declining consent, clicked in a real browser:

```text
error             = access_denied
error_description = The resource owner or authorization server denied the request
state             = a8bd538b365b61f54586892c73968b80
```

The page carries exactly one `href` and it is the cancel link. The
`state` matches, there is no `code`, and the code count for the app is
unchanged, the link being a plain `GET` to the client's callback that
never reaches `ProcessAuthorize`. The description is RFC 6749 §4.1.2.1's
own definition of `access_denied`, word for word.

That shared construction is what makes the `#nosec G203` annotation on
`CancelURI` sound: the URL is injected as a trusted `htmltemplate.URL`,
safe only because `newAuthorizeResponse` validated the registered scheme
before the response object could exist. Scenario 12 is the other half,
an app with a rejected scheme never reaching this page at all.

</details>

<details>
<summary><b>Where the consent page renders, across every GET
case</b></summary>

Only `GET` can render anything, and body size identifies which of four
renderers ran, so this is the table to check when a status code alone
looks right.

| Case | Status | Body bytes | Allow buttons | Rendered |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| well formed | 200 | 4928 | 1 | **consent page** |
| bad `code_challenge` | 302 | 263 | 0 | redirect stub |
| two bad fields | 302 | 319 | 0 | redirect stub |
| mismatched `redirect_uri` | 400 | 3814 | 0 | 400 error page |
| unparseable `redirect_uri` | 400 | 3846 | 0 | 400 error page |
| repeated `client_id` | 400 | 3846 | 0 | 400 error page |
| `client_id` in form body only | 400 | 77 | 0 | `httpmw` JSON, unstyled
|
| `{UPPERCASE}` `client_id` | 200 | 4940 | 1 | **consent page** |
| repeated `state` | 302 | 239 | 0 | redirect stub |
| corrupt callback, blocked scheme | 500 | 3346 | 0 | 500 error page |
| corrupt callback, unparseable | 500 | 3346 | 0 | 500 error page |
| `response_type=token` | 302 | 187 | 0 | redirect stub |
| `banana` / `code token` / `CODE` | 302 | 187 | 0 | redirect stub |
| empty `response_type` | 302 | 243 | 0 | redirect stub |
| `token`, no PKCE | 302 | 187 | 0 | redirect stub |
| `code`, no PKCE | 302 | 245 | 0 | redirect stub |
| unknown params, valid request | 200 | 4932 | 1 | **consent page** |
| `redirect_url` typo, valid request | 200 | 4932 | 1 | **consent page**
|
| `resource` malformed | 302 | 214 | 0 | redirect stub |
| `resource` valid absolute URI | 200 | 4932 | 1 | **consent page** |
| `resource=.../#` empty fragment | 200 | 4932 | 1 | **consent page**,
observation 7 |
| reserved params in registered callback | 200 | 4973 | 1 | **consent
page** |
| `scope` outside allowlist | 302 | 225 | 0 | redirect stub |
| `scope` covered by allowlist | 200 | 5182 | 1 | **consent page** |

The invariant: the page renders if and only if `extractAuthorizeParams`
returned no failure, so no input asks the owner to approve a request the
server has already refused. The `evil.example` rows are worth reading
carefully rather than alarming: RFC 6749 §3.1 requires a case variant
and a typo to be ignored, so from the server's view nothing was wrong
with either request, and both cancel links target the registered
callback.

About 4930 bytes is the consent page, about 3800 the 400 page, 3346 the
500 page, 77 the unstyled `httpmw` JSON, and low hundreds is Go's
redirect stub, whose length tracks the `Location` it embeds. Every
`unsupported_response_type` answer is exactly 187 bytes because they
share one description. Small variations within a renderer are expected:
the consent page moves 4928 to 4940 with a fresh CSRF token and the app
name.

As a regression signal, body size is more sensitive than the status
line. A change that rendered a page alongside a redirect would still
report 302, but the stub would come back at thousands of bytes rather
than hundreds.

</details>

<details>
<summary><b>Cleanup</b></summary>

```bash
for id in $(pg "SELECT id FROM oauth2_provider_apps WHERE name LIKE 'plat479%';"); do
  curl -s -X DELETE "$BASE_URL/api/v2/oauth2-provider/apps/$id" -H "$AUTH_HEADER" \
    -o /dev/null -w "$id -> %{http_code}\n"
done
pg "SELECT count(*) FROM oauth2_provider_apps WHERE name LIKE 'plat479%';"
./scripts/coder-dev.sh oauth2-provider dcr disable
```

All planted callback rows were restored before deletion, so no fixture
was left holding a value DCR would refuse.

</details>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Steven Masley <Emyrk@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-03 10:54:34 -07:00
e035967ef1 feat: mint access tokens with the negotiated scope (#28237)
**TL;DR**

First of PLAT-480, continuing the merged PLAT-479 stack. #28178 decided
what the scope is and #28179 reported it; this PR is the one that makes
it bind. Until now the scope negotiated at `/oauth2/authorize` was
recorded on the grant but never reached the token: every OAuth2 access
key was minted with `coder:all`, so a client that asked for
`coder:workspaces.access` still got full API access.

| PR | What it does |
|---|---|
| #28167 | `ScopesCover` compares an allowlist against a request by
permission coverage rather than by name. Merged. |
| #28178 | The authorize endpoint checks the request against the scope
catalog, grants it only if the app's filtered allowlist covers it, and
persists the result on the code. Merged. |
| #28179 | The consent page lists the negotiated permissions, and
`invalid_scope` reaches the client's own callback per RFC 6749 §4.1.2.1.
Merged. |
| **#28237 (this)** | The exchange mints the API key with the stored
scope, and the token response states what was granted. |
| #28740 | Re-checks the app allowlist at redemption, for a code whose
app was narrowed after the code was issued. |
| #28751 | Lets a refresh narrow the granted scope, which is the `scope`
request parameter this PR still ignores. |

- #28179 has merged, so this diff is against main and reviews on its
own.
- **This is the first PR in the stack where a token's authority actually
changes.** Everything before it recorded and reported. That is the blast
radius worth reviewing: a grant that negotiated a narrow scope now gets
a key that is genuinely narrower, and anything that was quietly relying
on `coder:all` will start seeing 403.
- Grants that predate the scope columns carry what migration 000569
backfilled, `coder:all`, so they refresh unrestricted and reach what
they reached before. Pinned by `BackfilledScopeRefreshesUnrestricted`,
seeded the way the migration leaves a row rather than exchanged.
- The actor that writes the key stays `rbac.ScopeAll`. Narrowing it to
the granted scope would deny `api_key:create` and fail the exchange. The
bound lives on `api_keys.scopes`, which dbauthz reads on every request,
not on the actor doing the insert.

**Where in the flow**

<details>
<summary>Diagram: where the stored scope turns into a bound on the
token</summary>

```mermaid
flowchart TD
    AZ["GET or POST /oauth2/authorize<br/>negotiates the scope and persists it on the code<br/>PR 28178, merged"]
    AZ --> TK["POST /oauth2/tokens"]

    TK --> GT{"grant_type"}
    GT -->|authorization_code| S1["scope read from codes.scope"]
    GT -->|refresh_token| S2["scope read from tokens.scope<br/>req.Scope is parsed and ignored, PR 28751"]

    S1 --> CV["scopeStringToAPIKeyScopes, this PR<br/>every name must be in the api_key_scope enum<br/>an empty list is an error, not coder:all"]
    S2 --> CV

    CV -->|"unknown name, or empty"| ERR["400 invalid_grant, this PR<br/>error_description names the offending value"]
    CV -->|mintable| GEN["apikey.Generate with Scopes, this PR<br/>was: no Scopes, so every key defaulted to coder:all"]

    GEN --> KEY["api_keys.scopes<br/>read by dbauthz on every later request:<br/>this is where the grant becomes a bound"]
    GEN --> ROW["the new tokens row carries the same scope,<br/>so the next refresh reads back the same grant"]

    KEY --> RESP["200 with scope in the token response, this PR<br/>RFC 6749 5.1, OAuth 2.1 1.4.1"]
    ROW --> RESP
```

</details>

- Token endpoint only, both grants. Authorize is untouched apart from
two comments that said the scope was not yet enforced.
- `scopeStringToAPIKeyScopes` turns the stored scope string into
`database.APIKeyScopes` for `apikey.Generate`. Names are checked there
rather than inside `apikey.Generate`, whose error would surface as a 500
rather than an OAuth2 error.
- An empty list is an error, not an unrestricted key. `apikey.Generate`
defaults an empty scope list to `coder:all`, so an empty stored scope
would silently widen the grant instead of failing it. The same reasoning
is why the `expandRBACScope` comment in `modelmethods.go` was stale:
that function already errored on an empty list while its comment still
promised `rbac.ScopeAll`.
- A stored scope outside the `api_key_scope` enum answers 400
`invalid_grant` rather than 500, with the offending name in
`error_description`. Not `invalid_scope`: RFC 6749 §5.2 and OAuth 2.1
§3.2.4 both scope that code to what the client requested, and this value
is server state the client cannot change by asking differently. The
grant is what is unusable, and re-authorizing is the only way out.
- Refresh copies the presented token's scope onto both the new API key
and the rotated refresh row. `req.Scope` is parsed but ignored; #28751
is where it starts being honoured.
- The swagger annotation moves from `oauth2.Token` to
`codersdk.OAuth2TokenResponse`, because `oauth2.Token` has no `scope`
field to document.
- `EveryCatalogNameMintable` pins the catalog against the
`api_key_scope` enum. The two are maintained separately, and a name
negotiable at authorization but unmintable at exchange would leave a
client holding a code it can never redeem.

**What it satisfies**

Checked against both RFC 6749 and the OAuth 2.1 draft
(draft-ietf-oauth-v2-1-15). The 2.1 draft moves the scope-reporting rule
from RFC 6749 §5.1 into §1.4.1 and grades it in §3.2.3, but the
requirement is the same one.

- RFC 6749 §5.1, OAuth 2.1 §1.4.1 — "If the issued access token scope is
different from the one requested by the client, the authorization server
MUST include the `scope` response parameter in the token response".
OAuth 2.1 §3.2.3 grades `scope` as "RECOMMENDED, if identical to the
scope requested by the client; otherwise, REQUIRED". Both grants set it
unconditionally, which covers both grades. Without it, a client whose
request was narrowed against the app's allowlist, or defaulted because
it requested nothing, first learns its bounds from an unexplained 403.
Pinned by `IssuedTokenBoundsTheAPI`, which requests no scope and asserts
the response names what it got.
- OAuth 2.1 §1.4.1 — "The authorization server MAY fully or partially
ignore the scope requested by the client, based on the authorization
server policy or the resource owner's instructions." This is what
licenses ignoring `scope` on a refresh, and the licence is conditional
on reporting the actual grant. Before this PR the exchange both ignored
the request and said nothing, which is the half that was not defensible.
- OAuth 2.1 §4.3.1, RFC 6749 §6 — the refresh `scope` parameter is
OPTIONAL and "if omitted is treated as equal to the scope originally
granted by the resource owner". Exactly what `refreshTokenGrant` does
with `dbToken.Scope`.
- OAuth 2.1 §4.3.3 — "If a new refresh token is issued, the refresh
token scope MUST be identical to that of the refresh token included by
the client in the request." Rotation copies `dbToken.Scope` onto the new
refresh row.
- OAuth 2.1 §3.2.3 — "If refresh tokens are issued, those refresh tokens
MUST be bound to the scope and resource servers as consented by the
resource owner. This is to prevent privilege escalation by the
legitimate client". The refresh row has carried the negotiated scope
since #28178; this PR is what makes the access token minted from it
carry the same bound. Pinned by `RefreshDoesNotWidenTheScope`.
- OAuth 2.1 §1.4.1 — a client that omits `scope` must be met with "a
pre-defined default value or fail the request indicating an invalid
scope", and the server "SHOULD document its scope requirements and
default value". #28178 chose the default; `scopes_supported` and the
integration guide document it. Unchanged here, but it is why
`IssuedTokenBoundsTheAPI` can request nothing and still receive a
bounded token.
- Not yet: OAuth 2.1 §4.3.1 also says "The requested scope MUST NOT
include any scope not originally granted by the resource owner." A
refresh naming a narrower scope is ignored rather than honoured, and one
naming a wider scope is ignored rather than rejected with
`invalid_scope` (§3.2.4, "exceeds the scope granted by the resource
owner"). Neither case widens a token, so there is no escalation, and
§1.4.1's MAY plus the `scope` response parameter keep the client
correctly informed in the meantime. #28751 is where narrowing lands.
Documented under Limitations until then.

---

First of three, [PLAT-480](https://linear.app/codercom/issue/PLAT-480).
Depends on #28179, which has merged, so this reviews against main.

#28178 decided the scope and #28179 reported it. This PR is the one that
makes a token feel it.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Steven Masley <Emyrk@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-02 13:14:44 -07:00
54e21f29a1 fix: deliver four more authorize errors to the client (#28450)
**TL;DR**

Fourth of the stack, split out of #28045. #28179 sent `invalid_scope` to
the client's own callback; this PR sends the rest of the errors raised
after the callback has been verified, behind one URL builder they all
now share.

| PR | What it does |
|---|---|
| #28007 | Schema: `codes.scope` and `tokens.scope`, so a negotiated
scope has somewhere to live. |
| #28167 | `ScopesCover` compares an allowlist against a request by
permission coverage rather than by name. |
| #28178 | The authorize endpoint negotiates the scope against the app's
allowlist and persists it on the code. |
| #28179 | The consent page lists the negotiated permissions, and
`invalid_scope` reaches the client's callback per RFC 6749 §4.1.2.1. |
| **#28450 (this)** | The same delivery for every other error raised
once the callback is trusted. |

- #28179 has merged, so this diff is against main and reviews on its
own.
- Nothing about what a token can do changes here. This is delivery, not
enforcement.

**Contract change**

Four failures now arrive at the app's registered callback instead of
terminating on Coder, so an integrator with error handling on its
callback starts seeing codes it never received.

| Verb | Condition | Error code | Was |
|------|-----------|------------|-----|
| GET | `response_type != code` | `unsupported_response_type` | static
"Unsupported Response Type" page, 400 |
| POST | `response_type != code` | `unsupported_response_type` |
`WriteOAuth2Error`, 400 |
| POST | `code_challenge_method=plain` | `invalid_request` |
`WriteOAuth2Error`, 400 |
| GET | `code_challenge_method=plain` | `invalid_request` | consent
page, 200, refused after Allow |

The GET static error page loses its only caller. The last row is what
review found: the method was checked on POST only, so the user approved
a request that could never succeed.

**Where in the OAuth Flow**

<details>
<summary>Diagram: where these errors are raised, and what licenses the
redirect</summary>

```mermaid
flowchart TD
    EX["GET or POST /oauth2/authorize<br/>extractAuthorizeParams exact-matches redirect_uri<br/>against the app's registered callback"]

    EX -->|"no match, rejected scheme, unparsable,<br/>other param failures"| CODER["Answers on Coder<br/>RFC 6749 3.1.2.4: MUST NOT redirect"]
    EX -->|"matched: a validatedCallbackURL,<br/>which is what licenses a redirect"| RT{"response_type == code?"}

    RT -->|no| E1["unsupported_response_type (this PR)"]
    RT -->|yes| PK{"code_challenge_method S256 or omitted?"}
    PK -->|no| E2["invalid_request (this PR, and newly checked on GET)"]
    PK -->|yes| SC{"scope negotiable?"}
    SC -->|no| E3["invalid_scope (previous PR)"]
    SC -->|yes| OK["GET: consent page, cancel link is access_denied<br/>POST: authorization code"]

    E1 --> OUT
    E2 --> OUT
    E3 --> OUT
    OK --> OUT["One builder produces every URL the flow emits:<br/>error redirect, cancel link, success code"]
```

</details>

- Authorize endpoint only, both verbs. The token exchange, refresh, and
revocation are untouched.
- Every redirect is licensed by a `validatedCallbackURL`, a type
produced only where `extractAuthorizeParams` exact-matches the URI
against the app's registration. A guard, not a proof: no other package
can fabricate one, this one still can.
- One builder now produces every response URL, including the consent
page's cancel link, which rolled its own and edited the shared URL in
place rather than copying it.
- Each rejection logs. The error leaves in a `Location` header, which
`loggermw` does not record, so a failed authorization used to look
exactly like a successful one.

**Three smaller behavior changes**

- A callback registered with `code`, `error`, `error_description`, or
`state` in its own query no longer receives that value back. A
registered `error=` rode out on the success redirect, where a client
that reads `error` first discards a valid code. The rest of the
registered query is kept, as §3.1.2 requires.
- `error_description` is confined to the NQSCHAR set Appendix A permits.
Descriptions name the offending value with `%q`, so every
`invalid_scope` Coder emits today carries excluded characters. Quotes
now render as apostrophes.
- An unparsable `redirect_uri` returns 400 instead of 500. It reached a
nil dereference in `httpapi.RedirectURL`, which `POST /oauth2/tokens`
also uses, and that endpoint takes no API key.

**What it satisfies**

- RFC 6749 §4.1.2.1 — on a failure that is not a bad redirection URI,
the server informs the client through the redirection URI. That is the
whole PR.
- RFC 6749 §3.1.2.4 and §4.1.2.1 — a missing, invalid, or mismatching
redirection URI "MUST NOT" be redirected to. A mismatched URI, and a
registered URI with a rejected scheme, still answer on Coder. Pinned by
`MismatchedRedirectURINotRedirected` and
`DangerousCallbackSchemeNotRedirected`.
- RFC 6749 Appendix A — `error_description` is NQSCHAR, and the rule is
on the decoded value, so percent-encoding on the wire does not satisfy
it.
- RFC 6749 §4.1.2 and §3.1.2 — the four reserved response parameters are
dropped from the registered query; everything else in it is retained.
- Not yet: the remaining parameter failures do have a trusted callback
in hand, but the parser reports one verdict for every field at once, so
the caller cannot say which field failed. A follow-up classifies them.
The two `server_error` sites also stay put: sending an internal fault
outbound with a Coder-written description wants its own review.

**Docs and Swagger.** `docs/admin/integrations/oauth2-provider.md` gains
a Common Issues entry per newly redirected code, and the implicit-grant
limitation now says where the error arrives. Both authorize verbs
document the 302, the GET side for the first time.

---

Split out of #28045
([PLAT-479](https://linear.app/codercom/issue/PLAT-479)). Fourth of the
stack. #28179 has merged, so this reviews against main.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Steven Masley <Emyrk@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-02 12:43:32 -07:00
Jeremy RuppelandCoder Agents 8b8c80614d feat: expose template builder agents and per-module agent (#28905)
Part of [DEVEX-556](https://linear.app/codercom/issue/DEVEX-556). Builds
on the base agent metadata added in #28794.

## Summary

Surfaces the backend multi-agent support through the SDK and HTTP API:
the bases endpoint returns each base's agents, and
compose/create-template accept a per-module `agent_name`.

## What changed

- `codersdk/templatebuilder.go`: added `TemplateBuilderBaseAgent`,
`TemplateBuilderBase.Agents`, and
`TemplateBuilderComposeModule.AgentName` (`agent_name,omitempty`).
- `coderd/templatebuilder_handler.go`: added `baseAgentsToSDK`; the
bases endpoint returns agents, and the compose and create-template
endpoints forward `AgentName`.
- `make gen` regenerated `site/src/api/typesGenerated.ts`,
`coderd/apidoc/docs.go`, `coderd/apidoc/swagger.json`,
`docs/reference/api/schemas.md`, and
`docs/reference/api/templatebuilder.md`.
- `wizardState.test.ts`: added `agents: []` to the base fixture now that
the field is required on the generated type.

## Scope

SDK/API plumbing only. `ComposeModule.AgentName` now has a producer (the
handlers) but no caller sets it yet — the wizard UI (follow-up) is what
will populate it. No DB change, so `enterprise/audit/table.go` is
unaffected.

## Testing

- Bases endpoint asserts each base returns agents with exactly one
default (and the `dev`/`main` names).
- Per-module `agent_name` round-trip and unknown-agent (400) compose
tests.
- `make gen` (idempotent), `make fmt` (no changes), `golangci-lint
./coderd/... ./codersdk/...`, the Go template-builder tests, frontend
`tsc` + `biome check`, and docs markdownlint all pass.

<details>
<summary>Design note</summary>

`display_name` is intentionally returned as `""` for now: every base is
single-agent, so no base authors a per-agent label. The field exists for
multi-agent bases where the wizard radio needs a human-readable name;
consumers fall back to the agent `name` when it is empty.

</details>

---
🤖 Generated by Coder Agents on behalf of @jeremyruppel.

Co-authored-by: Coder Agents <agents@coder.com>
2026-09-02 12:51:33 -04:00
dylanhuff-at-coder 4875ae218a feat: enforce user secret file policy (#28518)
Adds the deployment option `--user-secrets-disable-file-path` /
`CODER_USER_SECRETS_DISABLE_FILE_PATH` / `userSecretsDisableFilePath`
(default `false`). When it is set, the create and batch-create
user-secret endpoints reject requests with a non-empty file path, and
PATCH validates the post-update state under a `SELECT ... FOR UPDATE`
row lock, rejecting a new or changed file path as well as enabled states
that would have no effective delivery target. Legacy stored paths are
preserved, so users can still edit, disable, clear the path, or migrate
the secret to env delivery.

This is PR 1 of a 4-PR stack; follow-ups cover manifest filtering, the
dashboard, and CLI/docs.

Refs #27488

Reviewed and updated by Coder Agents on behalf of @dylanhuff-at-coder.
2026-09-02 09:21:36 -07:00
Matt VollmerandNick Vigilante cb6c98147f docs: add Agent Relay docs (#28786)
## What this adds

Two new docs pages for **Agent Relay**, a feature that connects a
supported cloud-hosted AI agent provider's hosted sessions to
self-hosted Coder workspaces. The provider's orchestration and AI
inference stay cloud-hosted; a worker process inside the workspace
executes the agent's tool calls.

- `docs/ai-coder/agent-relay/index.md` — top-level overview: what it is,
what it does, what it is and isn't, business value, current state, and
supported providers.
- `docs/ai-coder/agent-relay/cursor.md` — the Cursor-specific child
page, naming Cursor Cloud Agents and Cursor's own bring-your-own-machine
(BYOM) terminology.

Both pages are tagged `"state": ["early access"]` in the manifest and
state the feature is in **closed preview with select customers**,
pointing readers to their Coder account team or `sales@coder.com` for
access.

## Also included

- `docs/user-guides/workspace-management.md`: broadened the workspace
definition to include coding agents alongside developers.
- `docs/reference/glossary.md`: added an Agent Relay entry (alphabetized
between Agent Firewall and AI Gateway) and added it to the existing
"agent" term-disambiguation callout, since it's easy to conflate with
Coder Agents.

## Scope note for reviewers

`Agent Relay` itself (the underlying service, config, and worker
implementation) lives in a separate, non-public repository. I don't have
access to that source from this environment, so I deliberately kept both
pages high-level and didn't invent specifics like CLI flags, config file
structure, or exact command syntax. Before this goes further, someone
with access to that repo should verify the mechanics described here
(workspace-per-session lifecycle, provider pool mapping, worker
connection model) against the real implementation, and a follow-up PR
should add a step-by-step "Getting started" section once the feature
moves past closed preview to something self-serve.

## Validation

- `docs/manifest.json` is valid JSON.
- `markdownlint-cli2`: 0 issues across all changed/added Markdown files.
- `vale --no-exit`: 0 errors on every changed/added file (a handful of
pre-existing gerund-heading warnings on `workspace-management.md` and
`glossary.md` predate this branch and aren't touched here).
- `scripts/check_emdash.sh`: passes.
- Confirmed every relative link target in the new pages resolves to a
real file in the repo.

<details>
<summary>Decision log</summary>

- Dropped an "air-gap capable" claim and a "Coder AI Gateway" claim that
would have been present in an earlier draft: the integration requires
the in-workspace worker to hold an outbound connection to the cloud
provider for inference/orchestration, so true air-gapping isn't
possible, and Coder's AI Gateway isn't in the inference path for this
feature.
- Named the specific Cursor product as **Cursor Cloud Agents** and
linked Cursor's own "bring-your-own-machine (BYOM)" terminology
(`cursor.com/docs/cloud-agent/bring-your-own-machine`) rather than
inventing Coder-specific naming for the same concept.
- Kept "workspace" lowercase per the existing style guide (`workspace`
is the documented generic-concept casing, distinct from named features
like "Workspace Proxy"), while still linking the term to the Workspace
Management page.
- Used "closed preview with select customers" rather than "Preview," and
removed a blanket "not feature-complete or stable" disclaimer sentence
per explicit direction.

</details>

---

🤖 This PR was created by Coder Agents on behalf of @mattvollmer.

---------

Co-authored-by: Nick Vigilante <nickvigilante@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-02 09:19:49 -04:00
Bartek Gatz 55340de360 feat: add deployment setting to disable the Codernauts game (#27662)
Adds a `codernauts_enabled` runtime setting (default: enabled) that
controls whether the Codernauts game link appears in the user dropdown
menu. A toggle at the bottom of the Deployment > Appearance page
controls it, and the value persists in `site_configs`, so it survives
restarts and upgrades without any CLI flags or environment variables.

The setting works on all licenses: `GET /api/v2/appearance` reports it
from both the enterprise and the default (AGPL) appearance fetchers, and
`PUT /api/v2/appearance` persists it gated only by the deployment-config
RBAC permission, not by an entitlement. On the Appearance page the
toggle renders outside the Premium paywall introduced in #27948; the
other appearance fields keep their existing licensing behavior.

Note: a pure AGPL-only build of coderd does not register the
`/api/v2/appearance` routes at all, so the toggle cannot be saved there.
The standard `coder server` binary is unaffected regardless of license
state.

<details>
<summary>Implementation notes</summary>

- `coderd/database/queries/siteconfig.sql`: new `GetCodernautsEnabled` /
`UpsertCodernautsEnabled` queries backed by a `codernauts_enabled` key
in `site_configs`; defaults to `true` when unset (no migration needed).
- `coderd/database/dbauthz`: read has no authz checks (matching other
appearance reads); write requires `ResourceDeploymentConfig` update.
Coverage added to `dbauthz_test.go`.
- `codersdk`: `codernauts_enabled` added to `AppearanceConfig` and
`UpdateAppearanceConfig`.
- `coderd/appearance`: the default fetcher takes a `database.Store` and
reads the setting from the database so unlicensed deployments serve it
too.
- `enterprise/coderd/appearance.go`: fetches the value in `Fetch` and
persists it in `putAppearance`.
- Frontend: "Codernauts game" toggle section on Deployment > Appearance
saving immediately via the existing appearance mutation;
`codernauts_enabled` threaded from `useDashboard().appearance` through
Navbar to `UserDropdownContent`, which renders the menu item only when
enabled. Storybook stories with `play` functions cover toggling
(entitled and not) and the dropdown hiding the link when disabled.

</details>

---

🤖 This PR was generated by Coder Agents on behalf of @bartekgatzcoder.
2026-09-02 11:29:35 +02:00
Bobby Ho 20a41c067e feat: reject secret creation and fix reporting for public clients (#28097)
**TL;DR**

On top of #28047, closing the last two gaps in the stack split out of
#27873. A public client can now register (#28046) and exchange a code
(#28047), but the admin secrets API will still issue it a secret that
authenticates nothing, and the registration responses still report an
auth method the token endpoint will not accept.

| PR | What it does |
|---|---|
| #27712 | Schema: `app_secret_id` becomes nullable and tokens gain an
always-populated `app_id`, so ownership checks work without a secret
row. |
| #28041 | Accepts bare custom-scheme redirect URIs (`vscode://`,
`cursor://`) that native apps actually register. |
| #28043 | Derives and stores `client_type` (public vs confidential)
from the requested `token_endpoint_auth_method`, and pins it across
updates. |
| #28046 | Registration issues no secret for a public client and returns
no `client_secret`. |
| #28047 | The token endpoint accepts the exchange without a
`client_secret`. Discovery advertises `none`. |
| **#28097 (this)** | The admin secrets API refuses to create a secret
for a public client, and registration, read, and update report the auth
method the token endpoint actually enforces. |

A public client can only come into existence through dynamic client
registration, which is off by default, so neither guard is reachable
until DCR is enabled.

**Where in the flow**

- `POST /oauth2-provider/apps/{app}/secrets`, the admin secrets API. The
rest of the secret lifecycle is untouched: `GET` and `DELETE` are
unchanged, and a confidential app behaves exactly as before.
- The three RFC 7591 and 7592 responses that carry
`token_endpoint_auth_method`: registration (`POST`), read (`GET`), and
update (`PUT`). Only what is reported changes; the stored column is left
as the client sent it.
- Authorize, token exchange, refresh, and revocation are untouched.

**What it satisfies**

- RFC 7591 §2: `none` means the client is public and "does not have a
client secret", so the secrets API should not create one for it.
- RFC 7591 §3.2.1: the server MUST return all registered metadata and
MAY replace a requested value with a suitable one. Reporting the
enforced method in place of a stored one that contradicts `client_type`
is that substitution.
- RFC 7592 §2.2: an update MUST include all metadata as returned by a
previous registration, read, or update. Because clients echo back what
Coder reports, reporting the enforced method is what lets a legacy row
heal on the client's next `PUT`.
- RFC 7591 §2 default: an app with no stored method reports
`client_secret_basic`, which is both the RFC default and what
`ApplyDefaults` substitutes on update.
- OAuth 2.1 §3.2.1: the token endpoint enforces on `client_type`, so a
reported method that disagrees with it tells a client to authenticate in
a way the server will reject.

---

- `CreateAppSecret` returns 400 for a public client before generating
anything. The secret would authenticate nothing, since the token
endpoint no longer checks one for a public client. Deleting it would be
worse: `oauth2_provider_app_tokens.app_secret_id` is `ON DELETE
CASCADE`, so removing a confidential app's secret takes its tokens with
it, but a public client's tokens carry a NULL `app_secret_id` (#27712)
and survive. An admin who deleted the secret would think they had cut
off the client when they had not.
- `reportedAuthMethod()` replaces the raw stored value in all three
registration responses. It returns the stored method when it agrees with
`client_type`, `none` for a public app, and `client_secret_basic`
otherwise.
- The rows that can disagree are clients registered before #28043
derived the type from the method: the method was stored as sent while
the type was always `confidential`. Such a client holds a secret its
exchange still requires, while `GET` reported `none` and told it to drop
that secret.
- The stored column is deliberately not rewritten, so the response can
still differ from the row. That divergence is what a read-modify-write
client resolves on its next update, and the test asserts the row keeps
what the client sent.
- Coverage: the secrets guard asserts the 400 and that no partial secret
row was left behind. A table test walks `GET` then `PUT` over six
stored-method and client-type pairs: the legacy mismatch in both resend
shapes, the reverse mismatch that registration cannot produce but the
function still handles, an empty stored method, and the single pair that
already agrees and must be reported as stored.
- Docs: the client type is fixed at registration and a type-changing
update is rejected with `invalid_client_metadata` (behavior from #28043
that was never written down), plus what a legacy `none` client now sees.

Refs
https://linear.app/codercom/issue/ENG-3029/oauth2-support-public-client



## Manual Tests

Verified by hand against a local dev deployment
(`v2.36.3-devel+c85e4621ef`, dev Postgres), in addition to the automated
suite.

Both guards are reachable only through dynamic client registration,
which was confirmed off by default on this deployment and enabled for
the run. Two of the scenarios need a row where `client_type` and
`token_endpoint_auth_method` disagree, which registration cannot produce
since #28043 derives one from the other, so those rows were seeded by
updating the method column directly on a purpose-built client.

| # | Scenario | Result |
|---|----------|--------|
| 1 | Secrets API refuses a public client, with the guard's own message
| Pass |
| 2 | No partial secret row is left behind by the rejection | Pass |
| 3 | A confidential app's secret create, list, and delete are unchanged
| Pass |
| 4 | Admin-created apps are always confidential, so the guard is
unreachable there | Pass |
| 5 | When stored method and client type agree, the stored value is
reported unchanged | Pass |
| 6 | A legacy confidential row storing `none` reports
`client_secret_basic` | Pass |
| 7 | The reported method is the one the token endpoint enforces, in
both directions | Pass |
| 8 | An update resending the stored value is accepted and leaves the
row alone | Pass |
| 9 | An update resending the reported value heals the row | Pass |
| 10 | The reverse mismatch, a public row storing a secret method,
reports `none` | Pass |
| 11 | An empty or unrecognized stored method falls back to
`client_secret_basic` | Pass |
| 12 | Type-changing updates are rejected both ways,
`client_secret_basic` to `client_secret_post` is allowed | Pass |
| 13 | Regression sweep of the merged stack, discovery through
revocation | Pass |
| 14 | Every claim in the new docs paragraphs matches observed behavior
| Pass |

No correctness defects found. Commands and captured output for each
scenario below.

**Two notes for anyone re-running this.**

The previous runbook for this stack asserts the opposite of scenario 12:
it flips a confidential client to public with a `PUT` and records `200`.
That was correct before #28043 pinned the client type. The `400` here is
the fix, not a regression.

Generate the PKCE verifier with enough entropy that stripping `=+/`
still leaves 43 characters. The `openssl rand -base64 32 | tr -d "=+/" |
cut -c -43` recipe yields 38 to 43, so most runs are rejected by the
token endpoint under RFC 7636 section 4.1 with an error that looks
unrelated. Same trap noted in #28045.

<details>
<summary>Shell helpers used throughout</summary>

```bash
export BASE_URL=http://localhost:3000
export AUTH_HEADER="Coder-Session-Token: $(cat ./.coderv2/session)"
export PGURL="postgres://coder@localhost:$(cat ./.coderv2/postgres/port)/coder?sslmode=disable&password=$(cat ./.coderv2/postgres/password)"

# Enable DCR; both guards are unreachable without it.
curl -s -X PUT "$BASE_URL/api/v2/oauth2-provider/settings" -H "$AUTH_HEADER" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"dynamic_client_registration_enabled": true}'

# Print "HTTP <code>" then the body.
show() {
  local out; out=$(curl -s -w '\n%{http_code}' "$@")
  echo "HTTP $(printf '%s\n' "$out" | tail -n1)"
  printf '%s\n' "$out" | sed '$d' | jq . 2>/dev/null || printf '%s\n' "$out" | sed '$d'
}

# $1=name, $2=auth method ("" to omit the field).
register() {
  local body
  if [ -z "$2" ]; then
    body=$(jq -nc --arg n "$1" '{client_name:$n,redirect_uris:["http://localhost:9876/callback"]}')
  else
    body=$(jq -nc --arg n "$1" --arg m "$2" '{client_name:$n,redirect_uris:["http://localhost:9876/callback"],token_endpoint_auth_method:$m}')
  fi
  curl -s -X POST "$BASE_URL/oauth2/register" -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d "$body"
}

# The stored row, as opposed to what the API reports.
stored() {
  psql "$PGURL" -At -c "select client_type || ' | ' || coalesce(token_endpoint_auth_method,'<NULL>')
    from oauth2_provider_apps where id = '$1';"
}

# 43 characters from the unreserved set, always. See the note above.
gen_verifier() { openssl rand -base64 96 | tr -d "=+/\n" | cut -c -43; }
challenge_for() { printf '%s' "$1" | openssl dgst -sha256 -binary | base64 | tr -d "=" | tr '+/' '-_'; }

# Full PKCE authorize plus exchange. $1=client_id, $2=client_secret ("" for none).
exchange() {
  local verifier challenge redirect code args
  verifier=$(gen_verifier); challenge=$(challenge_for "$verifier")
  redirect=$(curl -s -X POST \
    "$BASE_URL/oauth2/authorize?client_id=$1&response_type=code&redirect_uri=http://localhost:9876/callback&state=$(openssl rand -hex 16)&code_challenge=$challenge&code_challenge_method=S256" \
    -H "$AUTH_HEADER" -w '\n%{redirect_url}' -o /dev/null)
  code=$(printf '%s' "$redirect" | grep -oE 'code=[^&]+' | sed 's/code=//')
  args=(-d "grant_type=authorization_code" -d "code=$code" -d "client_id=$1"
        -d "redirect_uri=http://localhost:9876/callback" -d "code_verifier=$verifier")
  [ -n "$2" ] && args+=(-d "client_secret=$2")
  curl -s -X POST "$BASE_URL/oauth2/tokens" -H "Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded" "${args[@]}"
}
```

</details>

<details>
<summary>1. Secrets API refuses a public client</summary>

A bare non-`201` would also be produced by a request that failed on
authentication, routing, or a malformed UUID before reaching the guard,
so the status and the message are both asserted.

```bash
PUB=$(register manual-28097-public none)
PUB_ID=$(echo "$PUB" | jq -r '.client_id')
stored "$PUB_ID"
show -X POST "$BASE_URL/api/v2/oauth2-provider/apps/$PUB_ID/secrets" -H "$AUTH_HEADER"
```

```text
public | none
HTTP 400
{
  "message": "Cannot create a client secret for a public OAuth2 app.",
  "detail": "Public clients authenticate with PKCE and have no client secret. The client type is fixed at registration, so register a new confidential client instead."
}
```

The message is the guard's own, so execution reached `CreateAppSecret`
and returned at the `IsPublic()` check. The detail points at registering
a new confidential client, which scenario 12 confirms is the only
remedy.

</details>

<details>
<summary>2. No partial secret row is left behind</summary>

The guard returns before `GenerateSecret()`, so nothing should exist at
either layer. The count was already `0` at registration, and a
confidential app is queried the same way as a control, so `0` is not
merely what this query always returns.

```bash
curl -s "$BASE_URL/api/v2/oauth2-provider/apps/$PUB_ID/secrets" -H "$AUTH_HEADER" | jq -c .
psql "$PGURL" -At -c "select count(*) from oauth2_provider_app_secrets where app_id = '$PUB_ID';"
psql "$PGURL" -At -c "select count(*) from oauth2_provider_app_secrets where app_id = '$CONF_ID';"
```

```text
[]
0
1
```

</details>

<details>
<summary>3. A confidential app's secret lifecycle is unchanged</summary>

```bash
CONF=$(register manual-28097-confidential "")
CONF_ID=$(echo "$CONF" | jq -r '.client_id')
show -X POST "$BASE_URL/api/v2/oauth2-provider/apps/$CONF_ID/secrets" -H "$AUTH_HEADER"
curl -s "$BASE_URL/api/v2/oauth2-provider/apps/$CONF_ID/secrets" -H "$AUTH_HEADER" | jq -c '[.[].id]'
curl -s -X DELETE "$BASE_URL/api/v2/oauth2-provider/apps/$CONF_ID/secrets/$SECRET_ID" \
  -H "$AUTH_HEADER" -o /dev/null -w "delete: HTTP %{http_code}\n"
```

```text
HTTP 201
{
  "id": "da7a1029-47c4-435e-988a-557ffa4aeacf",
  "client_secret_full": "coder_POUtoElODM_<redacted>"
}
["b2fc55b6-...","da7a1029-...","24f8f8c2-..."]
delete: HTTP 204
["b2fc55b6-...","da7a1029-..."]
```

Create, list, and delete all behave as before. The guard keys on
`client_type` and nothing else on this path changed.

Unrelated observation, not a finding against this PR: the listing
returns two different `client_secret_truncated` formats. Secrets issued
at registration are asterisk-padded (`***...TzqEOt`, from
`createDisplaySecret`), while secrets issued through the admin API show
the bare last six characters (`Rixs60`). Both write the same column and
surface through the same field. Cosmetic and pre-existing, but a UI
listing both kinds together would render them inconsistently.

</details>

<details>
<summary>4. Admin-created apps are always confidential</summary>

`postOAuth2ProviderApp` hardcodes the client type, so the guard is
unreachable through the admin create path.

```bash
ADMIN_APP=$(curl -s -X POST "$BASE_URL/api/v2/oauth2-provider/apps" -H "$AUTH_HEADER" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"name":"manual-28097-admin","callback_url":"http://localhost:9876/callback"}')
ADMIN_ID=$(echo "$ADMIN_APP" | jq -r '.id')
stored "$ADMIN_ID"
show -X POST "$BASE_URL/api/v2/oauth2-provider/apps/$ADMIN_ID/secrets" -H "$AUTH_HEADER"
```

```text
confidential | client_secret_post
HTTP 201
{
  "id": "a77ab276-ea74-4711-ba8b-955a8cb97951",
  "client_secret_full": "coder_eGlt04LhYg_<redacted>"
}
```

Together with scenario 1 this brackets the guard: it fires for a
dynamically registered public client and for nothing else. Note the
admin API stores `client_secret_post`, not the RFC 7591 section 2
default, so every admin-created app is an agreement case for scenario 5.
Such apps carry no registration access token, so they cannot reach the
RFC 7592 endpoints where the reporting change applies at all.

</details>

<details>
<summary>5. Agreement cases report the stored value unchanged</summary>

The `client_secret_post` case is the one that matters. An implementation
that substituted the type default on every call would still pass the
public case, since `none` is the public default, but would rewrite this
client to `client_secret_basic` and tell it to send its secret in the
wrong place.

```bash
curl -s "$BASE_URL/oauth2/clients/$PUB_ID" -H "Authorization: Bearer $PUB_RAT" \
  | jq -c '{reported: .token_endpoint_auth_method}'

POST_REG=$(register manual-28097-post client_secret_post)
POST_ID=$(echo "$POST_REG" | jq -r '.client_id')
echo "$POST_REG" | jq -c '{reported_on_register: .token_endpoint_auth_method}'
curl -s "$BASE_URL/oauth2/clients/$POST_ID" -H "Authorization: Bearer $POST_RAT" \
  | jq -c '.token_endpoint_auth_method'
stored "$POST_ID"
```

```text
{"reported":"none"}
{"reported_on_register":"client_secret_post"}
"client_secret_post"
confidential | client_secret_post
```

Registration and read both report the stored value. The update site is
covered by scenarios 8 and 9.

</details>

<details>
<summary>6. A legacy confidential row storing `none` reports
`client_secret_basic`</summary>

Seeded from a real confidential client so it genuinely holds the secret
its exchange requires, with only the method column rewritten. This is
the pre-#28043 shape and cannot be produced through the API any more.

```bash
LEGACY=$(register manual-28097-legacy "")
LEGACY_ID=$(echo "$LEGACY" | jq -r '.client_id')
LEGACY_SECRET=$(echo "$LEGACY" | jq -r '.client_secret')
stored "$LEGACY_ID"

psql "$PGURL" -c "update oauth2_provider_apps set token_endpoint_auth_method = 'none'
  where id = '$LEGACY_ID';"
stored "$LEGACY_ID"
psql "$PGURL" -At -c "select count(*) from oauth2_provider_app_secrets where app_id = '$LEGACY_ID';"

curl -s "$BASE_URL/oauth2/clients/$LEGACY_ID" -H "Authorization: Bearer $LEGACY_RAT" \
  | jq -c '{reported: .token_endpoint_auth_method}'
stored "$LEGACY_ID"
```

```text
confidential | client_secret_basic
UPDATE 1
confidential | none
1
{"reported":"client_secret_basic"}
confidential | none
```

The response substitutes and the row is deliberately not rewritten. A
read has no side effects.

</details>

<details>
<summary>7. The reported method is the one actually enforced</summary>

The token endpoint enforces on `client_type`, which is still
confidential, so the secret is required regardless of what the method
column says.

```bash
exchange "$LEGACY_ID" "$LEGACY_SECRET" | jq -c '{has_access: has("access_token"), error, error_description}'
exchange "$LEGACY_ID" ""               | jq -c '{has_access: has("access_token"), error, error_description}'
```

```text
{"has_access":true,"error":null,"error_description":null}
{"has_access":false,"error":"invalid_request","error_description":"Missing required parameter: client_secret"}
```

The second line is the pre-fix breakage reproduced. A client that read
`"token_endpoint_auth_method": "none"` from `GET` and dropped its secret
accordingly, which is what RFC 7592 tells it to do, would have hit
exactly this on its next exchange. The old response was not internally
inconsistent, it was actionable and wrong.

Scenario 10 shows the same property in the opposite direction.

</details>

<details>
<summary>8. An update resending the stored value is accepted and changes
nothing</summary>

```bash
show -X PUT "$BASE_URL/oauth2/clients/$LEGACY_ID" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $LEGACY_RAT" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"client_name":"manual-28097-legacy","redirect_uris":["http://localhost:9876/callback"],"token_endpoint_auth_method":"none"}'
stored "$LEGACY_ID"
```

```text
HTTP 200
  "token_endpoint_auth_method": "client_secret_basic",
confidential | none
```

Three things at once. The update is accepted, which is why the
type-change guard requires the auth method to actually change: the
requested `none` implies a public client while the row is confidential,
so a guard keyed on the type mismatch alone would reject this and lock a
legacy client out of managing its own registration. The `PUT` reports
the same substituted value as the `GET`, covering the third call site.
The row keeps what the client sent, so the divergence persists until
scenario 9.

</details>

<details>
<summary>9. An update resending the reported value heals the
row</summary>

```bash
show -X PUT "$BASE_URL/oauth2/clients/$LEGACY_ID" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $LEGACY_RAT" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"client_name":"manual-28097-legacy","redirect_uris":["http://localhost:9876/callback"],"token_endpoint_auth_method":"client_secret_basic"}'
stored "$LEGACY_ID"
curl -s "$BASE_URL/oauth2/clients/$LEGACY_ID" -H "Authorization: Bearer $LEGACY_RAT" \
  | jq -c '{reported: .token_endpoint_auth_method}'
exchange "$LEGACY_ID" "$LEGACY_SECRET" | jq -c '{has_access: has("access_token")}'
```

```text
HTTP 200
  "token_endpoint_auth_method": "client_secret_basic",
confidential | client_secret_basic
{"reported":"client_secret_basic"}
{"has_access":true}
```

The row healed through an ordinary read-modify-write cycle, with no
migration, backfill, or admin action. That works only because scenario 8
keeps the door open and this response gives the client a correct value
to echo back; remove either and the row stays inconsistent indefinitely.

</details>

<details>
<summary>10. The reverse mismatch reports `none`</summary>

Registration cannot produce this direction either, but
`reportedAuthMethod` branches on the general disagreement rather than
the one shape known to exist, so it is covered.

```bash
REVERSE=$(register manual-28097-reverse none)
REVERSE_ID=$(echo "$REVERSE" | jq -r '.client_id')
psql "$PGURL" -c "update oauth2_provider_apps set token_endpoint_auth_method = 'client_secret_basic'
  where id = '$REVERSE_ID';"
stored "$REVERSE_ID"
curl -s "$BASE_URL/oauth2/clients/$REVERSE_ID" -H "Authorization: Bearer $REVERSE_RAT" \
  | jq -c '{reported: .token_endpoint_auth_method}'
exchange "$REVERSE_ID" "" | jq -c '{has_access: has("access_token"), error}'
```

```text
public | client_secret_basic
{"reported":"none"}
{"has_access":true,"error":null}
```

This client has no secret row at all and the token endpoint does not ask
for one, so `none` is what the response should say. Reporting the stored
`client_secret_basic` would have instructed it to send a secret that
does not exist.

Both resend shapes behave symmetrically with scenarios 8 and 9:

```text
resend stored (client_secret_basic) -> reported "none", row unchanged
resend reported (none)              -> reported "none", row now public | none
```

</details>

<details>
<summary>11. Empty or unrecognized stored methods fall back to the
default</summary>

`NULL` and `''` are indistinguishable once read into `sql.NullString`. A
third case was added because the function gates on validity rather than
emptiness.

```bash
for v in "null" "''" "'private_key_jwt'"; do
  psql "$PGURL" -At -c "update oauth2_provider_apps set token_endpoint_auth_method = $v where id = '$CONF_ID';"
  stored "$CONF_ID"
  curl -s "$BASE_URL/oauth2/clients/$CONF_ID" -H "Authorization: Bearer $CONF_RAT" \
    | jq -c '.token_endpoint_auth_method'
done
```

```text
confidential | <NULL>
"client_secret_basic"
confidential |
"client_secret_basic"
confidential | private_key_jwt
"client_secret_basic"
```

`private_key_jwt` is a real RFC 7591 method that Coder does not
implement. Reporting it back would advertise an authentication scheme
the token endpoint cannot honor, which is the same class of problem as
the legacy `none` report in scenario 7.

</details>

<details>
<summary>12. Type-changing updates are rejected both ways</summary>

```bash
show -X PUT "$BASE_URL/oauth2/clients/$CONF_ID" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $CONF_RAT" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"client_name":"manual-28097-confidential","redirect_uris":["http://localhost:9876/callback"],"token_endpoint_auth_method":"none"}'
stored "$CONF_ID"

show -X PUT "$BASE_URL/oauth2/clients/$PUB_ID" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $PUB_RAT" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"client_name":"manual-28097-public","redirect_uris":["http://localhost:9876/callback"],"token_endpoint_auth_method":"client_secret_basic"}'
stored "$PUB_ID"

show -X PUT "$BASE_URL/oauth2/clients/$CONF_ID" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $CONF_RAT" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"client_name":"manual-28097-confidential","redirect_uris":["http://localhost:9876/callback"],"token_endpoint_auth_method":"client_secret_post"}'
stored "$CONF_ID"
```

```text
HTTP 400
{
  "error": "invalid_client_metadata",
  "error_description": "token_endpoint_auth_method cannot move an existing client between public and confidential (stored \"client_secret_basic\", requested \"none\"); the client type is fixed at registration, so register a new client instead"
}
confidential | client_secret_basic

HTTP 400
{
  "error": "invalid_client_metadata",
  "error_description": "token_endpoint_auth_method cannot move an existing client between public and confidential (stored \"none\", requested \"client_secret_basic\"); the client type is fixed at registration, so register a new client instead"
}
public | none

HTTP 200
  "token_endpoint_auth_method": "client_secret_post",
confidential | client_secret_post
```

Both rejections leave the row and its secrets untouched. A partial
application would be the dangerous outcome here, a client left
confidential while its caller believes it went public.

The third case is the control. Two `400`s alone would be equally
consistent with a guard that rejects every `token_endpoint_auth_method`
change, a considerably more disruptive rule than the documented one. The
`200` pins the guard to the derived client type rather than the method
string.

The second case is also what backs scenario 1. If public to confidential
were permitted, the workaround to a refused secret request would be to
flip the type and ask again. The two guards close that loop, which is
why the same remedy appears in both error messages.

</details>

<details>
<summary>13. Regression sweep of the merged stack</summary>

Nothing here is new in this PR, but the guards sit on top of it.

```text
discovery token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported : ["client_secret_basic","client_secret_post","none"]
public registration, client_secret key present  : false
confidential registration, secret issued        : true, method defaulted to client_secret_basic
PKCE-only exchange, no client_secret sent       : access + refresh issued
access token against /api/v2/users/me           : 200
token row app_id / app_secret_id                : populated / NULL
RFC 7009 revoke of own refresh token            : 200, access token then 401
authorized-apps listing while a token is live   : [{"name":"manual-28097-public"}]
bulk DELETE /oauth2/tokens                      : 204, listing then []
```

The NULL `app_secret_id` is what makes the secrets guard necessary. That
column is `ON DELETE CASCADE`, so deleting a confidential app's secret
takes its tokens with it, while a public client's tokens would survive.
An admin who deleted such a secret would believe access was cut off when
it was not.

PKCE failure modes were checked separately, since the token endpoint
distinguishes two the previous runbook treated as one:

```text
verifier omitted                     : invalid_request, RFC 7636 section 4.1 bounds
well-formed 43 chars but wrong       : invalid_grant, "The PKCE code verifier is invalid"
correct verifier, replaying that code: invalid_grant, "invalid or expired"
```

The third confirms the failed check destroys the code, so a leaked code
cannot absorb repeated verifier guesses.

</details>

<details>
<summary>14. The new docs paragraphs match observed behavior</summary>

`pnpm run lint-docs` reports 0 errors across 501 files, `pnpm run
format-docs` rewrites nothing, and Vale reports 0 errors with 2
warnings, both on pre-existing gerund headings that the same file on
`main` also produces. The new prose is one sentence per line.

| Documented claim | Verified by |
|---|---|
| A client's type is fixed when it registers | 12 |
| A type-changing update is rejected with `invalid_client_metadata` |
12, both directions |
| The client either holds a secret that would stop being required or has
none and no way to be issued one | 12 (2 secrets), 1 and 12 (0 secrets,
issuance refused) |
| Switching between `client_secret_basic` and `client_secret_post` is
allowed | 12 |
| To change type, register a new client | matches the remedy in both
errors and in scenario 1's detail |
| Legacy `none` clients are stored as confidential and still require
their `client_secret` | 6, 7 |
| Coder reports `client_secret_basic` for those clients | 6 |
| So that what it reports matches what it enforces | 7, both directions
|
| The mismatch clears itself the next time the client updates its
registration | 9 |

One wording note. Scenario 8 shows the mismatch does not clear on an
update that resends the stored value, so strictly it clears on the next
update carrying the reported value. A read-modify-write client, which is
what RFC 7592 section 2.2 prescribes, always carries the reported value,
so the sentence holds for the client it describes. A client that
hardcodes its own metadata would not self-heal, but it would also not be
following RFC 7592.

</details>

<details>
<summary>Cleanup</summary>

```bash
for id in "$PUB_ID" "$CONF_ID" "$POST_ID" "$LEGACY_ID" "$REVERSE_ID" "$ADMIN_ID"; do
  curl -s -X DELETE "$BASE_URL/api/v2/oauth2-provider/apps/$id" -H "$AUTH_HEADER" \
    -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n"
done
curl -s -X PUT "$BASE_URL/api/v2/oauth2-provider/settings" -H "$AUTH_HEADER" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{"dynamic_client_registration_enabled": false}'
show -X POST "$BASE_URL/oauth2/register" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"client_name":"should-fail","redirect_uris":["http://localhost:9876/callback"],"token_endpoint_auth_method":"none"}'
```

```text
204 (x6)
{"dynamic_client_registration_enabled":false}
HTTP 403
{"error":"invalid_request","error_description":"Dynamic client registration is disabled on this deployment"}
```

All six test apps deleted with no orphaned secret or token rows. Both
seeded rows had already healed to a consistent state before deletion.
DCR is back off, confirmed by a registration attempt rather than by
reading the flag back.

</details>
2026-09-01 08:58:01 -07:00
Bobby Ho 9be61a0c65 feat: accept PKCE-only token exchange for public clients (#28047)
**TL;DR**

Last of the stack, split out of #27873, that makes Coder usable by
public OAuth2 clients (CLIs, IDE plugins, MCP clients), which cannot
hold a secret and authenticate with PKCE alone.

| PR | What it does |
|---|---|
| #27712 | Schema: `app_secret_id` becomes nullable and tokens gain an
always-populated `app_id`, so ownership checks work without a secret
row. |
| #28041 | Accepts bare custom-scheme redirect URIs (`vscode://`,
`cursor://`) that native apps actually register. |
| #28043 | Derives and stores `client_type` (public vs confidential)
from the requested `token_endpoint_auth_method`, and pins it across
updates. |
| #28046 | Registration issues no secret for a public client and returns
no `client_secret`. |
| **#28047 (this)** | The token endpoint accepts the exchange without a
`client_secret`, so a public client can finally get a token. Discovery
now advertises `none`. |

Each of the earlier PRs is inert on its own: until this one, a
registered public client still could not complete a flow. Dynamic client
registration is off by default, so nothing here is user-visible until it
is enabled.

**Where in the flow**

- Token endpoint only — the `authorization_code` exchange. Authorize,
consent, and code issuance are untouched.
- Refresh and revocation come along for free: both already bind by
app_id, so a secretless token row works as-is.
- Discovery starts advertising `none`.

**What it satisfies**

- OAuth 2.1 §3.2.1 — only *confidential* clients must authenticate at
the token endpoint. A public client is no longer rejected for a missing
secret.
- OAuth 2.1 §4.1.3 — for a public client the server must instead ensure
the code was issued to the request's client_id. That check already
existed; here it becomes the sole binding.
- OAuth 2.1 §4.1.3 — client_id is required when the client does not
authenticate, and a code yields a token at most once: a failed PKCE
comparison consumes the code, so a leaked one cannot be brute-forced.
- OAuth 2.1 §2.1 + RFC 7591 §2 — `none` means public client with no
secret. The type is derived at registration (#28043) and read here.
- RFC 7636 §4.1 / §4.6 — a malformed verifier is `invalid_request`, a
wrong one `invalid_grant`. PKCE was already mandatory for every code
flow, so public clients inherit it.
- RFC 8414 §2 — advertised auth methods now match what the token
endpoint actually accepts.
- RFC 7009 — a cross-app revoke of a public client's token still returns
200 without revoking.

---

- The token endpoint stops requiring client_secret for a public client,
in both the presence check and secret validation. PKCE was already
mandatory for every authorization_code flow, so public clients inherit
it with no new validation code.
- The code ownership check (dbCode.AppID != app.ID) becomes the only
binding between the exchange and the app named by client_id for a public
client, where it was defense in depth for confidential ones. Retained,
now covered with a public client on both sides.
- Public client tokens carry a NULL app_secret_id rather than
referencing a secret row that does not exist. Refresh and revocation
already verify ownership via app_id, so they change only comments and
coverage.
- Discovery advertises `none` now that the token endpoint honors it.
- Valid() derives from the single canonical auth method list, so what
registration accepts and what discovery advertises cannot disagree.
- Swagger marks client_secret confidential-only.

Refs
https://linear.app/codercom/issue/ENG-3029/oauth2-support-public-client
2026-08-31 09:55:58 -07:00
57cbca585f feat: negotiate and persist authorization scope (#28178)
**TL;DR**

Middle of the stack, split out of #28045, that makes an OAuth2 app's
scope allowlist actually restrict what a client can be granted. The
authorize endpoint has always parsed `scope` and then thrown it away.

| PR | What it does |
|---|---|
| #28007 | Schema: `codes.scope` and `tokens.scope`, so a negotiated
scope has somewhere to live. Every code is still stamped unrestricted. |
| #28167 | `ScopesCover` compares an allowlist against a request by
permission coverage rather than by name, and fails closed on any shape
it does not model. Added with no production callers. |
| **#28178 (this)** | The authorize endpoint checks the request against
the scope catalog, grants it only if the app's filtered allowlist covers
it, and persists the result on the code. Both GET and POST negotiate, so
a doomed request fails before the consent page renders. |
| #28179 | The consent page states what was negotiated, and
`invalid_scope` is delivered to the client's own callback per RFC 6749
§4.1.2.1 instead of a Coder error page. |

- Each earlier PR is inert alone: the columns carry a placeholder, the
coverage rules have no caller.
- Visible on upgrade, unlike the rest of the stack. A scope name outside
the catalog, OIDC vocabulary included, now gets `invalid_scope`, on
admin-created apps as well as DCR ones.
- Tokens are unaffected. This changes which authorization requests
succeed, not what a token can do.

**Where in the flow**

- Authorize endpoint only, both legs: GET before the consent page
renders, POST before the code is minted. The token exchange, refresh,
and revocation are untouched.
- The result is persisted on the authorization code. The exchange copies
it onto the token row, but the API key it mints still carries no scope,
so nothing is enforced at request time yet.
- Registration and discovery are unchanged. The catalog checked against
is the `scopes_supported` both discovery documents already advertise.

**What it satisfies**

- OAuth 2.1 §1.4.1 — the server "MAY fully or partially ignore the scope
requested by the client, based on the authorization server policy". The
app's allowlist is that policy; until now the server ignored scope in
every direction.
- OAuth 2.1 §1.4.1 — on an omitted scope it "MUST either process the
request using a pre-defined default value or fail the request". The
filtered allowlist is that default; an allowlist filtering to nothing
takes the second branch. Same rule as RFC 6749 §3.3.
- OAuth 2.1 §1.4.1 — scope values "are defined by the authorization
server", and OIDC is named there as an extension that defines its own.
Hence `invalid_scope` for openid/profile/email rather than silent
acceptance.
- OAuth 2.1 §4.1.2.1 — `invalid_scope` is "invalid, unknown, or
malformed", which now covers an uncatalogued name and an over-broad one
alike. Delivery is interim here (static page on GET, error body on
POST); §4.1.2.1 wants it redirected to the client's callback, which is
#28179.
- OAuth 2.1 §4.1.1 — `scope` stays OPTIONAL. Omitting it selects a
default, never an error.
- RFC 7591 §2 — a registered `scope` is the list "the client can use
when requesting access tokens", a ceiling rather than a menu. Enforced
here for the first time; a client that registered an unsupportable one
repairs it via RFC 7592.
- RFC 8414 §2 — `scopes_supported` is that catalog, advertised since
before this stack, so a conformant client had no grounds to send a name
outside it.
- Not yet: §1.4.1 also requires `scope` in the token response when the
grant differs from the request. Tokens are untouched here, so that lands
with enforcement.

---

Split out of #28045
([PLAT-479](https://linear.app/codercom/issue/PLAT-479)). #28167 has
merged, so this diff is against main and reviews on its own.

The authorize endpoint parsed scope and threw it away, so an app's
allowlist never restricted anything and a client asking for too much was
never told no. Phase 1 added the columns that carry a negotiated scope
from a code to the token, but nothing wrote one.

**What changes**

- Requested names must be in the external scope catalog. The app's
stored allowlist is filtered through that same catalog, which only ever
narrows.
- The allowlist bounds authority, not spelling. A request is granted
when every permission it grants is also granted by the allowlist, named
or not, so an app allowed coder:workspaces.access can approve a client
asking only for workspace:ssh.
- Omitting scope grants the filtered allowlist (RFC 6749 §3.3).
- Both handlers negotiate, so a request that cannot succeed fails before
the consent page renders rather than after the user clicks Allow.
- Two paths produce an empty result and stay distinct. No allowlist and
no request keeps the previous unrestricted grant, written as an explicit
sentinel because the column is NOT NULL with a non-empty CHECK. An
allowlist filtering to nothing is rejected, since falling back would
grant more than it ever permitted.

**Accepted compatibility break, and it is wider than DCR.** The catalog
check runs before the allowlist is consulted, so it covers admin-created
apps too.

- Admin-created apps store no allowlist and had scope discarded
outright. A client sending OIDC vocabulary (openid, profile, email) now
gets invalid_scope on upgrade.
- DCR apps registered with openid, read or admin also hold allowlists
this server cannot grant from, and fail in both directions.
- scopes_supported has always been advertised on both discovery
documents, predating this stack, so a conformant client had no grounds
to send an uncatalogued name. RFC 6749 §4.1.2.1 makes invalid_scope the
answer for one that does.
- Grandfathering would seed the enforcement path with values it cannot
evaluate: a visible error now, a silent hole later.
- The rejection names the registered scopes and the remedy. Pinned in
TestOAuth2AuthorizeDCRScopeCompatibility.

**Interim error delivery, replaced in PR 3.** Rejections go out however
each handler already reports errors: a static error page on GET, an
OAuth2 error body on POST. #28179 delivers them to the client's own
callback (RFC 6749 §4.1.2.1) and rewrites the requireInvalidScope
helper. About 25 lines here are interim on purpose and flagged as such
in that helper.

**Not changed.** Issued tokens are still unrestricted. The exchange
copies the negotiated scope onto the token record, but the API key it
mints carries no scope. This changes which authorization requests
succeed, not what a token can do.

Stack: #28167 (merged), this PR, then #28179 for the consent page and
the invalid_scope redirect.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Steven Masley <Emyrk@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-08-31 09:29:27 -07:00
Stefan Naglee 589e313e83 fix: emit provisioner tags query param as string in swagger (#28311)
## Summary

The `tags` query parameter on the "Get provisioner daemons" and "Get
provisioner jobs" endpoints was annotated as `@Param tags query object`,
which caused Swagger to emit `"type": "object"` for a query parameter.
Query parameters cannot be of type `object` in the OpenAPI 2.0 spec, so
this produced an invalid schema that breaks spec validators and client
generators.

As noted in the doc, the value is actually a single JSON-encoded string
(parsed via `QueryParamParser.JSONStringMap`), so the correct type is
`string`. This is a doc only concern as generators do not use this file.

## Changes

- Change the `tags` query param annotation from `object` to `string` in:
- `coderd/provisionerdaemons.go` (`GET
/api/v2/organizations/{organization}/provisionerdaemons`)
- `coderd/provisionerjobs.go` (`GET
/api/v2/organizations/{organization}/provisionerjobs`)
- Regenerate API docs (`make coderd/apidoc/.gen`):
`coderd/apidoc/swagger.json`, `coderd/apidoc/docs.go`, and the reference
markdown.

The description still documents the expected JSON form
(`{'tag1':'value1','tag2':'value2'}`), so no behavior changes for
callers.

> [!NOTE]
> This PR was generated by Coder Agents on behalf of @snagles.
2026-08-31 11:36:43 -04:00
Stefan Naglee 1fa6ebe5c3 fix: support first-user-trial in non-interactive login (#28321)
## Summary

`coder login --first-user-trial=true` was unusable in non-interactive
environments: the trial info fields could only be collected via
interactive prompts, so scripted setup failed with a bare `EOF`.

This adds flags and env vars for every trial info field, extracts the
functions into a helper, turns the EOF into an actionable error, and
fixes a related quirk where enabling the trial via env didn't reliably
suppress the trial prompt.

Fixes coder/coder#23264

## Changes

* Add a flag + env var for each trial field (matching the existing
`first-user-*` convention):
`--first-user-trial-{first-name,last-name,phone-number,job-title,company-name,country,developers}`
and their `CODER_FIRST_USER_TRIAL_*` env vars.
* When a trial field is missing with no input available, return an error
naming the exact flag/env instead of a raw EOF.
* Read `CODER_FIRST_USER_TRIAL` from `inv.Environ` instead of
`os.Getenv` so the flag binding and the "Start a trial?" prompt gate
agree (previously the env toggle could hit an EOF prompt that silently
reset `trial` to `false`).
* Regenerate `coder_login_--help.golden` and
`docs/reference/cli/login.md`.

## Testing

* Non-interactive login via flags and via env vars (env test asserts the
trial is actually provisioned via a recording `TrialGenerator`).
* Missing trial info returns the clear flag-naming error instead of
hanging.
* Existing interactive `TestLogin` subtests pass; `golangci-lint` clean.

## Notes

No strict CLI validation of `country`/`developers` against the UI option
lists: the server doesn't enforce them, and the existing fixture uses
`developers=10-50` which isn't in the CLI bucket list. Can add if
preferred.

---

*Created by Coder Agents on behalf of* @snagles\*.\*
2026-08-31 11:35:59 -04:00
Jeremy Ruppel c73f34c35d feat: honor the deployment registry mirror in template builder bases (#28727)
## Summary

Threads the deployment's configured module registry
(`CODER_TEMPLATE_BUILDER_REGISTRY_URL`) into template-builder **base**
rendering, so a base that embeds a catalog module (e.g. the quickstart
base's `git-clone`) resolves its `source` through a registry mirror the
same way wizard-composed modules already do. Previously base-embedded
module sources hardcoded `registry.coder.com`, so on a
mirror/private-registry deployment a base-embedded module reached the
public registry while wizard modules used the mirror.

Implements [DOCS-610](https://linear.app/codercom/issue/DOCS-610).

## What changed

* `BaseRenderContext.RegistryBase` (new field), mirroring
`ModuleRenderContext.RegistryBase`. `Compose` threads the deployment
registry through `renderBase` into the base render context, and the four
hardcoded base module sources (`quickstart` git-clone,
`azure-linux`/`gcp-linux`/`gcp-windows` region modules) now use `{{
.RegistryBase }}`. Because the value defaults back to
`registry.coder.com`, rendered sources stay byte-identical; the only
golden change is the removal of the now-stale quickstart "follow-up"
note.
* **Boot-time validation.**
`codersdk.ValidateTemplateBuilderRegistryURL` runs in
`DeploymentValues.Validate()`, gated on the builder being enabled,
matching the chat-hook precedent. A malformed value fails at server
start naming the option, instead of surfacing as a per-request error to
a template author who cannot fix it. It uses `net/url` in authority form
to reject a scheme, path, query, fragment, trailing slash, or
credentials and accept a bare `host[:port]`; it does not canonicalize
the host.
* `Compose` **trusts the validated value**, defaulting an unset one and
defensively rejecting a malformed one for direct callers that bypass
boot.

## Tests

* `codersdk`: validator accept/reject matrix (incl.
credentials-without-echo) and a `DeploymentValues.Validate` boundary
test with a disabled-skips-validation case.
* `templatebuilder`: a base honors the mirror and falls back to the
default when unset, plus a defensive-reject case; existing compose tests
updated to bare-host registry values.

<details><summary>Design decision log</summary>

This PR is a deliberately minimal reimplementation of the
[DOCS-610](https://linear.app/codercom/issue/DOCS-610/template-builder-base-embedded-modules-should-honor-the-deployment)
scope, started fresh from `main` rather than carrying forward an
earlier, larger draft (coder/coder#28480). Key decisions:

* **Scope kept to the ticket.** The ticket's fix is three bullets: add a
registry field to `BaseRenderContext`, thread the deployment
`RegistryURL` through `Compose` -> `renderBase`, and use it in base
module sources. Independent hardening explored in the earlier draft was
dropped as out of scope: `terraform-svchost`-based IDN/punycode/port
canonicalization, a rendered-HCL backstop with a 500 mapping, and HCL
module-source extraction helpers. Telemetry misclassification of mirror
modules is tracked separately
([DOCS-712](https://linear.app/codercom/issue/DOCS-712/telemetry-misclassifies-registry-mirror-modules-as-non-coder))
and is not addressed here.
* **Default lives in the render layer.**
`templatebuilder.DefaultRegistryBase` holds the fallback host;
`codersdk` keeps its own option-default literal. An earlier version
exported the constant from `codersdk`, which only emitted a dead
`typesGenerated.ts` entry that nothing in the frontend consumed, so it
was moved out. The `codersdk` validator is a function, so it generates
no TS type.
* **Validate at the config boundary, fail fast.** The repo convention is
to hard-fail structurally invalid config in
`DeploymentValues.Validate()` (access URL, OAuth lifetimes, chat hook
URL) and to warn only for functional-but-risky settings. A malformed
registry host is structurally invalid, so it fails at boot. This also
puts the error in front of the admin who set it, rather than a template
author hitting a per-request error they cannot fix.
* `net/url`**, not a regex.** The codebase validates identifiers/names
with regexes but host/URL-shaped config with `url.Parse` (chat hook URL,
OAuth redirect URIs, AI provider base URL). This value is host-shaped,
so it follows that convention. `url.Parse("//" + v)` with `u.Host == v`
rejects a scheme/path/query/fragment/trailing-slash in one check.

</details>

> This PR was created with AI assistance (Coder Agents).
2026-08-31 09:32:24 -04:00
Michael Suchacz 8e49655e13 docs: remove early access label from chats API reference (#28760)
The Coder Agents chats API was promoted from `/api/experimental` to
`/api/v2` (CODAGT-921), but the docs still labeled the Chats API
reference as early access. This removes the early access state from the
Chats entry in `docs/manifest.json` and regenerates
`docs/reference/api/chats.md` so its front matter drops the label.

The generated reference already documents the promoted endpoints under
`/api/v2`. Intentionally unchanged: the computer-use desktop stream
endpoint stays documented under `/api/experimental` with its
experimental note, and the Advisor and Virtual desktop pages keep their
early access state, since those features remain experimental.

Validated with `make coderd/apidoc/.gen` (no drift), `pnpm check-docs`,
and `make lint/docs-html`. Remote dogfood UAT ran against the pushed
head and passed.

> 🤖 Xum created this PR on behalf of @ibetitsmike.
2026-08-30 21:01:08 +02:00
Michael Suchacz d6b67e8e31 feat: enforce SSRF protection for MCP config-directed traffic (#28242)
Routes all MCP config-directed traffic from coderd and chatd through a
shared SSRF-protected HTTP client, now that organization admins, not
only deployment admins, control MCP server URLs (#27942 and its stack
below).

## Summary

- Uses the [`coder/safedial`](https://github.com/coder/safedial)
library: it blocks private and special-purpose destinations at dial time
(validating resolved addresses at connection time so DNS rebinding
cannot bypass the check) and rejects cross-origin redirects.
- Covers the complete traffic surface: OAuth2 discovery, dynamic client
registration, code exchange, token refresh, revocation, and runtime MCP
connections from chatd.
- Deployments that intentionally host internal MCP servers opt in via
the new `--mcp-allowed-private-cidrs`
(`CODER_MCP_ALLOWED_PRIVATE_CIDRS`) option.
- Includes the deployment configuration surface, generated docs, CLI
goldens, TypeScript types, and regression coverage for each traffic
path.

## Merge window

This protection originally lived inside #27942 and was split out to keep
that diff reviewable. Until this PR lands, the stack below ships with
only main's existing discovery IP-range guard
(`CODER_MCP_OAUTH2_DISCOVERY_ALLOWED_IP_RANGES`), while org admins can
already point MCP configs at arbitrary URLs. This PR should merge
promptly after the stack below it.

Top of the MCP org-separation stack (CODAGT-711 -> CODAGT-717 audit ->
CODAGT-712 ACLs -> CODAGT-806 token RBAC -> CODAGT-714 org picker ->
this PR).

> Mux (AI agent) authored this PR on Mike's behalf.

<!-- mux-attribution: model=claude-fable-5 thinking=high -->
2026-08-30 13:09:17 +02:00
Nick Vigilante bc77c40296 docs: add front-matter titles to mechanical and no-H1 pages (Phase 3) (#28030)
## Summary

**Batch A of Phase 3** of the H1 → front-matter migration (`DOCS-484`;
parent `DOCS-477`). Adds a front-matter `title` to every navigable docs
page whose title can be migrated **mechanically**, with no editorial
judgment.

This is the content step that Phase 1 (renderers prefer front-matter
title, `DOCS-482`) and Phase 2 (tooling + generators front-matter-aware,
`DOCS-483`) unblocked. Both are merged; coder.com #964/#974 are merged
and live.

**Rendered no-op.** The renderers already resolve the page title from
the manifest and hide the leading body H1 (Phase 1), so no page changes
visually. This just moves the title into front matter where Fumadocs and
the migrated tooling can read it.

## What's in this batch

Dry-run on `main` (464 navigable pages) splits into:

| category | count | this PR |
|----------|-------|---------|
| already has front-matter title (Reference, from Phase 2 generators) |
196 | skipped (idempotent) |
| **mechanical** — leading body H1 equals the manifest label | 138 | ✅
add front-matter `title`, drop the duplicate H1 |
| **no body H1** — renders under the manifest label only | 4 | ✅ add
front-matter `title` only |
| **mismatch** — body H1 differs from the manifest label | 126 | ⏭️
deferred (needs an editorial decision, see below) |

142 files changed, all under `docs/`.

## Deliberately out of scope: the 126 mismatches

Pages where the body H1 is richer than the short sidebar label (e.g.
label **Modules** / H1 *Contributing modules*, label **Install** / H1
*Installing Coder*) need a canonical-title decision, not a script. A few
even look like the body H1 is the redundant one (`install/cli.md` and
`install/index.md` both carry the H1 *Installing Coder*). These will
land in follow-up batches **by nav section** once the policy is set, so
each gets real review.

## Verification

AI was the primary author of this PR (see disclosure below); per the [AI
Contribution
Guidelines](https://coder.com/docs/about/contributing/AI_CONTRIBUTING)
here is the manual verification.

- Every added front-matter block parses as YAML and its `title`
round-trips to the manifest label (checked programmatically across all
142 files).
- Every removed line is a leading `# H1` that equalled the manifest
title; no body prose was reflowed. Front matter is correctly hoisted
above pre-existing `<!-- markdownlint-disable -->` comments on the two
pages that had them.
- `pnpm check-docs` (markdownlint-cli2 + table formatter) passes on the
changed set: `Summary: 0 error(s)`. `MD041` stays off (re-enabled in
Phase 4); `MD025` is not tripped because the duplicate body H1s are
removed.

```
$ pnpm exec markdownlint-cli2 $(git diff --name-only origin/main)
Linting: 142 file(s)
Summary: 0 error(s)
```

Linear: DOCS-484

> This PR was created with AI assistance (Coder Agents).
2026-08-27 12:34:13 -04:00
Hank Hwang c9dedc65e6 fix: model nullable UUID fields as uuid strings in Swagger (#28684)
## TLDR
Updated `.swaggo` file to include new rule to replace all
`uuid.NullUUID` with a `type: string` and `format: uuid` in
`swagger.json`. One such property example is `context_file_agent_id`

## What

Nullable UUID fields (`uuid.NullUUID`) were rendered in the
Swagger/OpenAPI spec as nested objects (with `UUID` and `Valid`
sub-fields) instead of as a plain UUID string. This adds a swaggo
`replace` directive so `uuid.NullUUID` is modeled as a `string` with
uuid format, matching how these fields serialize over the wire and how
other UUID fields are already documented.

## Changes

- `.swaggo`: add `replace github.com/google/uuid.NullUUID string` (with
an explanatory comment), alongside the existing `NullTime` replacement.
- `coderd/apidoc/docs.go` and `coderd/apidoc/swagger.json`: regenerated
output reflecting the new modeling.

## Testing

- Generated docs via the standard `make gen` flow; `docs.go` and
`swagger.json` are the regenerated artifacts.

---

> This PR was created by Coder Agents on behalf of @hwang251.
2026-08-27 09:13:33 -07:00
Rowan SmithandClaude Opus 5 4830010c8e chore: update tailscale fork version used by coder to remove hairpin probes (#28682)
Updates the version of tailscale used by Coder to pull in
coder/tailscale/pull/132 in order to remove hairpin probes, a feature
long ago removed from upstream tailscale. Requested by a customer.

https://linear.app/codercom/issue/PLAT-537

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-27 14:40:37 +02:00
Ethan 0f5c7b3154 refactor!: remove default organization model routes (#28632)
> [!IMPORTANT]
> Most of the added lines in this PR are generated API reference content
for publishing the organization-scoped `GET` and `POST
/api/v2/organizations/{organization}/chats/models` replacements. There
is no matching generated-doc deletion because the three removed
default-organization endpoints are experimental and are not present in
the generated public API reference on the current base. The removed
paths remain only as explicit 404 reservations, with no
default-organization shim or functional handler.

## Summary

Remove the unused default-organization chat model collection routes:

```text
GET  /api/experimental/chats/models
GET  /api/experimental/chats/model-configs
POST /api/experimental/chats/model-configs
```

Use the organization-scoped collection instead:

```text
GET  /api/v2/organizations/{organization}/chats/models
POST /api/v2/organizations/{organization}/chats/models
```

## Context

The intention of PR #28440 was to consolidate model availability into
the organization-scoped models collection for CODAGT-898 and remove the
superseded collection routes. That PR removed
`/organizations/{organization}/chats/models/available`, but it missed
these older default-organization routes and explicitly retained one of
them. This PR completes the intended #28440 cutover. The repository has
no SDK, CLI, or frontend consumer for the removed routes.

This change also prevents PR #28496 from promoting the missed
default-organization `/chats/models` route into the stable `/api/v2`
API.

This change is separate from the one-release `/api/experimental`
compatibility window in CODAGT-921. That window preserves experimental
versions of the intended stable API. It does not require compatibility
routes for unused deployment-scoped endpoints.

Refs CODAGT-898.

## Breaking change

Clients that call the removed routes must use the organization-scoped
model collection and provide an organization.

## Changelog

Remove unused default-organization Coder Agents model API routes. API
clients must use the organization-scoped chat models collection.

> [!NOTE]
> Coder Agents generated this pull request on Ethan Dickson's behalf.
2026-08-27 10:49:14 +01:00